President Davis border defense strategy

[atlantis]

The Davis strategy has often come under heavy fire, but is the criticism justified. I suggest not, along the length of the confederate land border much is not suitable for crossing large forces. So, it comes down to a matter of identifying transit chokepoints and holding them. The coastline also has limited number of locations suitable for bringing in large forces.
Is this a viable response to the Anaconda plan.

 

[Stryker65]

The Confederacy definitely should have put more effort into defending their coastline instead of leaving it up to the states. Also, once the Union captured footholds, the Confederates should have put serious effort into knocking the Union off those footholds.

 

[Trooper "D"]

The Davis strategy has often come under heavy fire, but is the criticism justified. I suggest not, along the length of the confederate land border much is not suitable for crossing large forces. So, it comes down to a matter of identifying transit chokepoints and holding them. The coastline also has limited number of locations suitable for bringing in large forces.
Is this a viable response to the Anaconda plan.

The Western Theater had way too much ground to defend even using the chokehold theory.

 

[Spinifex]

The Davis strategy has often come under heavy fire, but is the criticism justified. I suggest not, along the length of the confederate land border much is not suitable for crossing large forces. So, it comes down to a matter of identifying transit chokepoints and holding them. The coastline also has limited number of locations suitable for bringing in large forces.
Is this a viable response to the Anaconda plan.

Really tough situation for Davis. Not only did he have to defend the coastline, but also had the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers to deal with. And Richmond was ridiculously close to the enemy as well. Impossible!

 

[Saruman]

The Confederate government also had to divert much needed troops from the coast and river forts to suppress the Unionist rebellion in Eastern Tennessee. Some reports suggest about 8,000 troops had to be stationed there in late 1861/early 1862.

 

[SWS]

Mobile was essential as a communications center and in insulating the farmland, black belt prairie, cane-brake, and industries of the Tombigbee and Alabama Valleys. Pensacola was a waste of 8000 good troops in the first winter of the War, as I don't believe any Federal commander proposed amphibious operations up the lower Chattahoochee, although Fort Pickens probably magnified the threat there.

 

[Trooper "D"]

Mobile was essential as a communications center and in insulating the farmland, black belt prairie, cane-brake, and industries of the Tombigbee and Alabama Valleys. Pensacola was a waste of 8000 good troops in the first winter of the War, as I don't believe any Federal commander proposed amphibious operations up the lower Chattahoochee, although Fort Pickens probably magnified the threat there.

Those at Pensacola trained. In their shirt sleeves but they trained.

 

[leftyhunter]

The Davis strategy has often come under heavy fire, but is the criticism justified. I suggest not, along the length of the confederate land border much is not suitable for crossing large forces. So, it comes down to a matter of identifying transit chokepoints and holding them. The coastline also has limited number of locations suitable for bringing in large forces.
Is this a viable response to the Anaconda plan.

Davis didn't have a strategy and realistically there was no strategy that works against a larger better equipped enemy plus it doesn't help that over forty percent of the Confederate population is hostile to the Confederacy. The only viable strategy that would of given the Confederacy a chance if foreign military intervention just like the Colonial Rebels received but unfortunately for the Confederacy no foreign military power was interested in military intervention on behalf of the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

 

[Trooper "D"]

Davis didn't have a strategy and realistically there was no strategy that works against a larger better equipped enemy plus it doesn't help that over forty percent of the Confederate population is hostile to the Confederacy. The only viable strategy that would of given the Confederacy a chance if foreign military intervention just like the Colonial Rebels received but unfortunately for the Confederacy no foreign military power was interested in military intervention on behalf of the Confederacy.
Leftyhunter

Intervention? They didn't even want it to be known what nation the blockade runners and rams came from. Kind of hard to deny the enfield rifles and grey jersey wool uniforms though.

 

[Rhea Cole]

The existential goal of Davis' strategy had to be holding ground at every point. That was because the whole purpose of the rebellion was to "Preserve the God given right to hold human beings as property."

Anywhere that Union forces entered slaveholding territory, wholesale self liberation took place. That meant that a rational strategy that involved trading territory for space & time was not possible.

From the Chesapeake to New Orleans there were only 4 harbors capable of handling blue water shipping.

Memphis is closer to Canada than it is to Bristol on the TN / NC border. Absent any internal lines of communication, any Confederate concentration could be cut off & overwhelmed.

If holding everything everywhere can be called a strategy, that is what Davis was forced to employ.

 

[leftyhunter]

Intervention? They didn't even want it to be known what nation the blockade runners and rams came from. Kind of hard to deny the enfield rifles and grey jersey wool uniforms though.

True as France,the UK and the Austrian- Empire were delighted to sell weapons to both sides which is a time honored practice that the US has engaged in as well. There's an old saying that I just made up concerning the arms trade" Thou shalt not leave money on thy table".
Leftyhunter

 

[jackt62]

The Davis strategy has often come under heavy fire, but is the criticism justified. I suggest not, along the length of the confederate land border much is not suitable for crossing large forces.

There really was no considered and consistent "Davis strategy." Defending all the land and sea borders of the Confederacy made for a bold talking point at the outset of the war and bowed to the influence of state governors and plantation masters. And while parts of that land border may in fact be unsuitable for enemy offensive operations, the path of important waterways such as the Tennessee and Cumberland worked to the advantage of the north especially given its excellence in combined army/naval operations. And that is exactly why the Davis strategy quickly fell apart with the collapse of the Kentucky-Tennessee cordon in early 1862.

 

[13 IL Cav & 64 GA Inf]

The Confederacy definitely should have put more effort into defending their coastline instead of leaving it up to the states. Also, once the Union captured footholds, the Confederates should have put serious effort into knocking the Union off those footholds.

You are correct, of course, but the Confederacy did have a terrible problem allocating their very limited resources against the multiple major threats posed by the Union army and navy.

 

[J C J Barefoot]

Davis did indeed have a "hold at every point" grand strategy but it did not apply to the entire Confederacy. Essentially, there were two strategies for what became two fronts —and eventually another strategy for a third front during and after Vicksburg. The Virginia front strategy was political and diplomatic. It was diplomatic in that if the Confederates could string together impressive victories near Washington City and regions north, England may grant recognition at best, or belligerent classification at worst to both North and South— which would have altered the international law of the sea and opened up shipping lanes and trade to the Birts. Hard to sink British ships coming through the blockade if they declare both parties to be a belligerent. To do so would be an act of war.

The Virginia(east) strategy was also political in that Davis knew the only way the South could defeat the North was by defeating the will of the Union states to fight or to have enough victories by the AONV close to D.C. , that Union voters would panic and no longer continue to support the Lincoln administration. That is what the slugfest in the east was all about up to sunset on July 3rd, 1863. The diplomatic strategy was essentially severely wounded at Antietam leading to the EmanProc—and the political strategy was shot in the gut at Gettysburg and finally died with the fall of Atlanta. So we see the "fight at all points" was never really applicable to the east theater. Now yes, events in the west impacted diplomacy and politics --but never to the extend as in Virginia where the capitals were in such close proximity.

West of the mountains -- diplomacy and politics had a much smaller strategic part to play so the default was "fight everywhere." This default strategy is confirmed when the fall of Vicksburg did not make Davis change his strategy. The "hold every point" in the west was the only strategy Davis could follow due to his third front. The third front was not with the Union but the Confederate Government against the ten independent states(eleven less Virginia) , each demanding of Davis (under the cult of states honor) that his strategies conform to the protection of their own states and property--especially the slaves who would be freed everywhere the Yankees showed up. Once Vicksburg fell and it was impossible to do anything about the trans Mississippi states , there was no grand strategy for the west that could possibly work because the default had failed.

 

[Kearny The Magnificent]

Davis had his hand forced. Every state in the CSA felt their issues could not become an afterthought. The military eligible white men were overwhelmingly conscripted and taking them away from their homes was only possible with the guarantees from their state + CSA central government that property (including human property) + family would be taken care of without them. The government wouldn't be able to keep the wool pulled over the soldiers eyes either.

As head of the central government, Davis had to at least appear to be taking the unrealistic obligation of total national defense seriously. He also had to deal with varying levels of cooperation from states, each with governments that realized defending the entire area in their borders was an extreme challenge, who didn't want to part with garrisoned troops that weren't stationed in active areas that desperately could have used them.

 

[Trooper "D"]

True as France,the UK and the Austrian- Empire were delighted to sell weapons to both sides which is a time honored practice that the US has engaged in as well. There's an old saying that I just made up concerning the arms trade" Thou shalt not leave money on thy table".
Leftyhunter

New made old sayings are the best.

 

[Bryce]

The Davis strategy has often come under heavy fire, but is the criticism justified. I suggest not, along the length of the confederate land border much is not suitable for crossing large forces. So, it comes down to a matter of identifying transit chokepoints and holding them. The coastline also has limited number of locations suitable for bringing in large forces.
Is this a viable response to the Anaconda plan.

Take a look at Steve Newton's book Joseph E.CJohnston and the defensE OffRichmond. He articulates very clearly what Davis is strategy was at the beginning of the war. The confederacy was very weak in those days and so Davis sent troops to the border states to fool the Yankees into thinking, he outnumbered them

 

[Lubliner]

The pillars or defense Davis relied upon, Maryland and Kentucky becoming confederate states, both were knocked down early at the outset. The whole proposition of defense was to receive Maryland and overtake Washington City, receive foreign support and public sentiment up north, and move the border in the west to the Ohio River. All of it was washed away early on and impossible to stem as the flow of recruitments up North continued to materialize. The Mississippi River control from the Missouri down to New Orleans was also a main point for defensive action. Again, it was impossible to defend.
Lubliner.

 

[USS ALASKA]

If holding everything everywhere can be called a strategy, that is what Davis was forced to employ.

Thats going to take a whole lot of troops that the Confederacy doesn't have...

A French general is entrusted by Napoleon to defend a length of the border with a force of a certain size. The general is showing off his efforts to Napoleon: by dispersing his troops, he is able to cover the entire length of the border (or at least the area he is responsible for).

Napoleon replies, "That's nice. And what do you expect to accomplish with this - preventing smuggling!?"

Cheers,
USS ALASKA

 

[USS ALASKA]

The confederacy was very weak in those days and so Davis sent troops to the border states to fool the Yankees into thinking, he outnumbered them

"Appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak" - Sun Tzu

Of course, that can backfire...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA