Strategic Hex Game McClellan's Last Command (custom GCACW module) - community playthrough

[Saphroneth]

I have that map from the last game. I did find that once I explode the map to a readable size I can't implement the edit feature to draw any lines, and if I don't explode it I can, but I can't see where the lines are put.
Lubliner.

The best approach tends to be to download the map and edit it locally.

 

[Lubliner]

The best approach tends to be to download the map and edit it locally.

I am anxiously awaiting an opening turn that starts the game. Are you going to give some order of battle for both sides first, and where they may be located? How is this going to work without giving away vital secrets with either side? Thanks, Saph.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

I am anxiously awaiting an opening turn that starts the game. Are you going to give some order of battle for both sides first, and where they may be located? How is this going to work without giving away vital secrets with either side? Thanks, Saph.
Lubliner.

Alas, there has been an issue which has delayed orders from one side.

 

[Lubliner]

Alas, there has been an issue which has delayed orders from one side.

No problem. I just needed to be sure it hadn't been forgotten. Thanks again; I am looking forward to the opening.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

Movements on turns 1-2 of the previous (November 1862) game:

Key points shown here:
Union movements preparatory to crossing the Rappahannock and the Hazel.

Formation of a battalion-carre structure, with the Union having a "rightward" wing (9th Corps plus Whipple) facing the Valley, plus a central column (1st, 2nd) and a leftward column (5th, 3rd) and 6th in reserve. (Ironically 9th is the core of the Left and 5th is the core of the Right.)

The Confederates have a front line established, but it is very weak along the right flank (Pickett and Kemper have only a few thousand men each). It probably would have been better to move McLaws and Pickett to each cover one of the fords, with Robertson and Ransom setting up in Culpeper along with Pendleton; orders to withdraw if imperilled and each of the individual "delaying" divisions being a strong unit would mean the Union had to "waste time" setting up flanking attacks or going to the further fords.

Anderson's position is much better. Not only is Anderson's division a unitary division which has been kept together (and is thus a very strong single unit) but it's also at a point where Union troops can't work around the immediate flanks in the forest. If Anderson had been deployed forward to the fords it could have been encircled.

The Union right flank is, at this point, quite weak. 6th Corps is available as a (very strong) reserve if need be, but it's still not ideal - Burns, Sturgis, Getty and Whipple have 18,000 men between them and not very good leadership, while Jackson's corps is ~30,000 strong and has excellent leadership.


The fundamental strategic issue though is that the Union could redivert 2nd and 6th Corps to help 9th + Whipple fend off Jackson and they'd still have ca. 70,000 infantry closing in on Culpeper. This is the kind of situation where the Confederates want to delay but not at the cost of manpower - each Confederate casualty hurts a lot more than a Union one because there's less CS manpower on the board.

 

[Lubliner]

The problem I faced was all I knew was a large cavalry force was east of the Rappahannock bridge. I sent Hampton around to meet it and find its strength. Meanwhile the real threat I thought I was facing was coming from Hazel Run, the north. My troops were not sufficient enough to hold the fords there and lower down on the Rappahannock. Essentially, I was overwhelmed as the Union forces advanced rapidly, and gained considerable ground and strength on every front.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN


This is a what-if battle from the Northern Virginia campaign, turn 4 (which saw no serious fighting). It uses the same orders as issued in the turn, I'm just rerunning the turn and the dice go differently.


Reno had Ferrero's division march to break contact at Ross's Mill, though his division made hard work of breaking contact and by midday was only around one and a half miles from the Mountain Run.
Lee directed a flanking column, with Evans' large brigade in the fore, over the fords of the Mountain Run at Paoli Mills and got to Fleetwood House ahead of Reno's column while Hood and Kemper closed up behind.
Meanwhile, King's division marched to Farley along the south bank of the Muddy Run, ready to make for St Jame's Church.

A little after midday, Longstreet launched a massive assault against Ferrero's retreating division with more than 10,000 troops. This attack involved Kemper and Hood's divisions, and was aided by Lee personally aligning the troops before stepping off, with the result that (out of universe) it was type +1 tac +1 ratio +2 flank +4 Lee Bonus +1 for a total of +9. The dice rolls made this +10.

Ferrero's division was effectively destroyed in the attack, suffering 2,500 casualties out of 3,500, and the remains of the division managed to rout to Mt Holly Church.

King's division readied to march to St Jame's church in the afternoon, with McDowell in command, only to discover based on cavalry recce that the church was occupied by several thousand closed-up Confederate troops. With no clear way through, McDowell halted King's division north of Fleetwood Hll with Bayard covering the route around his flank.

 

[Pat Answer]

Ah, those capricious cubes… !

 

[Saphroneth]

Oh dear... not a good day, methinks.




Battle information for August 24
Battle of Germantown (first phase)
AP Hill's division marched from Fayetteville to a mile north of Germantown and launched an attack on Griffin's brigade of Morell's division. The Union force was not quite caught by surprise but was attacked at extremely poor odds, and was forced into a precipiate rout back to New Jerusalem Church with the loss of half of the brigade.
(1000 Union casualties)


Battle of Rappahannock station
With Pope's assistance, Sigel attempted to launch a combined attack against Confederate forces at Rappahannock Station with Stahel's division and the 3rd Corps of the Army of Virginia. This attack broke down in coordination, however, as McDowell's corps was having trouble with the move from a point of contact at Beverly Ford to the position west of Tinpot Run where he could support the attack, and while he provided a distracting effect on the flank only Schenck's division* actually went in.
The attack was a disaster, with Schenck's men suffering 1,000 casualties and becoming completely exhausted, and no effective disruption achieved on the Confederate forces in response.
(1000 Union casualties.)


Battle of Tinpot Run (first phase)
Finding his force imperilled by Confederate movements to his north and west, McDowell launched an attack by the 3rd Corps AoV against Ewell's division just to the north,on the western side of Tinpot Run.
His intent was for both divisions to attack, however a breakdown in communication led to the attack being made solely by Ricketts' division, and this combined with significant failures in execution to result in the attack being the second Union disaster of the day.
(1,500 Union casualties.)

(second phase)
Longstreet launched an attack of his own against the 3rd Corps AoV; however this attack was also poorly managed owing to the difficulty of expanding the Confederate bridgehead. Only DR Jones' divsion made the attack, and they suffered poorly in crossing the creek; 1,000 casualties resulted, and McDowell's force was not significantly troubled by the attack.
(1,000 Confederate casualties.)


Battle of Rogue's Road
Turning his attention to Sigel's force around Norman's Ford, Longstreet launched Hood's division and Evans' brigade against the Germans and achieved a much more convincing victory. The division was driven away with 1,000 further casualties and forced in the direction of Elk Run, badly routed and disorganized.
(1,000 Union casualties.)


Battle of Germantown (second phase)
Reno took Ferrero's division to a position northwest of Germantown, not realizing the risk this posed to his command; by the time he was aware of the problem, Jackson had ridden to the other end of AP Hill's column and reversed the division. He attacked Reno from the northwest while Taliaferro's force flanked the Union division from the southeast, compelling Ferrero to rout in the direction of Bealeton Station.
(1,000 Union casualties.)


Battle of Morgansburg
Marching via the Rogue's Road, Wilcox's division was delayed by Beardsley's cavalry but managed to get into position to attack Milroy's brigade in Morgansburg from the south. The small brigade was utterly unable to resist the Confederate assault, and was forced north after a sharp fight which resulted in several hundred Union casualties.
(500 Union casualties.)

 

[neyankee61]

I could click "Like" but I don't think I will!

 

[Lubliner]

It certainly was a bleak house row that day for the Union forces. With the rivers rising after all that rain in a land unfamiliar to them, being scattered adds to the fear of what comes. Pray for a sunny day, and hope the confederates go for a picnic in the Shenandoah. Why not? Pickett went to a fish fry round about Sailor's Creek!
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

August 25 (a rain turn)

Battle of Clover Hill
Piatt's small independent brigade was directed to proceed by rail to Bealeton Station. En route the trains (containing around 1,000 Union soldiers) ran into F. Lee's brigade of cavalry blockading the rail line.
The result was a confused action where Piatt's men did far better than expected given the incredibly difficult tactical situation, but the brigade ended up in a disorganized state after detraining under fire; casualties were minor on both sides.
(no significant casualties)

Battle of Tinpot Run (third phase)
Under orders to march to Bealeton Station, and finding the Tinpot Run swollen against the movement of his force, McDowell opted to launch an assault with his forces against Ewell's division to the north - this force covered the Fayetteville Road and represented the most effective compromise between a manageable objective for his corps and the ability to actually reach Bealeton were he to be successful.
While both the divisions of King and Ricketts were ready to break out, only Ricketts' division actually recieved the go order at the correct time - King being too occupied with both the difficulty of fending off Confederate divisions to the south and also with his own medical issues.
As a consequence of this, the artillery was in insufficient mass to effectively suppress Ewell's own divisional artillery - a contributing factor in a rainy battle which saw around 1,000 Union casualties from all causes before McDowell called the retreat.
(1,000 Union casualties)



Clover Hill was sort of interesting. The situation was such a direct parallel to the historical Bull Run Bridge that I decided to treat it as an equivalent - Piatt's brigade was treated as attacking in a "column of march" attack, and racked up a ton of penalties, but then rolled almost the best possible result and was merely disorganized.

 

[Lubliner]

The forces of McDowell seemed to all bog down in the rain, not going much of anywhere far. If the confederates can now maintain pressure that disorganization will only become worse. What does the weather forecast call for the 26th of August?
Thanks Saphroneth.
Lubliner.

 

[Saphroneth]

August 26

(another rain turn)


Battle of Tinpot Run (fourth phase)

In another attempt to escape his situation, and to comply with his orders to retreat, McDowell attempted another attack on Ewell's positions with his men. The first attempt resulted in failure owing to significant flaws in organizing the breakout, stemming principally from the tired state of both divisions and the lack of fodder. Another key cause of the delay was the confused command structure, as a tired orderly mistakenly copied down an order as for the divisions of "First Corps".

This problem was rectified around midday, however, and McDowell launched both divisions in an assault against Kemper's division (to the northwest) as the new weak link in the encirclement owing to worrying signs of Confederate reinforcement. This attack however was no better conducted than the last one, and around 1,500 Union casualties resulted from the breakout.
(1,500 Union casualties)


Opting not to wait for the last of the planned reinforcements, Lee ordered the planned attack into the 3rd Corps AoV pocket. This attack involved over 25,000 Confederate attackers (and around 14,000 Union defenders), and saw Jackson displaying an impressive flair - McDowell's lines, already disorganized from the breakout attempt, were shattered by a powerful assault that resulted in five hundred Confederate casualties to Taliaferro's division but around 2,500 Union combat casualties.
The impact of the attack caused a complete disintegration in McDowell's command, which fled in panicked rout through the Confederate lines around Rappahannock Station and northeast. Some semblance of order was regained after the Tinpot Run was crossed, and though around 4,000 more Union troops were captured on the retreat over half the starting strength of the corps reached the area northeast of Liberty - though the whole corps was in a sorry state.
This also caused news of the defeat to spread, resulting in the development of significant hysteria in the Army of Virginia and a dangerous loss of morale army-wide.
(2,500 Union combat casualties, 4,000 Union retreat casualties; 500 Confederate combat casualties)
Union Panic is now in effect, which grants 15 Confederate VPs and reduces Union combat values army-wide on turn 9. (It would have applied on turn 8 as well but no further fighting took place on that turn.)



Tinpot Run is probably going to be a heavily significant battle in the history of the Civil War, in this alternate history... it had more casualties than Seven Pines!

 

[Lubliner]

Can't blame all that on the rain. It fell on both sides of the battle forces.
Lubliner.

 

[Piedone]

Maybe there are still people to deride simulations and games - well...I won ´t anymore.

Of course I played all kind of war games before - but Saphroneth´ s setting is quite unique.
Without any exaggeration:
I never got that accurate a "feeling" about how it must have felt to walk in a civil war general´ s shoes.

You are writing orders - but you cannot know how subordinates will react. Will the attack be properly synchronized? Will units reach their objectives? Timing is extremely hard - and every plan based on accurate timing is prone to fail.

Then you never get a clear view. Of course you are shooing your cavalry around - but all they will tell you is "We saw a maybe division-sized force over there" - and you have no chance to know which division and how strong it is...and if there are more of ´em just hidden somewhere in the fog of war.

Consequentially every attack order being effective tomorrow is kind of a desperate gamble...you do not know what the enemy ordered and where he moved to - hence disaster is luring pretty much everywhere....

A lot of people are criticizing Lee for being overly aggressive.
Well...I ´d say they should take part in such a simulation. It is extremely nerve-wracking to stay in the defense - you have to have absolute faith in your force disposition and intelligence reports to be able to calmly await the enemy - quite every report of unexpected forces will throw you in some state of panic....
Hence you maybe will find more confidence in acting offensively - as it gives you the false impression of having control when forcing the enemy to react.

But you are just taking pretty incalculable risks, throwing dices and sending units into the fog of war....

A lot of people are citical about Lee ´s performance at Gettysburg - he should have moved away, fought on another day... - well I am facing pretty much the same situation at the moment - both sides have invested most of their forces now on a certain spot and hence have a pretty clear overview over the dispositions and the forces.
How shall I pull back? They will follow me....
How shall I surprise them? They are observing every move now - as we are just too close now...
And will I ever be able to find a situation that calculable and favourable again? Pretty sure not!

And then there are those people who are always expecting the death-blow to be delivered (read southern papers of the era...).
Well just do try it! Even if a combat was very successful....they take losses... and then retreat to somewhere. They order reinforcements. They will close their ranks soon - and then it ´s up to you to throw the dices again - and sometime soon those pesky things will decide against you.....

Now consider maps being incorrect or not available at all...
consider being dependant on lazy couriers getting lost or caught somewhere....
people loosing orders (to be found by the enemy)...
deserters ratting on you and your plans...
subordinates enjoying shad-bakes ...or just hating you and looking for every way to misinterprete your orders...
officers hating other commanders and willfully denying cooperation to them....

All I can say is that I will from now on be a much more humble judge to civil war generals.

And all I can say regarding the current state of play In this game is...well....
it might be that the ANV is praised at the moment in Richmond...but none of those jubilants have only a slight idea how much sheer luck was playing a decisive role....
I can extremely well understand now why "marse Robert" never boasted....

 

[Pat Answer]

"Welcome to the party, pal!" — John McClane

But seriously, many tabletop war games have to introduce mechanisms like chit pull unit activation or written orders to an umpire to counterbalance the God's-eye view of the player. Otherwise one is really playing a variant of chess - potentially hideously difficult to calculate especially against an expert but not because there are any mysteries in the layout of the board itself. As you put it so eloquently here, the operating environments of war and chess are not the same, and this setup (as I've mentioned before) captures the incomplete information/ uncertainty/ half "poker" spirit of true Kriegsspiel quite well.

And the point is exactly as you say: we should approach the study of command in this or any war like we should assess the performance of our favorite sports teams - with a healthy dose of "they are (or were) there while my posterior is comfortably lodged in this chair" skepticism about our hindsight/wishful-thinking laden 'wisdom'. Of course that isn't what many of us tend to do, being human and all… but it is always good to hear of one more eye-opening experience!


"Who's next?"

 

[Saphroneth]

August 27


Battle of Payne's Mill

AP Hill's division encountered first the Purnell Legion, in Payne's Mill, and then the 60th NY just northwest of the mill. Neither regiment was steady or well led, and AP Hill's division vastly outmatched them in both strength and fighting power; AP Hill in fact did not even bother to deploy his division, and simply had his leading infantry regiment (the 7th NC) march ahead of the rest of the force before firing a volley and attacking at a trot.
Both regimentally sized formations were destroyed.
(1,000 Union casualties.)


Skirmish outside Warrenton Junction
Kemper's division attacked Steinwehr's badly diminished division southwest of Warrenton Junction after taking part in crossing the Licking Run at Germantown. The efforts of the 6th NY and of Beardsley's brigade failed to delay the Confederate move, and Steinwehr's division was destroyed along with its battery - though the actual casualties incurred were minor.
(500 Union casualties.)



In addition to this, I should mention that the AoV 3rd corps shed about 2,500 stragglers today (bad rolling on straggling for a unit in bad shape). They were being followed up closely by enemy divisions so those men are probably captured, but they don't strictly count as battle casualties so don't count towards VPs.

 

[Saphroneth]

August 28



Battle of Auburn Mills
While his orders envisaged a retreat from 3-Mile Station, it quickly became apparent to Heintzelman that there were multiple Confederate divisions to his north that had been concealed by cavalry screening. His force made only a short distance in the morning, in contact and with skirmishing, and he determined to attack the force astride the road out around noon.
Owing to a communication mishap, Hooker's division was not yet ready when Kearny launched his force at Ewell to the north. This was compounded by Kearny's habitual problem with coordinated attacks, and in fact he got distracted ordering a single brigade to charge with bayonets against one of Ewell's brigades supported by artillery. Consequently his command reeled back to the start line with around a thousand casualties.
(1,000 Union casualties.)
Around the same time, AP Hill under Jackson launched an attack on the vanguard of the moving column - that being Reynolds, already at Auburn Mills. The assault took place over the upper Cedar Run, which impaired the attack, but Hill's brigades nevertheless hit Reynolds extremely hard and broke his formation. The division routed through Heintzelman's lines and to Warrenton.
(1,000 Union combat casaulties, 500 Union retreat casualties)

 

[Saphroneth]

Battles on Turn 11/Aug 29

Battle of Payne's Mill
Heintzelman and Reno attempted to move their forces out of the encircling effect of large parts of the Confederate army, and succeeded in delaying and disrupting Confederate plans. However around noon Jackson launched his whole corps in a concentric attack against Heintzelman's 3rd Corps AoP, bringing 24,000 men to bear on the 12,000 men making up the Union force.
The resultant attack was enough to completely rout Heintzelman's force, causing 2,500 battle casualties and another 2,000 men to be captured on the retreat, and Heintzelman's 3rd Corps fled clear to New Baltimore.
(2,500 Union battle casualties, 2,000 retreat casualties)

Following up on this, Longstreet launched Evans and DR Jones against the 9th Corps southeast of Payne's Mill. Only DR Jones actually attacked owing to a SNAFU, but the attack was nevertheless enough to rout the 9th Corps divisions already jittery from bearing witness to the rout of the AoP 3rd Corps.
Under heavy Confederate pressure, Reno eventually got the remains of his force out of the encirclement and to Blacksmith's Store.
(1,000 Union battle casualties, 2,000 Union retreat casualties)

Battle of Blacksmith's Store
Following up on the routed forces of 9th Corps, Jackson pushed Ewell's division to an attack on Blacksmith's Store; however, Reno had managed to consolidate his position enough to offer at least token resistance. While he was pushed back further to Bethel Church, the unexpected fighting cost Ewell both time and casualties and prevented a further disintegration of 9th Corps.
(500 Confederate casualties)

Reynolds marched from Warrenton to Blacksmith Shop relying on old information, and towards evening Wilcox's division arrived to attack Blacksmith Shop (also relying on old information) with the result that Reynolds was attacked there by Wilcox's division near the end of the day.
Reynolds' division lost significantly in the fighting and was routed to Georgetown.
(1,000 Union casualties)

Skirmish at Greenwich

Beardsley attempted to delay the march of Anderson along the Ringwood-Broad Run Church road, but misjudged his disengagement and lost around a regiment of cavalry in his retirement to New Market.
(500 Union cav-retreat casualties)