Nashville Campaign

[5th Texas]

I know we've all heard of J.B. Hood's Nashville campaign, but I have never quite figured out WHY it was so devestating. Was Hood just not capable of that high a command position? He was an excellent commander, but was he just not a brilliant strategist? What is your opinion?
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[OldGreyWolf]

General George H. Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga, happened, Pard.

"We have whipped the enemy, taken many prisoners and considerable artillery."

 

[diddyriddick]

Lol...Gonna have to agree with OGW on this one.

 

[timewalker]

Arguably, the campaign was lost before he ever met Thomas. One could certainly argue it was lost before it began in that it was a desperate stroke which accomplished nothing and could probably not accomplish anything.

The Battle of Franklin devastated Hood's army. He should have withdrawn following that loss, but couldn't. There is conjecture that Franklin was an attempt by Hood to discipline his army. I have never bought that hypothesis, but if true he disciplined it right out of existance.

I have great admiration for Thomas, but by the time Hood gets to Nashville to meet him, his army is a shadow waiting to be blown away by a stiff breeze. Not to take away from Thomas' performance, but I think even a lesser general could have taken out Hood at Nashville.

 

[OpnDownfall]

(Dusting off my old 'What If ....? arguments)
Strategically, Johnston was replaced by Hood, because Davis was not satisfied with Johnston's strategy. So fighting retreats were not an option. Following Sherman to the East Coast effectively abandons the West to the Union.The Mississippi is a relative backwater of the war by now. The life or death battles are clearly going to happen in the Eas, IF the war is not somehow revitalized in the West.
Davis ( and certainly Lee) can send no supplies, no equipment, no manpower, yet Hood has to accomplish the near impossible with the forces available, however inadequate they may be for the job.
Still, Hood comes within an ace of destroying Schofield's command (the projected battle tested core of Thomas', still assembling army of green troops and rear area sweepings)
The destruction of Schofield, automatically eliminates the Battle of Franklin and Hood a hard driving, hard fighting commander if nothing else, would be before Nashville long before Thomas is ready. Nashvill may have formidable defensive works, but you still need enough troops to man them preferably battle hardened vetrans, like those that should have been lost with Schofield at Spring Hill.

 

[richard]

One question that I have about Hoods movements is this; why did he not make a concerted effort to cross the Tennessee at Decatur. He fought with Granger who had only 5000 men. It was a sharp but short battle and hood lost some 500 men. Yet, with only 5000 and a much more direct and shorter route to Nashville, why did he not press the issue?

 

[OpnDownfall]

The Commanding General, P.G.T Beauregard, joined Hood at Decatur for a final council of war with Hood. At that time, the River was up and difficult to cross at that particular point and before Hood could get his army across, two Union gunboats arrived making a major crossing hazardous, so, in effect, although seriously outnumbering the Union force, Hood was unable to completely surround the enemy emplacements.
Winter was coming on, lack of supplies and shortages in ammunition induced Beauregard to advise against a major effort (straight ahead attack against a prepared position) and of course a regular siege with its loss of time and expenditure of men and materiale (already short of food and ammunition) was not really a viable option and, apparently, Hood agreed.
IMO it would have been a risk worth taking, but that is 20/20 hindsight. By late 1864, there were only the 'best' of bad options available to the Confederacy. It is difficult to second guess such options.

 

[gary]

I wouldn't call Hood an excellent commander. He was certainly an aggressive commander and performed competently as a division commander, but as a corps or army commander but was overly aggressive and careless with men's lives. Hood explains his views in his post-war apology, Attack and Retreat (or is it Attack & Git Beat?). Hood believed that men fighting behind entrenchments lost their elan and all taste for attack. That men who were accustomed to defensive warfare were reluctant to leave their fortifications to attack in the open.

McPherson was Hood's roommate at Westpoint and knew Hood to be an aggressive poker player. When Hood replaced Johnston, Sherman asked his generals what they knew of Hood. "He will attack." "Good."

Hood launched three failed attacks before abandoning Atlanta. While he had little choice (lest he become surrounded and beseiged like Pemberton did at Vicksburg) about leaving Atlanta, he didn't have to attack at Franklin. He could have flanked Schofield at Franklin and cut him off from Nashville. Thomas wasn't exactly in a position to rush reinforcements down to save Scofield either (remember, the USCT were largely untried in combat). Instead, we have some (great) tragic stories about the culling of Confederate soldiers and officers at Franklin to read and reflect upon.

As mentioned before, for all purposes, Hood's army at Nashville was a mere shadow of what it had once been. Giving Thomas's overwhelming numbers, Hood should have anticipated the attack and pre-planned a defensive battle with a rearguard action.

Hood was certainly brave, but foolhardy.

 

[richard]

I am no expert on Franklin but one person who posts here once in a while is. He suggest that Hood had no choice but to attack head long at Franklin. From his studies, he has conluded that there was no way that Hood could have flanked Schofield on the left or the right. It was fight or get out.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Hood could well have 'missed' Franklin physically. He and his army were exhausted and he was hell bent on stopping Schofield before that gentleman could reach Nashville and link with Thomas' waiting force. The 'main' road went north through Franklin to Nashville, either Franklin Pike (from the Nashville perspective) or Wilson's Pike leading to Brentwood. A more or less clear path was lying to the east through Arno or Triune, which Forrest and Bates would occupy a week later. Hood was not in a listening mood. Forrest and Cleburne tried to tell him. He paid with nearly 7,000 lives. Had he taken an alternate route to Nashville, I believe the result would have been similar. Nashville was well defended, both with implacements, Ft. Negley's guns and the six other hilltop camps as well as Wilson's cavalry and considerable infantry. Hood could have found a better town to attack, perhaps Murfreesboro, but nothing of value to gain there. The railroad had served it's purpose for the Union. Hood had little choice and fewer skills as a commander. Bigger obstacle than anything else except Thomas was the severe winter weather. No one ever confused Nashville with Florida, at least not in 1864.

 

[OpnDownfall]

Schofield had infantry and cavalry on the North bank of the Harpeth, covering likely fords near Franklin. Even if Forrest got across, it would have been too late to stop Schofield, who was crossing his wagons over the river by noon of the 30th and was planing to retreat to Nashvill as soon as it got dark.
Hood was not there to escort Schofield back to Nashville.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Schofield had infantry and cavalry on the North bank of the Harpeth, covering likely fords near Franklin. Even if Forrest got across, it would have been too late to stop Schofield, who was crossing his wagons over the river by noon of the 30th and was planing to retreat to Nashvill as soon as it got dark.
Hood was not there to escort Schofield back to Nashville.

I can buy part, but not quite all of that. Remember please Sir, that Forrest was only about thirty miles from his home until 1834. He had also led his Escort through this area and had fought at Franklin and Brentwood previously as well as Thompson Station. It was Forrest who had done his best to evacuate Confederate supplies from Nashville in advance of Grant's arrival in 1862. He was no rookie at this point in time. Forrest had been skirmishing with components of Hatch's and Croxton's cavalry all the way from Florence. They had met at the Harpeth on the 29th with not too satisfying results from Forrest's perspective. He could have crossed the Harpeth to the east and approached Franklin from the east. Given enough men, which Hood refused, he could well have diverted Schofield's attention from Columbia Pike. How strong Wilson, Hatch, Croxton, Hammond and the US 4th cavalry could have been, we'll never know. I really don't want to. My gg grandpa was a farrier tending to those horses. Forrest would and did have several more opportunities to train these yankee horsemen during the Confederate retreat in the week and a half following Nashville.

Schofield had the luxury of using the bridge on the Nashville/Franklin Pike north of town for moving his equipment as you state. The vast majority of his men, aside from the mentioned cavalry, were concentrated there along that ditch in south Franklin, waiting for Hood's ill-advised approach. If Forrest and Cleburne advised me that this was a bad idea, I'd have given that some consideration. Hood was not that kind of general, unfortunately for the AOT.

 

[OpnDownfall]

Nashville Campaign,

Schofield had infantry guarding fords. getting cavalry and infantry selected and either fight its way across a defended ford or an undefended ford further away. Either way time is going to be lost and Schofield is not waiting for anybody. Thomas sent a query to Schofield asking if he could not nold Franklin for three more days and Scofield said No. Schofield had already made up his mind, he would not hold Franklin, not even for a day.

 

[larry_cockerham]

Schofield had infantry guarding fords. getting cavalry and infantry selected and either fight its way across a defended ford or an undefended ford further away. Either way time is going to be lost and Schofield is not waiting for anybody. Thomas sent a query to Schofield asking if he could not nold Franklin for three more days and Scofield said No. Schofield had already made up his mind, he would not hold Franklin, not even for a day.

Schofield went to considerable effort to beef up the defenses at Franklin, not exactly the action expected of a man ready to move? Schofield knew he was outmanned and outgunned. He decided to hold his ground and was somewhat forced to do so by Hood's decison to forge ahead. Even Thomas had advised him to only do that which was possible. Hood's decision to post Forrest's command on opposite ends of the line made them perhaps less effective than if left whole with Forrest on the eastern flank. That reduced many of the possible options Forrest could have taken.

 

[Battalion]

Schofield had infantry guarding fords. getting cavalry and infantry selected and either fight its way across a defended ford or an undefended ford further away. Either way time is going to be lost and Schofield is not waiting for anybody. Thomas sent a query to Schofield asking if he could not nold Franklin for three more days and Scofield said No. Schofield had already made up his mind, he would not hold Franklin, not even for a day.

Schofield had confronted two corps of the AoT...another one was on its way.
That extra corps was what 'made up his mind.'

 

[trice]

Schofield had confronted two corps of the AoT...another one was on its way.
That extra corps was what 'made up his mind.'

The near-disaster escape at Spring Hill undoubtedly made him nervous. Whatever else, he knew that Hood needed to take him outside of the Nashville defenses to do anything.

Thomas was there already with several thousand men (not the best troops, but inside defenses they could do well.) Smith was arriving with 10,000 more, all tough veterans. More were due from the direction of Murfreesboro. Nashville itself was probably the 2nd most heavily fortified city in the Union at the time. Once Schofield gets his men back there, Hood has no realistic chance of taking the place.

A different man would probably have tried to hold near Franklin until Thomas could come forward with Smith. Schofield, who appears out-matched by Hood, was more concerned with getting back intact. That's not a terrible decision. It makes sure that Hood will fail. But it isn't the choice we'd like, not the bold one.

Tim

 

[mobile_96]

Schofield went to considerable effort to beef up the defenses at Franklin, not exactly the action expected of a man ready to move? Schofield knew he was outmanned and outgunned. He decided to hold his ground and was somewhat forced to do so by Hood's decison to forge ahead.

"Shofield learned shortly after sending the 5:30 telegram (to Thomas) that the wagon bridge spanning the rain-swollen river and at that location (the north edge of Franklin's town square) was destroyed" For Cause and for Country, Eric Jacobson and Richard Rupp. pg. 198
Both () mine, to clarify.
This is why he forced to hold his ground. He chose to fortify what defenses were already in place south of Franklin. He had to buy time while the bridge was rebuilt.

 

[ole]

Still an exciting thread! Hood couldn't flank Schofield at Franklin in the sense of bringing on a flanking battle with him. But he might well have gone around Franklin and raced Schofield to Nashville. In either case, Nashville was a pipe dream.

Nashville was fortified. Hood's starving, undersupplied army, was no match for Thomas' defenses -- nevermind his mixture of green and veteran troops. Thomas would only have had to hold and Hood would have had to fold.

Hood really, really, had no hope of taking Nashville, even if he hadn't lost so many men at Franklin. Kinda makes one wonder what he was thinking, don't it?

ole

 

[trice]

I can buy part, but not quite all of that. Remember please Sir, that Forrest was only about thirty miles from his home until 1834. He had also led his Escort through this area and had fought at Franklin and Brentwood previously as well as Thompson Station. It was Forrest who had done his best to evacuate Confederate supplies from Nashville in advance of Grant's arrival in 1862. He was no rookie at this point in time. Forrest had been skirmishing with components of Hatch's and Croxton's cavalry all the way from Florence. They had met at the Harpeth on the 29th with not too satisfying results from Forrest's perspective. He could have crossed the Harpeth to the east and approached Franklin from the east. Given enough men, which Hood refused, he could well have diverted Schofield's attention from Columbia Pike. How strong Wilson, Hatch, Croxton, Hammond and the US 4th cavalry could have been, we'll never know. I really don't want to. My gg grandpa was a farrier tending to those horses. Forrest would and did have several more opportunities to train these yankee horsemen during the Confederate retreat in the week and a half following Nashville.

Schofield had the luxury of using the bridge on the Nashville/Franklin Pike north of town for moving his equipment as you state. The vast majority of his men, aside from the mentioned cavalry, were concentrated there along that ditch in south Franklin, waiting for Hood's ill-advised approach. If Forrest and Cleburne advised me that this was a bad idea, I'd have given that some consideration. Hood was not that kind of general, unfortunately for the AOT.

Larry,

Two of Forrest's divisions are essentially out of ammo at this point. Their wagons had been left behind with Lee's corps, and they had exhausted most of what they had with them during the fighting leading up to Franklin. At Spring Hill they had, in some cases, already run dry. Forrest was borrowing ammo from Hood's infantry before he left Spring Hill, so we know most of these troops were not in shape for a heavy fight that day at Franklin.

I think Forrest's plan was a better one than Hood's, and that it should have been tried. If successful, I think it would have hustled Scofield out of Franklin -- but Schofield was going anyway. Given the time of day, I don't think Forrest could have fought his way across and cut Schofield off from Brentwood against resistance -- but you never know.

However, Hood and Forrest and the rest did not know what Schofield was already doing. Forrest's plan can be a great one if Schofield lingers in Franklin. In that case, maybe the next day dawns with Hood across the river between Schofield and Nashville -- which would change anything.

Tim

 

[larry_cockerham]

Tim, Schofield "lingered" long enough to kill nearly 7,000 Confederates. You are right, I also believe that Forrest had little chance against Wilson's cavalry at that precise point in time. A surrounding of the Union forces, not that they would have allowed that to happen, would only have killed more Confederates. To attack Nashville without more support was folly. Thomas might not have had the "A" team in place, but he was ready for Hood.