Most Underrated General

[Elennsar]

Early was no Hannibal, et al but he did well. I guess 'under-rated' might be too subjective, too loose a term. He did well enough that Lee valued him but not so well as to be retained as the army shrank. I do think Early's reputation is based more on what was said and done after the war rather than during it. However, I think he is overlooked a little too much - and probably because of post-war issues.

He's not overlooked by any halfway through study of the ANV or its battles. "He did well" is a standard evaluation of most of his battles and campaigns (he's gotten some criticism for some specific decisions within the campaign versus Sheridan, which per his wont CWS has used low figures for Confederate causalities and high for Union) - so he's not underrated by said accounts either.

Even in regards to comparing his post war actions to his actions during the war, no one has treated Early as a bad general on the grounds that his writings after the war were, to put it as politely as possible, unreliable accounts.

So I stand by my statement. If "underrated" has any useful meaning, someone who did a good job with what they had to work with - as opposed to what they might have done with more - has to be treated as if they didn't do a good job.

CWS isn't offering anything that hasn't been presented by standard history, and when he is its with a lack of evidence.

 

[Civil War Scholar]

He's not overlooked by any halfway through study of the ANV or its battles. Even in regards to comparing his post war actions to his actions during the war, no one has treated Early as a bad general on the grounds that his writings after the war were, to put it as politely as possible, unreliable accounts.

Elennsar,
Early's writings were not "unreliable accounts". You seem to discount any southern commentator of the war, from Jubal Early to Shelby Foote. Whatever sources and commentators that come from the South are characterized as "unreliable". This was their own side of the coin, their own part of the story. Why do you accept Northern sources but discount Southern ones?
Moreover, Early is often underrated. People and some historians focus on his final defeat and marvel at Sheridan for disposing Early's band from the Valley. Yet, what is overlooked is not only Early's past accomplishments, which are many, but also the odds he faced and the fact that he came close to beating Sheridan.
Thank you,
Civil War Scholar.

 

[Elennsar]

Elennsar,
Early's writings were not "unreliable accounts". You seem to discount any southern commentator of the war, from Jubal Early to Shelby Foote. Whatever sources and commentators that come from the South are characterized as "unreliable". This was their own side of the coin, their own part of the story. Why do you accept Northern sources but discount Southern ones?

I don't trust Sheridan's writings for the same reason I don't trust Early (both are liars), and one of the historians I find most useful in making sense of the situation in the West is a Georgian - another is from Tennessee. Hell's Bells, I quote when I think his work hasn't been contradicted by someone else one of Virginia's most famous historians when talking about the ANV.

I discount Foote because - for example - there is nothing offered to back up claims like "half the Union wounded were captured" as part of translating Seven Days killed/wounded/missing or captured - just Foote asserting it as if him saying so was all the proof needed to establish it. That he was a Southerner means one and one thing alone to me: His accent is part of why he had a "pleasant speaking voice".

Moreover, Early is often underrated. People and some historians focus on his final defeat and marvel at Sheridan for disposing Early's band from the Valley. Yet, what is overlooked is not only Early's past accomplishments, which are many, but also the odds he faced and the fact that he came close to beating Sheridan.
Thank you,
Civil War Scholar.

Name these "Some historians" who focus on Early's final defeat as if that sums up his career. Please.

Northern or Southern or even nonAmerican entirely, contemporary or modern. I don't care, as long as you can find these "some historians" and demonstrate they represent anything other than a minority.

 

[Nytram01]

Jospeh O. Shelby's a cult figure, well rated by those who know of him but largely obscure because he spent his Confederate Career out in Kirby-Smith-Dom and that wasn't a place to make many headlines. So the case could be made that he is underrated.

John A. Wharton is another one who the case could be made is underrated by consquence of ending up the wrong side of the Mississippi to get any real press. Depite being one of the more capable of the Confederacy's Cavalry commanders he's not well know - partly I expect because he did end up in the Tran-Mississippi but also because he was under Wheeler prior to that and Forrest and Morgan got the headline in their independent roles instead.

Then there's John George Walker. At the very least a competant commander who gained some measure of fame commanding the Greyhounds but, once more, a largely obscure figure because he ended up west of the Mississippi.

I'd argue a lot of the officers on both sides who saw action in the Trans-Mississippi theater would fall into the category of "underrated" if only for the fact that the theater there was of secondary importants at best and the focus of most people researching the war, for academic purposes or just their own enjoyment, is mainly on the more important theaters in Virginia and Tennessee/Mississippi/Georgia.

 

[Nytram01]

No. I get that. But was this another example of Davis's high opinion of his military knowledge, or what? Why put Johnston in command in the west, then counteract his decisions? Who was he, Lincoln?

I seem to recall making commenting on a similar issue in a different thread before. Someone said that Johnston didn't have the right to countermand Davis's orders to Pemberton and I responded that he had every right to do so as he was the ranking commander in the field at the scene, and him to have any hope of being able to do his job effectively his orders had to supersede the President's in times of crisis. Just did a search and found the thread I was thinking of, here: http://civilwartalk.com/threads/if-you-were-general-pemberton.90687/page-2#post-738847

 

[rbasin]

I seem to recall making commenting on a similar issue in a different thread before. Someone said that Johnston didn't have the right to countermand Davis's orders to Pemberton and I responded that he had every right to do so as he was the ranking commander in the field at the scene, and him to have any hope of being able to do his job effectively his orders had to supersede the President's in times of crisis. Just did a search and found the thread I was thinking of, here: http://civilwartalk.com/threads/if-you-were-general-pemberton.90687/page-2#post-738847

Thanks.

I've mentioned before and I'll mention it again:

The Halleck doctrine is that the general in the field is the best judge of conditions.

from who I think is the most underrated general in the war.

 

[Elennsar]

A rather pertinent question: What is the point of Johnston's position - briefly, is his role to carry out Davis's instructions with his authority being there to ensure that he can force Pemberton and Bragg to do what Davis orders (in which case Bragg and Pemberton have no reason to stop reporting to Richmond, as Johnston is a lieutenant for Davis in the original sense of the term - a place holder, serving in the role of Davis in the field), or is he supposed to be given charge to direct affairs subject only to Davis, in which case Bragg and Pemberton should be reporting to him in the same way their subordinates should report to him?

Davis seems to have intended the former, which sharply limits the relevance of the Halleck doctrine.

 

[28thNewYork]

I'm coming in late to this (as usual). George Henry Thomas.

 

[rbasin]

A rather pertinent question: What is the point of Johnston's position - briefly, is his role to carry out Davis's instructions with his authority being there to ensure that he can force Pemberton and Bragg to do what Davis orders (in which case Bragg and Pemberton have no reason to stop reporting to Richmond, as Johnston is a lieutenant for Davis in the original sense of the term - a place holder, serving in the role of Davis in the field), or is he supposed to be given charge to direct affairs subject only to Davis, in which case Bragg and Pemberton should be reporting to him in the same way their subordinates should report to him?

Davis seems to have intended the former, which sharply limits the relevance of the Halleck doctrine.

I appreciate your question. Its a good one. But, as Davis had good relationships with both Bragg and Pemberton, who I presume will gladly carry out his wishes to the best of their ability, why would he appoint Joe Johnston, who he had, shall we say, a so-so relationship with, to a position that had little power over the other two? Was it to just get rid of him, or did he actually think Johnston could be of some value?

Before Halleck was brought to Washington, Lincoln asked him what he would do in the east with McClellan, Pope, etc. Halleck replied that Lincoln should place someone over the eastern armies, much as Halleck was as Head of the department of the Mississippi, and hold that person responsible. Was this to be Johnston's role in the west? If not, then isn't Davis to blame for the loss of Vicksburg?

 

[NedBaldwin]

A rather pertinent question: What is the point of Johnston's position - briefly, is his role to carry out Davis's instructions with his authority being there to ensure that he can force Pemberton and Bragg to do what Davis orders (in which case Bragg and Pemberton have no reason to stop reporting to Richmond, as Johnston is a lieutenant for Davis in the original sense of the term - a place holder, serving in the role of Davis in the field), or is he supposed to be given charge to direct affairs subject only to Davis, in which case Bragg and Pemberton should be reporting to him in the same way their subordinates should report to him?

Davis seems to have intended the former, which sharply limits the relevance of the Halleck doctrine.

I think he intended the later.

 

[Elennsar]

I appreciate your question. Its a good one. But, as Davis had good relationships with both Bragg and Pemberton, who I presume will gladly carry out his wishes to the best of their ability, why would he appoint Joe Johnston, who he had, shall we say, a so-so relationship with, to a position that had little power over the other two? Was it to just get rid of him, or did he actually think Johnston could be of some value?

But as the Kentucky campaign showed, two commanders are not going to necessarily pull together in a situation where unity of effort is needed. So I think Davis had putting Johnston over them in mind as a way to have a figure who could take charge as one single head - and Johnston was the only halfway competent general superior to both of them of the two available (Lee is busy, Cooper is a desk guy, Beauregard is on even worse terms with Davis than Joe Johnston and not as able, and anyone else would be junior to Bragg if not both to Bragg and Pemberton)

Not ideal, but I think that was part of it.

Before Halleck was brought to Washington, Lincoln asked him what he would do in the east with McClellan, Pope, etc. Halleck replied that Lincoln should place someone over the eastern armies, much as Halleck was as Head of the department of the Mississippi, and hold that person responsible. Was this to be Johnston's role in the west? If not, then isn't Davis to blame for the loss of Vicksburg?

i think the fall of Vicksburg is the fault of three men - Pemberton, Davis, and Johnston, and their failure to either separately or together come up with a response capable of defeating Grant.

Pemberton's failings are obvious and don't need detailing here, but as far as dealing with that goes, I think Johnston and Davis were too busy at loggerheads - Johnston wanting so very badly to bring across troops from the Trans-Mississippi rather than Tennessee, and Davis expecting more of Johnston than Johnston felt he could deliver - that Grant had a situation ripe for exploitation by someone bold enough to take advantage while it was still uncertain, as opposed to after the reinforcements sent in May had arrived and consolidated.

 

[Elennsar]

I think he intended the later.

So why then do we see the conflict over what authority Johnston had between Davis and Johnston? If Davis had intended Johnston to use his best judgment, faulting him for it and interfering with him using it would be petty and mean spirited and just plain stupid - and while Davis was certainly the former and capable of the second, the third gets into "But why would he sabotage something he set up just for the sake of messing with it? Even if he didn't trust or like Joe Johnston, that sounds like a waste of presidential time."

That's not how he treated Joe Johnston's command of the Army of Tennessee, and depending on what you consider his authority in 1862, not how he handled Johnston's command of the Virginia army. And he certainly wasn't hands off in either case - just not actively sabotaging the exercise of that authority (though one might argue that certain correspondence sabotaged Johnston's position, that relates to the "dignity of the office" as it were and not to whether or not say, an attack was to be made at Cassville).

 

[NedBaldwin]

i think the fall of Vicksburg is the fault of three men - Pemberton, Davis, and Johnston, and their failure to either separately or together come up with a response capable of defeating Grant.

I have fluctuated a little on this over time, but have come to land on the view that Pemberton is at fault; Johnston and Davis shoulder blame only in that they were Pemberton's superiors and thus could have done better at managing him.

 

[Elennsar]

I have fluctuated a little on this over time, but have come to land on the view that Pemberton is at fault; Johnston and Davis shoulder blame only in that they were Pemberton's superiors and thus could have done better at managing him.

Pemberton certainly comes off as having failed utterly at handling the situation. Even granting him all due understanding, he just doesn't look like someone able to handle field command, even before "versus a general as aggressive as Grant" comes in.

Overpromoted bureaucrat at best. And I say this as someone who likes good bureaucrats.

 

[hrobalabama]

Wade Hampton doesn't get much love.

Of course not - he was wealthy.
Doesn't anyone out there vote for Braxton Bragg??? Oh that's right this is for underrated.
Does underrated and worst mean the same thing?

 

[NedBaldwin]

So why then do we see the conflict over what authority Johnston had between Davis and Johnston?

The conflict I am aware of involves Davis wanting Johnston to exercise command over the department under him and Johnston avoiding responsibility leading to frustration from Davis.

 

[Elennsar]

Of course not - he was wealthy.
Doesn't anyone out there vote for Braxton Bragg??? Oh that's right this is for underrated.
Does underrated and worst mean the same thing?

I made a post arguing Bragg is underrated in this thread, which I'd be happy to find if you want.

The conflict I am aware of involves Davis wanting Johnston to exercise command over the department under him and Johnston avoiding responsibility leading to frustration from Davis.

But Johnston, and I'm not defending his position, seems to have felt Davis was interfering with him carrying out anything.

Frankly I think the two men simply could not work together.

 

[chellers]

Of course not - he was wealthy.
Doesn't anyone out there vote for Braxton Bragg??? Oh that's right this is for underrated.
Does underrated and worst mean the same thing?

If my memory serves, I think Hampton was financially broke by the end of the war.

 

[rbasin]

I made a post arguing Bragg is underrated in this thread, which I'd be happy to find if you want.


But Johnston, and I'm not defending his position, seems to have felt Davis was interfering with him carrying out anything.

Frankly I think the two men simply could not work together.

Should Lee have been sent out west in that May-ish timeframe? Jackson still being alive likely could handle the Army of the Potomac. Lee at least Davis trusted.

 

[Elennsar]

Should Lee have been sent out west in that May-ish timeframe? Jackson still being alive likely could handle the Army of the Potomac. Lee at least Davis trusted.

Honestly, I think the best bet in May was Lee's strategy, which was half heartedly implemented - Davis gave Lee more than "nothing more than what Lee had at Chancellorsville", but not enough to pose the threat needed to make a difference.

Vicksburg in May simply would require a logistically unrealistic amount of effort to secure, which is not worth taking Lee away from a more vital area.