Petersburg vs Atlanta

[OldReliable1862]

In his book Decision in the West, Albert Castel briefly suggests Joe Johnston could have tried a limited offensive to blunt Sherman's movement after Kennesaw Mountain, similar to Lee at Petersburg. It seems Hood kinda did this once he reached Atlanta's defenses - i.e., remain on the defensive while engaging in offensives to blunt enemy movements. However, Hood's attacks were too ambitious, and all three of his major efforts (Peach Tree Creek, Bald Hill, Ezra Church) failed.

The question on my mind is, could the basic strategy that Lee used in Petersburg for almost 10 months have worked during the Atlanta Campaign? Had Snake Creek Gap been defended, I think this strategy may have been workable - e.g., blocking attempts to outflank you by another position, forcing the enemy flanking column to move farther away from the main body.

 

[redbob]

Hood's biggest problem around Atlanta seems to be the fact that when he attacked the attacks were poorly organized and/or coordinated.

 

[Irishtom29]

The question on my mind is, could the basic strategy that Lee used in Petersburg for almost 10 months have worked during the Atlanta Campaign? Had Snake Creek Gap been defended, I think this strategy may have been workable - e.g., blocking attempts to outflank you by another position, forcing the enemy flanking column to move farther away from the main body.

An interesting idea. Offhand my response is that at Petersburg Lee was vulnerable only on his right but in the vastness of Georgia Johnston was vulnerable both right and left.

 

[Irishtom29]

If this thread were about rocks at Gettysburg there would've been a dozen responses. If about Pickett's Charge at least a score rehashing the same old BS.

 

[OldReliable1862]

If this thread were about rocks at Gettysburg there would've been a dozen responses. If about Pickett's Charge at least a score rehashing the same old BS.

I share your frustration - the Western theater, while it's gradually getting more attention, still just doesn't draw people the way Gettysburg does.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

An interesting idea. Offhand my response is that at Petersburg Lee was vulnerable only on his right but in the vastness of Georgia Johnston was vulnerable both right and left.

Agreed. The strategy is viable, but given the differences in terrain and the relative armies it would be very difficult to execute successfully.

 

[Saint Jude]

Hood's attacks were too ambitious, and all three of his major efforts (Peach Tree Creek, Bald Hill, Ezra Church) failed.

In his letters home at the time, General Howard made two comments about Hood, whom he had known at West Point. The first was that he loved to fight; the second was that he was a "stupid fellow." Those traits alone seem to have precluded the possibility of executing a strategy like Lee's at Petersburg.

 

[OldReliable1862]

P. G. T. Beauregard held off a Union assault on Petersburg despite pretty long odds, perhaps he could manage the same at Atlanta in command of the AoT? It should be noted that at Petersburg, Beauregard was defending against a force commanded by Ben Butler and Robert Potter, which advanced sluggishly and fought poorly. While Sherman made several puzzling decisions during the Atlanta campaign, it is doubtful Beauregard would anywhere near so easy a time.

 

[Dead Parrott]

P. G. T. Beauregard held off a Union assault on Petersburg despite pretty long odds, perhaps he could manage the same at Atlanta in command of the AoT? It should be noted that at Petersburg, Beauregard was defending against a force commanded by Ben Butler and Robert Potter, which advanced sluggishly and fought poorly. While Sherman made several puzzling decisions during the Atlanta campaign, it is doubtful Beauregard would anywhere near so easy a time.

Agreed. to take nothing away from Beauregard or his force, he was being attacked by perfect idiots in a perfectly idiotic manner.

Two competent Union generals on either end of Grant's original 1864 plan would have ended the war in 1864.

Butler and Sigel ...weren't. (Again hats off to Beauregard and his brave ersatz defending force).

 

[Luke Freet]

I think, given how Johnston's total force of 74000 outnumbered Lee's army of 65000(thought of course Johnston started out with only 2 corps and one division of Polk's, by at least New Hope Church I believe he had his full force massed (not including the Georgia militia), Lee was able to fend of in several engagements a union army of 120,000, while Johnston was facing 100,000, and had the vast forestry of North Georgia at his disposal. He could have easily engaged Sherman in Wilderness style engagements, slowing his advance more considerably. I believe he truly lost the campaign giving up the Chattahoochee without a fight or opposing the eastern crossings. Those are my 2 cents

 

[Irishtom29]

....Lee was able to fend of in several engagements a union army of 120,000, while Johnston was facing 100,000, and had the vast forestry of North Georgia at his disposal. He could have easily engaged Sherman in Wilderness style engagements, slowing his advance more considerably. I believe he truly lost the campaign giving up the Chattahoochee without a fight or opposing the eastern crossings. Those are my 2 cents

I'm not one to defend Johnston but Sherman had room to work with that Grant lacked. And a quicker, faster reacting army group with better army and corps commanders.

 

[Luke Freet]

I'm not one to defend Johnston but Sherman had room to work with that Grant lacked. And a quicker, faster reacting army group with better army and corps commanders.

I disagree. His cavalry was horribly decentralized, with 3 seperate commanders. He had 3 armies of varying size. Most of the commanders at the start I'd deem competent, maybe I'd give props to Thomas, Schofield and Logan, but there are plenty of guys who I'd rate between mediocre and abhorrent: McPherson kept pulling a Warren and was overly cautious; Hooker and Howard are also present, and Howard screwed up royally at Pickett's Mill, being repulsed by a single division due to the nature of his subordinates, one of who, BG McLean, was still smarting from Howard's screw ups at Chancellorsville that lost him his command. I'd say Sherman was worse off in his subordinate's capabilities than Grant was throughout the Overland Campaign (not counting peripheral forces like Sigel and Butler, but those in the AotP)

 

[OpnCoronet]

The question on my mind is, could the basic strategy that Lee used in Petersburg for almost 10 months have worked during the Atlanta Campaign? Had Snake Creek Gap been defended, I think this strategy may have been workable - e.g., blocking attempts to outflank you by another position, forcing the enemy flanking column to move farther away from the main body.

Probably not, IMO, Lee's basic plan was to achieve another of his stunning reverses over the AoP, in hopes that, like all his similar successes, the AoP would retreat to regro. Lee had no real answer for a Commander(and Army) that just kept on advancinf, anymore than did Johnston.

Lee's success in the Wilderness fed into the very kind of war that he always tried to avoid, because it was the one kind of war he did not think the confederacy could win. Johnston was well aware of the limitations of confederate manpower and resources and unlike Lee was not willing to risk them in sterile battles of attrition, that had already been proven inadequate for confederat independence, i.e., To Johnaron, such battles, was too much like throwing good many(confederate lives) after bad; expending southern blood prodigiously, to no good end

 

[Dead Parrott]

Probably not, IMO, Lee's basic plan was to achieve another of his stunning reverses over the AoP, in hopes that, like all his similar successes, the AoP would retreat to regro. Lee had no real answer for a Commander(and Army) that just kept on advancinf, anymore than did Johnston.

Lee's success in the Wilderness fed into the very kind of war that he always tried to avoid, because it was the one kind of war he did not think the confederacy could win. Johnston was well aware of the limitations of confederate manpower and resources and unlike Lee was not willing to risk them in sterile battles of attrition, that had already been proven inadequate for confederat independence, i.e., To Johnaron, such battles, was too much like throwing good many(confederate lives) after bad; expending southern blood prodigiously, to no good end

Agreed entirely. The keys to Union victory were applying pressure at all points, the use of superior numbers to pin and flank (denying the enemy the initiative), and the willingness to engage in tough battles with casualties. Both Grant\Meade and Sherman did this successfully.

I actually admire a lot in the performances of Lee and Johnston in these campaigns. Grant's dogged pin\flank\hit strategy was going to best Lee into an unwinnable siege anyway, but Lee did about as much as possible in the situation (Lee really could only hope for a Grant 'grand battle' mistake, a Grant retreat\fall back, or an election upset). Johnston actually parried Sherman pretty well, and while Sherman was going to take Atlanta eventually, a delay in doing so, plus an intact Confederate army to defend the interior afterwards, might have made a difference in the election.

Basically, the only cards left for the Confederacy in 1864 were a huge Union military blunder, or too few Union successes to tip the election for Lincoln. Given that, I thought Johnston and Lee played their roles about as well as possible. Unfortunately, the only Huge Union Blunders were by Sigel, Butler and Banks, and not by Sherman, Meade or Grant - and the Union strategy produced easily enough successes for the Lincoln election (as the facts illustrate). Atlanta falls, the Western army is broken, the Eastern army is trapped in an unwinnable and unescapable siege - everyone but Jefferson Davis can see the end is coming.

Davis replacing Johnston with Hood just greased the run - to the benefit of the Lincoln reelection campaign.

Militarily, I give good marks to both Lee and Johnston.

 

[Belfoured]

I share your frustration - the Western theater, while it's gradually getting more attention, still just doesn't draw people the way Gettysburg does.

The rest of the Eastern Theater is in the same state. The conflict simulation business illustrates the problem. Nobody has ever lost money developing and marketing a Gettysburg sim. How many [fill in the blank]ing times can you use a "different" system to go after Cemetery Ridge or LRT without getting bored?

 

[jackt62]

could the basic strategy that Lee used in Petersburg for almost 10 months have worked during the Atlanta Campaign?

Of course, Lee's strategy around Petersburg was not successful in the end, he simply delayed the inevitable fall longer than Atlanta held. In both cases, the Union strategy, whether by Grant or Sherman, was to cut off the rail lines linking those respective cities and armies, and force the enemy into submission. It took Sherman less time than Grant, but one of the reasons was because he was up against Hood who was more willing than Lee, to squander his resources in several consecutive failed assaults. Lee was more cautious in choosing his points of attack. Moreover, Lee benefited by diverting resources in the form of Early's corps to the Shenandoah Valley, which caused Grant to likewise respond to that threat to the Washington defenses, further prolonging the encirclement and eventual fall of Petersburg.

 

[eeric]

I share your frustration - the Western theater, while it's gradually getting more attention, still just doesn't draw people the way Gettysburg does.

Is there a book you would recommend ?

 

[OpnCoronet]

Basically, the only cards left for the Confederacy in 1864 were a huge Union military blunder, or too few Union successes to tip the election for Lincoln. Given that, I thought Johnston and Lee played their roles about as well as possible. Unfortunately, the only Huge Union Blunders were by Sigel, Butler and Banks, and not by Sherman, Meade or Grant - and the Union strategy produced easily enough successes for the Lincoln election (as the facts illustrate). Atlanta falls, the Western army is broken, the Eastern army is trapped in an unwinnable and unescapable siege - everyone but Jefferson Davis can see the end is coming.
Davis replacing Johnston with Hood just greased the run - to the benefit of the Lincoln reelection campaign.
Militarily, I give good marks to both Lee and Johnston.

All this is basically true, but, to me, it points out the truth of Sherman's, et. al., preediction of the course of the Civil War, given even before the outbreak of the conflict, i.e., that the odds were stacked just too high, to rationally justify secession.

Jefferson Davis and Lee both had a glimmer of the only rational source of confederate hopes for a successful war for its independence, would be political not military. Although both sawit from a mainly visceral and not logical perception. That the real road to success ran through Washington D.C. and the state capitols of the Unionist states. The war would continue uuntil Lincoln(as President) lost heart in trying to rreunify the Union,, and/or the people of the North failed to supoort his policy for reunion.

Confederate military, social and economic resources would have to be rationalized to achieve that end, but, I do not believe, that the South, or even the United States itself, was sufficiently unified to allow such an policy of rationalization. So, in this case, as in all the others, the prospects for southern success was dim, at best.

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

Interesting thread,
I see Atlanta and Petersburg together as two different type actions. I wish to point out first not the commanders but the fighting men for both armies. I do think the men under Lee had his trust in any movement or action that were purposed and they acted upon it with the thought of winning that action. Their moral even at Petersburg during the heat of the summer and being in trenches for the most part was still positive to what the outcome may be.
Johnston men had only knew that when pushed we fell back, gave up ground and waited to be pushed again. Of course we do have the exception at the Kennesaw line but still what did Johnston do after that victory? He fell back. Not only fell back but crossed the last river that that was between Sherman and Atlanta.
Both armies had their good Generals, some that did okay and some that were so inept that only friends in Congress or the Presidents kept them from being relieved from command. The soldiers were the fighting force, what were their thoughts and their moral. Of course when Hood took over command the general population or ranks of the AOT went down even more. Hood was still an unknown to the western troops and the love they had for Johnston even compounded the loss of moral among the troops.
Sherman was before Atlanta, Grant was before Richmond or below Richmond but none the less the capital of the Confederacy. Soldiers understood that importance and with Lee's army their fight was to safeguard their capital. Atlanta was just a major hub in the Deep South. (You will defend your capital better than a hub of transportation I do suspect)
Lee opportunity only was to defend or to either hold out or not allow the Union armies to move northward toward Richmond, just one direction which Lee was on total guard against. Johnston/Hood armies had a more open area to defend. Sherman went west to cut of the rail lines, Sherman went east and cut the rail lines. The only open rail line was coming from the south from Macon to supply Hood's army. Lee's army albeit was not getting a lot of food because to the prime land from which they gather their food the Shenandoah Valley was being invaded yet again and cutting down on the food that was going to be harvested for his troops. Food was still coming in from other means and other area in the lower parts of Virginia and west.
Now let me get into the overall Generalship of each armies. The Union army Under Sherman around Atlanta was overall in good shape. Thomas, McPherson, Scofield, were quality army commanders, they were loyal to what Sherman wanted to do. They may have not liked him all that much but loyal and did what was ask of them.
Hardee, Hood, Polk/Loring, I can't see a comparable loyalty that Johnston or Hood had with any of those. Hood distrusted Johnston, Hardee distrusted Hood, and Polk wasn't what I consider a very good army commander. Loring became commander after Polk was killed at Pine Mountain.
The Generals below the head commanders i.e. Cheatham, Cleburne, Bate, Stewart, Walker were fine commanders but most of them were under Hardees command, leaving much to bear on the rest of the other two Corps.