Mosby Captures Grant May,1864

[General Butterfield]

Mosby Captures Grant May, 1864

From wiki: The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant tell of an incident near Warrenton, Virginia on about May 1, 1864 when Mosby unknowingly missed by only a few minutes a chance to kill or capture Grant, who was traveling unguarded on a special train from Washington back to his headquarters to launch the Overland Campaign.

Seems like it would be an interesting what if taking Grant off the table at this stage. It comes just a few days before AoP crossed the Rapidan and the battle of the Wilderness. How do you see the war progressing? Would Halleck get his old job back? Would Sherman advance as normal? Would Meade remain in command or be replaced by Hancock, Warren, other? How do you see the Overland and Valley campaigns going?

 

[OldReliable1862]

Suffice to say, this will have major effects on the war. From what I remember, Meade, while at times slow to move, was a very good commander, so I think he'll keep his position. One big question is: will Meade have Grant's simply dogged determination to go "where Lee goes"?

 

[Hoseman]

Interesting question. While I don't think it would have changed the outcome of the war, I do believe that without Grant the war would have been prolonged another year. Meade was no Grant. Also, Grant saw the "big picture" and coordinated multiple armies across the entire south. I just don't see anyone else who could have done such an effective job not only with the AOP but with all the combined federal forces.

 

[Saphroneth]

Suffice to say, this will have major effects on the war. From what I remember, Meade, while at times slow to move, was a very good commander, so I think he'll keep his position. One big question is: will Meade have Grant's simply dogged determination to go "where Lee goes"?

As I like to point out, Grant didn't "go where Lee went". He engaged Lee, took generally heavier casualties than Lee did, then moved south and east (only for Lee to block him again).
If anyone was making sure the two armies kept engaging one another, it was Lee and not Grant; if all Grant wanted was to fight a battle of attrition with Lee, he historically went about it the wrong way.

 

[Carronade]

As I like to point out, Grant didn't "go where Lee went". He engaged Lee, took generally heavier casualties than Lee did, then moved south and east (only for Lee to block him again).
If anyone was making sure the two armies kept engaging one another, it was Lee and not Grant; if all Grant wanted was to fight a battle of attrition with Lee, he historically went about it the wrong way.

Good observation. It was more Lee going where Grant was going - and getting there first, though sometimes just barely as at Laurel Hill or Cold Harbor.

 

[Saphroneth]

Good observation. It was more Lee going where Grant was going - and getting there first, though sometimes just barely as at Laurel Hill or Cold Harbor.

Yes. The Overland Campaign makes perfect sense as Grant trying to turn Lee out of position and Lee being too quick for Grant - which is no mean feat for Lee, as Grant was the one initiating the marches - but of the two it was Lee who was executing a coherent strategy... or, at least, one which he admitted he was doing.

Grant was probably the general with the right political skill to keep the AotP going, but his strategy executed earlier in the war- in 1862 for example - would have been either outright impossible or merely an extremely costly failure. Grant's approach, in other words, was one which only worked because of his huge available manpower relative to Lee.



Oddly, I suspect that if you had McClellan (very much a manoeuvrist, and a real possibility as a Union general picked to fight the war if Grant wasn't available) fighting the Overland campaign it might well have looked almost identical, except for the lack of extremely bloody battles (as McClellan didn't need to be taught by experience that frontal assaults against works are a bad idea). It'd even see McClellan crossing to Petersburg, where he might justly have written a letter to his wife about how it was two years late but Halleck had finally let him do what he wanted in July 1862.
Thing is, though, if it was McClellan fighting Petersburg I'm pretty sure he'd have concluded the siege much earlier than Grant did. McClellan knew how to fight a battle of position...

(And before anyone suggests McClellan would be spooked, quite apart from McClellan's estimates historically being fairly good he tended to manoeuvre appropriately for the force he was facing - and a series of turning movements would make sense against an equal force, so he'd probably do them even if he estimated Lee's force at double the true value.)

 

[Carronade]

I think the Union offensives would kick off as planned and progress as they did historically, at least at first. One question I see is whether whoever was in overall charge in the east would keep enough pressure on Lee to keep the Confederates from sending troops to support Johnston (or Hood).

I expect Meade would remain in command of the AofP, but he and the whole senior leadership were imbued with that "what Bobby Lee's going to do to us" spirit that Grant so deplored. They would likely continue the paradigm of fighting a battle, then falling back to regroup for a while before taking the field again. It took a Grant to turn south after the Wilderness and do it all over again, and again.

One more point, Meade was junior to several of the generals Grant brought into the campaign - Burnside, Baldy Smith, Butler. Grant as lieutenant general could put them all to work; who else could do that as well?

Grant's rank might be a disadvantage if he was captured; the Confederates would be reluctant to exchange him, and they'd have a good excuse not to unless the Union captured one of their Lt. Gens.

The rebs' best chance in 1864 might be to maintain a stalemate in Virginia while sending troops to help stop Sherman's advance, perhaps pull off another Chickamauga. Having Grant out of the picture makes that a lot more likely.

 

[wausaubob]

"Grant's rank might be a disadvantage if he was captured; the Confederates would be reluctant to exchange him, and they'd have a good excuse not to unless the Union captured one of their Lt. Gens."

If Mosby's rangers had been able to stop the train, Grant would have surrendered. He did not travel with a large body guard, and could not have fought it out. Mosby would have found himself with a very valuable asset.

However, since Grant travelled light, and usually on an unpredictable schedule, known only to Grant, it was difficult to know where he was. Without telephones, Mosby's people were one step behind.

Oddly, Mosby and Grant became friends after the war.

 

[Saphroneth]

I expect Meade would remain in command of the AofP, but he and the whole senior leadership were imbued with that "what Bobby Lee's going to do to us" spirit that Grant so deplored. They would likely continue the paradigm of fighting a battle, then falling back to regroup for a while before taking the field again. It took a Grant to turn south after the Wilderness and do it all over again, and again.

I don't actually think that's the case - the "turn south" story itself featuring Grant at a crossroads is something of a late arrival in the literature and doesn't seem well attested. The previous battles all saw either a Union defeat, or a Union victory where logistically an advance would be too difficult - but post-Wilderness Grant had an embarrassment of riches, logistically speaking (and in terms of troop count).

The rebs' best chance in 1864 might be to maintain a stalemate in Virginia while sending troops to help stop Sherman's advance, perhaps pull off another Chickamauga. Having Grant out of the picture makes that a lot more likely.

I'm not sure. By 1864 the Rebels have been ground down pretty far - Lee's strength is only about 60% of Grant's for the entire campaign, and that's with Grant losing troops proportionately faster than Lee - and Rebel strategy was consistently to place Richmond first because it was both their capital, vital logistically, and among their only sources of cannon and rifles (it had some horrendously high fraction of Confederate industry.)

Cutting a significant number of troops out of Virginia and sending them west leaves open the possibility that someone will repeat the Peninsular Campaign, which would mean that very quickly there was a large army on the Peninsula en route to Richmond. (I'd need to check the numbers but I'm pretty sure the Confederacy would be in serious trouble if that happened.)

One more point, Meade was junior to several of the generals Grant brought into the campaign - Burnside, Baldy Smith, Butler. Grant as lieutenant general could put them all to work; who else could do that as well?

Well... McClellan, who was a Major General of Regulars with a date of rank of May 14, 1861. Nobody in the army could be senior to him unless they were a Lt. Gen of some kind, as Scott had left the army late in 1861.
Apart from that, anyone promoted to Lt. Gen of Volunteers would be senior to everyone except Grant, and Halleck was senior to everyone except Grant and McClellan.

 

[Saphroneth]

Okay, quick overall strength breakdown in the eastern theatre. Going by PFD.

June 30 returns - Union
Potomac 86,500
Washington 25,500
Middle 6,000
West Virginia 28,500
Virginia and North Carolina 45,000

Not all of these, especially Virginia&NC and West Virginia, are available - assume 10,000 total from those latter two departments, representing the smallest realistic contribution

Plus add-back casualties from Overland battles
55,000

Total estimated strength in the East for the Union: 183,000
(about equal to the strength in the East in December 1861, actually)


Confederate - splitting difference between PFD and Aggregate to account for lower CS definitions of PFD

Army of Northern Virginia 60,000
Dept. of Richmond 6,500
Early's force 10,000

Plus add-back casualties from Overland battles 33,000

Total estimated strength in the East for the Confederacy: 86,500


What this means is that it would be quite possible to conduct a phased move to the Peninsula - about 20,000 men at a time. By the time enough men have been moved into the Peninsula that Lee could swipe at Washington with his whole force, enough force would be in the Peninsula that Lee couldn't do so without risking Richmond. It's the same theory used to pin Lee at Richmond during the Petersburg siege, but without the lopsided casualties first.