Member Review One Continuous Fight

[wausaubob]

The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-14, 1863 Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael E. Nugent
Savas Beatie 2008
Its fun to read a book into which so much work and love has been dedicated. I am not all the way through, but I do have one observation.
The question posed as to whether General Meade was correct in refraining from attacking the Confederates at the defensive positions the Confederates arranged at Williamsport seems to me to be the wrong question.
It wasn't a race to Williamsport. It should have been a race to Richmond. The object should have been to establish as soon as possible a position north or east of Richmond which would force the Confederates to defend Richmond or perhaps engage in another Seven Days type operation against a US army that packed much more fire power by the Summer 1863.
Following General Lee's army south and attacking it in defensive positions it had chosen, does not seem to put the maximum pressure on the Confederates.
Maximum pressure would have been created by making the Confederate Army of No. Virginia move as fast as possible.
Its true that the US administration could not perceive that making Lee's army defend Richmond put that army in an untenable logistical position.
That's enough for that observation.
I love the excerpted quotes from the participants and the observers. The care taken in finding and reproducing these quotes is a fine display of scholarship, and depth.
The US had railroads, steamships and ferries. It should have used them to get a substantial position south of Chancellorsville and the wilderness area before General Lee could get his people there.
Good book. The book about Phil Sheridan will probably make me angry.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

The object should have been to establish as soon as possible a position north or east of Richmond which would force the Confederates to defend Richmond or perhaps engage in another Seven Days type operation against a US army that packed much more fire power by the Summer 1863.

Given the condition of Meade's army after Gettysburg, Union logistical limitations, public opinion, and the failure of Dix's operations near Richmond simultaneous with the Gettysburg Campaign I simply don't think that was possible.

I'm just starting Gettysburg's Southern Front by Hampton Newsome which addresses the latter issue.

 

[wausaubob]

Given the condition of Meade's army after Gettysburg, Union logistical limitations, public opinion, and the failure of Dix's operations near Richmond simultaneous with the Gettysburg Campaign I simply don't think that was possible.

I'm just starting Gettysburg's Southern Front by Hampton Newsome which addresses the latter issue.

Not every infantry division was in bad shape. And one of the calvary divisions was available. It would have been difficult for the US forces, but the Confederates would have had trouble responding.
The problem wasn't logistics, it was two contradictory requirements: stay between the Confederates and Washington, D.C. and destroy the Confederate Army. Without some freedom of movement, the US forces were probably going to end up fighting General Lee's forces on terrain that the Confederates had chosen.

 

[Belfoured]

The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-14, 1863 Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael E. Nugent
Savas Beatie 2008
Its fun to read a book into which so much work and love has been dedicated. I am not all the way through, but I do have one observation.
The question posed as to whether General Meade was correct in refraining from attacking the Confederates at the defensive positions the Confederates arranged at Williamsport seems to me to be the wrong question.
It wasn't a race to Williamsport. It should have been a race to Richmond. The object should have been to establish as soon as possible a position north or east of Richmond which would force the Confederates to defend Richmond or perhaps engage in another Seven Days type operation against a US army that packed much more fire power by the Summer 1863.
Following General Lee's army south and attacking it in defensive positions it had chosen, does not seem to put the maximum pressure on the Confederates.
Maximum pressure would have been created by making the Confederate Army of No. Virginia move as fast as possible.
Its true that the US administration could not perceive that making Lee's army defend Richmond put that army in an untenable logistical position.
That's enough for that observation.
I love the excerpted quotes from the participants and the observers. The care taken in finding and reproducing these quotes is a fine display of scholarship, and depth.
The US had railroads, steamships and ferries. It should have used them to get a substantial position south of Chancellorsville and the wilderness area before General Lee could get his people there.
Good book. The book about Phil Sheridan will probably make me angry.

If you mean Little Phil, I recommend it. Eric makes clear at the beginning that it's intended to provoke thinking about Sheridan's performance without simply relying on the "conventional wisdom" that has long been in place and has not examined his actual conduct and achievements. He also makes clear that a reader may disagree. In fact, Wert in his foreword states that he disagrees with some of the conclusions. I recommend it because of how skillfully the book analyzes Sheridan's performance. It is, after all, written by somebody who is eminently qualified to take this on. Whether you end up agreeing with all/some/none, I predict you will find it enlightening and worth reading.

 

[Belfoured]

Not every infantry division was in bad shape. And one of the calvary divisions was available. It would have been difficult for the US forces, but the Confederates would have had trouble responding.
The problem wasn't logistics, it was two contradictory requirements: stay between the Confederates and Washington, D.C. and destroy the Confederate Army. Without some freedom of movement, the US forces were probably going to end up fighting General Lee's forces on terrain that the Confederates had chosen.

I've always cut Meade some slack on this - based on the factor you point to but also based Union losses at Gettysburg - especially the losses in the command structure, corps level on down.

 

[wausaubob]

If you mean Little Phil, I recommend it. Eric makes clear at the beginning that it's intended to provoke thinking about Sheridan's performance without simply relying on the "conventional wisdom" that has long been in place and has not examined his actual conduct and achievements. He also makes clear that a reader may disagree. In fact, Wert in his foreword states that he disagrees with some of the conclusions. I recommend it because of how skillfully the book analyzes Sheridan's performance. It is, after all, written by somebody who is eminently qualified to take this on. Whether you end up agreeing with all/some/none, I predict you will find it enlightening and worth reading.

It will be like reading the opponent's brief.

 

[Belfoured]

It will be like reading the opponent's brief.

I do that for a living. Except that in litigation I never "agree" with any of it (although I occasionally may have to silently "agree" that they've made a decent point).

 

[wausaubob]

I have to wonder if the Pennsylvania raid was a net livestock and mobility loss for General Lee's army. Although they may have collected some livestock in Pennsylvania, I have to wonder if most farmers were able to get out of the way of the Confederate army. The pressure to get to Williamsport and across the Potomac was very hard on the Confederate livestock. I don't think the Confederate Army was able to move very well after the Gettysburg operation.

 

[wausaubob]

I've always cut Meade some slack on this - based on the factor you point to but also based Union losses at Gettysburg - especially the losses in the command structure, corps level on down.

Meade and Ingalls had the best performance in May and June of 1864 when they had two options for Grant's advance. But that's not the subject these authors tackled.

 

[wausaubob]

It easy to see how Pleasonton comes in for some abuse. Pleasonton should not have been attacking General Meade's legacy after Meade had passed away. But I consider that the US infantry divisions were so constrained by the defense of Washington that only the US cavalry could inflict damage on the retreating Confederates.

 

[Elliot Crumblemuffin]

I loved this book

 

[jepridgen]

I have to wonder if the Pennsylvania raid was a net livestock and mobility loss for General Lee's army. Although they may have collected some livestock in Pennsylvania, I have to wonder if most farmers were able to get out of the way of the Confederate army. The pressure to get to Williamsport and across the Potomac was very hard on the Confederate livestock. I don't think the Confederate Army was able to move very well after the Gettysburg operation.

Read Retreat from Gettysburg: Lee, Logistic, and the Pa Campaign. It discusses the retreat with a focus on logistics although it does discuss combat where applicable.. They got a lot more back to Va with them than you'd think. They ate off confiscated livestock for quite a while.

 

[WScott]

I think that part of the problem of aggressively pursuing Lee after Gettysburg and pressuring Richmond during this time period could be traced back to Meade's relatively short tenure as Commander of the Army of the Potomac.
If you recall, Hooker was trying to pull in troops from all across the eastern seaboard for his "Master Plan" and was fighting with Lincoln and Halleck to get things his way. Didn't work and Meade took over shortly before the Battle of Gettysburg; he didn't even know all his Corp Commanders.
Lee started his retreat early on the 4th gaining time on Meade. Between time and weather Lee made good his escape.
Between Vicksburg and Gettysburg I don't think there was a reliable commander left to try and cut off Lee's retreat nor go after Richmond. In July of 1863 who ya gunna trust?

 

[rpkennedy]

The Retreat from Gettysburg and the Pursuit of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, July 4-14, 1863 Eric Wittenberg, J. David Petruzzi, and Michael E. Nugent
Savas Beatie 2008
Its fun to read a book into which so much work and love has been dedicated. I am not all the way through, but I do have one observation.
The question posed as to whether General Meade was correct in refraining from attacking the Confederates at the defensive positions the Confederates arranged at Williamsport seems to me to be the wrong question.
It wasn't a race to Williamsport. It should have been a race to Richmond. The object should have been to establish as soon as possible a position north or east of Richmond which would force the Confederates to defend Richmond or perhaps engage in another Seven Days type operation against a US army that packed much more fire power by the Summer 1863.
Following General Lee's army south and attacking it in defensive positions it had chosen, does not seem to put the maximum pressure on the Confederates.
Maximum pressure would have been created by making the Confederate Army of No. Virginia move as fast as possible.
Its true that the US administration could not perceive that making Lee's army defend Richmond put that army in an untenable logistical position.
That's enough for that observation.
I love the excerpted quotes from the participants and the observers. The care taken in finding and reproducing these quotes is a fine display of scholarship, and depth.
The US had railroads, steamships and ferries. It should have used them to get a substantial position south of Chancellorsville and the wilderness area before General Lee could get his people there.
Good book. The book about Phil Sheridan will probably make me angry.

You're ignoring Meade's number 1 priority from the administration: keep his army between the AoNV and Washington/Baltimore. On several occasions during Lee's retreat (after recrossing the Potomac River), Meade floated your idea to Lincoln and Halleck and it was shot down as too risky. With those instructions, Meade really had no choice but to shadow Lee as he moved back down the Valley.

I would highly recommend Jeffrey William Hunt's Meade and Lee After Gettysburg. It covers the end of the campaign through the Battle of Wapping Heights which concluded the campaign.

Ryan

 

[Belfoured]

You're ignoring Meade's number 1 priority from the administration: keep his army between the AoNV and Washington/Baltimore. On several occasions during Lee's retreat (after recrossing the Potomac River), Meade floated your idea to Lincoln and Halleck and it was shot down as too risky. With those instructions, Meade really had no choice but to shadow Lee as he moved back down the Valley.

I would highly recommend Jeffrey William Hunt's Meade and Lee After Gettysburg. It covers the end of the campaign through the Battle of Wapping Heights which concluded the campaign.

Ryan

An excellent recommendation - and the same goes for Jeff's two sequels about Bristoe and Rappahannock Station. I expect that his final salvo on Mine Run will be of the same high quality. For detailed tactical/operational analysis of Meade's late Summer/Fall 1863 campaigning, these books are now the "go to" source. A related study that will be highly worthwhile is @ericwittenberg's forthcoming evluation of Meade's performance.

 

[Belfoured]

I think that part of the problem of aggressively pursuing Lee after Gettysburg and pressuring Richmond during this time period could be traced back to Meade's relatively short tenure as Commander of the Army of the Potomac.
If you recall, Hooker was trying to pull in troops from all across the eastern seaboard for his "Master Plan" and was fighting with Lincoln and Halleck to get things his way. Didn't work and Meade took over shortly before the Battle of Gettysburg; he didn't even know all his Corp Commanders.
Lee started his retreat early on the 4th gaining time on Meade. Between time and weather Lee made good his escape.
Between Vicksburg and Gettysburg I don't think there was a reliable commander left to try and cut off Lee's retreat nor go after Richmond. In July of 1863 who ya gunna trust?

This touches on a significant point. Name a CO in military history who assumed command three days before a major battle while his opponent was invading the home turf and his own pursuing (and defending) army was scattered over a broad swath, requiring him to immediately determine where and when to fight and how to gather his forces. The result, as we know, was a victory after a massive three-day battle. Say what you want about Meade but that alone is an impressive achievement.

 

[wausaubob]

You're ignoring Meade's number 1 priority from the administration: keep his army between the AoNV and Washington/Baltimore. On several occasions during Lee's retreat (after recrossing the Potomac River), Meade floated your idea to Lincoln and Halleck and it was shot down as too risky. With those instructions, Meade really had no choice but to shadow Lee as he moved back down the Valley.

I would highly recommend Jeffrey William Hunt's Meade and Lee After Gettysburg. It covers the end of the campaign through the Battle of Wapping Heights which concluded the campaign.

Ryan

I disagree. The US would have had to form a separate mobile force, as it eventually did in 1864. Making the cavalry into a separate mobile, fighting and raiding force was not the doctrine at that time. But that is where Pleasonton was headed. That was Grant's goal both at Vicksburg and Chattanooga, and later in Virginia. But Meade didn't see it that way.
The authors wrote that overall the performance of the US cavalry during the retreat was good to excellent. General Stuart was capable of protecting the Confederate retreat, but the cost was high.

 

[wausaubob]

This touches on a significant point. Name a CO in military history who assumed command three days before a major battle while his opponent was invading the home turf and his own pursuing (and defending) army was scattered over a broad swath, requiring him to immediately determine where and when to fight and how to gather his forces. The result, as we know, was a victory after a massive three-day battle. Say what you want about Meade but that alone is an impressive achievement.shif

Shifting the blame to General Meade, when Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck were imposing strategic restraints on the Army of the Potomac is part of the protective envelope that encircled the memory of President Lincoln.
Perhaps instead of waiting for a crisis in Tennessee to provoke an emergency cabinet meeting and a large troop movement east to west, the news of the successful conclusion of the Vicksburg operation should have led to a west to east troop movement that brought Grant, Sherman, Ord and their commands east.
Once Rosecrans was in Chattanooga, and Burnside made it to Knoxville, maybe mandatory orders were prudent to fix the railroad to Chattanooga and fight eastward from Knoxville towards Virginia. The US dissipated its advantage into secondary political goals instead of going after the Confederates. The pace of decision making in the US administration gave General Lee time to have his army recover, and he could count on it.

 

[wausaubob]

I think that part of the problem of aggressively pursuing Lee after Gettysburg and pressuring Richmond during this time period could be traced back to Meade's relatively short tenure as Commander of the Army of the Potomac.
If you recall, Hooker was trying to pull in troops from all across the eastern seaboard for his "Master Plan" and was fighting with Lincoln and Halleck to get things his way. Didn't work and Meade took over shortly before the Battle of Gettysburg; he didn't even know all his Corp Commanders.
Lee started his retreat early on the 4th gaining time on Meade. Between time and weather Lee made good his escape.
Between Vicksburg and Gettysburg I don't think there was a reliable commander left to try and cut off Lee's retreat nor go after Richmond. In July of 1863 who ya gunna trust?

The US administration was reluctant to create a unified command structure in the east. The administration seems to have been concerned that an army general would win the war in the east and take Lincoln's place as President, like McClellan attempted. But I think McClellan, Hooker and Grant would have agreed: the US had the resources, they needed to be applied consistently and without meddling by Halleck and Stanton.

 

[wausaubob]

The retreat was very costly for both armies. The difference was that the US had the agricultural and industrial resources to make up the losses. By September the Confederacy was fighting from a very restricted territory and had only two functioning ports, Wilmington and Mobile.