- Joined
- Jan 16, 2015
The players, at nightfall on July 2:
Major General George Sykes, commanding Fifth Corps
Colonel James C. Rice, commanding Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, 20th Maine, Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps
Brigadier General S. Wiley Crawford, commanding Third Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Joseph W. Fisher, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps
Lieutenant Colonel George Dare, 5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Second Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Martin D. Hardin, 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Second Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Lewis A. Grant, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Sixth Corps
Brigadier General Evander M. Law, commanding Hood's Division
Colonel James Sheffield, commanding Laws' Brigade
At nightfall on July 2, when quiet finally descended upon the hotly contested hill known as Little Round Top, plans were already being formulated among the Federals to secure the larger adjacent hill, called Big Round Top. Rice's battered brigade and Fisher's fresh brigade were immediately available for this purpose.
Fisher claimed it was his idea to secure Big Round Top. He sent an aide to Crawford and Sykes to explain the situation and request permission to carry out the task. Crawford rode up and gave Fisher the order in person. The same order came from Sykes, according to Chamberlain. Fisher approached Rice, within earshot of Chamberlain, to talk it over. Fisher declined to take the lead, claiming his men were armed with smooth bores, while Chamberlain's regiment had Springfield muskets. Moreover, the ground was difficult and his men were unfamiliar with it. Rice turned to Chamberlain, "Colonel, will you do it?" Chamberlain's anger and frustration with Fisher seems to seep through his postwar recollection of the event, but he always obeyed orders, and a request from a superior is tantamount to an order. But first he had to wake up his thoroughly exhausted and thirsty men (about 200 of them were on hand), and prepare them to resume the battle. One can only imagine their initial reaction upon being roused from a deep sleep they had so richly deserved.
Not wanting to tip off the enemy to his weakness, Chamberlain resolved that his men would use only the bayonet. There was another reason – they were apparently low on ammunition. They moved out about 9 p.m., in open order to negotiate the huge boulders scattered liberally on the slope. A nearly full moon was just rising, but it was still nearly pitch dark under the tree canopy on Big Round Top. Two of Fisher's regiments, under Dare and Hardin, were supposed to follow behind, but they were not quite ready, despite having been there for nearly two hours. When they finally started, in a regular line formation, the 20th Maine was already gone. Their line was almost immediately disrupted by the rocky terrain, and the men became more disoriented and confused as time passed.
In the meantime, Chamberlain's men steadily advanced up the slope, as Confederate skirmishers in their front fell back. As they reached the highest ground (the crest was beyond their left), the enemy opened a scattering fire, wounding a respected officer, 1st Lieutenant Arad H. Linscott of Company I (he would die on July 27). But the 20th Maine did not return the fire, which must have perplexed their opponent. Chamberlain deployed his men and sent forward his own pickets.
The Confederates resolved to scout out the situation. Lieutenant Thomas L. "Tom" Christian, formerly with Company D, 4th Alabama, but now one of Law's staff officers, personally led a group of two dozen enlisted men up the steep and rocky slope in the darkness. They encountered Lieutenant Sidlinger with five soldiers of the 20th Maine, who managed to position themselves in just the right way to capture the entire enemy party without a struggle. From them, Chamberlain learned that Hood's Division was in his front and only 200-300 yards distant.
So far, so good. But now, around 10 p.m., an undetermined but sizable force approached Chamberlain's right flank. He quickly repositioned his men to meet the new threat. Luckily it turned out to be Dare and his regiment, with Hardin following. They must have gotten lost somewhere down the northern slope of Big Round Top. Chamberlain asked Dare to join his right, but then learned that Dare was "right in front," meaning that when his regiment fronted, his men would be facing the wrong way! During the attempt to realign his regiment, which probably raised a ruckus, the Confederate skirmishers opened fire. The two regiments of Fisher scattered and bolted down the hill like "antelopes," as Chamberlain put it, not stopping until they reached the northeastern base of the hill, not far from where they had started. Hardin counted 70 of his men around him (out of 250). Over the next hour, Dare and Hardin collected their soldiers and made their way around the eastern perimeter of Big Round Top, at one time coming up behind pickets (5th Vermont) of Grant's brigade, which had just arrived on the scene. Now unopposed, Dare and Hardin brought their respective regiments to the very summit of Big Round Top, which they reached around midnight.
Meanwhile Chamberlain found himself alone again. This time he sought a reliable relief - from his own brigade, along with a request for ammunition. Rice sent up the 83rd Pennsylvania, which arrived without any issues and joined Chamberlain's right. Later on Chamberlain learned that the 5th and 12th regiments were at the summit to his left rear, but he did not consider the threat from that direction significant enough to even bother linking up with them to close the gap. The rest of the night passed without incident.
The role of the 44th New York on this night is unclear. Their support of Chamberlain is also mentioned, but details are suspiciously lacking. Perhaps they advanced toward the saddle between the hills, but no evidence (that I know of) supports even this limited movement. My feeling is that they merely extended their line into a single rank to cover the ground vacated by the 83rd Pennsylvania on their left, which would have been a prudent move. A 200-yard gap between Rice's separate positions on the two hills was partially filled by two skirmish companies of the 44th New York and Fisher's other two regiments, the 9th and 10th Pennsylvania Reserves, which moved up a short distance at daylight to close that gap.
Principal Sources:
-From Huntsville to Appomattox: R. T. Coles's History of the 4th Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry, C. S. A., Army of Northern Virginia, ed. by Jeffrey D. Stocker (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1996), p. 109.
-Official Report, Col. J. L. Sheffield, 48th Alabama.
-Busey and Busey, Confederate Casualties at Gettysburg, 1:21.
-35 Days to Gettysburg, The Campaign Diaries of Two American Enemies, by Mark Nesbit (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), p. 162.
-History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, by M. D. Hardin (New York, NY: Published by the Author, 1890), p. 154.
-Bachelder Papers, Letter of Joshua Chamberlain, 2:992-993.
-July 6, 1863 letter of Joshua Chamberlain to General Barnes.
-Maine in the War for the Union.
-Official Reports of Joshua Chamberlain and Joseph Fisher.
-Joseph Fisher, statement prepared April 8, 1878, Supplement to the Official Records, ed. by Janet B. Hewett (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 201-205.
-Address delivered Wednesday, 28th November 1866, in Feller's Hall, Madalin, township of Red Hook, Duchess County, New York, by J. Watts de Peyster, derived from correspondence with Maj. Gen. S. W. Crawford.
Major General George Sykes, commanding Fifth Corps
Colonel James C. Rice, commanding Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, 20th Maine, Third Brigade, First Division, Fifth Corps
Brigadier General S. Wiley Crawford, commanding Third Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Joseph W. Fisher, commanding Second Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps
Lieutenant Colonel George Dare, 5th Pennsylvania Reserves, Second Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Martin D. Hardin, 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, Second Brigade, Third Division, Fifth Corps
Colonel Lewis A. Grant, commanding Third Brigade, Second Division, Sixth Corps
Brigadier General Evander M. Law, commanding Hood's Division
Colonel James Sheffield, commanding Laws' Brigade
At nightfall on July 2, when quiet finally descended upon the hotly contested hill known as Little Round Top, plans were already being formulated among the Federals to secure the larger adjacent hill, called Big Round Top. Rice's battered brigade and Fisher's fresh brigade were immediately available for this purpose.
Fisher claimed it was his idea to secure Big Round Top. He sent an aide to Crawford and Sykes to explain the situation and request permission to carry out the task. Crawford rode up and gave Fisher the order in person. The same order came from Sykes, according to Chamberlain. Fisher approached Rice, within earshot of Chamberlain, to talk it over. Fisher declined to take the lead, claiming his men were armed with smooth bores, while Chamberlain's regiment had Springfield muskets. Moreover, the ground was difficult and his men were unfamiliar with it. Rice turned to Chamberlain, "Colonel, will you do it?" Chamberlain's anger and frustration with Fisher seems to seep through his postwar recollection of the event, but he always obeyed orders, and a request from a superior is tantamount to an order. But first he had to wake up his thoroughly exhausted and thirsty men (about 200 of them were on hand), and prepare them to resume the battle. One can only imagine their initial reaction upon being roused from a deep sleep they had so richly deserved.
Not wanting to tip off the enemy to his weakness, Chamberlain resolved that his men would use only the bayonet. There was another reason – they were apparently low on ammunition. They moved out about 9 p.m., in open order to negotiate the huge boulders scattered liberally on the slope. A nearly full moon was just rising, but it was still nearly pitch dark under the tree canopy on Big Round Top. Two of Fisher's regiments, under Dare and Hardin, were supposed to follow behind, but they were not quite ready, despite having been there for nearly two hours. When they finally started, in a regular line formation, the 20th Maine was already gone. Their line was almost immediately disrupted by the rocky terrain, and the men became more disoriented and confused as time passed.
In the meantime, Chamberlain's men steadily advanced up the slope, as Confederate skirmishers in their front fell back. As they reached the highest ground (the crest was beyond their left), the enemy opened a scattering fire, wounding a respected officer, 1st Lieutenant Arad H. Linscott of Company I (he would die on July 27). But the 20th Maine did not return the fire, which must have perplexed their opponent. Chamberlain deployed his men and sent forward his own pickets.
The Confederates resolved to scout out the situation. Lieutenant Thomas L. "Tom" Christian, formerly with Company D, 4th Alabama, but now one of Law's staff officers, personally led a group of two dozen enlisted men up the steep and rocky slope in the darkness. They encountered Lieutenant Sidlinger with five soldiers of the 20th Maine, who managed to position themselves in just the right way to capture the entire enemy party without a struggle. From them, Chamberlain learned that Hood's Division was in his front and only 200-300 yards distant.
So far, so good. But now, around 10 p.m., an undetermined but sizable force approached Chamberlain's right flank. He quickly repositioned his men to meet the new threat. Luckily it turned out to be Dare and his regiment, with Hardin following. They must have gotten lost somewhere down the northern slope of Big Round Top. Chamberlain asked Dare to join his right, but then learned that Dare was "right in front," meaning that when his regiment fronted, his men would be facing the wrong way! During the attempt to realign his regiment, which probably raised a ruckus, the Confederate skirmishers opened fire. The two regiments of Fisher scattered and bolted down the hill like "antelopes," as Chamberlain put it, not stopping until they reached the northeastern base of the hill, not far from where they had started. Hardin counted 70 of his men around him (out of 250). Over the next hour, Dare and Hardin collected their soldiers and made their way around the eastern perimeter of Big Round Top, at one time coming up behind pickets (5th Vermont) of Grant's brigade, which had just arrived on the scene. Now unopposed, Dare and Hardin brought their respective regiments to the very summit of Big Round Top, which they reached around midnight.
Meanwhile Chamberlain found himself alone again. This time he sought a reliable relief - from his own brigade, along with a request for ammunition. Rice sent up the 83rd Pennsylvania, which arrived without any issues and joined Chamberlain's right. Later on Chamberlain learned that the 5th and 12th regiments were at the summit to his left rear, but he did not consider the threat from that direction significant enough to even bother linking up with them to close the gap. The rest of the night passed without incident.
The role of the 44th New York on this night is unclear. Their support of Chamberlain is also mentioned, but details are suspiciously lacking. Perhaps they advanced toward the saddle between the hills, but no evidence (that I know of) supports even this limited movement. My feeling is that they merely extended their line into a single rank to cover the ground vacated by the 83rd Pennsylvania on their left, which would have been a prudent move. A 200-yard gap between Rice's separate positions on the two hills was partially filled by two skirmish companies of the 44th New York and Fisher's other two regiments, the 9th and 10th Pennsylvania Reserves, which moved up a short distance at daylight to close that gap.
Principal Sources:
-From Huntsville to Appomattox: R. T. Coles's History of the 4th Regiment Alabama Volunteer Infantry, C. S. A., Army of Northern Virginia, ed. by Jeffrey D. Stocker (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1996), p. 109.
-Official Report, Col. J. L. Sheffield, 48th Alabama.
-Busey and Busey, Confederate Casualties at Gettysburg, 1:21.
-35 Days to Gettysburg, The Campaign Diaries of Two American Enemies, by Mark Nesbit (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), p. 162.
-History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, by M. D. Hardin (New York, NY: Published by the Author, 1890), p. 154.
-Bachelder Papers, Letter of Joshua Chamberlain, 2:992-993.
-July 6, 1863 letter of Joshua Chamberlain to General Barnes.
-Maine in the War for the Union.
-Official Reports of Joshua Chamberlain and Joseph Fisher.
-Joseph Fisher, statement prepared April 8, 1878, Supplement to the Official Records, ed. by Janet B. Hewett (Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 201-205.
-Address delivered Wednesday, 28th November 1866, in Feller's Hall, Madalin, township of Red Hook, Duchess County, New York, by J. Watts de Peyster, derived from correspondence with Maj. Gen. S. W. Crawford.
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