Mixed Arms Tactical Question

[The Ninth Ohio]

I have a question for the armchair tacticians of the board.

How does a brigade commander account for mixed arms between regiments in his brigade? For example,

I was recently refereeing a PBEM game covering a version of the Battle of Cedar Mountain. One of the CS officers had a brigade consisting of 4 regiments, 3 with rifles and 1 with smoothbores. His brigade was ordered to skirmish a forest, and he, being new to Civil War tactics in general, asked a simple question: "How would you use the smoothbores in this instance? Do I put them up front since line of sight is limited in a forest anyhow? Or do I hold them in reserve because they wouldn't perform as well as rifles?"

That also got me thinking about the same brigade being asked to advance against an enemy across an open field. I realize a lot depends on the overall situation, but in general, what is the role of the unit who has not yet received the "2.0 hardware upgrade", so to speak?

I know something of Civil War tactics, but this is a question whose answer eludes me. Would anyone care to share their thoughts on this tactical situation? Personal opinions are great, documented specifics are even better.

Thank you,

 

[John Winn]

Good question. I'm no expert on infantry but do know a thing or two and can offer a little.

If there were rifled and smoothbore muskets then typically the rifled ones would have been given to skirmishers as they often actually took aim. Most of the regiment just pointed in the direction of the enemy and fired their volleys as smoke and other things soon obscured their vision such that actual aiming didn't generally happen. That, and the typical close ranges in firefights, is why many dispute the notion that the rifled musket increased the casualty rate or was a significant factor in a tactical sense.

So, I'd say if your regiment had only smoothbores you'd line those boys up in good order and fire away like everybody else. If the skirmishers had rifled muskets they'd just get in line once they'd retreated back to the regiment and join the other companies in firing volleys.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

Interesting, that is more or less what he ended up reasoning out as well, and he left them in reserve hoping to pull them up when a general fight was underway. Only ended up being some Yankee cavalry.

I think you bring up a great point about aiming and ranges in firefights that is often missed. Hess in The Rifled Musket in Civil War Combat talks a bit how many factors such as what you describe take away from the myth of the "deadly accuracy" of the rifled musket. Although much of that can be attributed to user error rather than the tool itself.

 

[gary]

As skirmishers they would have to get very close to be effective (50 yards). It would be an unfair contest. They're better off held as reserves to be thrown in when the fighting gets close.

 

[James N.]

This can be a complicated situation! In the beginning of the war, often individual companies - or even individual soldiers! - might have a very mixed bag of arms, many brought from home. As the war progressed, these were eventually standardized within the regiments as soon as possible, but often brigades and divisions still contained the mixture you describe, and little could be done about it in a practical way, especially on the battlefield. The reason for that was the way Civil War battles tended to develop: A great example of that was Gettysburg, which even though not exactly a true meeting engagement involved units arriving from different directions in road columns. The best explanations I have ever seen as to just how this occurred are in the first chapters of Pfanz' Gettysburg - The Second Day and William Martin's Gettysburg - July 1 in both of which the authors lay out where and how the units involved camped the night before and were thereupon committed to their respective routes of march and road columns; some units or parts of units were detailed and not even included in the marches until later, their commanders not knowing exactly what was happening "at the front." In some cases units having the most experienced colonels *might* be leading the columns IF a battle was expected; otherwise, units in marching columns during the course of a campaign would trade places in rotation as to fairness about who was at the head of the column enjoying the fresh air and who was at the tail eating all the dust! With considerations such as these, particular armament was usually ignored in favor of this fairness to the men in the units.

 

[AUG]

I agree with the above answers in that companies from the rifle-equipped regiments, if not an entire regiment, would be deployed as skirmishers - with the smoothbore-armed regiment and others not on the skirmish line in reserve or line of battle.

And as to which of the three rifle-equipped regiments was chosen for the job, that might depend on which was better drilled or commanded. Often individual companies and company commanders within a regiment specialized in skirmish drill and regularly served as the designated skirmishers for the regiment or brigade. That was usually the role of the rifle-equipped flank companies early in the war, but even after a regiment was entirely equipped with rifles the flank companies sometimes continually served as the designated skirmishers.

In some cases entire regiments specialized in skirmish drill and acted as skirmishers for their brigade or division, as how a sharpshooter battalion would. That seems to have especially been true for the North, which raised fewer specialized sharpshooter units than the South.

 

[sjw83071]

Not specific to the scenarios given but I have heard of instances, exact examples I don't recall, where rifled companies would be deployed on the flanks.

 

[AUG]

Not specific to the scenarios given but I have heard of instances, exact examples I don't recall, where rifled companies would be deployed on the flanks.

Early in the war when many regiments were equipped with only a limited number of rifles those were usually given to the flank companies, which were the two light infantry companies of the regiment in accordance with the drill manuals. They were positioned on the flanks of the regiment in line but could be deployed as skirmishers wherever needed.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

In some cases entire regiments specialized in skirmish drill and acted as skirmishers for their brigade or division, as how a sharpshooter battalion would. That seems to have especially been true for the North, which raised fewer specialized sharpshooter units than the South.

Very interesting. Do you have any specific examples of this? I have seen many times where specific regiments or brigades have been regularly chosen to lead the vanguard, but nothing like that about skirmishing duty. It would make sense.

 

[AUG]

Very interesting. Do you have any specific examples of this? I have seen many times where specific regiments or brigades have been regularly chosen to lead the vanguard, but nothing like that about skirmishing duty. It would make sense.

The 13th Pennsylvania Reserves "Pennsylvania Bucktails" were I guess you could say the light infantry of the Pennsylvania Reserves Division in the AotP. They served that role many times but are probably best known for spearheading the attack on Turner's Gap at South Mountain. They were largely armed with Sharps rifles.

The 64th Illinois "Yates' Sharpshooters" and 66th Illinois "Birge's Western Sharpshooters" in the Army of the Tennessee both specialized as designated skirmishers for their brigade or division. Later in the war they were almost entirely armed with Henry repeaters and were utilized in combination with skirmishers to good effect in the Atlanta and Carolinas Campaigns.

Likewise, the 37th Massachusetts in the Eastern Theater was armed with Spencer repeaters in July 1864 and were often the go-to skirmishers. I recall that they spearheaded the Petersburg breakthrough on April 2, 1865, and the Federal advance at Sailor's Creek.

The 8th Missouri Infantry "American Zouaves" was said to have been drilled in Zouave tactics, expert in skirmish drill and bayonet practice. Lew Wallace's 11th Indiana (also a Zouave regiment) was as well. Both regiments were known for successfully assaulting a Confederate line at Fort Donelson utilizing light infantry tactics. There's some remarks here and there of other Federal Zouave regiments being drilled in "Zouave tactics", however not many other instances of them utilizing that on the battlefield.

The 9th New Jersey Infantry also specialized as sharpshooters and skirmishers.

There were a number of Federal units designated as sharpshooters, but they fought similarly to the above regiments - more so elite skirmishers than modern day snipers. For example, Berdan's 1st and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, 1st Michigan Sharpshooter Regiment, 1st New York Sharpshooter Battalion. The South tended to raise more of those sharpshooter units, mainly battalions formed by pulling men from existing units. Their role was often to lead the column in a march, spearhead an attack, cover a retreat, guard the flank, etc. By 1864 there was an army-wide effort in the ANV to organize a sharpshooter battalion within every brigade.

 

[The Ninth Ohio]

The 13th Pennsylvania Reserves "Pennsylvania Bucktails" were I guess you could say the light infantry of the Pennsylvania Reserves Division in the AotP. They served that role many times but are probably best known for spearheading the attack on Turner's Gap at South Mountain. They were largely armed with Sharps rifles.

The 64th Illinois "Yates' Sharpshooters" and 66th Illinois "Birge's Western Sharpshooters" in the Army of the Tennessee both specialized as designated skirmishers for their brigade or division. Later in the war they were almost entirely armed with Henry repeaters and were utilized in combination with skirmishers to good effect in the Atlanta and Carolinas Campaigns.

Likewise, the 37th Massachusetts in the Eastern Theater was armed with Spencer repeaters in July 1864 and were often the go-to skirmishers. I recall that they spearheaded the Petersburg breakthrough on April 2, 1865, and the Federal advance at Sailor's Creek.

The 8th Missouri Infantry "American Zouaves" was said to have been drilled in Zouave tactics, expert in skirmish drill and bayonet practice. Lew Wallace's 11th Indiana (also a Zouave regiment) was as well. Both regiments were known for successfully assaulting a Confederate line at Fort Donelson utilizing light infantry tactics. There's some remarks here and there of other Federal Zouave regiments being drilled in "Zouave tactics", however not many other instances of them utilizing that on the battlefield.

The 9th New Jersey Infantry also specialized as sharpshooters and skirmishers.

There were a number of Federal units designated as sharpshooters, but they fought similarly to the above regiments - more so elite skirmishers than modern day snipers. For example, Berdan's 1st and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters, 1st Michigan Sharpshooter Regiment, 1st New York Sharpshooter Battalion. The South tended to raise more of those sharpshooter units, mainly battalions formed by pulling men from existing units. Their role was often to lead the column in a march, spearhead an attack, cover a retreat, guard the flank, etc. By 1864 there was an army-wide effort in the ANV to organize a sharpshooter battalion within every brigade.

Excellent information, that's exactly what I was hoping for.

Thanks.