Most "Intelligent" General...?

[Shadow9216]

The role of Intelligence as a military discipline grew drastically through the Civil War. From initial, largely ad-hoc and localized efforts to gather information on the number and composition of enemy troops arrayed against a force, through spies and informers, to codemaking/breaking and message interception, on up to the formal development of the Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information, the methods and techniques for gathering, processing, and exploiting information assumed ever-greater importance. My question to the forum is which generals best utilized intelligence in their operations? Which officer(s) made the best use of the assets available to them at the time? Who successfully pieced together a picture of his enemy's movements and exploited it, or prevented it? Who was able to position his forces and carry the day through prompt action on information? Answers will vary, but please "show your work" as my math teachers always said…

 

[rpkennedy]

Meade may have had the best picture of his opponent at Gettysburg. Colonel Sharpe's analysis had Lee's numbers and armaments pegged pretty closely. For example, on the night of July 2/3, Meade knew that only Pickett's Division had not been engaged.

R

 

[cash]

The BMI gave Union generals Hooker, Meade, and Grant a significant advantage in information.

 

[Shadow9216]

It's going to be hard to beat the advantage the BMI afforded the AoP, but is that the best use of intelligence during the war?

What about Lee's use of Stuart to determine the AoP's positions/disposition and then defeat it, despite often being outnumbered? Or at Chancellorsville, where he was able to determine that the VI Corps was not moving, and therefore able to attack the Union flank- which he found out about through use of local informants?

Any other examples?

 

[diane]

I come up with cavalry, since that was largely their job. Forrest made use of an extensive intelligence gathering network in Tennessee and Mississippi - he didn't miss much but very often his information was disregarded by his superiors. Major William H Forrest was in charge of the scouts, who often acted as spies in varying capacities. Sometimes they were deserters with wrong information to feed the enemy - notably at Chickamauga with Rosecrans - sometimes in other capacities. Black members of Forrest's escort sometimes posed as servants around inns or taverns frequented by Union officers or soldiers and picked up earfuls of information simply because nobody paid them any mind! It was Forrest's scouts who first determined Buell had arrived at Shiloh, but again the information was discarded. A rare intelligence failure happened at Parkers Crossroads, where the scouts took a wrong road and missed Sullivan's advance force. Forrest was trapped between two Union lines then and managed to withdraw sideways! Forrest checked information himself as much as possible and maintained a strict discipline so that his informants were also careful to double check. Once a scout rode into camp very excited, saying there were large numbers of Union soldiers in the vicinity. Forrest carefully questioned him, asking, "Did y0u see these Union soldiers yourself?" "No," the scout replied. "But I heard it from the blacksmith who was shoeing my horse." Forrest thereupon yanked the scout off his horse and whapped his head upside a tree trunk several solid times! "If you ever bring me a bad piece of information again it will not go so easy with you!" he growled. That was a lesson learned by that scout and also by those others witnessing it. Forrest's information was usually pretty reliable!

Jeb Stuart can't be beat for accurate, real-time information and Lee was a great superior - he was excellent at accurately analyzing Stuart's intelligence. Stuart had the advantage of being a West Pointer, a professional, and he was generally utilized as fully as possible. His spy ring was very intricate and somewhat romantic in certain phases! He had a whole string of ladies who could get information just by listening to some officer chat. Sometimes he got a little too much of the cavalier about it and was caught off-guard, but not very often. Lee said he had never brought him a bad piece of information - and he didn't have to beat Jeb's head against a tree trunk, either!

 

[cash]

Take a look at Sheridan. He made pretty good use of the Jessie Scouts in the Shenandoah Valley. These scouts dressed as confederates and cultivated southern accents to blend in. They would join up with confederates and engage them in conversation, in the process learning a great deal about confederate movements and operations.

http://www.jessiescouts.com/JS_Overview.html

 

[diane]

Take a look at Sheridan. He made pretty good use of the Jessie Scouts in the Shenandoah Valley. These scouts dressed as confederates and cultivated southern accents to blend in. They would join up with confederates and engage them in conversation, in the process learning a great deal about confederate movements and operations.

http://www.jessiescouts.com/JS_Overview.html

Very like Grierson's Butternut Guerrillas - they were quite a group of themselves. Grierson owed much of his success in his famous Mississippi raid to them.

 

[major bill]

One must understand there is a big difference between raw information and processed intelligence. Almost every where the Union advanced local slaves provided information. Much the same could be said of Confederate sympathizers in the rear of Union armies. The local commanders often used such information, but both the Union and the Confederacy lacked a central processing center at division, corps or army level to combine the information, analyze it and provide intelligence to a commander. The effective S2 sections found today at division, corps and army did not exist in the 1860s.

 

[diane]

One must understand there is a big difference between raw information and processed intelligence. Almost every where the Union advanced local slaves provided information. Much the same could be said of Confederate sympathizers in the rear of Union armies. The local commanders often used such information, but both the Union and the Confederacy lacked a central processing center at division, corps or army level to combine the information, analyze it and provide intelligence to a commander. The effective S2 sections found today at division, corps and army did not exist in the 1860s.

I think that was what Hooker was getting at when he was in command of the AoP. He was willing to try some temperamental and new-fangled equipment, methods and basically be a guinea pig for some things - it didn't go very well but at least there were improvements for the next guy. I think this contributed considerably to his defeat at Chancellorsville, however.

 

[101combatvet]

 

[tmh10]

Expired Image Removed

I think General A. Hays was an unsung hero at Gettysburg.

Reports of Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays, U.S. Army, commanding Third Division.
Gettysburg Campaign
O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 43]

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, SECOND CORPS,
July 8, 1863.
Lieut. Col. C. H. MORGAN,
Chief of Staff.
SIR: I have the honor to report through you the part taken by this division in the battle near Gettysburg, Pa.


On July 2, the division, moving on the Taneytown road, arrived within about a mile of the town, where it was assigned a position on a ridge nearly parallel with the road, facing westward. A stone wall just below the crest of the hill gave much strength to the position, and an open space of half a mile in our front afforded the artillery posted on the right and left flanks a fair field for effective service. A strong line of skirmishers was thrown forward to our front, and during the day contended successfully with the enemy. Twice, at least, sorties were made from our position by the Twelfth New Jersey Volunteers, First Delaware, and Fourteenth Connecticut Regiments against a barn and house one-fourth of a mile in advance of our position, returning in each case successfully with prisoners.

Col. G. L. Willard, One hundred and twenty-fifth New York Volunteers, commanding the Third Brigade, was early in the day withdrawn from the division by the major-general commanding, and took a prominent part in the engagement on our left.

The history of this brigadiers operations is written in blood. Colonel Willard was killed, and next day, after the brigade had rejoined the division, his successor, Col. Eliakim Sherrill, One hundred and twenty-sixth New York Volunteers, also fell. Col. Clinton Dougall MacDougall, One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers, and Maj. Hugo Hildebrandt, Thirty-ninth New York Volunteers, were each severely wounded, leaving the brigade in command of a lieutenant-colonel. The loss of this brigade amounts to one-half the casualties in the division. The acts of traitors at Harper's Ferry had not tainted their patriotism.

The operations of the First Brigade, commanded by Col. S. S. Carroll, are fully set forth in his own accompanying report. Too much credit cannot be given him and his command for the gallant manner in which they went to the relief of the troops on our right. The darkness of night was no obstacle, and I have no doubt their timely arrival and merits will be acknowledged by the general commanding in that part of the field.

The Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth, First Delaware Volunteers, remained continuously in protection of our front along the stone wall and in support of our line of skirmishers.
Throughout the 2d, the enemy kept up a desultory fire from their artillery, posted on the skirts of the distant timber, frequently shifting their batteries and opening suddenly on our line. In no case were they enabled long to retain position, but were relieved or driven off by the effective fire of our artillerists. The ensuing night passed in comparative quietness, our men resting on their arms.
The daylight of the 3d was a signal for renewed hostilities, and during the forenoon was a repetition of the practice of the previous day, excepting that their skirmishers appeared more pertinacious in their assault.

About 11 a.m. an entire lull occurred, which was continued until nearly 2 p.m. Anticipating the movement of the enemy, I caused the house and barn in our front, which interrupted the fire of our artillery, to be burned. At the hour last named, they opened upon our front the most terrific and uninterrupted fire from artillery. I cannot believe there were less than eighty pieces bearing on us within good range. It was continued uninterruptedly until 4.30 o'clock, when a heavy column of the enemy moved forward in three lines, preceded by a strong line of skirmishers, debouched from the wood opposite our line. Their march was as steady as if impelled by machinery, unbroken by our artillery, which played upon them a storm of missiles. When within 100 yards of our line of infantry, the fire of our men could no longer be restrained. Four lines rose from behind our stone wall, and before the smoke of our first volley had cleared away, the enemy, in dismay and consternation, were seeking safety in flight. Every attempt by their officers to rally them was vain. In less time than I can recount it, they were throwing away their arms and appealing most piteously for mercy. The angel of death alone can produce such a field as was presented.

The division captured and turned into corps headquarters fifteen battle-flags or banners. A number of other flags were captured, but had been surreptitiously disposed of, in the subsequent excitement of battle, before they could be collected.

I transmit the report of Lieut. W. E. Potter, showing a collection by him of 2,500 stand of arms, besides an estimate of 1,000 left upon the ground for want of time to collect them. From my own personal examination of the field, I am satisfied the number estimated is not too great. Of the prisoners which fell into our hands, I regret that no accurate account could be kept but by estimate, which cannot be less than 1,500.

Colonel Smyth, commanding Second Brigade, was severely wounded in the head and face by a shell, which, however, did not prevent his return to duty next day.

I commend to the notice of the general commanding and the War Department the gallant conduct of my commanders of brigades and regiments, trusting that they, in return, will not be forgetful of meritorious subordinates. When all behaved unexceptionably it is difficult to discriminate. The coolness and determination evinced by our officers and men reflect back credit on their former commanders.

I cannot omit the high recommendation of credit which is due Dr. Isaac Scott, medical director of the division, and all his assistants. No case of neglect or evasion of their duties has come to my notice.
Lieutenant [John S.] Sullivan, of the ambulance corps, deserves the highest credit for his courage and the fearless manner he discharged his duties, continually, under the fire of the enemy's skirmishers, bringing off the wounded and assisting in keeping up the stragglers.

Lieut. W. E. Potter, ordnance officer, was indefatigable in the discharge of his duties.
Capt. George P. Corts, assistant adjutant-general, and my aide, Lieut. David Shields, Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, were constantly by my side, exhibiting, as always heretofore, self-possession and courage of the highest order. Captain Corts lost 2 horses, killed, and Lieutenant Shields 1.
Division quartermaster, Captain [Marshall I.] Ludington, and commissary officer, Captain [Columbus J.] Queen, discharged their duties to my entire satisfaction, and deserve the notice of their respective departments.

Second Lieut. E. J. Hueston, One hundred and eleventh New York Volunteers, attracted my attention by his exemplary conduct in charge of posting and encouraging our pickets. As a present recognition, I have appointed him an acting aide on my staff.

By accompanying report, the entire loss of the division in the two days' action will be seen to be 1,285 men killed, wounded, and missing.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
ALEX. HAYS,
Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding Division.

 

[Shadow9216]

One must understand there is a big difference between raw information and processed intelligence...The effective S2 sections found today at division, corps and army did not exist in the 1860s.

True- but the fundamentals of the intelligence cycle haven't changed. Information needs to be collected, that information needs to be evaluated to determine if it's accurate or not, the results need to be reported in some fashion to someone, and new requirements for information need to be determined. A general needs to know if the enemy plans to attack or stand its ground; to achieve this, scouts are dispatched, reports from local citizens are taken, perhaps prisoners/deserters are interrogated; the information is evaluated to see what's corroborated and what isn't; finally, orders are dispatched to the troops to prepare to attack or receive an attack, based on the information. All the armies did this, although maybe not as clearly defined as I laid it out...I'm curious as to which commanders provide an example for good use of information on the battlefield; I've got a theory I'm developing, but need some more examples and opinions.

Good suggestions folks, keep 'em coming!

 

[leftyhunter]

One must understand there is a big difference between raw information and processed intelligence. Almost every where the Union advanced local slaves provided information. Much the same could be said of Confederate sympathizers in the rear of Union armies. The local commanders often used such information, but both the Union and the Confederacy lacked a central processing center at division, corps or army level to combine the information, analyze it and provide intelligence to a commander. The effective S2 sections found today at division, corps and army did not exist in the 1860s.

Was not the AoP's BMI the same has S2? I don't know for sure but was it not so to speak the Grand Pa of modern military intel?
Leftyhunter

 

[leftyhunter]

True- but the fundamentals of the intelligence cycle haven't changed. Information needs to be collected, that information needs to be evaluated to determine if it's accurate or not, the results need to be reported in some fashion to someone, and new requirements for information need to be determined. A general needs to know if the enemy plans to attack or stand its ground; to achieve this, scouts are dispatched, reports from local citizens are taken, perhaps prisoners/deserters are interrogated; the information is evaluated to see what's corroborated and what isn't; finally, orders are dispatched to the troops to prepare to attack or receive an attack, based on the information. All the armies did this, although maybe not as clearly defined as I laid it out...I'm curious as to which commanders provide an example for good use of information on the battlefield; I've got a theory I'm developing, but need some more examples and opinions.

Good suggestions folks, keep 'em coming!

I don't have the exact details but based on Gen. Thomas achieving such a major defeat of Hood at Nashville did not Thomas have very good intel about Hood and use it to full advantage?
Leftyhunter

 

[Shadow9216]

Was not the AoP's BMI the same has S2? I don't know for sure but was it not so to speak the Grand Pa of modern military intel?
Leftyhunter

That's pretty much it- they showed the need for a dedicated unit to sort through all incoming information, as well as to maintain situational awareness of their opponents even when not directly engaged- the modern "Order of Battle", which not only lists units/commanders, but maintains tables of organization and equipment as well as current manpower, disposition, and readiness/capability (where known).

 

[Shadow9216]

I don't have the exact details but based on Gen. Thomas achieving such a major defeat of Hood at Nashville did not Thomas have very good intel about Hood and use it to full advantage?
Leftyhunter

I don't know much about the battle beyond McPherson- can you give me a few more details??

 

[leftyhunter]

I don't know much about the battle beyond McPherson- can you give me a few more details??

I am by no means an expert on the Battle of Nashville and Franklin. I remember we had a thread about Hood a few weeks or so back and one of the posters wrote a book about the above and he seemed to agree that Thomas had a good grasp of what need to be done. There is a good biography of Thomas by Einsholf (sp?) and I read it a year or so again. The fact that Thomas didn't seem to loose a battle or get surprised suggests that Thomas had a good grasp of intel. It has been argued that Thomas's victory over the AoT at Nashville was one of the most complete of the whole CW. That would argue that Thomas had his ducks lined up in a row and that requires some good intel.
Leftyhunter

 

[Shadow9216]

Thanks- I'll look into that a bit more.

 

[John Davison]

An example of the lack of intelligence gathering would be Grant's underestimating the strength of the enemy prior to the Battle of Shiloh. I'm mystified that Grant didn't have enough recon, scouts, informers, etc, to realize that the Confederates had anticipated his move on Corinth and had infantry, artillery, and Calvary massed around Pittsburg Landing -- almost enough firepower to knock Grant's forces right back into the Tennessee River. Grant was extremely lucky! I can't help thinking of the similarities between Shiloh and the WW2 Allied Normandy landing.

 

[diane]

An example of the lack of intelligence gathering would be Grant's underestimating the strength of the enemy prior to the Battle of Shiloh. I'm mystified that Grant didn't have enough recon, scouts, informers, etc, to realize that the Confederates had anticipated his move on Corinth and had infantry, artillery, and Calvary massed around Pittsburg Landing -- almost enough firepower to knock Grant's forces right back into the Tennessee River. Grant was extremely lucky! I can't help thinking of the similarities between Shiloh and the WW2 Allied Normandy landing.

And he was lucky that Confederate commanders muffed their intelligence. A S Johnston was not aware of how close Buell really was - like right behind the next Indian mound.