Primarily a land war?

[Old Soldier]

FYI: The Telegraph was powered by wet cell batteries.

View attachment 493943
This is a ten volt wet cell battery. It amounts to the one we put in smoke detectors. The sulfuric acid was in large glass jars. Special built sprung wagons carried the scary liquid.


For long distance, the batteries were wired together.

View attachment 493944
The Beardslee Repeating Telegraph / Field Telegraph never needed a battery. It was powered by a magneto. Range, depending on a host of variables, was 5 to 8 miles.

Beardslee's were deployed with miles of wire & poles. A series of Beardslee stations were critical in the A of the Cumberland's switch from the left to center on June 23, 1863.

U.S. Military Telegraph Corps was formed in 1861 with five employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, but operators of the corps were not classed as serving soldiers, hence the lack of uniforms in the photo. There was also a US Military Telegraph Construction Corps who laid and strung the wires

The reason for the short range was the resistance of the wire used - bare copper wire - and the rather low power of the batteries. These were Daniell cells which are primary batteries and were not rechargable. They would also need a supply of acid, water and copper sulphate cyrstals as well as the zinc and copper electrodes. To give some idea of range, 20 miles needed about 100v. Each 'battery' of 10 cells produced 10v = 2 miles. Connected in series, it would need 4 batteries, at least. It would be relayed through fixed stations with more batteries to produce the necessary voltage.

The Telegraph Corps were the equivalent of a modern Signal Corps - communications to and from higher level formations and commanders. The Signal Corps at the time of the Civil War operated the tactical communications and occasionally the operational comms in the field - the modern Signal Regiment.

The Beardslees were the equivalent of field telephones. They still needed a hard wire connection, but used insulated wire. The principal advantages of the Beardslees were that it could be operate without batteries and by men without knowledge of Morse code. Their power came from magnetos - mechanical electrical source - hand cranked. Disadvantages were short range, higher error rate and limited range.

1860-1865 SIGNAL CORPS. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ~ Part II

(Part II) Flags, Lanterns, Rockets and Wires: A number of other visual communication techniques were also tried and used during the Civil War. Lieutenant Colonel Iain Standen British Army, Royal Corps of Signals

www.civilwarsignals.org

 

[wausaubob]

U.S. Military Telegraph Corps was formed in 1861 with five employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, but operators of the corps were not classed as serving soldiers, hence the lack of uniforms in the photo. There was also a US Military Telegraph Construction Corps who laid and strung the wires

The reason for the short range was the resistance of the wire used - bare copper wire - and the rather low power of the batteries. These were Daniell cells which are primary batteries and were not rechargable. They would also need a supply of acid, water and copper sulphate cyrstals as well as the zinc and copper electrodes. To give some idea of range, 20 miles needed about 100v. Each 'battery' of 10 cells produced 10v = 2 miles. Connected in series, it would need 4 batteries, at least. It would be relayed through fixed stations with more batteries to produce the necessary voltage.

The Telegraph Corps were the equivalent of a modern Signal Corps - communications to and from higher level formations and commanders. The Signal Corps at the time of the Civil War operated the tactical communications and occasionally the operational comms in the field - the modern Signal Regiment.

View attachment 493978

The Beardslees were the equivalent of field telephones. They still needed a hard wire connection, but used insulated wire. The principal advantages of the Beardslees were that it could be operate without batteries and by men without knowledge of Morse code. Their power came from magnetos - mechanical electrical source - hand cranked. Disadvantages were short range, higher error rate and limited range.

1860-1865 SIGNAL CORPS. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ~ Part II

(Part II) Flags, Lanterns, Rockets and Wires: A number of other visual communication techniques were also tried and used during the Civil War. Lieutenant Colonel Iain Standen British Army, Royal Corps of Signals

www.civilwarsignals.org

I guess it would all be behind the battle lines, and its not visible to enemy spies. Because its mobile, it would be hard to tap into.
The telegraph men became adept at taking down and preserving the wire. Burnside seems to have come up with a way to repurpose extra telegraph wire at Knoxville.

 

[wausaubob]

Cool posts. Off topic, but interesting.

 

[wausaubob]

The Confederate armies were winning enough battles through early 1863 to convince the voters it was going to be a long and bloody war. The land battles might have been enough to convince the voters to elect a President willing to negotiate. But while that was happening the US took the biggest city and best port in the Confederacy, captured the Mississippi nearly to Vicksburg, captured several enclaves along the Confederate coast, slowly improved a blockade that even the British considered legitimate, while still maintaining the important sea routes to and from Panama. The incentive for US voters to quit the war was mitigated by the fact that the US had control of the west, and that normal commercial activity had resumed by 1863.

 

[wausaubob]

What's missing is a close look at US logistics. The most important depots were at New York City, Washington,. Louisville and St. Louis. Each was an ocean port or a river city serviced by steamboats. Washington, D.C. like New Orleans, was both. The most important forward depots were at Nashville and City Point. Both locations were located next to navigable water. Without knowing the exact arithmetic, it seems to me that more freight moved more miles by water than by rail.
Many of the major rivers did not have railroad bridges in the 1860s. The railroad system was dependent on ferry boats, including the clever English technology of railroad car ferries. The rail system depended on naval supremacy on the internal rivers.

 

[Rhea Cole]

I guess it would all be behind the battle lines, and its not visible to enemy spies. Because its mobile, it would be hard to tap into.
The telegraph men became adept at taking down and preserving the wire. Burnside seems to have come up with a way to repurpose extra telegraph wire at Knoxville.

The reason that the Military Telegraph staff were not in uniform is that they were not soldiers. For reasons way to convoluted for this venue, the USMTS was not in the chain of command,

For example, the military had no access to the cipher system. All telegraphic coms encoded & decoded exclusively by civilian operators. Emblematic is a photo of USMTS members crouching in a dugout directly behind the Petersburg front line.

Interestingly, when Grant took command, he butted heads with the USMTS. He had no tolerance for not having control of his own messaging.

If you look into this, it will become obvious why the USMTS leadership held out against Grant's demand… until it became obvious that he would not shy away from naked brute force to get his way.

No need to speculate. If you want to see how the telegraphic cipher worked, the Ekert Collection has the cipher logs of the Washington station.

 

[Old Soldier]

Be careful, as the Rebs had a rather neat way of re-supply by beating the blockade - and it wasn't by land.

 

[Rhea Cole]

What's missing is a close look at US logistics. The most important depots were at New York City, Washington,. Louisville and St. Louis. Each was an ocean port or a river city serviced by steamboats. Washington, D.C. like New Orleans, was both. The most important forward depots were at Nashville and City Point. Both locations were located next to navigable water. Without knowing the exact arithmetic, it seems to me that more freight moved more miles by water than by rail.
Many of the major rivers did not have railroad bridges in the 1860s. The railroad system was dependent on ferry boats, including the clever English technology of railroad car ferries. The rail system depended on naval supremacy on the internal rivers.

Agreed. Here in Middle Tennessee, the stage of the river had a profound effect on traffic. The water levels varied dramatically. During most of 1863 people waded across the Cumberland at Nashville. Farmers on the Upper Cumberland waited two years to ship cotton down river.

Before the war Nashville business men began construction of the Nashville & Northwestern RR. It was driven seventy miles to the Tennessee River by contract labor & guarded by USCT at what became Johnsonville.

I highly recommend visiting Johnsonville State Park. It epitomizes the synergy was the riverine & RR transportation system.

When Rosecrans moved toward the Tennessee River he reserved the rebuilt N&CRR exclusively for fodder. All other rations & ordinance was relegated to wagons. There we have the third leg of the stool.

RR & river transport meant nothing without equine motive power & wagons to distribute it. Absent one element [ Army of TN 1863 ] & the entire logistical systems were crippled.

 

[Old Soldier]

One look at the railroad network of 1861 says a lot about the long distance logistics of both sides. Don't forget that the Southern ports were blockaded too.

 

[wausaubob]

Agreed. Here in Middle Tennessee, the stage of the river had a profound effect on traffic. The water levels varied dramatically. During most of 1863 people waded across the Cumberland at Nashville. Farmers on the Upper Cumberland waited two years to ship cotton down river.

Before the war Nashville business men began construction of the Nashville & Northwestern RR. It was driven seventy miles to the Tennessee River at what became Johnsonville.

I highly recommend visiting Johnsonville State Park. It epitomizes the synergy was the riverine & RR transportation system.

When Rosecrans moved toward the Tennessee River he reserved the rebuilt N&CRR exclusively for fodder. All other rations & ordinance was relegated to wagons. There we have the third leg of the stool.

RR & river transport meant nothing without equine motive power & wagons to distribute it. Absent one element [ Army of TN 1863 ] & the entire logistical systems were crippled.

And the US had big cities where all the forage had to be shipped in, and winter, for which every farmer with livestock had to prepare.

 

[wausaubob]

Be careful, as the Rebs had a rather neat way of re-supply by beating the blockade - and it wasn't by land.

Very little railroad equipment made it through the blockade. @DaveBrt found one locomotive that made it. Maybe it was actually reassembled too.
I doubt many wagons or ambulances were smuggled in. And mules and horses don't appear on the freight list of any captured blockade runners.

 

[DaveBrt]

Very little railroad equipment made it through the blockade. @DaveBrt found one locomotive that made it. Maybe it was actually reassembled too.
I doubt many wagons or ambulances were smuggled in. And mules and horses don't appear on the freight list of any captured blockade runners.

No locomotives were run through the blockade.

 

[wausaubob]

No locomotives were run through the blockade.

I thought you wrote that you had found one that made it?

 

[DaveBrt]

I thought you wrote that you had found one that made it?

No, I think you are remembering English locomotives that were still in use in the CSA.

 

[Rhea Cole]

Very little railroad equipment made it through the blockade. @DaveBrt found one locomotive that made it. Maybe it was actually reassembled too.
I doubt many wagons or ambulances were smuggled in. And mules and horses don't appear on the freight list of any captured blockade runners.

The manifests of blockade runners are well documented. Bloviating about things that did not happen is a singular way of speaking to people who are knowledgeable.
Re: Blockade Runner Modern Greece.

 

[Old Soldier]

Very little railroad equipment made it through the blockade. @DaveBrt found one locomotive that made it. Maybe it was actually reassembled too.
I doubt many wagons or ambulances were smuggled in. And mules and horses don't appear on the freight list of any captured blockade runners.

I wasn't talking railroads, but sea transport. Arms and ammunition was imported as well as personal equipment in the main. The blockade-runners took out cotton. After 1863, there was little opportunity.

Happy New Year y'all

 

[leftyhunter]

Double post

 

[leftyhunter]

Be careful, as the Rebs had a rather neat way of re-supply by beating the blockade - and it wasn't by land.

Not really because Confederate vets autobiographies talk a lot about hunger in the ranks.
Leftyhunter

 

[Rhea Cole]

Not really because Confederate vets autobiographies talk a lot about hunger in the ranks.
Leftyhunter

The RR connecting the 60 mile wide A of TN in Middle TN with its base in N Alabama was completely dysfunctional. In the month leading up to the June 23, 1863 Tullahoma Campaign there was absolutely no meat ration for Bragg's soldiers.

The Atlanta / Dalton depot was exclusively supplying Lee's army in Virginia. Using his revolutionary resource map, Sherman was able to cut Lee off from the meat, corn & leather goods he depended on.

During the winter at Petersburg Lee's soldiers were not receiving enough protein to maintain muscle mass. The onset of scurvy meant that large numbers of men were night blind & suffering the debilitating effects of that scourge.

Note: Anybody who has more than a slight knowledge about the Civil War is aware of the most hated man in the CSA. For inscrutable reasons, Davis clung to the Commissary General Northcut & his cohort of incompetents until the very end. There was, in fact, plenty of food was produced in the CSA to feed the men & animals of the army. It was only rampant competence that allowed the armies to starve.

Note: Here in the West the best account of the dire state of the A of TN's logistics is in Connelly's 'Army of the Heartland' & 'Autumn of Glory' history of the A of TN.

I can't imagine that anybody wanting to comment on the Western Theater has not read Connelly. It is the seminal work. Unlike him, we don't have to drive endless un-air conditioned miles to access the cornucopia of references.

 

[leftyhunter]

Napoleon did say " An army marches on it's stomach". Of course there's another old saying from probably way back in the ancient era but Lt.General John " Blackjack " Pershing said something to the effect " Amateurs study strategy professionals study logistics or depending on the source Lt. General Omar Bradley said it. It's hard to know why Davis who himself was a Colonel during the Mexican American War and a West Point graduate did what he did in terms of firing or not firing various officers but I guess he had his reasons.
Leftyhunter