Quantification of Strategic Objectives

[tony_gunter]

Has anyone ever attempted to put together a ranked list of strategic targets in the war? There's a lot of talk of which strategy worked / failed but it seems like having a valuated list of targets would allow for a better framework for this type of discussion.

I'm thinking: human capital (free and not), foodstuffs, leather, clothing, horses, raw materials, industrial production, transportation, import / export capability (am I missing any?)

 

[Rhea Cole]

Two things about Augusta are possible. Sherman may not have wanted to go there as a battle and destruction of the mill would lead to a large loss of life on both sides, including workers there, who may not have been free to flee. Also, Sherman might have chosen to stay out of that area, if that was Alexander Stephens area. Stephens had a long career as a Whig, before becoming a Democrat and a secessionist.

Actually, a faint toward August fixed Confederate forces that were gathered to defend the Arsenal in place. That secured Sherman's flank without fighting a battle. He passed onto Savannah unmolested as a result. The rail connection between Augusta was cut, effectively negating its strategic value without a direct assault.

 

[Pat Answer]

"Strategy is a system of expedients."
Love it!

I understood the Confederate need to retain Virginia more in the sense that with Virginia remaining in the Union, and those resources being added to the already overwhelming balance, the war cannot possibly last longer than a year or so. Either way, though, certainly what happens between the Mississippi and the Appalachians decides things.

 

[Rhea Cole]

"Strategy is a system of expedients."
Love it!

I understood the Confederate need to retain Virginia more in the sense that with Virginia remaining in the Union, and those resources being added to the already overwhelming balance, the war cannot possibly last longer than a year or so. Either way, though, certainly what happens between the Mississippi and the Appalachians decides things.

It cost 240,000 casualties to defend a few counties in Virginia. 493,026 is the total of CSA casualties… you to the math.

 

[Pat Answer]

It cost 240,000 casualties to defend a few counties in Virginia. 493,026 is the total of CSA casualties… you to the math.

My math says almost 49% (! That is something to consider.) And yet… defending those few VA counties absorbed much Federal effort that I imagine would go swarming over the Carolinas and Georgia while Kentucky and Tennessee were being overrun.

Kind of a hanged either way…

 

[wausaubob]

"Strategy is a system of expedients."
Love it!

I understood the Confederate need to retain Virginia more in the sense that with Virginia remaining in the Union, and those resources being added to the already overwhelming balance, the war cannot possibly last longer than a year or so. Either way, though, certainly what happens between the Mississippi and the Appalachians decides things.

Mainly because there was a large territory that permitted slavery, but was not committed to cotton production. Without those areas in Kentucky and Tennessee the Confederacy could not hope to match the US in horses, mules and pork.

 

[wausaubob]

To quantify these objectives one would have to have a report on cargoes captured from inbound blockade runners. One would also want covert dock workers at the departure ports of the blockaders counting the crates being loaded of various commodities.
Its a worthwhile question. In September 1863 the US occupied Battery Wagner, which effectively closed Charleston because the blockaders were able to stay in areas within the bar of the harbor. Then the US captured Cleveland, but the administration lost focus, because of the French subversion of Mexican independence.
The history is that everything the Lincoln administration did was right, but its not true. Banks hurt the US in 1864 and allowing Butler to command in person in December 1864 delayed the end of the war and cost lives.

 

[Saphroneth]

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On an 8 1/2 X 11" map of the Western Theater of the Civil War, the entire operations of the Armies of Northern Virginia & of the Potomac is literally the size of a postage stamp.

I've seen you say this before.



I'm willing to accept the southernmost limit being New Orleans and the northernmost limit being somewhere along the northern frontier of Kentucky, with the westernmost limit being a hundred miles west of the Mississippi and the easternmost limit being at Raleigh; I would say the AoNV clearly got as far north as Harrisburg, the AoP clearly got as far south as Yorktown, and Yorktown will do for an eastern boundary while obviously the AoNV and AoP fought at Appomattox Court House so that's a good working western boundary (as AoP units did not unambiguously fight in the Valley west of there and I intend to be scrupulous).



This puts the Western Theater as eight hundred miles across east-west and six hundred miles across north-south, so it's about 1.4 inches to the 100 miles.

Now, Harrisburg to Yorktown north-south is 200 miles, and Yorktown to Appomattox east-west is about 140 miles. Which means that the "postage stamp" in this case would have to be 2.8 by 2 inches.

Since a typical US postage stamp is less than 1 inch by 1 inch, then this postage stamp that the "entire operations" would have to be "literally the size of" doesn't exist in the US. Even the special novelty Mars one which was 3" by 1.5" is only 4.5 square inches in area, rather than the 5.6 square inches required here by the north-south and east-west boundaries.