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Their second act was to state they would not arm their militia or to take any measure which would be construed as "hostile" towards the federal government.

Then who did the governor ordered disperse to stave off the attack, as stated in the excerpt from your book?

As for Maryland flirting with secession: it was brought up for a vote at all, and was supported by a not insignificant minority of the state's white residents.

My advice to you is to find some other book which the cover pleases you greatly and you can just tell by natural instinct that it is a good book.

I was not among those earlier in the thread debating the meaning of the cover art.

But what is disturbing is that this is the 2nd time that you are somehow supporting the federal government attacking a civilian city in a state that had not seceded. There is something wrong with justifying that. There would be no doubt that thousands of innocent men, woman and children would have been slaughtered in such an event since on April 25, 1861 Lincoln had already directed Gen. Scott to "Bombard their cites" if there was a conflict and those instructions were passed by Scott to his field commanders.

You seem be arguing Lincoln and Scott were prepared to raze Baltimore to the ground. That not only seems hyperbolic on its face, it's not at all the impression I got from the excerpt of your book that was posted.

I think the core of our disagreement lies not within the facts uncovered in your research, but how you have chosen to interpret them. In particular, you perceive a great deal of malicious intent.
 
The big picture here is that there was an attack order issued against the city of Baltimore that somehow had been dropped from our history. You have to go back 122 years to G.P. Radcliffe that first wrote of it. The orders (multiple) are right there in the War of Rebellion so there is no denying this. Why has this history disappeared? I can only guess but just a few days prior to the initial attack order by Gen. Scott, Lincoln instructed Scott to "bombard their cites" if they took arms against the United States and Scott passed these instructions to Gen. Butler who was to attack Baltimore. Trust me - it would have been a blood bath and if you know anything about how Marylanders fought in the revolutionary war, you will realize they would have stood their ground. The written instructions from Lincoln to Scott had been "re-interpreted" by modern historians into Lincoln only meant for such a measure if Maryland actually seceded. Maybe this is why the attack order of Baltimore disappeared since Lincoln's instructions were used for that attack and you can't "re-interpret" Lincoln's intentions if history tells that his instructions were to be used during this planned attack just days after he issued them. (but I am only speculating here). I do not "like" this history about our 16th President but what I dislike even more is that somewhere along the line this history was "sugar coated" where the darker side was suppressed, and false information prevailed.

You seem to rely on allot of misinformation disseminated by the administration and the Northern press that continues to this day. There was no vote of the legislature on secession - what you stated is false. Democracy was practiced by the people organizing into conventions, after debating the issues they would pass resolutions which they would send to the governor which were simply meant to inform the governor of the wishes and desire of the people that joined in convention. (Basic constitutional right of the people to assemble and to present their government their wishes and grievances) The Northern press labeled a convention held by the "Constitutional Unionist" of Maryland a "secession convention." This was a false label applied at that time which carries to this day propagated by historians who did not do their research and which you allude to. However, they did not even propose a resolution on secession. And my book details exactly what they accomplished. Because they were "constitutional" unionist who placed the Constitution first and foremost they were labeled "disloyal" by the administration because they were against Lincoln's violations of the Constitution. Labels of "Southern Sympathizers" and "Secessionist" were placed upon them and constitutional protections were denied them. Marylanders who held the political view of "constitutional Unionist" were subjected to imprisonment for being "disloyal" to the President though they supported the adherence to our Constitution. Interesting history when a person who supports the Constitution was branded "disloyal" and was subject to imprisonment. So you are asserting false information above in your post that originated in false information during that time that was intended to promote Lincoln's war policies and manipulate public opinion. What you do not realize and is just now coming to light is that there was another dimension to that war and it was the war for public opinion- in other word "fake news" (propaganda). There was a huge amount of disinformation disseminated that later became historical "fact." Bottom line is there is only one book written on this subject of this crisis in Maryland and that is mine, and it wades through the actual events in Maryland and the misinformation disseminated by the Northern press and the federal government to manipulate and control public opinion.
 
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"There was no vote of the legislature on secession - what you stated is false."

This is an odd assertion. Care to elaborate?

FYI - You've got me hooked -- I'll be reading your book in full before long.
 
The big picture here is that there was an attack order issued against the city of Baltimore that somehow had been dropped from our history. You have to go back 122 years to G.P. Radcliffe that first wrote of it. The orders (multiple) are right there in the War of Rebellion so there is no denying this. Why has this history disappeared? I can only guess but just a few days prior to the initial attack order by Gen. Scott, Lincoln instructed Scott to "bombard their cites" if they took arms against the United States and Scott passed these instructions to Gen. Butler who was to attack Baltimore. Trust me - it would have been a blood bath and if you know anything about how Marylanders fought in the revolutionary war, you will realize they would have stood their ground. The written instructions from Lincoln to Scott had been "re-interpreted" by modern historians into Lincoln only meant for such a measure if Maryland actually seceded. Maybe this is why the attack order of Baltimore disappeared since Lincoln's instructions were used for that attack and you can't "re-interpret" Lincoln's intentions if history tells that his instructions were to be used during this planned attack just days after he issued them. (but I am only speculating here). I do not "like" this history about our 16th President but what I dislike even more is that somewhere along the line this history was "sugar coated" where the darker side was suppressed, and false information prevailed.

You seem to rely on allot of misinformation disseminated by the administration and the Northern press that continues to this day. There was no vote of the legislature on secession - what you stated is false. Democracy was practiced by the people organizing into conventions, after debating the issues they would pass resolutions which they would send to the governor which were simply meant to inform the governor of the wishes and desire of the people that joined in convention. (Basic constitutional right of the people to assemble and to present their government their wishes and grievances) The Northern press labeled a convention held by the "Constitutional Unionist" of Maryland a "secession convention." This was a false label applied at that time which carries to this day propagated by historians who did not do their research and which you allude to. However, they did not even propose a resolution on secession. And my book details exactly what they accomplished. Because they were "constitutional" unionist who placed the Constitution first and foremost they were labeled "disloyal" by the administration because they were against Lincoln's violations of the Constitution. Labels of "Southern Sympathizers" and "Secessionist" were placed upon them and constitutional protections were denied them. Marylanders who held the political view of "constitutional Unionist" were subjected to imprisonment for being "disloyal" to the President though they supported the adherence to our Constitution. Interesting history when a person who supports the Constitution was branded "disloyal" and was subject to imprisonment. So you are asserting false information above in your post that originated in false information during that time that was intended to promote Lincoln's war policies and manipulate public opinion. What you do not realize and is just now coming to light is that there was another dimension to that war and it was the war for public opinion- in other word "fake news" (propaganda). There was a huge amount of disinformation disseminated that later became historical "fact." Bottom line is there is only one book written on this subject of this crisis in Maryland and that is mine, and it wades through the actual events in Maryland and the misinformation disseminated by the Northern press and the federal government to manipulate and control public opinion.
"The orders (multiple) are right there in the War of Rebellion so there is no denying this."

Out of curiosity, what are the citations to the orders?
 
"The orders (multiple) are right there in the War of Rebellion so there is no denying this."

Out of curiosity, what are the citations to the orders?
Gen Scott to his generals April 28,1861, WoR series 1, vol 2 p. 607 and there are others
 
"There was no vote of the legislature on secession - what you stated is false."

This is an odd assertion. Care to elaborate?

FYI - You've got me hooked -- I'll be reading your book in full before long.
Thank you so much! I am overloaded with family business this evening and will give you a detailed reply tomorrow.
 
For relaying Lincoln's instructions to bombard Maryland's cities: Scott to Butler, WoR, series 2, vol 2 p. 602.
Thanks for clarifying that. I figured you meant those communications but didn't know if there were others.

I'm not sure I understand the material distinction you draw regarding Lincoln's April 25 letter to Scott (incorporated in Scott's April 26 to Butler) and the reference by some to Scott's authority being conditioned on "secession". As you note, Lincoln conditioned his authorization to Scott on the legislature "arm[ing] their people against the United States". That sounds an awful lot like an unlawful insurrection without even the pretense of legality under secession. (I note that in the same letter Lincoln forbade him from arresting the legislature before they acted on the grounds that "they have a clearly legal right to assemble").

Regarding this issue alone, I assume your book looks objectively at everything that was going on in and around Baltimore in late April/early May, including the Maryland Adjutant General diverting to Stonewall Jackson ordnance that was intended for Baltimore and Gov. Hicks' April 22 letter telling Lincoln to not send troops through Maryland, that a "truce" be offered by Lincoln, and that Lord Lyons be brought in as a "mediator". Those are rather disconcerting points from the Governor of a state where admittedly the passage of Union troops to the threatened US capital wsas being objected to and whch had already resulted in violence.
 
"There was no vote of the legislature on secession - what you stated is false."

This is an odd assertion. Care to elaborate?

FYI - You've got me hooked -- I'll be reading your book in full before long.
Three days after the April 19 civil unrest in Baltimore Gov. Hicks called for a special session of the State Legislature to convene. On the 24th he instructed them to meet in the city of Frederick since Annapolis was being occupied by Gen. Butler who had also seized the surrounding rail roads. On the 25th the Gov. gave the Legislature a written message bringing them up to date on what has transpired and the actions he had taken. He also gave them advise that Maryland should remain neutral in the conflict. The Legislature met in Frederick on the 26th and the first thing they published was a Proclamation to the People of Maryland. This special session of the legislature was open to the public who would view their discussion and debates. All except for one early session to discuss Sen. Yellott's "committee of safety" proposal was held openly. The Legislature would order thousands of copies of reports and resolutions they had generated printed and disseminated throughout Maryland and the press reported on their daily activities.

Anyway back to the Proclamation to the People of Maryland they created on April 27th. This proclamation stated that they had listened to the desires of their constituents and proclaimed that the Maryland State Legislature had no constitutional authority to issue an ordinance of secession. Now in this respect the "constitutional authority" they refereed to was with respect to the Maryland Constitution. The Maryland Legislature never voted on secession. Some later historians fell into a trap into believing the conventions held in Baltimore were somehow official government conventions to decide on secession. I can not fault them since even during that time the Northern press was calling the convention hosted by the "Constitutional Unionist" a "convention on secession" and the delegates to that convention were aware of this misinformation. To understand the conventions you have to understand how democracy was practiced in Maryland up to that time. For local issues a meeting would be announced by whoever was interested and wanted to host a meeting of the local citizens on a certain subject. Citizens would attend become informed, debate the issues and often there would be resolutions generated and agreed to. These resolutions would then be given to the local government officials to communicate to them the desires of the people on that subject - but they were not binding and only advisory to the elected officials. On a state wide issue the process would work the same, however each county would first meet and elect delegates to the statewide conventions and they often had restrictions placed upon them. All of this was "grass roots" democracy from the citizens up and not organized by the government. (Our U.S. Constitution states that it is a basic right of the people to assemble.) The conventions in Baltimore in early 1861 were just that, a grass roots origination of the citizens that discussed and debated the issues and created resolutions which they gave to the governor to communicate the wishes of the people, but such were advisory only. The Maryland Constitution did have provisions for a "Sovereign Convention" of the people from which they could change and alter their form of government. However a sovereign convention would have to be called by the Legislature and then even if the delegates chose to alter or abolish their form of government it would have to be approved through a general election of the citizens. The second thing the Maryland Legislature accomplished after meeting in Frederick was to proclaim that they would not call a sovereign convention or to arm the state militia again with thousands of copies printed and disseminated. I hope this answers your question.... lol.
 
Thanks for clarifying that. I figured you meant those communications but didn't know if there were others.

I'm not sure I understand the material distinction you draw regarding Lincoln's April 25 letter to Scott (incorporated in Scott's April 26 to Butler) and the reference by some to Scott's authority being conditioned on "secession". As you note, Lincoln conditioned his authorization to Scott on the legislature "arm[ing] their people against the United States". That sounds an awful lot like an unlawful insurrection without even the pretense of legality under secession. (I note that in the same letter Lincoln forbade him from arresting the legislature before they acted on the grounds that "they have a clearly legal right to assemble").

Regarding this issue alone, I assume your book looks objectively at everything that was going on in and around Baltimore in late April/early May, including the Maryland Adjutant General diverting to Stonewall Jackson ordnance that was intended for Baltimore and Gov. Hicks' April 22 letter telling Lincoln to not send troops through Maryland, that a "truce" be offered by Lincoln, and that Lord Lyons be brought in as a "mediator". Those are rather disconcerting points from the Governor of a state where admittedly the passage of Union troops to the threatened US capital wsas being objected to and whch had already resulted in violence.
Excellent questions! The direct quote from Lincoln to Scott was " If it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to
adopt the most prompt, and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment of their cities."
Many follow on historian (I did not name names or book titles) claim that what Lincoln meant was if Maryland seceded and was to join in arm insurrection against the Union - then Scott was directed to bombard Maryland's cites. However, these instructions were immediately passed from Gen. Scott to Gen Butler who would be a primary commander in the attack against Baltimore. It certainly appears that these instructions were to be implemented if the militias in Baltimore resisted the attack by the four regiments to attack the city. That the indiscriminate bombardment of the city was authorized by the President if they resisted. Further evidence was that after the "Battle of Baltimore" was over Gen. Butler proclaimed that if anyone shot at the troops passing through Baltimore then he would "blow up their house." We also have the guns on Federal Hill and of Ft. Mchenry trained towards the city itself.
I think Lincoln's instructions to "bombard their cites" had an impact on the Governor and the State Legislature since the Legislature proclaimed in early May that they would not arm their militia or take any action that could be construed as "hostile" towards the federal government. Shortly after and starting in May Gov. Hicks ordered the collections of all State arms held by the state militia and had them turned over to the Federal forces. The Maryland Legislature investigated this and proclaimed that Governor's actions violated the Maryland Constitution, but they also stated that they would not re-arm the Maryland militia. This dis-arming of Maryland is a major point in the analysis of the arrest of the Legislature in September. Gen. Dix knew full well Maryland was disarmed, almost fully occupied and I quote Dix as stating that there was "no difficulty in holding Maryland militarily." By the time the Legislature was imprisoned, Maryland had no military force to resist, had been occupied by an overwhelming force of Union troops and any Marylander who wanted to take arms against the Union had already left the State.

As to your second rounds of questions, yes I do detail much but not all of what you said. An entire book could be written on what transpired in April / May 1861. At this point in time Hicks publicly proclaimed he wanted Maryland to remain neutral, but he soon turned towards and supported Lincoln's policies both nationally and towards Maryland. As stated above Hicks was instrumental in de-arming the Maryland militia and I have numerous citations of his communications with the Union Generals and vis versa. After leaving office Hicks was re-warded by Lincoln with a commission as a Union General. Early after the civil unrest on the 19th both Baltimore Mayor Brown and Gov. Hicks did not want more troops to pass through Baltimore. This was not because they wanted to openly defy the President but because the reality was that the citizens of Baltimore were hugely agitated and they knew that any further passing of federal troops would lead to violence on a scale far larger than what was seen on the 19th. I re-iterate that this was because of the agitation of the people and the government of Maryland took measure to avoid conflict. Since you are very sophisticated in CW history, I probably don't have to tell you that their agitation was based upon the North using force against the states and had nothing to do with abolition. Both Pres. Lincoln and Gen. Scott agreed that they would march around Baltimore and use other routes. Mayor Brown agreed that he would work to get his people under control and will protect the federal troop to the best of his abilities.

As to Lord Lyon's acting as a mediator, I believe that proposal related to Lyons being a mediator between Lincoln and Davis, but that idea seemed to have fissiled. I do briefly talk about how the Maryland Legislature sent "peace commissioners" to meet with Lincoln and Davis asking them to hold off on any hostilities until Congress convened and hopefully broker a resolution acceptable to all. That also did not go anywhere though the Maryland peace commissioners were sent.

Gov. Hicks did communicate to Pres. Lincoln that he could not supply the 4 regiments from Maryland at that time due to the agitated state of affairs in Maryland. I believe this was within the April 22 communication you refer to. However, it was not long afterwards that Hicks informed Lincoln that he would supply the President the regiments of Marylanders and there was an agreement that the Marylanders would only be used for the protection of the Capitol itself or within Maryland. Though such was agreed to, the limitation on using Marylanders only in Maryland or for the defense of the Capitol was not honored by the President.
 
Excellent questions! The direct quote from Lincoln to Scott was " If it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to
adopt the most prompt, and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment of their cities."
Many follow on historian (I did not name names or book titles) claim that what Lincoln meant was if Maryland seceded and was to join in arm insurrection against the Union - then Scott was directed to bombard Maryland's cites. However, these instructions were immediately passed from Gen. Scott to Gen Butler who would be a primary commander in the attack against Baltimore. It certainly appears that these instructions were to be implemented if the militias in Baltimore resisted the attack by the four regiments to attack the city. That the indiscriminate bombardment of the city was authorized by the President if they resisted. Further evidence was that after the "Battle of Baltimore" was over Gen. Butler proclaimed that if anyone shot at the troops passing through Baltimore then he would "blow up their house." We also have the guns on Federal Hill and of Ft. Mchenry trained towards the city itself.
I think Lincoln's instructions to "bombard their cites" had an impact on the Governor and the State Legislature since the Legislature proclaimed in early May that they would not arm their militia or take any action that could be construed as "hostile" towards the federal government. Shortly after and starting in May Gov. Hicks ordered the collections of all State arms held by the state militia and had them turned over to the Federal forces. The Maryland Legislature investigated this and proclaimed that Governor's actions violated the Maryland Constitution, but they also stated that they would not re-arm the Maryland militia. This dis-arming of Maryland is a major point in the analysis of the arrest of the Legislature in September. Gen. Dix knew full well Maryland was disarmed, almost fully occupied and I quote Dix as stating that there was "no difficulty in holding Maryland militarily." By the time the Legislature was imprisoned, Maryland had no military force to resist, had been occupied by an overwhelming force of Union troops and any Marylander who wanted to take arms against the Union had already left the State.

As to your second rounds of questions, yes I do detail much but not all of what you said. An entire book could be written on what transpired in April / May 1861. At this point in time Hicks publicly proclaimed he wanted Maryland to remain neutral, but he soon turned towards and supported Lincoln's policies both nationally and towards Maryland. As stated above Hicks was instrumental in de-arming the Maryland militia and I have numerous citations of his communications with the Union Generals and vis versa. After leaving office Hicks was re-warded by Lincoln with a commission as a Union General. Early after the civil unrest on the 19th both Baltimore Mayor Brown and Gov. Hicks did not want more troops to pass through Baltimore. This was not because they wanted to openly defy the President but because the reality was that the citizens of Baltimore were hugely agitated and they knew that any further passing of federal troops would lead to violence on a scale far larger than what was seen on the 19th. I re-iterate that this was because of the agitation of the people and the government of Maryland took measure to avoid conflict. Since you are very sophisticated in CW history, I probably don't have to tell you that their agitation was based upon the North using force against the states and had nothing to do with abolition. Both Pres. Lincoln and Gen. Scott agreed that they would march around Baltimore and use other routes. Mayor Brown agreed that he would work to get his people under control and will protect the federal troop to the best of his abilities.

As to Lord Lyon's acting as a mediator, I believe that proposal related to Lyons being a mediator between Lincoln and Davis, but that idea seemed to have fissiled. I do briefly talk about how the Maryland Legislature sent "peace commissioners" to meet with Lincoln and Davis asking them to hold off on any hostilities until Congress convened and hopefully broker a resolution acceptable to all. That also did not go anywhere though the Maryland peace commissioners were sent.

Gov. Hicks did communicate to Pres. Lincoln that he could not supply the 4 regiments from Maryland at that time due to the agitated state of affairs in Maryland. I believe this was within the April 22 communication you refer to. However, it was not long afterwards that Hicks informed Lincoln that he would supply the President the regiments of Marylanders and there was an agreement that the Marylanders would only be used for the protection of the Capitol itself or within Maryland. Though such was agreed to, the limitation on using Marylanders only in Maryland or for the defense of the Capitol was not honored by the President.
Thanks for answering these. One of the difficulties in looking at this from the perspective of 160 years is that - especially in the April 12 - June time frame - the circumstances from the US side and the absolute need to defend Washington presented a number of previously un-encountered threats to national survival. Especially after the mob violence in Baltimore against the 19th Massachusetts, which was merely on its way to Washington, I understand Lincoln's grave concerns about what was happening in Maryland, where without question there was a good amount of pro-secession sentiment and there were acts of sabotage against railroad and telegraph lines. If Maryland formally or as a practical matter ended up aligned with the CSA, Washington was in effect under siege. I think both sides - the Administration and Maryland's government - were trying to walk lines that had no clear boundaries. For me, it's essential that anybody tackling this period acknowledge the balancing and the murky lines. Only one example was Lincoln's April 25 message to Scott - recognizing, on the one hand, the "right to assemble" and, on the other, the need to respond with force if Maryland "armed its citizens against the US". I find it useful to put myself in somebody's role and ask what I would have done. Full disclosure - my starting point is that if I'm Lincoln my obligation is to preserve the Union, oppose its dissolution, and protect Washington. What that requires me to do and where that falls gets into the gray areas - muddled by what was rumor and what was fact, a problem for both sides.

Everybody likes the easy "good" or "bad" binary choice. That may feed rooting interests that tend to surface in forums like this, but it is far from objective - IMHO, of course.
 
Thanks for answering these. One of the difficulties in looking at this from the perspective of 160 years is that - especially in the April 12 - June time frame - the circumstances from the US side and the absolute need to defend Washington presented a number of previously un-encountered threats to national survival. Especially after the mob violence in Baltimore against the 19th Massachusetts, which was merely on its way to Washington, I understand Lincoln's grave concerns about what was happening in Maryland, where without question there was a good amount of pro-secession sentiment and there were acts of sabotage against railroad and telegraph lines. If Maryland formally or as a practical matter ended up aligned with the CSA, Washington was in effect under siege. I think both sides - the Administration and Maryland's government - were trying to walk lines that had no clear boundaries. For me, it's essential that anybody tackling this period acknowledge the balancing and the murky lines. Only one example was Lincoln's April 25 message to Scott - recognizing, on the one hand, the "right to assemble" and, on the other, the need to respond with force if Maryland "armed its citizens against the US". I find it useful to put myself in somebody's role and ask what I would have done. Full disclosure - my starting point is that if I'm Lincoln my obligation is to preserve the Union, oppose its dissolution, and protect Washington. What that requires me to do and where that falls gets into the gray areas - muddled by what was rumor and what was fact, a problem for both sides.

Everybody likes the easy "good" or "bad" binary choice. That may feed rooting interests that tend to surface in forums like this, but it is far from objective - IMHO, of course.
I do agree on most of this except one. If I was Lincoln I would have messaged for Congress to convene as soon as possible and worked to resolve the problem with both Congress along with help from the Supreme Court. In other words through our democratic process. Many justify Lincoln that he had no choice but in reality there were allot of choices and he made them himself. It would have been nice if the Supreme Court could have provided constitutional guidance about the southern states assertion to the right of secession and if Congress could have been part of the process either to use force or find resolution without force. It was just rumor that the confederates would attack the Capitol and as I discovered a confederate attack on the Capitol was false information put out from Washington in August 1861 which may very well be the basis many people believe today that the Capitol was threatened. But as President it would be Lincoln's responsibility to protect Washington immediately no matter what. Let's not forget there originally was a buffer between Washington and the original 7 states that seceded. It was not until Lincoln stated that he would enter those states with force (without Congress weighing in btw) that VA and NC seceded. Many historians today believe Lincoln specifically put off convening Congress until July 4 so that they would not be in the way. I agree with that. Congress could have had a quorum within weeks of Lincoln's call to convene and he could have called for that even before his inauguration. But I am just hypothesizing alternative history which there are so many variables that you can not know how things would turn out. We do know however that Lincoln called the shots and pretty much assumed powers of a dictator and believed he could not work within the constrains of the Constitution. The Maryland legislature believed that the best hope for future re-union would have been to let those 7 states go in peace which is a valid position and pretty much the position of President Buchanan. Would have had a USA with 7 less states but saved 850,000 lives,11 destroyed cities and allot of expense and animosity. But then there was slavery that needed to end, but the British gave a good example how to end that without blood shed. Again all hypothesizing alternate history. But writing history is not about justifying actions that took place or hypothesizing alternative historical timelines - that should be up to the reader to determine. My role in writing this history is to just lay it out there for folks to read and decide for themselves maybe even to learn from and maybe apply such lessons to our troubles today.
 
I do agree on most of this except one. If I was Lincoln I would have messaged for Congress to convene as soon as possible and worked to resolve the problem with both Congress along with help from the Supreme Court. In other words through our democratic process. Many justify Lincoln that he had no choice but in reality there were allot of choices and he made them himself. It would have been nice if the Supreme Court could have provided constitutional guidance about the southern states assertion to the right of secession and if Congress could have been part of the process either to use force or find resolution without force. It was just rumor that the confederates would attack the Capitol and as I discovered a confederate attack on the Capitol was false information put out from Washington in August 1861 which may very well be the basis many people believe today that the Capitol was threatened. But as President it would be Lincoln's responsibility to protect Washington immediately no matter what. Let's not forget there originally was a buffer between Washington and the original 7 states that seceded. It was not until Lincoln stated that he would enter those states with force (without Congress weighing in btw) that VA and NC seceded. Many historians today believe Lincoln specifically put off convening Congress until July 4 so that they would not be in the way. I agree with that. Congress could have had a quorum within weeks of Lincoln's call to convene and he could have called for that even before his inauguration. But I am just hypothesizing alternative history which there are so many variables that you can not know how things would turn out. We do know however that Lincoln called the shots and pretty much assumed powers of a dictator and believed he could not work within the constrains of the Constitution. The Maryland legislature believed that the best hope for future re-union would have been to let those 7 states go in peace which is a valid position and pretty much the position of President Buchanan. Would have had a USA with 7 less states but saved 850,000 lives,11 destroyed cities and allot of expense and animosity. But then there was slavery that needed to end, but the British gave a good example how to end that without blood shed. Again all hypothesizing alternate history. But writing history is not about justifying actions that took place or hypothesizing alternative historical timelines - that should be up to the reader to determine. My role in writing this history is to just lay it out there for folks to read and decide for themselves maybe even to learn from and maybe apply such lessons to our troubles today.
If I was Lincoln I would have messaged for Congress to convene as soon as possible and worked to resolve the problem with both Congress along with help from the Supreme Court.
When he issued the proclamation on April 15 that also called for a special session to start July 4, a lot of things were up in the air regarding membership in Congress, including the possibility (subsequently realized) of more states seceding and upcoming state elections for some members of the House. It's also a nice theory to posit working to "resolve the problem" with Congress (that had already failed) and the SCOTUS (which didn't and doesn't issue advisory opinions - not sure how on earth that would operate), but the reality is different.

The Maryland legislature believed that the best hope for future re-union would have been to let those 7 states go in peace which is a valid position and pretty much the position of President Buchanan. Would have had a USA with 7 less states but saved 850,000 lives,11 destroyed cities and allot of expense and animosity.
This is my concern. I think it's fair to disagree about the extent of the measures that were taken in Maryland. That's an entirely different issue, however, from diving into the lawfulness of secession, especially after the firing on Fort Sumter. If the measures taken in Maryland are evaluated in light of their constitutionality and necessary extent standing alone, I get it. If it's wrapped up with some defense/justification of secession, the validity of what Buchanan did, etc. we're diving into another agenda and we know where that one's headed. I'd be interested in an objective look at the events in Maryland unsullied by the good old claim that secession is lawful, that Lincoln forced SC to fire on a US installation, etc etc. Any argument that Lincoln should have emulated Buchanan is DOA. I might be interested in the book if it's in the former category. If it's anchored on the validity of secession/Lincoln should have left the South alone after Fort Sumter, "been there done that". (As a minor point I assume you meant "750,000", not "850,000")

It was just rumor that the confederates would attack the Capitol and as I discovered a confederate attack on the Capitol was false information put out from Washington in August 1861 which may very well be the basis many people believe today that the Capitol was threatened.
Respectfully, I don't think "false information" put out in August 1861 is the only basis why people think the capital was threatened. By May there were enemy forces in an immediately adjoining state that were now actively making efforts to cut off the B&O, etc. as well as actions by the denizens of the other adjoining state engaging in a violent riot in Baltimore and destruction of the capital's rail and wire lifelines. It doesn't take too vivid an imagination to get from Point A to Point B in those circumstances.
 
When he issued the proclamation on April 15 that also called for a special session to start July 4, a lot of things were up in the air regarding membership in Congress, including the possibility (subsequently realized) of more states seceding and upcoming state elections for some members of the House. It's also a nice theory to posit working to "resolve the problem" with Congress (that had already failed) and the SCOTUS (which didn't and doesn't issue advisory opinions - not sure how on earth that would operate), but the reality is different.


This is my concern. I think it's fair to disagree about the extent of the measures that were taken in Maryland. That's an entirely different issue, however, from diving into the lawfulness of secession, especially after the firing on Fort Sumter. If the measures taken in Maryland are evaluated in light of their constitutionality and necessary extent standing alone, I get it. If it's wrapped up with some defense/justification of secession, the validity of what Buchanan did, etc. we're diving into another agenda and we know where that one's headed. I'd be interested in an objective look at the events in Maryland unsullied by the good old claim that secession is lawful, that Lincoln forced SC to fire on a US installation, etc etc. Any argument that Lincoln should have emulated Buchanan is DOA. I might be interested in the book if it's in the former category. If it's anchored on the validity of secession/Lincoln should have left the South alone after Fort Sumter, "been there done that". (As a minor point I assume you meant "750,000", not "850,000")


Respectfully, I don't think "false information" put out in August 1861 is the only basis why people think the capital was threatened. By May there were enemy forces in an immediately adjoining state that were now actively making efforts to cut off the B&O, etc. as well as actions by the denizens of the other adjoining state engaging in a violent riot in Baltimore and destruction of the capital's rail and wire lifelines. It doesn't take too vivid an imagination to get from Point A to Point B in those circumstances.
It's in the former category which you mentioned, however many in Maryland, probably the majority believed that the people could alter or abolish their government. The Maryland Constitution the latest of which had been ratified by Marylanders in 1851 said just that, with verbiage close to what is in the Declaration of Independence. Marylanders believed in this and is the basis of the emotions behind the Baltimore riots. In their mind the Federal government should be loyal to the wishes of the people but those troops symbolized the opposite. Marylanders viewed secession of those 7 Southern states as rash, uncalled for and extreme but they were very unified against using force against them. I do not argue in any way that they had the right to secede but I do tell what Marylanders thought about military coercion against them. Many including President. Buchanan and the Maryland Legislature State that the Constitution is silent on secession and it is a basic write earned by the founders and stated in the Declaration of Independence. I did not go down that road. I believe it was James Madison who wrote about this during the nullification crisis in the 1830's, that the threshold had not been met to rebel against the general government during the nullification crisis but he did say the people ultimately held that right under certain conditions, which he did not define or I just don't know of. I mention this in relation to what was happening in Maryland for my readers to ponder but again I did not go there. However Marylanders were aware of it at that time and were living in a world where the Constitution and democracy for them had ceased. Imprisoning a judge because he was upholding the Constitution then putting out false propaganda about the reasons for his arrest is pretty darn extreme. My research of this event revealed that enlistments for the confederacy jumped 400% in Talbot county (the county of that event) after that happened. I want my readers to think what would they think or do if they experienced those times. Governments troops coming to peoples homes in the middle of night to take away a loved one. No trial or charges and often the family never knew where they were held or even if they were alive, mayors, police commissioners, judges, members of the Legislature and even a U.S. Congressman imprisoned by the government without trial. You and I know how it turned out, they had no idea what the future held.

850,000 deaths is from a 2011 study by a Dr. Hacker who used census data to determine the drop in population by the War. This would account for civilian deaths and other deaths by disease, starvation or shortened life spans from war wounds etc. Years ago the number was 620,000 but that did not take into account civilians, war caused delayed deaths and other factors.
 
It's in the former category which you mentioned, however many in Maryland, probably the majority believed that the people could alter or abolish their government. The Maryland Constitution the latest of which had been ratified by Marylanders in 1851 said just that, with verbiage close to what is in the Declaration of Independence. Marylanders believed in this and is the basis of the emotions behind the Baltimore riots. In their mind the Federal government should be loyal to the wishes of the people but those troops symbolized the opposite. Marylanders viewed secession of those 7 Southern states as rash, uncalled for and extreme but they were very unified against using force against them. I do not argue in any way that they had the right to secede but I do tell what Marylanders thought about military coercion against them. Many including President. Buchanan and the Maryland Legislature State that the Constitution is silent on secession and it is a basic write earned by the founders and stated in the Declaration of Independence. I did not go down that road. I believe it was James Madison who wrote about this during the nullification crisis in the 1830's, that the threshold had not been met to rebel against the general government during the nullification crisis but he did say the people ultimately held that right under certain conditions, which he did not define or I just don't know of. I mention this in relation to what was happening in Maryland for my readers to ponder but again I did not go there. However Marylanders were aware of it at that time and were living in a world where the Constitution and democracy for them had ceased. Imprisoning a judge because he was upholding the Constitution then putting out false propaganda about the reasons for his arrest is pretty darn extreme. My research of this event revealed that enlistments for the confederacy jumped 400% in Talbot county (the county of that event) after that happened. I want my readers to think what would they think or do if they experienced those times. Governments troops coming to peoples homes in the middle of night to take away a loved one. No trial or charges and often the family never knew where they were held or even if they were alive, mayors, police commissioners, judges, members of the Legislature and even a U.S. Congressman imprisoned by the government without trial. You and I know how it turned out, they had no idea what the future held.

850,000 deaths is from a 2011 study by a Dr. Hacker who used census data to determine the drop in population by the War. This would account for civilian deaths and other deaths by disease, starvation or shortened life spans from war wounds etc. Years ago the number was 620,000 but that did not take into account civilians, war caused delayed deaths and other factors.
Thanks. If that's your approach it may well be worth looking at. I have no interest in reading something that falls into "the South was Right" stuff.
I was referring to Hacker. The 850,000 was the top of his range and 650,000 was the bottom end. My recollection is that he concluded c. 750,000.
 
Thanks. If that's your approach it may well be worth looking at. I have no interest in reading something that falls into "the South was Right" stuff.
I was referring to Hacker. The 850,000 was the top of his range and 650,000 was the bottom end. My recollection is that he concluded c. 750,000.
You could very well be correct on that number…..
 
Three days after the April 19 civil unrest in Baltimore Gov. Hicks called for a special session of the State Legislature to convene. On the 24th he instructed them to meet in the city of Frederick since Annapolis was being occupied by Gen. Butler who had also seized the surrounding rail roads. On the 25th the Gov. gave the Legislature a written message bringing them up to date on what has transpired and the actions he had taken. He also gave them advise that Maryland should remain neutral in the conflict. The Legislature met in Frederick on the 26th and the first thing they published was a Proclamation to the People of Maryland. This special session of the legislature was open to the public who would view their discussion and debates. All except for one early session to discuss Sen. Yellott's "committee of safety" proposal was held openly. The Legislature would order thousands of copies of reports and resolutions they had generated printed and disseminated throughout Maryland and the press reported on their daily activities.

Anyway back to the Proclamation to the People of Maryland they created on April 27th. This proclamation stated that they had listened to the desires of their constituents and proclaimed that the Maryland State Legislature had no constitutional authority to issue an ordinance of secession. Now in this respect the "constitutional authority" they refereed to was with respect to the Maryland Constitution. The Maryland Legislature never voted on secession. Some later historians fell into a trap into believing the conventions held in Baltimore were somehow official government conventions to decide on secession. I can not fault them since even during that time the Northern press was calling the convention hosted by the "Constitutional Unionist" a "convention on secession" and the delegates to that convention were aware of this misinformation. To understand the conventions you have to understand how democracy was practiced in Maryland up to that time. For local issues a meeting would be announced by whoever was interested and wanted to host a meeting of the local citizens on a certain subject. Citizens would attend become informed, debate the issues and often there would be resolutions generated and agreed to. These resolutions would then be given to the local government officials to communicate to them the desires of the people on that subject - but they were not binding and only advisory to the elected officials. On a state wide issue the process would work the same, however each county would first meet and elect delegates to the statewide conventions and they often had restrictions placed upon them. All of this was "grass roots" democracy from the citizens up and not organized by the government. (Our U.S. Constitution states that it is a basic right of the people to assemble.) The conventions in Baltimore in early 1861 were just that, a grass roots origination of the citizens that discussed and debated the issues and created resolutions which they gave to the governor to communicate the wishes of the people, but such were advisory only. The Maryland Constitution did have provisions for a "Sovereign Convention" of the people from which they could change and alter their form of government. However a sovereign convention would have to be called by the Legislature and then even if the delegates chose to alter or abolish their form of government it would have to be approved through a general election of the citizens. The second thing the Maryland Legislature accomplished after meeting in Frederick was to proclaim that they would not call a sovereign convention or to arm the state militia again with thousands of copies printed and disseminated. I hope this answers your question.... lol.

Yes, your response answers my query -- and I give you a lot of credit for a creative response to a rhetorical dilemma facing Maryland's Confederate sympathizers.

As you noted, the Maryland Legislature did meet to consider secession and chose an escape hatch from answering the question directly. As I understand it, they answered it indirectly by voting a resolution asserting that the body had no authority to approve secession.

For Union supporters, including Gov. Hicks, the vote was a great victory because it effectively derailed any movement toward an official declaration of secession. I doubt they cared very much how "democratic" the process was, as long as it was legally plausible and achieved their goal.
 
Yes, your response answers my query -- and I give you a lot of credit for a creative response to a rhetorical dilemma facing Maryland's Confederate sympathizers.

As you noted, the Maryland Legislature did meet to consider secession and chose an escape hatch from answering the question directly. As I understand it, they answered it indirectly by voting a resolution asserting that the body had no authority to approve secession.

For Union supporters, including Gov. Hicks, the vote was a great victory because it effectively derailed any movement toward an official declaration of secession. I doubt they cared very much how "democratic" the process was, as long as it was legally plausible and achieved their goal.
That was (in a very general way) analogous to how the Hartford Convention ended up in January 1815, ditching secession and requesting amendments to the Constitution addressing specific complaints. So far as appears, that was based on the fact that some delegates were told by their home state that they had no authority to vote for secession.
 
Yes, your response answers my query -- and I give you a lot of credit for a creative response to a rhetorical dilemma facing Maryland's Confederate sympathizers.

As you noted, the Maryland Legislature did meet to consider secession and chose an escape hatch from answering the question directly. As I understand it, they answered it indirectly by voting a resolution asserting that the body had no authority to approve secession.

For Union supporters, including Gov. Hicks, the vote was a great victory because it effectively derailed any movement toward an official declaration of secession. I doubt they cared very much how "democratic" the process was, as long as it was legally plausible and achieved their goal.
I can't agree that the Legislature was convened to consider secession. This comes from the Legislative journals themselves and the written message from Gov. Hicks to the Legislature dated April 25. Hicks had taken a "neutral" position at this point though he was under allot of pressure to convene the legislature. They were convened because of the extraordinary crisis Maryland faced in many regards and the legislature was considered the direct representatives of the people. Their proclamation that they had no authority to issue an ordinance of secession was based on the Maryland constitution which did not give them that authority, but they also state that such was the dominant wishes of Marylanders (not to secede).

I found that the government of Maryland, at all levels, cared deeply about respect for the law and for both the U.S. and Maryland Constitutions. This was their primary concern with the Lincoln administration who was setting aside both to support his policies. This was the basis of the conflict between the Maryland Legislature and the Lincoln administration and was the reason for their imprisonment. The belief that the Legislature was going to secede Maryland was a product of false news reports originated from Washington to provide an acceptable reason for their imprisonment.

One thing that I do in my book is to define "sympathizers" and "secessionist" since a reader today may have a totally different idea of who they were then how it was applied in 1861. What I found was that Maryland's "constitutional" unionist were included into this label and were suppressed by the administration in every way to include imprisonment. This political belief did not want secession but wanted the federal government to respect the Constitution and called for peace. The suspension of habeas was the means to suppress this political view. With the constitutional unionist placarded as sympathizers and secessionist the "secessionist" movement in Maryland was greatly exaggerated at that time and such belief was promoted by later historians who failed to differentiate true secessionist and the constitutional unionists.

All of this leads up to the arrest and imprisonment of the state legislature which is the main event in my book. Those chapters documents in great detail both how and most importantly why they were imprisoned. The detail and supporting documentation I provide shatters the long held belief that they were imprisoned to prevent the secession of Maryland.
 
The very first act of the special session of the Maryland Legislature when called into session in April 1861 was to publicly proclaim they had no constitutional authority to secede Maryland.
Your analysis appears to be authoritative, so I accept the above at face value. But if so, why did Lincoln want to block the September 17, 1861 session in Frederick?
 

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