OR Vol 46 Pt 1 - Help Needed Please

lelliott19

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Thanks in advance for your help! :bounce::dance::bounce:

Can someone who knows how to locate specific sections of the OR see if they can find this please? @east tennessee roots perhaps?

OR Vol. XLVI, pt. 1: Serial No. 95 p. 1293, 1283

It is used as a footnote in a book I am reading and is supposed to refer to info about the 50th Georgia's evacuation from Richmond or perhaps to Colonel McGlashan 's account or report during that timeframe. Can someone help? It looks like it is two separate entries? One on page 1293 and on on 1283?

Thanks again for any assistance!
 
pp. 1280-84:
______________

HDQRS. ARTILLERY CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
April 10, 1865--Day after surrender.​

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery under my command from the 1st day of April to the present time. Much to my regret it has to be made without possible access, as it will be seen from the circumstances of the case, to special reports from those superior officers of this important arm--General A. L. Long, chief of artillery, Second Corps; General E. P. Alexander, chief of artillery, First Corps; and General R. L. Walker, chief of artillery, Third Corps:

Owing to demonstrations of the enemy on the right of our lines near Petersburg on the morning of the 1st April, I ordered seven guns of Poague's battalion, which had been held in reserve near Howlett's, to march to Petersburg, and on the night of the 1st, by direction of the commanding general, I ordered the remainder of the battalion down; at the same time ordered the guns which had arrived during the day to proceed on the road toward the right, so as to be out of sight of the tower by dawn. Those guns were used with good effect near Mr. Turnbull's house (General Lee's headquarters) on the morning of the 2d, where the enemy had unexpectedly massed a heavy force against the opposite portion of our line and succeeded in breaking it, and then sweeping down toward the city, captured a number of men and guns along the line. While these guns were well contesting the ground and holding the enemy in check, Lieutenant-Colonel Poague arrived with the remainder of his guns, and rendered admirable service in retarding the heavy advance of the enemy until such troops as remained could be withdrawn into the interior line. Three pieces with Major Brander were placed on the north side of the Appomattox, so as to annoy the left flank of the enemy and prevent him from crossing. On the line and to the right of the Cox road were placed four pieces of the horse artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Chew and Major Breathed. The enemy had by this time, 12 o'clock, fully established his line from Fort Gregg to the Appomattox River.

In the fighting attendant upon these operations various batteries of the Third Corps were captured. The conduct of officers and men was worthy of all praise, and that of the drivers and supernumeraries of the artillery, who had been by General Walker armed with muskets, deserves special mention. Those in Fort Gregg fought until literally crushed by numbers, and scarcely a man survived.

In the meantime the firing on Colonel Jones' front, east of the city, had been severe. During the night of the 1st the fire from mortars and guns was incessant, and the men were very much exposed throughout the 2d. I saw Colonel Jones on the line about 3 o'clock, and found his pieces so disposed as effectually to prevent any attempt of the enemy to improve the advantage already gained at the Rives' Salient.

I was at Battery 45 during the day, and directed its guns against columns of the enemy moving down the valley toward the Weldon railroad. The officers in charge of this part of the line deeming an attack imminent, I ordered two pieces of artillery to strengthen the position.

In obedience to orders from the commanding general, I ordered the withdrawal of all the guns at 8 p.m. This was accomplished with <ar95_1281> great success, and although the difficulties on Colonel Jones' line were very great, he succeeded in withdrawing all but about ten, which for the most part were not provided with horses, and not intended to be removed. Several mortars were also brought off. Every piece that was abandoned was first disabled. After making all necessary arrangement with regard to this movement, and seeing all the guns safely across the river, about 2 a.m. on the 3d I moved on by the Hickory road, marching all night.

The march on the 3d was fatiguing, and very slow, on account of the immense number of carriages with the army. At night I bivouacked on the roadside about nine miles from Goode's Bridge.

I reached Amelia Court-House on the morning of the 4th, and immediately proceeded to make arrangements for reducing the artillery with the troops to a proportionate quantity, and properly to dispose of the surplus. These arrangements were at last effected; and on the 5th General Walker moved to the right and west of the line of march of the army, having in charge all the artillery not needed with the troops. Ninety-five caissons, mostly loaded, which had early in the winter been sent to the rear from Petersburg, were here destroyed.

Moving on past Amelia Springs, by 10 o'clock the next morning (6th) we reached Rice's Station, on the South Side Railroad. Our troops here went into line, and I chose positions for guns commanding the Burkeville road and sweeping the ground to its left. On this line there was heavy skirmishing during the evening, but no attack by the enemy. The enemy's cavalry meanwhile having attacked our wagon train about two miles back on the road, I (happening to be with the commanding general when he received information of this) was requested by him to see what could be done to prevent any further loss in that quarter. On the way I met a few wearied men of Harris' brigade, and taking from them some twenty volunteers proceeded with them to the road where the train had been attacked. While attempting to rescue some of the property most valuable, I discovered a line of the enemy in a thick pine wood, and supposing it to be but a small body I arranged for an attack upon them [with] one of General Cooke's regiments, which had just reported to me in consequence of a message previously sent to the commanding general. This regiment was unable to hold its ground, and fell back some half a mile on the same road, until re-enforced by two regiments of cavalry. They then again moved forward, but after regaining the original advanced position the infantry was recalled by General Cooke, and the cavalry, by my direction, fell back with some few prisoners they had secured. The enemy meantime had fired our train to prevent us from saving anything. The enemy now seemed disposed
to quiet, and nothing apparently remaining to be accomplished by the small force with me, I directed it slowly to withdraw toward our main body near the station, and returned myself in that direction. Not long after the enemy made a sudden rush, and succeeded for a time in running over our small cavalry force, and threatening the unprotected rear of our line; our cavalry regiment, however, speedily rallied and charged in turn, and inflicted merited punishment upon their greatly outnumbering assailants. Shortly after night closed our guns were withdrawn, and we moved on the Farmville road, reaching Farmville early on the morning of the 7th.

As we were leaving Farmville by the bridges there crossing the Appomattox, the enemy pressed up close after our rear guard, and guns were placed in position and used to good purpose on the heights north of the river. Guns were again used with effect a mile or two farther «81 R R---VOL XLVI, PT I» <ar95_1282> on, when General Gordon (then commanding Second Corps, with the justly honored General A. L. Long, his chief of artillery) pressed back the enemy's line near the road along which all our wagons were passing, so as to allow these to get well on their way. This position was held all day, and it was not until midnight that the column moved on the road toward Buckingham Court-House. In spite of the terrible roads quite a long march was effected, and the evening of the 8th saw the head of our column near Appomattox Court-House. I pushed on in person to communicate with General Walker, and found him with his command parked about two miles beyond the Court-House on the road to Appomattox Station, South Side Railroad. While I was with him an attack wholly unexpected was made by the enemy on his defenseless camp. To avert immediate disaster from this attack demanded the exercise of all our energies. It was, however, at once effectually repelled by the aid especially of the two
gallant artillery companies of Captains Walker and Dickenson, under command of the former, which, being at the time unequipped as artillerists, were armed with muskets as a guard. They met the enemy's sharpshooters in a brush-wood near, and enabled a number of General Walker's pieces to play with effect while the remainder of his train was withdrawn. After a sharp skirmish this attack seemed remedied, and I started back, having received by courier a note requesting my presence with the commanding general. When I had reached a point a few hundred yards from the court-house, the enemy's cavalry, which had under cover of dusk gained the road, came rushing along, firing upon all in the road, and I only escaped being shot or captured by leaping my horse over the fence and skirting for some distance along the left of that road toward our column then advancing, and until I reached a point beyond where the enemy's charge was checked. While these operations were in progress there was much noise of engines upon the South Side Railroad. From this circumstance, and from the enemy's using artillery in the attack above described, I became satisfied that the attacking body, which had at first seemed to me small, was a large and accumulating force, and the inference became inevitable that General Walker and his guns must be, if they had not already been, captured. These facts and inferences were reported to the commanding general on my reaching his headquarters about 1 a.m. of the 9th.

Movements at daylight confirmed all that had been thus inferred. The enemy was found in heavy force on our front, and dispositions were promptly made for a fierce encounter. The artillery participated with alacrity, with cavalry and infantry, in a spirited attack upon the enemy's advancing columns, and promptly succeeded in arresting their advance. Two guns were captured from the enemy and a number of prisoners taken; but in spite of this the conviction had become established in the minds of a large majority of our best officers and men that the army, in its extremely reduced state, could not be extricated from its perilous condition, surrounded by the immense force of the enemy, and without subsistence for men or animals, unless with frightful bloodshed, and to scarcely any possible purpose, as its remnant, if thus rescued, must be too much enfeebled for efficient service. In view of these convictions, known of in part by him, and of all the facts before his own mind, the commanding general, before the battle had raged extensively, made arrangements for arresting hostilities By the respective commanders-in-chief main principles of our surrender were then agreed upon, and as soon thereafter as practicable articles in detail were adjusted by a commission of officers on both sides. Those serving under General Lee's <ar95_1283> appointment were General Longstreet, chief of First Corps, General Gordon, chief of Second Corps, and the general chief of artillery. In accordance with stipulations thus adjusted, the artillery was withdrawn, as were the other troops, and it was, as soon as practicable, in due form turned over to the enemy. Of 250 field pieces belonging to the army on the lines near Richmond and Petersburg, only sixty-one remained, and thirteen caissons.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. N. PENDLETON,
Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery.
Lieut. Col. W. H. TAYLOR,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

_____


CAMDEN, S.C., October 9, 1865.​

MAJOR: On the morning of Monday, the 3d of April last, I moved, in obedience to the orders of Lieutenant-General Ewell, from my position on the lines near Fort Gilmer through Richmond to Mayo's Bridge, reporting in person to Lieutenant-General Ewell.

Under his orders I detached two battalions to suppress the mob then engaged in sacking the city. Arriving at the bridge I found it in flames, and rapidly passed my command over to Manchester, informing General Ewell of the facts. By the efforts of some boatmen the flames were arrested before they had rendered the bridge impassable. By the time the infantry had passed, the large mill above the Danville depot--and too far distant from it to have been ignited by the burning of the latter--was observed to be on fire, the smoke being first seen to issue through the roof in all parts of it, and then the windows on all sides, indicating that it had been set on fire in the interior. As much of the conflagration which ensued was caused by the burning of this building, the circumstance has been deemed of sufficient importance to be stated here, in order to remove the erroneous imputation that the conflagration resulted from the action of the authorities.

A few miles from the river the command united with that of General Custis Lee and moved in the direction of Amelia Court-House. Learning that all the upper crossings of the Appomattox were impassable, on Tuesday the command moved to the railroad crossing, and by night had succeeded in passing the river with the entire train. The next day the rear of the Petersburg army was overtaken at Amelia Court-House, and marching all night the command arrived at Amelia Springs a little after sunrise the next day. From this point Gordon's corps marched in the rear. About 10 o'clock the command reached a point where the wagon train was moved to the right upon a cross-road which intersected that upon which the troops moved at right angles. Here the column was posted to resist the cavalry of the enemy--Merritt's and Custer's divisions--which attacked at that point, and repulsed several charges upon different parts of the line. They were held at bay until the last of the train had passed the point attacked, when I was directed to follow the movement of
General Custis Lee's division. Before my troops left the ground Gordon's advance appeared, while his rear was engaged with the enemy. I was not informed that Gordon would follow <ar95_1284> the wagon train as he did, and was therefore surprised on arriving at Sailor's Creek to find that my rear was menaced. As the troops in my front had halted, I detached Humphreys' brigade, commanded by Colonel Fitz Gerald, and Gary's dismounted battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Barbara, to take position near the house occupied as a hospital by Pickett's division, to cover my crossing Sailor's Creek. Upon arriving at the top of the hill on the south side of the creek, I was informed by General Ewell that the enemy had possession of the road in front of General Anderson, and that we were to hold the enemy in check while that officer attempted to open the way. My command then consisted of only three brigades---Humphreys', Simms' (Brig. Gen. J. P. Simms commanding), and Du Bose's brigade (Brig. Gen. D. M. Du Bose commanding)--and the dismounted cavalry already mentioned; the whole at that time amounted to less than 2,000 effective men. Du Bose was placed in the edge of the wood, with his right resting on the road; Simms, on the left of the road, a little in advance. General Lee's division was on the left of the road, his right occupying a line in front of Du Bose, his left on the same line, or nearly so. In the meantime the enemy attacked and overpowered Humphreys and the dismounted cavalry, forcing them back to my position. They were formed at once on the left of the road, and Simms was moved farther to the right. The enemy planted batteries near the hospital and swept our position at short range, and under cover of the fire the Second and Sixth Corps attacked us. Both in his (General Lee's) front and my own they were repulsed, with loss, on every advance, but pressed on constantly with fresh troops, extending all the while to our left. During this attack I received from General Anderson a message, through Capt. S. D. Shannon, aide-de-camp, to the effect that he had commenced hismovement, and hoped to be successful if I could hold out a few moments longer. Sending him an encouraging reply, I continued to resist the enemy for some time, hoping to hear from General Anderson that the way was open. Unfortunately his attempt had failed, and the enemy made his appearance in rear of Simms' brigade at the same time he was engaged in front and flank. That officer attempted to extricate his command, but found it impossible to do so without confusion, as he was attacked on all sides. This condition of things being discovered by the other troops, all fell back toward the rear and left. I kept up something of a skirmish as the command retreated; but after moving some 400 yards I discovered that all who had preceded me had been taken by the Yankee cavalry, who were in line of battle across the road. I then directed the men about me and the members of my staff to make their escape in any way possible. I discovered afterward that but one had succeeded, as the enemy had completed the circle around our position when General Anderson's line was broken. My losses in killed and wounded must have been considerable, but I have no means of estimating the number.

The conduct of the officers and men of the command under these trying circumstances is beyond all praise, and worthy the reputation of these veteran regiments. On no battle-field of the war have I felt a juster pride in the conduct of my command.

I beg leave expressly to include in these just encomiums the little command of Lieutenant-Colonel Barham, and especially that officer.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. B. KERSHAW.​


Maj. CAMPBELL BROWN,
Richmond, Va.
 
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pp. 1291-95

HEADQUARTERS WALLACE'S BRIGADE,
Near Appomattox Court-House, April 10, 1865.​

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that this brigade was moved on the 28th ultimo from the lines near Hatcher's Run to a position near Burgess' Mills, where it remained in line during the day without being engaged, and retiring at night to its former camp.

On the 29th of March it was moved, with the rest of the division, to the plank road near Bevill's house, and at 3 p.m. was readvanced against a position of the enemy near Bevill's house (held by infantry and artillery), which it failed to carry. At night-fall it was withdrawn to the camp within the lines near Hatcher's Run.

On the 2d of April, instant, the remnant of the brigade which had escaped from the affair of April 1 at the Five Cross-Roads reported to <ar95_1292> Major-General Johnson at Ford's Depot, and was marched to a position on ------ Creek, where it intrenched and remained until 2 a.m., when it was moved across the creek and encamped.

On the 3d instant it was marched in the direction of Amelia Court. House, and skirmished with the enemy on the march.

On the 4th instant it moved on in the same direction, and intrenched about four miles from Amelia Court-House, where it repelled an attack by the enemy's cavalry skirmishers.

On the 5th instant the command marched through Amelia Court-House, and continued to march until 6 p.m. on the 6th instant, when it was placed in position, and about 12 m. repelled an attack of cavalry skirmishers, who were driven back some distance by our line. About 1 p.m. it was moved farther on in the direction of the previous line of march, and ordered to hold a position, where it repelled an attack of cavalry skirmishers. At 5 p.m. it moved in line of battle in a direction unknown, with the division, which was attacked, after advancing a short distance, on its left flank by a party of cavalry and routed. The men, after falling back about a mile, were reassembled and marched to a road upon which the army was moving, where it joined the column and arrived at High Bridge about 11 p.m.

On the 7th instant, at 2 a.m., it moved to Farmville, and at 1 p.m. retreated with the army from that place.

On the 8th instant it reached a point about one mile from Appomattox Court-House, and at 10 p.m. was formed in line to meet a threatened attack. At 11 p.m. it was moved to Appomattox Court-House and again formed in line, the men sleeping on their arms. About this time I was directed to report with my command to Brigadier-General Evans, Second Army Corps.

The strength of the brigade on the 29th of March was about 1,300 aggregate, and the loss about 188. On the 2d of April about 350 men had been reassembled. The losses in the subsequent skirmishes cannot be stated, but were slight.

I beg to call attention to the conspicuous gallantry of Maj. R. J. Bet-sill, Eighteenth South Carolina Volunteers, in all the actions mentioned in this report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. WALLACE,
Brigadier-General.​

Capt. J. E. SANDERS,
Aide-de-Camp.

_______


SPRING HILL, TENN., December 20, 1865.​

GENERAL: About the middle of February last I received a communication from you inclosing a law which I was directed to carry out. This law required preparations to be made for destroying the cotton, tobacco, &c., which the owners could not remove, in places exposed to capture by the enemy. I immediately sent Major Brown, of my staff, to Mayor Mayo with the document, and requested him to call a meeting of the common council to give their opinion as to the measures proper to be taken. After a free discussion with some of the council, and by their <ar95_1293> advice, I issued a circular to the "merchants and owners of cotton and tobacco," embodying the substance of your order and the law that accompanied it. This I intrusted to those gentlemen and to Maj. Isaac H. Carrington, provost-marshal, for distribution. Being informed a few hours later that it was misunderstood as to take effect at once, I substituted another, stating expressly that "the necessity had not yet arisen." Together with Mr. Scott, a tobacco owner and councilman, I visited and inspected all the warehouses containing tobacco, and after consulting the keepers we concluded they could be burned without danger of a general conflagration. I gave instructions to Major Carrington to make the necessary arrangements, and requested Mr. Scott and the other members of the council to consult with him and give him their views. The Ordnance Department offered to furnish barrels of turpentine to mix with the tobacco, so as to insure its burning, but this I declined for fear of setting fire to the city. I sent for the mayor and several of the most prominent citizens, earnestly urged upon them the danger of mob violence should we be forced to evacuate, and the entrance of Federal troops be delayed, and begged them to endeavor to organize a volunteer guard force for such an emergency, proffering the necessary arms. I regret to say but one man volunteered, and the rioters, as predicted, were unchecked.

On the night of Saturday, April 1, I received a dispatch from General Longstreet telling me he was going to the south side with two divisions, that Kershaw would be left on the lines, directing me to move whatever troops I could collect down the Darbytown road, and to ride by his headquarters for further instructions. I left my staff to see to the movement and collection of troops (of which only the cadets and three battalions of convalescents from the hospitals were in town) and rode down, but General Longstreet had gone before I reached his headquarters, and I received orders from his assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Latrobe, to relieve and send forward two brigades left on picket, which was done soon after sunrise by Colonel Shipp, commanding the cadets and convalescents.

At 10 a.m. of Sunday I received a message from Major Chestney, my assistant adjutant-general, to return at once to the city, and on doing so received the order for the evacuation, and to destroy the stores which could not be removed. All that time allowed was done.

General G.W.C. Lee's division, being mostly composed of heavy artillery, was almost without transportation, which was procured by impressing all that could be found.

All the guard forces were required to take the prisoners from the Libby and Castle Thunder, and as the militia had dispersed, being mostly foreigners, no troops remained in town, except a few convalescents. A mob of both sexes and all colors soon collected, and about 3 a.m. set fire to some buildings on Cary street, and began to plunder the city. The convalescents, then stationed in the square, were ordered to repress the riot, but their commander shortly reported himself unable to do so, his force being inadequate. I then ordered all my staff and couriers who could be spared to scour the streets, so as to intimidate the mob by a show of force, and sent word to General Kershaw, who was coming up from the lines, to hurry his leading regiment into town. By daylight the riot was subdued, but many buildings which I had carefully directed should be spared had been fired by the mob. The arsenal was thus destroyed, and a party of men went to burn the Tredegar Works, but were deterred by General Anderson arming his operatives and declaring his intention to resist. The small bridge over the canal <ar95_1294> on Fourteenth street was burned by incendiaries, who set a canal-boat on fire and pushed it under the bridge. This was evidently done in hopes of embarrassing our retreat, and General Kershaw's division passed the bridge while on fire at a double-quick. By 7 a.m. the last troops had reached the south side, and Mayo's and the railroad bridges were set on fire.

From the hills above Manchester we watched for some time the progress of the flames, and all at once saw fire break out through the roof of one of the large mills on the side farthest from the burning warehouses, the flames from which scarcely reached half way up the sides of the mill. It was considered a fire-proof building, and extra precautions had been taken by the owners. I cannot conceive how it could have caught in such a place, unless set on fire. I have been told that Mr. Crenshaw found his mill full of plunderers, whom he got out by agreeing to give them all the provisions in the mill, and that they were in the act of building a fire on the upper story of the mill when discovered. I tried to find out if this were true, but no reply has come to the letters written for that purpose. If correct, it affords exact proof of what I am firmly convinced is the case--that the burning of Richmond was the work of incendiaries, and might have been prevented by the citizens.

General G. W. C. Lee's division crossed the river at Drewry's, and united with Kershaw a few miles from Manchester. We marched very rapidly to join the main body, and though delayed by the swollen condition of the Appomattox came up with it near Amelia Court-House on the 5th of April. We were to march all that night, but, owing to the slow progress of the trains and troops in front, had only reached Amelia Springs, seven miles off, by 8 a.m. Parties of cavalry here appeared on our left flank, and about 11 a.m. made an effort to get to the road on which our trains were moving past us. Gordon's corps, the rear guard, was being hard pushed at the same time. I threw out as skirmishers part of Colonel Atkinson's command of heavy artillery, of General Lee's division, and a battalion of light artillery, acting as infantry, under Captain Dement, which had just been assigned to me. These troops soon repelled the enemy's cavalry skirmishers. Their demonstrations continued from 11 a.m. till 2 p.m., and I retained my troops in position to cover the passage of the trains. As soon as they were out of the way I followed General Anderson's corps, and was followed by General Gordon, who brought up the rear of the trains, constantly fighting.

On crossing a little stream known as Sailor's Creek, I met General Fitz Lee, who informed me that a large force of cavalry held the road just in front of General Anderson, and was so strongly posted that he had halted a short distance ahead. The trains were turned into a road Bearer the river, while I hurried to General Anderson's aid. General Gordon's corps turned off after the trains. General Anderson informed me that at least two divisions of cavalry were in his front, and suggested two modes of escape--either to unite our forces and break through, or to move to the right through the woods and try to strike a road which ran toward Farmville. I recommended the latter alternative, but as he knew the ground and I did not, and had no one who did, I left the dispositions to him. Before any
were made the enemy appeared in rear of my column in large force preparing to attack. General Anderson informed me that he would make the attack in front if I would hold in check those in rear, which I did until his troops were broken and dispersed. <ar95_1295>

I had no artillery, all being with the train. My line ran across a little ravine which leads nearly at right angles toward Sailor's Creek. General G. W. C. Lee was on the left, with the Naval Battalion, under Commodore Tucker, behind his right. Kershaw's division was on the right. All of Lee's and part of Kershaw's division were posted behind a rising ground that afforded some shelter from artillery. The creek was perhaps 300 yards in their front, with brush pines between and a cleared field beyond it. In this the enemy's artillery took a commanding position, and finding we had none to reply, soon approached within 800 yards and opened a terrible fire. After nearly half an hour of this, their infantry advanced, crossing the creek above and below us at the same time. Just as it attacked General Anderson made his assault, which was repulsed in five minutes. I had ridden up near his lines with him to see the result, when a staff officer, who had followed his troops in their charge, brought him word of its failure. General Anderson rode rapidly toward his command. I returned to mine to see if it were yet too late to try the other plan of escape. On riding past my left I came suddenly upon a strong line of the enemy's skirmishers advancing upon my left rear. This closed the only avenue of escape, as shells and even bullets were crossing each other from front and rear over my troops, and my right was completely enveloped. I surrendered myself and staff to a cavalry officer who came in by the same road General Anderson had gone out on. At my request he sent a messenger to General G. W. C. Lee, who was nearest, with a note from me telling him he was surrounded, General Anderson's attack had failed, I had surrendered, and he had better do so too, to prevent useless loss of life, though I gave no orders, being a prisoner. Before the messenger reached him General Lee had been captured, as had General Kershaw, and the whole of my command.

My two divisions numbered about 3,000 each at the time of the evacuation; 2,800 were taken prisoners, about 150 killed and wounded. The difference of over 3,000 was caused mainly by the fatigue of four days' and nights' almost constant marching, the last two days with nothing to eat. Before our capture I saw men eating raw fresh meat as they marched in ranks.

The heavy artillery brigade of Lee's division was closely engaged for the first time on this occasion, and spite of the fall of its commander, Colonel Crutchfield, displayed a coolness and gallantry that earned the praise of the veterans who fought alongside of it, and even of the enemy.

I was informed at General Wright's headquarters, whither I was carried after my capture, that 30,000 men were engaged with us when we surrendered, namely, two infantry corps and Custer's and Merritt's divisions of cavalry.

I deem it proper to remark that the discipline preserved in camp and on the march by General G. W. C. Lee, and the manner in which he handled his troops in action, fully justified the request I had made for his promotion. General Kershaw, who had only been a few days under my command, behaved with his usual coolness and judgment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. EWELL,
Late Lieutenant-General, C. S. Army.​

General R. E. LEE,
Lexington, Va.
 
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Thank you @KeyserSoze for including the link. I had used Cornell's link before but for some reason couldn;t find it this time. I really appreciate your help.

There are multiple mentions of Col. McGlashan in the OR, but most are passing references, and I did not see an actual report by him on this event or any other.

That's Ok Andy, what I hoped to find was in the part you included. I was hoping the information included a description of Kershaws marching over Mayo's Bridge while it was burning - and it did! It also included Kershaws whole report which I had not been able to locate!!!! :bounce::dance::bounce: Thank you sooooooo much!

"The small bridge over the canal on Fourteenth street was burned by incendiaries, who set a canal-boat on fire and pushed it under the bridge. This was evidently done in hopes of embarrassing our retreat, and General Kershaw's division passed the bridge while on fire at a double-quick. By 7 a.m. the last troops had reached the south side, and Mayo's and the railroad bridges were set on fire."
@Podad did you read it? :wavespin:
 
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Good stuff.
"The small bridge over the canal on Fourteenth street was burned by incendiaries, who set a canal-boat on fire and pushed it under the bridge. This was evidently done in hopes of embarrassing our retreat, and General Kershaw's division passed the bridge while on fire at a double-quick. By 7 a.m. the last troops had reached the south side, and Mayo's and the railroad bridges were set on fire."

See!?!?!? It REALLY is the most interesting regiment that has NEVER been written about! Well....I guess it and the 24th since they were together from the Peninsula on.
 
"The small bridge over the canal on Fourteenth street was burned by incendiaries, who set a canal-boat on fire and pushed it under the bridge. This was evidently done in hopes of embarrassing our retreat, and General Kershaw's division passed the bridge while on fire at a double-quick. By 7 a.m. the last troops had reached the south side, and Mayo's and the railroad bridges were set on fire."

See!?!?!? It REALLY is the most interesting regiment that has NEVER been written about! Well....I guess it and the 24th since they were together from the Peninsula on.

Yep, the 24th Ga. has very little written history as the 16th Ga used to. You are fixing that problem for the 16th.

No wonder those men were starving 5-6 days later. They only had what they could carry when they fled the trenches in front of Richmond. The supplies they must have been drawing out of while in the defensive positions were no doubt destroyed upon abandonment of the capitol.
 

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