Officers, how replaceable were they?

Kentucky Derby Cavalier.

First Sergeant
Joined
Oct 24, 2019
Hi friends, I have a question. For the highers up of each army, how replaceable were the usual officers? Basically from the lowest to highest ranking officer positions. Personally, when I think about higher ranking individuals that I consider to be irreplaceable I think of Thomas J. Jackson and Harry T. Buford. Both were very good at their jobs, brave, and took initiative. This doesn't really apply to everyone though, so what do you guys think?
 
I have read several books that usually related to the Confederate Cavalry. It seems that after the first 6 months or 1 year, there was an excess of officers due to how the regiments were reduced it size due to losses. Some officers found themselves without a command and some faced demotion. That is how a few ended up in the cavalry as many soldiers were getting tired of pulling garrison duty.
 
Officers could readily be replaced by promoting someone to fulfil the role.

But the abilities and experiences of outstanding field commanders could not be so easily substituted.

Thought examples of Confederate officer losses that severely dented the effectiveness of the command structure were:

Corps commander - L-G 'Stonewall' Jackson
Division commanders (M-Gs) - Dorsey Pender, JEB Stuart (cavalry), Robert Rodes, Stephen Ramseur, Patrick Cleburne
Brigade commanders (B-Gs) - Maxcy Gregg, William Barksdale, Paul Semmes, Micah Jenkins, Junius Daniel

Would regard the loss of the above officers as irreplaceable, in the sense that they were not replaced by officers with at least the same talents.
 
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I feel the loss of field grade officers was far more significant than losing corps commanders like Stonewall Jackson or John Reynolds. How irreplaceable are officers like Lt. Col Rufus Dawes (6th Wis). Maj/ Henry Abbott (20th Mass-KIA), Col. Henry Burgwyn (26th NC-KIA) and many, many others times a factor of........? The frontline men of any rank far outweigh the importance of a corps commander, for their intimate knowledge of the immediate and unsung ability to lead without instruction.
 
The problem with officer replacement is when you have a need to replace a bunch in a short period of time, you run out of qualified candidates very soon. Just look at what happened to the officer corps of lees army starting at Chancellorsville through cold harbor.
 
The issue as I see it is not looing a corp commander. (say to an accident or long term sickness)
If that happen you replace him with a division command, that gets replaced by a brigade commander and so on.

The big issue is that when you loose a corp commander in combat you very likely also lost say (invented numbers)
2 divisions commanders (1 WIA and 1 KIA)
A number of brigade commanders and a lot of regimental level officers.

So in stead of 3-4 officers all moving up one level. You have a lot of brigades, regiments and companies getting new commanders and that cause disruption and lack of coordination and effectives across the entire corp... for some time.

And every time you get promoted one step up, you need both time and a few fights to get the hang of it.
 
I think it depends on how the army is run. One reason the American military is so good is that the first line leader is encouraged to exercise initiative etc. I think losing a "good one" means the same between the platoon leader and the field grade officer. The difference is how many people it affects. When I think about the leaders I've worked with in my life I reflect on how many were good. Out of 100 10 were miserable 40 were blah 40 more were good and ten I would follow to hell. So I guess replacing a good leader is difficult and a great leader is a needle in a haystack.
The wbts wouldn't be much different than that I shouldn't think.
 
I think it depends on how the army is run. One reason the American military is so good is that the first line leader is encouraged to exercise initiative etc. I think losing a "good one" means the same between the platoon leader and the field grade officer. The difference is how many people it affects. When I think about the leaders I've worked with in my life I reflect on how many were good. Out of 100 10 were miserable 40 were blah 40 more were good and ten I would follow to hell. So I guess replacing a good leader is difficult and a great leader is a needle in a haystack.
The wbts wouldn't be much different than that I shouldn't think.
There where no specific platoon leaders. Who managed a platoon depended entirely on what it was doing.
Company officers where not allowed or excepted to take any initiative.
The unit was commanded directly by the regimental commander. And they where usually closely managed by the brigade commander.
 
The issue as I see it is not looing a corp commander. (say to an accident or long term sickness)
If that happen you replace him with a division command, that gets replaced by a brigade commander and so on.

The big issue is that when you loose a corp commander in combat you very likely also lost say (invented numbers)
2 divisions commanders (1 WIA and 1 KIA)
A number of brigade commanders and a lot of regimental level officers.

So in stead of 3-4 officers all moving up one level. You have a lot of brigades, regiments and companies getting new commanders and that cause disruption and lack of coordination and effectives across the entire corp... for some time.

And every time you get promoted one step up, you need both time and a few fights to get the hang of it.
Double edged sword. It also allows quality officers to rise into more prominent, influential positions.
 
I feel the loss of field grade officers was far more significant than losing corps commanders like Stonewall Jackson or John Reynolds. How irreplaceable are officers like Lt. Col Rufus Dawes (6th Wis). Maj/ Henry Abbott (20th Mass-KIA), Col. Henry Burgwyn (26th NC-KIA) and many, many others times a factor of........? The frontline men of any rank far outweigh the importance of a corps commander, for their intimate knowledge of the immediate and unsung ability to lead without instruction.
I think this is an excellent point. Replacing experienced field officers is probably the most important - and most difficult - task. I don't minimize the significance of losing a corps or division commander, but there's a much better chance of finding one officer as a competent replacement. Ultimately armies that win battles have a strong cadre of lower-rank officers and the more you lose at those levels, the less likely you are to find qualified replacements without significant training/down time.
 
I think this is an excellent point. Replacing experienced field officers is probably the most important - and most difficult - task. I don't minimize the significance of losing a corps or division commander, but there's a much better chance of finding one officer as a competent replacement. Ultimately armies that win battles have a strong cadre of lower-rank officers and the more you lose at those levels, the less likely you are to find qualified replacements without significant training/down time.
You also see a point of diminishing returns where an officer may be a jam up brigade division corps commander but cannot handle the next step up in class.
 
There where no specific platoon leaders. Who managed a platoon depended entirely on what it was doing.
Company officers where not allowed or excepted to take any initiative.
The unit was commanded directly by the regimental commander. And they where usually closely managed by the brigade commander.
I was referring to the current military structure in this metaphor.
 
I suspect that many officers at the beginning of the war, regimental or field, would now be classed as 'peacetime officers', that is, not battle-proven. They would have some knowledge of tactics and the drills required, but would expect ALL the men to behave as they expected and no consideration given to standards or even physical differences. They would receive their baptism of fire at the same time as their unit. The regimental officers, principally company commanders, were expected to lead from the front and therefore many would be casualties in their first action.

As with many armies, the field officers would be either 'time-served' or 'well-connected' with little regard to ability and little practice at leading in the field. Any 'front line' experience would be long ago and not necessarily line of battle. Most would be more conversant with open country and battle lines.

This would begin to change after the first few battles and skirmishes. As the officer casualties increased - or their performance left something to be desired - they would be replaced, but not necessarily by anyone with experience. Sure, sergeants would get commissioned if they showed well in battle, but often the company sergeant WAS the company man, the guy who 'made' the company, not the officer. (There were few 'Sharpe's around) . Technology was new and the tactics still revolved around rifle drills and rank discipline. Exactly the same situation faced the British army in 1854 in the Crimea and the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1866, with different outcomes. Luck has a lot to do with it too!

This would also apply to the British Army 1939-42 and, to some extent, the US Army 1942-3.
 
Hi friends, I have a question. For the highers up of each army, how replaceable were the usual officers? Basically from the lowest to highest ranking officer positions. Personally, when I think about higher ranking individuals that I consider to be irreplaceable I think of Thomas J. Jackson and Harry T. Buford. Both were very good at their jobs, brave, and took initiative. This doesn't really apply to everyone though, so what do you guys think?
How do we determine what a "usual officer" means?
There is no statisical data to specify the mean, mode and median.
I would think that many of the officers that we are familiar with are not necessarily "usual," but we "know" them because they stand out in some way.
 
How do we determine what a "usual officer" means?
There is no statisical data to specify the mean, mode and median.
I would think that many of the officers that we are familiar with are not necessarily "usual," but we "know" them because they stand out in some way.
"..the usual officers ..."
In peacetime, they are known to their men who are used to their little idiosyncrasies and personalities and make allowances for them. They know they are there to lead. The 'main man' for the company soldier is the the company sergeant who trains the men and disciplines them with the help of the platoon sergeants and they, too, get to work with the company commander and his few lieutenants and they tend to work as a team - each knowing their others strengths and weaknesses and compensating for each other.

ANY battle casualties upset this blend and new people come in. They have to be assessed and new areas of competency organised around. This period is usually marked as a re-training and re-organising stage and the unit is usually removed from the forward lines until it is up to par - that is, working as an effective team again.
 
…….Confederate officer losses that severely dented the effectiveness of the command structure were:

…….JEB Stuart (cavalry)…….

Would regard the loss of the above officers as irreplaceable, in the sense that they were not replaced by officers with at least the same talents.
Do you not consider Wade Hampton to have achieved the competency and ability of his mentor Stuart?
 

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