Nicodemus Heights

Andy Cardinal

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In his history of the battle, Francis Palfrey pointed out that Nicodemus Heights were "far enough to the west to enable the force holding it to take not only in flank but in reverse the whole of the Confederate position." It seems that if Hooker had decided to seize the Heights in force, Lee's position would have been untenable.

McClellan had not carried out any sort of reconnaissance on that part of the field, and I am unaware that anyone from the Engineers staff did so either. Hooker was sent across the Antietam to assault Lee's left, so it would seem that the decision of how to attack was left to him.

The axis of the attack was south along the Hagerstown Pike, with Nicodemus Heights more or less ignored. I am interested in anyone's thoughts or comments on this missed opportunity. Thanks.
 
I recall from reading either Harsh or Rafuse that McClellan really couldn't scout that area because Lee's cavalry had the northern end of his line covered all the way to the Potomac and it wasn't feasible to cross the river to gain the rear of the Confederates. The terrain behind the Sharpsburg ridge was party wooded and undulating, so it really was difficult to determine just how many troops were in the area. The best vantage point for scouting was Red Hill and the other elevated heights on the east side of the Antietam.

I also recall, though not sure where I read this or if I recall correctly, that Hooker/McClellan thought the hill where S.D. Lee's guns were positioned (where the Visitor Center is now) was a more valuable position to hold than Nicodemus Heights. I think it had something to do with the centrality of the location, and holding it would have made Lee's line untenable. Maybe someone else can comment on this.

That said, on the evening of the 17th as well as sometime on the 18th, Franklin tried to convince McClellan to allow him to try to take Nicodemus Heights. McClellan wanted to wait until he knew for sure he had adequate and well-rested troops able to follow up on any attack there. It wasn't until late on the 18th that McClellan approved of trying to take the heights the morning of the 19th. Of course by then, Lee had retreated.
 
According to Harsh (pp 370-371), Hooker "decided his object would be the high flat ground from which S. D. Lee’s artillery battalion was clearly visible almost a mile directly south in his front. This plateau (on which the small white Dunkard Church was located) was truly a critical point. The ground to its front (east) fell away sharply to form the dale in which lay the Sunken Road and the hinge in D. H. Hill’s line, meant to cover the flank of the bluffs crowning the Antietam. With this plateau in Confederate hands, a Federal assault could not have succeeded against the hinge in Lee’s line. Once it was occupied by the Federals, however, an attack on the Sunken Road almost could not fail. Unfortunately for Hooker, in order to get to the plateau, he had first to dispose of the salient Jackson had constructed a half-mile in its front for its protection."

Further, he writes (p. 372): "If Hooker failed to anticipate fully the fierce combat that would erupt when he tried to seize the Dunkard Church plateau, he was guilty of naively assuming the Confederates did not recognize the key to the defense of their entire line. Jackson must have been pleased when he saw the enemy intended to assail his salient directly on its face and upper right shank. Shortly after daybreak, he swung his left flank 180 degrees to the north by sending Early’s brigade to support Stuart and the artillery on Nicodemus Hill. This position now became doubly important, as it allowed the Confederates to enfilade the western flank of the Federals advancing on both the Smoketown Road and the Hagerstown Pike; and it subjected them to a cross fire from the guns of S. D. Lee to the south."
 
Thanks for finding the Harsh quotes. The first paragraph you quoted what I was thinking of when I mentioned S. D. Lee's position. It doesn't explain the choice not to attack Nicodemus Heights, though. Someone better versed in military tactics will have to answer that one.
 
Rafuse (p. 314): "With authority over the battle north of Sharpsburg delegated to him by McClellan and no other directions but to press the enemy left, Hooker set as his objective the only landmark he could clearly see through the smoke and early morning light, the Dunker Church at the plateau where the Smoketown Road and Hagerstown Pike intersected. Although Mansfield’s two divisions had crossed the creek the night before and gone into bivouac only a few miles to the north on the Smoketown Road, Hooker decided not to wait until they were up before making his attack— which suggests McClellan may have impressed upon him his expectations for the initial attack more successfully than Hooker’s later statements would suggest. Hooker, however, made no provision for dealing with a rise to the west of the Hagerstown Pike called Nicodemus Hill that provided the rebels with an excellent position from which to enfilade the Union right with artillery.... Despite the carnage and Hooker’s inexplicable failure to do anything about Nicodemus Hill, before long the weight of the First Corps attack began driving Jones and Lawton from their position."
 
Jeb Stuart's observations concerning Nicodemus Hill taken from his report following the Battle of Sharpsburg as found in the Official Records Series 1, Volume XIX, Part 1, pages 814. The main snippet is found on page 819. It appears Hooker never had the opportunity to occupy Nicodemus Hill before the Confederates took possession. In his own unfinished report (pages 216 - 219) Hooker mentions total unfamiliarity of the ground and minimal cavalry support. He also mentioned that during the preceding night (Sept 16 - 17) Jackson's command had arrived and the Confederates had "planted field batteries on high ground on our right and rear, to enfilade our lines when exposed during the advance.

Numbers 206. Report of Major General James E. E. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry, of operations September 2-20.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS,
February 13, 1864.

COLONEL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the cavalry division, from the battle of Groveton Heights, August 30, 1862, to the recrossing of the Potomac, September 18, 1862.

**********
I reported, in person, to General Jackson at Harper's Ferry, and thence rode, at his request, to communicate to him General Jackson's news and information. Our army being in line of battle on the heights overlooking the Antietam, I was assigned to the left, where Brigadier General Fitz. Lee's brigade took position after his severe engagement near Boonsborough between the enemy and his rear guard, Munford's small command being on the right.

On the afternoon of the 16th the enemy was discovered moving a column across the Antietam to the pike, with the view of turning our left beyond the Dunkard church. This was duly reported and the movement watched. A little skirmishing took place before night. I moved the cavalry still farther to the left, making way for our infantry, and crowned a commanding hill with artillery, ready for the attack in the morning. General Jackson had arrived in time from Harper's Ferry, with a part of his command, on the night before, to take position on this line, and the attack began very early next morning. The cavalry was held as a support for the artillery, which was very advantageously posted so as to bring an enfilading fire upon the enemy's right.

**********
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.

Colonel R. H. CHILTON,
Chief of Staff, Army of Northern Virginia.​
 
This brings up another point I have always wondered about and not found answered satisfactorily to my mind -- what was McClellan doing with the cavalry?

I realize it would be another 9 months before the Union cavalry would reach some level of ability to compare with Stuart's. The cavalry force with the Army of the Potomac was minimal. But McClellan claimed to be concerned about a massive rebel force hidden from view behind the ridges and hills. It would seem sending even a few cavalry regiments to cover Hooker's flank would have been an expected precaution. If McClellan really believed unseen Confederates were massed out of view, he was risking the destruction of a relatively unsupported 1st Corps.
 
Below is from page 346 of Taken at the Flood where Harsh mentions a couple of reasons why McClellan might not have employed his cavalry in the northern end of the field.

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Regarding the First Corps being relatively unsupported, I don't believe they were at much risk when first crossing Antietam Creek, as the Confederates were still some distance to the west. McClellan may have been waiting to see how Lee responded to the threat of an attack by the First Corps. Once McClellan saw that Lee was going to stand and fight and was reinforcing his left flank, he ordered the Twelfth Corps to support Hooker. Again, this is all from Harsh, pp. 344-354, which is a really interesting summary of what McClellan's thinking might have been on the 16th and 17th.
 
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