Mansfield. Brice Crossroad. Raymond?

[tony_gunter]

In all three of these battles, a larger force is approaching a smaller force along a single road.

At Brice Crossroad and Mansfield, an aggressive commander of a smaller force struck the head of the approaching army as it emerged from a choke point and routed them, pushing the panicked men back into the column of reinforcements creating confusion, more panic, and retreat.

Do you think Gregg did not have the chops to pull this off, was he limited by his instructions from Pemberton, was it McPherson that prevented this, or some combination of the three? Curious what y'all's opinions are.

 

[UCVRelics]

Brices Crossroads is a whole different animal as it was just CS cavalry and Gen NBF. Gregg had a very small force and acted accordingly. Lets see if we can get our Raymond expert to chime in. Paging @alan polk

 

[tony_gunter]

Brices Crossroads is a whole different animal as it was just CS cavalry and Gen NBF. Gregg had a very small force and acted accordingly. Lets see if we can get our Raymond expert to chime in. Paging @alan polk

Gregg had 2700 infantry. McPherson had ~5000 in his leading division, less than 9,000 after his other division arrived late in the day.

 

[alan polk]

Brices Crossroads is a whole different animal as it was just CS cavalry and Gen NBF. Gregg had a very small force and acted accordingly. Lets see if we can get our Raymond expert to chime in. Paging @alan polk

I don't know enough about Brice's Crossroad or Mansfield to make a proper distinction between those battles and Raymond. And I'm certainly no expert on Raymond. But I can, for whatever it's worth, give my opinion in regard to Gregg and the fight at Raymond.

First, it is my recollection that Gregg was under orders not to bring on a general engagement. I can't recall the exact wording. It might have been worded as a very strong suggestion.

Second, Gregg and Confederate high command were both equally unaware that an entire Union corp was operating on the Utica Road (modern Hwy 18). Rather, Gregg received word (not from high command) that a small enemy force was moving to Raymond along the Utica Road. I can't recall the size that Gregg expected, but it seems that I remember it being, at best, about a brigade — maybe a foraging expedition.

Thus, Gregg's tactic for dealing with the approaching enemy should be understood in light of the above two points. Again, in my opinion. The tactic was designed with a slightly smaller or even equal force of enemy in mind. It was one of entrapment and capture — by luring the enemy with one part of Gregg's force into the valley of 14-Mile Creek, while circling behind the enemy with another part. I suppose he reasoned that by receiving the small force of enemy into his trap did not violate the order or suggestion of not bringing on a general engagement.

Nevertheless, the tactic he prescribed relied on an enemy not exceeding a brigade size, and that that force could be lured into a small floodplain. This of course fell apart in the early hours of the fighting. His circling forces soon became involved in their own maneuverings and fights as they attempted to deal with an enemy that clearly exceeded a brigade size force. Once this happened, Gregg lost communication with those parts of his own force and was left in a grudge match for mere survival.

Had Gregg not been under orders to avoid a general engagement, perhaps he would have attacked head-on and accidentally rolled back a larger force into confusion as described above in those other battles. But the battle was limited by Gregg's tactical premise based on the suggestion of not bringing on a general engagement, and not because he didn't have the "chops." In fact, the Confederates were eager for a fight, and it is likely that, left to his own devices, Gregg would have formulated a very different tactic to deal with that approaching force coming down the Utica Road.

 

[Choatecav]

Wonderful thread!! This is the type of study that I joined this forum for.....

A lot of this can be laid at the feet of "those who think outside of the box" with both Forrest and Taylor. Gregg, under Pemberton, not so much.

 

[UCVRelics]

for whatever it's worth

Thanks, I knew you would have the insight on Raymond. Thanks.

 

[tony_gunter]

[deleted]

 

[tony_gunter]

I don't know enough about Brice's Crossroad or Mansfield to make a proper distinction between those battles and Raymond. And I'm certainly no expert on Raymond. But I can, for whatever it's worth, give my opinion in regard to Gregg and the fight at Raymond.

First, it is my recollection that Gregg was under orders not to bring on a general engagement. I can't recall the exact wording. It might have been worded as a very strong suggestion.

Second, Gregg and Confederate high command were both equally unaware that an entire Union corp was operating on the Utica Road (modern Hwy 18). Rather, Gregg received word (not from high command) that a small enemy force was moving to Raymond along the Utica Road. I can't recall the size that Gregg expected, but it seems that I remember it being, at best, about a brigade — maybe a foraging expedition.

Thus, Gregg's tactic for dealing with the approaching enemy should be understood in light of the above two points. Again, in my opinion. The tactic was designed with a slightly smaller or even equal force of enemy in mind. It was one of entrapment and capture — by luring the enemy with one part of Gregg's force into the valley of 14-Mile Creek, while circling behind the enemy with another part. I suppose he reasoned that by receiving the small force of enemy into his trap did not violate the order or suggestion of not bringing on a general engagement.

Nevertheless, the tactic he prescribed relied on an enemy not exceeding a brigade size, and that that force could be lured into a small floodplain. This of course fell apart in the early hours of the fighting. His circling forces soon became involved in their own maneuverings and fights as they attempted to deal with an enemy that clearly exceeded a brigade size force. Once this happened, Gregg lost communication with those parts of his own force and was left in a grudge match for mere survival.

Had Gregg not been under orders to avoid a general engagement, perhaps he would have attacked head-on and accidentally rolled back a larger force into confusion as described above in those other battles. But the battle was limited by Gregg's tactical premise based on the suggestion of not bringing on a general engagement, and not because he didn't have the "chops." In fact, the Confederates were eager for a fight, and it is likely that, left to his own devices, Gregg would have formulated a very different tactic to deal with that approaching force coming down the Utica Road.

The first thing I think needs to be considered is intel. We really don't know much about McPherson's intel resources, but he somehow knew Gardner was reinforcing Pemberton, that the forces were bound for Raymond, and that Beauregard (actually Johnston) was traveling to Jackson with an army to take overall command.

Either McPherson got extremely lucky, or he knew exactly where and when to launch a cavalry strike on Crystal Springs to mitigate the reinforcements coming from Port Hudson. The raid broke the railroad just after a train had passed to pick up Gregg's Brigade at Brookhaven. This trapped all of the cars of the New Orleans railroad south of the cut and forced Gregg to march the distance to Jackson, rest one day, then march to Raymond, arriving the afternoon before the battle. The men arrived exhausted and dropped to sleep where they stood.

We know a little about Pemberton's intel gathering because he had to enlist amateurs from the ranks of units raised locally. The reason we know about them is that they were using their real names in correspondence and operating out of their personal houses.

I think Grant's bayou expeditions had drawn all of his professional scouts into the Yazoo Delta and Pemberton had trouble recalling them. The only intel Gregg had upon arriving in Raymond is that there were cavalry operating in the direction of Utica (the same cavalry that had forced him to walk to Jackson), so Gregg assumed the brigade that arrived at Raymond was a cavalry brigade engaged in foraging. However, Gregg should have been aware of the possibility of a larger force showing up in his front because of the orders from Pemberton: do not engage a larger force, but notify me and withdraw slowly to Jackson.

So McPherson knew he was facing one of Gardner's brigades from Port Hudson (3500 men maximum), and Gregg had no idea what he was facing.

 

[tony_gunter]

Brices Crossroads is a whole different animal as it was just CS cavalry and Gen NBF. Gregg had a very small force and acted accordingly. Lets see if we can get our Raymond expert to chime in. Paging @alan polk

Another battle that's similar is Irish Bend: Federal division under Cuvier Grover meets brigade-sized force trying to hold open the road up Bayou Teche. Grover fails to comprehend the size and alignment of the defending force and prematurely orders his leading brigade under Henry Birge to scatter them, assuming the Confederates are just a blocking force protecting Taylor's rear. Birge's brigade gets absolutely rocked and suffers ~20% losses, Grover is knocked back on his heels and allows Taylor to escape up Bayou Teche.

 

[alan polk]

The first thing I think needs to be considered is intel. We really don't know much about McPherson's intel resources, but he somehow knew Gardner was reinforcing Pemberton, that the forces were bound for Raymond, and that Beauregard (actually Johnston) was traveling to Jackson with an army to take overall command.

Much of the intelligence was coming from captured Confederate newspapers, contrabands, and deserters. If I recall correctly, this would have been army-wide information and not particularly limited to McPherson. Days earlier, Grant was already writing Banks about the reported evacuation of Port Hudson, and he conjectured that they were being sent to Pemberton.

Not sure that I remember reading anywhere that McPherson or anyone else "knew" troops from Port Hudson were moving to Raymond from Jackson until after the fact. If Grant was conjecturing, I'm not sure how McPherson "knew."

Either McPherson got extremely lucky, or he knew exactly where and when to launch a cavalry strike on Crystal Springs to mitigate the reinforcements coming from Port Hudson.

I'm not completely sure, but I believe this raid on Crystal Springs was ordered by Grant, not from the independent or creative mind of McPherson. Again, I could be wrong, but it was Grant, more so than anyone else, who was concerned that those troops reported to be evacuating Port Hudson were moving to Pemberton. I think it was Grant who wanted Colonel Wright or someone to cut the line to prevent reinforcements and gather intelligence on the activities out there on the railroad. I think McPherson was to rubber stamp the raid.

The raid broke the railroad just after a train had passed to pick up Gregg's Brigade at Brookhaven. This trapped all of the cars of the New Orleans railroad south of the cut and forced Gregg to march the distance to Jackson, rest one day, then march to Raymond, arriving the afternoon before the battle. The men arrived exhausted and dropped to sleep where they stood.

Gregg's men had already passed through Crystal Springs before Colonel Wright's raiders hit Crystal Springs and Gregg's men did so on both rail cars and on foot. It was Maxey's brigade who would be later frustrated by the torn up railroad— not Gregg. At least if my recollection is correct.

We know a little about Pemberton's intel gathering because he had to enlist amateurs from the ranks of units raised locally. The reason we know about them is that they were using their real names in correspondence and operating out of their personal houses.

I think you're talking about Captain Russel, whose messages were captured by some of McClernand's men. He was a soldier in Featherston's brigade who was from the area and volunteered to swim Big Black from Loring's position and coordinate the activities of the local home guard and to report on Grant's movements.

Without proper cavalry to operate on the other side of Big Black against the enemy, Pemberton simply could never penetrate Grant's screen. He knew he was blind and that is the reason Pemberton did not want to venture far from the works at Big Black or even from Edwards. Very few, if any, reports he received — whether from Wirt Adams or Home guards — ever mentioned Union infantry movements. They all referenced enemy cavalry. Pemberton knew this. In my mind, it is because of this — and not so much from incompetence— that forced Pemberton to become defensive minded.

So McPherson knew he was facing one of Gardner's brigades from Port Hudson (3500 men maximum),

Please direct me to this evidence. I simply don't recall McPherson having this knowledge before the fact. If I recall correctly, his intel in this context would have come from Colonel Wright's raid on Crystal Springs. And though Wright reported the news that Gregg had passed through on rail cars going to Jackson, I don't recall Wright (or anyone else) reporting that any of "Gardner's brigades from Port Hudson" had moved to Raymond and was awaiting McPherson. But, again, I don't have the information in front of me and I could be wrong. But I would be interested in seeing such evidence.

 

[tony_gunter]

Much of the intelligence was coming from captured Confederate newspapers, contrabands, and deserters. If I recall correctly, this would have been army-wide information and not particularly limited to McPherson. Days earlier, Grant was already writing Banks about the reported evacuation of Port Hudson, and he conjectured that they were being sent to Pemberton.

Not sure that I remember reading anywhere that McPherson or anyone else "knew" troops from Port Hudson were moving to Raymond from Jackson until after the fact. If Grant was conjecturing, I'm not sure how McPherson "knew."



I'm not completely sure, but I believe this raid on Crystal Springs was ordered by Grant, not from the independent or creative mind of McPherson. Again, I could be wrong, but it was Grant, more so than anyone else, who was concerned that those troops reported to be evacuating Port Hudson were moving to Pemberton. I think it was Grant who wanted Colonel Wright or someone to cut the line to prevent reinforcements and gather intelligence on the activities out there on the railroad. I think McPherson was to rubber stamp the raid.



Gregg's men had already passed through Crystal Springs before Colonel Wright's raiders hit Crystal Springs and Gregg's men did so on both rail cars and on foot. It was Maxey's brigade who would be later frustrated by the torn up railroad— not Gregg. At least if my recollection is correct.

Ooof .. yeah, I was thinking of Gregg's Brigade, but it was Maxey's Brigade he cut off at Crystal Springs. Gregg had passed the previous day. WRT McPherson knowing that troops from Port Hudson had passed and were bound toward Raymond, he knew from Wright that a concentration was taking place at Jackson and they would necessarily move to protect the railroad at Raymond because Raymond was the nexus for roads to the railroad at Midway, Bolton, Clinton, and Jackson.

I didn't recall, however, how many men Wright had reported had passed through Crystal Springs prior to his raid. He claimed 4,500 troops had passed through on the rail, and an equal number on foot! I guess that's easily discounted, because that's the entire garrison of Port Hudson. But based on McPherson's deployment, it appears he only expected one brigade. But that could be because there was only a single battery supporting.

As far as who ordered Wright to break the railroad, it was McPherson:

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS, Weeks' Plantation, 4 miles east of Utica, May 10, 1863.

Major General U. S. GRANT,

Commanding Department of the Tennessee:

GENERAL: Inclosed please find a sketch of my position. * The road is very dry and dusty following the divide between Big Black and north fork of Bayou Pierre. There are no streams on the road, and the troops have suffered some for want of water.

On my arrival in Utica about noon, I found Colonel Wright, with his cavalry, who reported considerable skirmishing with the enemy, but as no one was hurt, the skirmishing amounted to very little. There were probably 100 rebel cavalry in our front, and a small force reported at the bridge across Tallahala Creek, north fork of Bayou Pierre, on the road to Crystal Springs. I immediately dispatches Colonel Wright, with his whole cavalry force, in a southeast direction crossing the creek lower down than where this force was said to be stationed, and then to proceed up on the south side and cut them off, if possible. He was also instructed to learn all he could be of the movements of the enemy, and as it is only 18 or 20 miles to the Mississippi Central Railroad, and probably not many troops in that direction, to make a dash over that way, and destroy the telegraph and railroad track, if he should find it practicable.

A forward movement of about 5 miles will bring me on an east and WEST line with Auburn, and near one of the branches of

Fourteen-Mile Creek.

I had to be guided to-day in selecting camps somewhat by the chances of getting water.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. B. McPHERSON.

 

[tony_gunter]

You don't know where Newland's Mills is do you? It was marked on the federal maps, but McPherson reported the place hadn't existed for several years. But they were still using it as a designation to direct troops.

IN FIELD, rocky Springs, MISS., May 9, 1863.

Colonel WRIGHT, Commanding Cavalry:

COLONEL: Your dispatch, 8th, is received. Reconnoiter the enemy cautiously, and, if possible, find out his strength and intentions. Keep me fully advised of any important movements. Find out, if possible, whether troops have been running up north from Port Hudson, on the Mississippi Central Railroad.

You can fall back at dark to some good position near Mrs. Myers'. Leave vedettes along the road and near the different crossings, to give notice of any movements on the part of the enemy. Caution the vedettes to be particularly vigilant. I have sent my escort company to Newland's Mills.

Very respectfully,

JAS. B. McPHERSON.

 

[alan polk]

Thanks for those reports to Wright from McPherson. I'd completely forgot about those.

I do not know where Newland's Mill was located. I've often wondered about it myself. In the report you copied above, McPherson is writing from Rocky Springs. In the other report (alluded to in your post), he writes about Newland's Mill, but this time, he is writing about it from the Crossroads (Regantown).

From the Crossroads, he describes Newland's Mill as being "at the front," while also describing Utica, Cayuga in the same report. I think he mentions sending some men toward Cayuga from the Crossroads. So, I'm assuming that he does not consider Utica or Cayuga as "the front."

Thus, I've often thought that perhaps Newland's is somewhere along the Big Black, or on one of those roads meandering toward the river. Horner's ferry is just west of the Crossroads. Then there is that vast area northwest of Cayuga with roads leading off to Hall's Ferry and to Baldwin's Ferry, and I've come across reports of a tan yard and a college being out in that mysterious area. Maybe that's where it is. After all, I'm sure he would want the approaches from the Big Black covered in order to protect his headquarters at Crossroads from an attack from directly across the river.

he knew from Wright that a concentration was taking place at Jackson and they would necessarily move to protect the railroad at Raymond because Raymond was the nexus for roads to the railroad at Midway, Bolton, Clinton, and Jackson.

Is the above your own conclusion? Or are you referencing a report which states or implies that McPherson or Wright or Grant knew the Confederates "would necessarily move to protect the railroad at Raymond, etc…" I would like to see the source if you can point me to it. Thanks.

 

[tony_gunter]

Thanks for those reports to Wright from McPherson. I'd completely forgot about those.

I do not know where Newland's Mill was located. I've often wondered about it myself. In the report you copied above, McPherson is writing from Rocky Springs. In the other report (alluded to in your post), he writes about Newland's Mill, but this time, he is writing about it from the Crossroads (Regantown).

From the Crossroads, he describes Newland's Mill as being "at the front," while also describing Utica, Cayuga in the same report. I think he mentions sending some men toward Cayuga from the Crossroads. So, I'm assuming that he does not consider Utica or Cayuga as "the front."

Thus, I've often thought that perhaps Newland's is somewhere along the Big Black, or on one of those roads meandering toward the river. Horner's ferry is just west of the Crossroads. Then there is that vast area northwest of Cayuga with roads leading off to Hall's Ferry and to Baldwin's Ferry, and I've come across reports of a tan yard and a college being out in that mysterious area. Maybe that's where it is. After all, I'm sure he would want the approaches from the Big Black covered in order to protect his headquarters at Crossroads from an attack from directly across the river.



Is the above your own conclusion? Or are you referencing a report which states or implies that McPherson or Wright or Grant knew the Confederates "would necessarily move to protect the railroad at Raymond, etc…" I would like to see the source if you can point me to it. Thanks.

Oh yeah, McPherson almost never records what he was thinking so I'm just judging by his reaction. Raymond is the choke point for all roads leading to the railroad. Foster returns from chasing the state cavalry company to report that he had met an infantry picket one mile away.

McPherson immediately deploys Dennis' entire brigade into line of battle and orders them forward. The men struggle through a half-mile of the worst underbrush they've ever experienced, cursing under their breath whoever ordered this. McPherson gets to the top of the hill and can see from the dust clouds in the distance that whatever is waiting on him appears to have not pushed across the creek. He orders the line reduced by half and sends Dennis forward to the creek. Two hours have passed by the time DeGolyer unlimbers and scatters the skirmishers on the far side of Fourteen Mile Creek.

I think it's safe to assume by that reaction that McPherson understands that an infantry picket guarding the bridge means a large force from Port Hudson defending Raymond. Based on Wright's exaggerated report, it could be as large as 9,000 men.

 

[tony_gunter]

Thanks for those reports to Wright from McPherson. I'd completely forgot about those.

I do not know where Newland's Mill was located. I've often wondered about it myself. In the report you copied above, McPherson is writing from Rocky Springs. In the other report (alluded to in your post), he writes about Newland's Mill, but this time, he is writing about it from the Crossroads (Regantown).

From the Crossroads, he describes Newland's Mill as being "at the front," while also describing Utica, Cayuga in the same report. I think he mentions sending some men toward Cayuga from the Crossroads. So, I'm assuming that he does not consider Utica or Cayuga as "the front."

As far as I can tell, the only Newland family in the area was on White Oak Creek near Carpenter, which doesn't make a lot of sense as "the front" unless you consider that McPherson's responsibility was the eastern flank of the army, so "the front" was whichever roads pointed towards Raymond, Crystal Springs, and Hazelhurst. Also, Wirt Adams was moving north trying to find his way around the edge of the Federal army to rejoin Pemberton, and Carpenter is just north of one of the only crossings of Bayou PIerre.

 

[alan polk]

As far as I can tell, the only Newland family in the area was on White Oak Creek near Carpenter, which doesn't make a lot of sense as "the front" unless you consider that McPherson's responsibility was the eastern flank of the army, so "the front" was whichever roads pointed towards Raymond, Crystal Springs, and Hazelhurst. Also, Wirt Adams was moving north trying to find his way around the edge of the Federal army to rejoin Pemberton, and Carpenter is just north of one of the only crossings of Bayou PIerre.

Could be. I was thinking that because Grant's objective was the railroad at Edwards at this time, with McPherson's goal being the railroad near Bolton, that the "front" would be to the northeast not southeast. Who knows. But if he considers his front to the east, which I suppose is just as likely, then perhaps the mill is between Crossroads and Myers. I can't see how it would be beyond Myers, especially if he is telling Wright that he can fall back from the Utica area to that point.

 

[tony_gunter]

Could be. I was thinking that because Grant's objective was the railroad at Edwards at this time, with McPherson's goal being the railroad near Bolton, that the "front" would be to the northeast not southeast. Who knows. But if he considers his front to the east, which I suppose is just as likely, then perhaps the mill is between Crossroads and Myers. I can't see how it would be beyond Myers, especially if he is telling Wright that he can fall back from the Utica area to that point.

A lot of people discount anything James Wilson says out of hand, but Wilson claims Clinton and Jackson were McPherson's targets the whole time. This is corroborated by Confederate scouts who reported the pickets near Utica saying they were marching to Jackson.

If you look at the map, Grant is marching along a ridge protected by Big Black to the north and Bayou Pierre to the south. Beyond Rocky Springs, the Big Black turns almost due north, and Bayou Pierre turns almost due south. At that point, everything in a big arc from Halls Ferry to Cayuga to Utica to Carpenter is the front. Direct roads ran from that area to Utica and to the crossroads, so I think it's within the operational situation that Wright could have fallen back from Utica to Carpenter.if pressed by a larger force.

TL;dr - If McPherson's target is Jackson and McClernands role is to screen him from Pemberton then the front for McClernand at that point is Halls Ferry to Cayuga, McPherson's front is Cayuga to Carpenter.

 

[alan polk]

Clinton and Jackson were McPherson's targets the whole time.

No harm, no foul. I've seen you make that argument for as long as I've been in this site. History inevitably involves narration, and that interpretation feels right to you, so I'm not going to argue the point. Clearly, at a certain level of discussion, one finds that there are no longer "bare facts" at all but only interpretations, and the whole thing, as Immanuel Kant once noted, becomes an exercise in antinomy.

Direct roads ran from that area to Utica and to the crossroads, so I think it's within the operational situation that Wright could have fallen back from Utica to Carpenter.if pressed by a larger force.

I looked at some maps and I think that is reasonable, and since you said you found evidence of Newland property owners near Carpenter, then perhaps that is where Newland's Mill was located.

Have you tried searching digital newspapers from the era? I bet there would be some sort of mention of the mills there. It would certainly be of some importance if you discovered that the location was around Carpenter. At least I think so!!

 

[tony_gunter]

No harm, no foul. I've seen you make that argument for as long as I've been in this site. History inevitably involves narration, and that interpretation feels right to you, so I'm not going to argue the point. Clearly, at a certain level of discussion, one finds that there are no longer "bare facts" at all but only interpretations, and the whole thing, as Immanuel Kant once noted, becomes an exercise in antinomy.



I looked at some maps and I think that is reasonable, and since you said you found evidence of Newland property owners near Carpenter, then perhaps that is where Newland's Mill was located.

Have you tried searching digital newspapers from the era? I bet there would be some sort of mention of the mills there. It would certainly be of some importance if you discovered that the location was around Carpenter. At least I think so!!

I was thinking the land records might have the answers. It seems each county has a book with family names mapped to land patents … need to lay hands on Hinds and Copiah to see.

I know both have Newland as an included family name. It might resolve the question of where McPherson was headed to know what he considered "the front."'

 

[Rhea Cole]

The first thing I think needs to be considered is intel. We really don't know much about McPherson's intel resources, but he somehow knew Gardner was reinforcing Pemberton, that the forces were bound for Raymond, and that Beauregard (actually Johnston) was traveling to Jackson with an army to take overall command.

Either McPherson got extremely lucky, or he knew exactly where and when to launch a cavalry strike on Crystal Springs to mitigate the reinforcements coming from Port Hudson. The raid broke the railroad just after a train had passed to pick up Gregg's Brigade at Brookhaven. This trapped all of the cars of the New Orleans railroad south of the cut and forced Gregg to march the distance to Jackson, rest one day, then march to Raymond, arriving the afternoon before the battle. The men arrived exhausted and dropped to sleep where they stood.

We know a little about Pemberton's intel gathering because he had to enlist amateurs from the ranks of units raised locally. The reason we know about them is that they were using their real names in correspondence and operating out of their personal houses.

I think Grant's bayou expeditions had drawn all of his professional scouts into the Yazoo Delta and Pemberton had trouble recalling them. The only intel Gregg had upon arriving in Raymond is that there were cavalry operating in the direction of Utica (the same cavalry that had forced him to walk to Jackson), so Gregg assumed the brigade that arrived at Raymond was a cavalry brigade engaged in foraging. However, Gregg should have been aware of the possibility of a larger force showing up in his front because of the orders from Pemberton: do not engage a larger force, but notify me and withdraw slowly to Jackson.

So McPherson knew he was facing one of Gardner's brigades from Port Hudson (3500 men maximum), and Gregg had no idea what he was facing.

All that we know for sure is that Grant was receiving comprehensive, timely & accurate intel. Extract what, from where & form whom is unknowable.

It was a hard & fast rule that sources & methods were closely guarded. Records were systematically burned.

There has been entire stands of trees have been sacrificed to record the speculation, imaginings & fantacies about how or what Grant knew… or didn't.