McGilvery's Mystery Battery

[Scott F]

Col. Fisher was sent to the opposite side of LRT before this, so Gildea probably had mistaken Col. Taylor from the Bucktails for Col. Fisher. From the history of the Bucktails,

Confused masses of troops came tearing up the rocky incline seeking safety, and the men at the battery on the crest made preparations to spike their guns. If the rebels should effect lodgment on Little Round Top, the Union position was lost. And rebel uniforms were everywhere mounting the heights. A change in the line to repel a threatened attack on the left, caused the brigade to straighten out into a line of five regiments,' and threw the Bucktails to the extreme left, so that their path lay through the battery, whose men, encouraged both by their presence and promises of assistance, stuck to their guns.

 

[Tom Elmore]

A Magnificent Irishman from Appalachia: The Letters of Lt. James Gildea, First Ohio Light Artillery, Battery L Pg. 64-65.

We came behind them and taking fire arrived on the file in the rear of Little Round Top. Could not find the Chief, Capt. Martin, to direct us where to go.

Captain Gibbs told me to accompany him and we rode out in front where we found Genl. Sykes with about 1200 regulars. As we rode up to the General, Captain Gibbs requested to know where he was wanted as he could not find the Chief. Syke looked around for a moment, replied, "Captain choose your own position to cover this front. I leave it to yourself'. As we turned, Gibbs said, "James, you place the left on the side of that slope, I will place the right here and you take the center. Place them about fifty yards in the rear and do not fire a shot until we are all captured".

After showing Guthrie his location and going to my own, I found the ground covered with scrub and brush which I directed them men to cut down so as to give a clear view to the front. While engaged in this, Corpl. John W. Craig said, "Lieutenant, what troops are those coming up behind us"? As there was considerable smoke and haze in the air, I could not see very clear and as the road was sunken so that nothing was to be seen but their guns and flag, which was furled up, I mistook it for an Irish Flag and I replied that it must be the 9th Mass., Col. Cass's old command, I did not look further but the head of the column swung around us and came on the regulars who did not see them until they received a volley which sent the remainder of them up to my section where they formed a support.

This was Wilcox's Division, who having driven the 3rd Corps back to the Baltimore Road, were try to find their way back to their own lines and having opened a passage through the regulars now swing out in front and not more than 70 or 80 feet from the front of our four advanced guns.

Seeing how things were, I directed my men to carry canister to the left section as the rapid fire now going on would soon exhaust the supply in the limbers, the caissons not being yet up.

As soon as our boys opened double shot canister (54, 4 oz. ball) the rebs dropped on their face behind the rocks which were here in plenty and never raised until driven out by the charge of the 9th Penna. Reserves, Col. Fisher, Commdg. When Fisher passed my guns, he became a little excited for fear that the rebs would get our front guns before he arrived, so his men fired one volley through our men by which 2 of our men, Harri'son Massie and Asa Kline were wounded. Lieutenant Guthrie yelled to him to charge or cease firing, so he advanced and drove the rebs out of their holes which ended the fight there.

When Fisher charged, I looked back for the first time and found 6 lines of battle in the rear of my guns The Sixth Corps had arrived and Genl. Sedgwich was standing between the two' guns. When I saluted him he remarked that we had got work and done splendid by holding the ground against such a force. An opinion which our Corps Commander. Genl. Sykes, corroborated that night by sending for Gibbs and told him he should have the credit of saving that Part of the line in his official report. Our General did not allow an Army correspondent in this Corps. He wanted only a wax officer record.

We could only use the 3 guns as one of the right sections could not be fired on account of the rocks around it caused hot recoil and jumped straight up, but we fired 90 rounds of canister in that little fight and although under fire of shot and shell and bullet, all the next day we took no active part but lay there to meet a charge which we never received after that.

It would seem to me from Gildea's account that his section was 50 yards to the rear and left of the right section (and north of the road). In that position, I figure the regiment directly behind him was the 139th Pennsylvania of Nevin's brigade, not the 9th Pennsylvania Reserves of Fisher's brigade, which did not charge, but instead was sent southward (except for the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves). Gildea's mention of the Sixth Corps having come up behind him also indicates that his section was north of the road. i can't account for "6 lines of battle" but there were certainly four (Eustis and Shaler) after Nevin had advanced. It is possible that Gildea counted six lines of battle just prior to Nevin's advance.

 

[Scott F]

It would seem to me from Gildea's account that his section was 50 yards to the rear and left of the right section (and north of the road). In that position, I figure the regiment directly behind him was the 139th Pennsylvania of Nevin's brigade, not the 9th Pennsylvania Reserves of Fisher's brigade, which did not charge, but instead was sent southward (except for the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves). Gildea's mention of the Sixth Corps having come up behind him also indicates that his section was north of the road. i can't account for "6 lines of battle" but there were certainly four (Eustis and Shaler) after Nevin had advanced. It is possible that Gildea counted six lines of battle just prior to Nevin's advance.

Yes Gibbs' report also has Gildea's section on the north side of the road. However, the attacking regiment wounded two from Guthrie's section and charged through his section down the slope of the hill. From the History of the Bucktails quoted above and a passage from PA at Gettysburg pg. 103 along with Captain Bell's account, it is quite possible that it was Bucktails.

On the left of the second line, Colonel Taylor, not realizing the position, undertook to countermarch the Bucktails, which movement was also attempted by the Second, but in the confusion of the movement they suddenly found themselves confronted and mixed up with the charging enemy. In the short but desperate melee that followed, the greater part of these two regiments charged without firing a shot. So far up the slope were the enemy, that the gunners of Hazlett's Battery on the crest were preparing to spike their guns, but this movement encouraged them not to do so.

 

[Tom Elmore]

The attempted countermarch by the Bucktails (13 PR) and also the 2 PR was done to have the regiments facing to the front; they had marched into that position with their right in front, meaning their right company was on the left as they deployed south of the road, so that when they fronted they would actually be facing eastward with their backs (and their file closers) exposed to the enemy. So they were faced to the rear to confront their opponent. If that countermarch movement was only partially executed when the charge was ordered, 13 PR would have been in quite a jumbled state.

Incidentally, Colonel S. M. Jackson of the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves (11 PR) claimed to have given the order to charge, thus Gen. Crawford merely repeated the order. That sounds credible because Crawford was with the 1st Pennsylvania Reserves in the second line behind 11 PR. In fact Jackson claims he first noticed McCandless' brigade when nearing the marshy ground of Plum Run, when 1 PR and 13 PR came up on his left.

Gildea's account is unclear since he mentions a Federal line wounding two of his men while passing his guns, so I attributed that incident to the 139th Pennsylvania passing Gildea's center section, but as Scott points out, Gildea mentions Guthrie, who was with the left section. So there are two possibilities. Perhaps Gildea considered Guthrie under his control and was with Guthrie's left section or afterwards heard of the "friendly fire" incident involving Guthrie's section. Another possibility is that Guthrie was at Gildea's center section at the time, an idea which we might entertain because Captain Bell clearly indicates at least one of Guthrie's pieces was momentarily abandoned and claimed by a lone Confederate. (I do wish we knew that brave Confederate's identity!) I just can't see Gildea leaving his center section given Gibbs' explicit orders to him.

 

[Scott F]

Good point. Gildea was standing by his guns when he said Fisher had charged, because when he turned around General Sedgwich was standing in-between his two guns. Also a little context is in order here. Gildea was promoted from Sgt. to 2nd Lieutenant on May 6, 1863. Unfortunately his orders were lost so he could not be mustered out so he could back. Captain Gibbs wanted him to remain as orderly sergeant until it could be sorted out but Gildea refused. It reached a boiling point during the march to Gettysburg and Gibbs had to place Gildea under arrest for refusing to obey orders. Gildea requested a trial by court martial rather than give in. General Weed put an end to it because Gildea was already a commissioned officer regardless of the fact they could not muster him out to take the section leader slot in the battery. Weed set him free and smoothed it over with Gibbs and he and Gildea became best friends again.

 

[Scott F]

If it was the 139th Pennsylvania then it would also make sense. "As we pushed down the north side of Little Round Top. it was the fortune of Company "D'" to recover two brass guns from the hands of some of Longstreet's men who were ready to turn them on our lines. Company "D" not only got the guns, but captured the Louisiana Tigers [sic], who were laying their disloyal hands on them." Sounds very similar to Captain Bell's account,

A brass piece in our immediate front on the edge of the crest had been worked for all it was worth, but was deserted now, save by the dead and wounded. When at last the boys of the 1st Division had passed over us and we rose to our feet, one of the pursuers had clambered so closely after them that he had his hands on that gun, and was calling to his companions to come and help him turn it on us. I remember firing at him with my pistol without waiting for orders, and after our Colonel's order 'up boys and at them,' the men opened promptly with their breech loaders, checking the advance of the enemy who swarmed in the valley in front, and it was but a few moments before they began to give ground. The retiring of the 1st Division allowed some guns on our right to be brought into play, and the Napoleon, which the bold Confederate designed to turn upon us was again manned and worked with a vengeance.

From Bell's account the "guns on our right" were Gibbs' right section making the abandoned guns either Guthrie's or maybe the withdrawn section from Walcott.

 

[Scott F]

It is interesting to note that part of Wheatfield Road is labelled by the Park Service with a cast iron tablet (like the one in your avatar) that says it is "McGilvery Artillery Avenue".

This is a post about the subject on one of my blogs.

From Captain John Bigelow's bid the rename United States Avenue to either Hunt Avenue or McGilvery Avenue. Since United States Avenue still exists they must have gave him McGilvery Ave. somewhere else as the tablet suggests.

I am the only surviving Light Battery Commander from Massachusetts who fought at Gettysburg, and my fighting was done along the Trostle Lane, consequently I am especially interested in having the avenue, which you have made of the Trostle Lane, properly named for the credit of the Artillery. "Hunt Avenue" will give belated honor to the dear General, while "McGilvery Avenue" will give credit to a most deserving officer, whose assuming command when General Sickles and all the officers of the Third Corps had disappeared, and whose courage, energy and ability hall a most important influence at a critical part of the battle field.
My first preference would be "Hunt Avenue," which would honor the General and emphasize the fact that the fighting along its lines was by the Artillery. My second preference would be "McGilvery Avenue," for the reasons I have stated.
The name "United States Avenue" to my mind suggests, means and tells nothing.

 

[Scott Brown]

I've got a question about the placement of Barnes and Walcott over on the left with Grant and Russell. Presumably this was done by arrangement between Sykes and Sedgwick, but why? Was it because of a lack of 6th Corps batteries in the immediate area, or due to the problematic rocky ground north of Gibbs mentioned earlier in this thread (on Bachelder's July 3 maps there are no batteries in between Gibbs and Ames), or was the advanced position of the 6th Regulars north of the Wheatfield Road the issue? And was this 'sharing' of batteries between two different corps unusual?

 

[Scott F]

I've got a question about the placement of Barnes and Walcott over on the left with Grant and Russell. Presumably this was done by arrangement betiween Sykes and Sedgwick, but why? Was it because of a lack of 6th Corps batteries in the immediate area, or due to the problematic rocky ground north of Gibbs mentioned earlier in this thread (on Bachelder's July 3 maps there are no batteries in between Gibbs and Ames), or was the advanced position that

 

[Scott F]

I've got a question about the placement of Barnes and Walcott over on the left with Grant and Russell. Presumably this was done by arrangement between Sykes and Sedgwick, but why? Was it because of a lack of 6th Corps batteries in the immediate area, or due to the problematic rocky ground north of Gibbs mentioned earlier in this thread (on Bachelder's July 3 maps there are no batteries in between Gibbs and Ames), or was the advanced position of the 6th Regulars north of the Wheatfield Road the issue? And was this 'sharing' of batteries between two different corps unusual?

Sorry my reply didn't post before, but are you talking about July 3rd?

 

[Scott Brown]

Yes.

 

[Scott F]

In that case you are correct, the 5th Corps batteries were used to reinforce the left because that part of the line was hit hardest on July 2nd. But the Confederates never exploited the other side by that position left vacated but neither side advanced on that part of the field on July 3rd.

 

[Tom Elmore]

I've got a question about the placement of Barnes and Walcott over on the left with Grant and Russell. Presumably this was done by arrangement between Sykes and Sedgwick, but why? Was it because of a lack of 6th Corps batteries in the immediate area, or due to the problematic rocky ground north of Gibbs mentioned earlier in this thread (on Bachelder's July 3 maps there are no batteries in between Gibbs and Ames), or was the advanced position of the 6th Regulars north of the Wheatfield Road the issue? And was this 'sharing' of batteries between two different corps unusual?

A good question, but I have not come across an answer yet from participants, so will venture an opinion. The Federals must have perceived a threat to their far left, perhaps driven by Confederate probes from the previous day, including from Law's/Sheffields' Alabama brigade. It seems they wanted to bolster their two infantry brigades with two batteries of artillery support, and because Barnes and Walcott were both considered superfluous for lack of tenable positions in their front, they were sent.

 

[Scott Brown]

A good question, but I have not come across an answer yet from participants, so will venture an opinion. The Federals must have perceived a threat to their far left, perhaps driven by Confederate probes from the previous day, including from Law's/Sheffields' Alabama brigade. It seems they wanted to bolster their two infantry brigades with two batteries of artillery support, and because Barnes and Walcott were both considered superfluous for lack of tenable positions in their front, they were sent.

Thanks, Tom. Sounds logical to me that Sykes would have loaned the two batteries to Sedgwick, especially if they could not be utilized in his line.

And as you said, there doesn't appear to be anything in the record that points to an answer on this.

 

[Militarybooks]

I also heard that Savas Beatie will be doing a "revised, updated" reprint. No info on a timetable.

Tis the plan.

 

[jameswoods]

Referencing Bachelder's 1876 map of 3rd day positions, a section of Gibbs' L, 1st Ohio occupies the same position occupied by Barnes' C, 1st Massachusetts of the day before. So it isn't as if the Massachusetts' guns had not been in a tenable position. It may have just been more efficient to move an undamaged battery (Barnes') to the left and just require Gibbs, with one section already ensconced on LRT, to essentially stay put. Walcott's five serviceable guns had been drawn to the rear immediately after the Confederate repulse and were also conveniently available.

 

[jameswoods]

Meant to have written Barnes' C, 1st New York.

 

[Chattahooch33]

This is the rock wall General Wofford mentioned to McLaws that they advanced to. It is the same wall that Col. Bryan of the 16th Georgia also claimed was their advanced position. The photograph was taken in 1867 just 4 years after the battle and runs parallel to modern Sedwick Ave. Just out frame to the left and about 100 yards beyond the wall was Captain Gibbs' right section of his battery consisting of two guns commanded by Lt. Walworth. His left section commanded by Lt. Guthrie was positioned on the northern slope of LRT (where their monument now stands), again just out of frame. There was, however, another section of a different battery also on the other side of the Wheatfield Road but closer to the wall than Gibbs' left section. Given that Walcott's right section was recaptured by the 62nd New York where their monument (the 62nd's) now stands and the 139th PA recaptured Walcott's middle section at the crossroads (where the 139th and Battery C monuments are located) it stands to reason that Walcott's left section was originally posted south of the Wheatfield Road in the Valley of Death. They however would have been in the field of fire of Gibbs' right section and therefore may have been moved back further to the foot of LRT, just as Tom Elmore suspected.

View attachment 398615

We were there a few days ago and I tried to locate the furthest advance. From what I could tell this wall was removed at some point... how\why do you remove a stone wall? However, the section to the north side of wheatfield rd. remains.