Mac and Pope

[Saphroneth]

Lee moved upon Malvern Hill, etc. on August 6-7 in direct response to McClellan's coming out of his lines at Harrison's landing. But more to the point, since Lee's army was generally back around Richmond otherwise, before August 3, why wasn't McClellan too?

McClellan just said it was because no one would reinforce him. In other words he knew he would have a battle as soon as he threatened to approach Richmond... any time.

Until the end of July, McClellan's plan was to cross the James and go after Petersburg, once Burnside arrived; this changed to a direct attack on Richmond but he was still promised Burnside to arrive in a few days. The time interval where the plan is to go after Richmond directly is very short, no more than a week.

When did Halleck positively ORDER McClellan not to advance upon Richmond? Never. McClellan's the one constantly reporting it was impossible without an enormous and impossible reinforcement. His superiors had to believe him, of course, while they trusted him with the command on the ground.

Halleck orders McClellan to withdraw from Harrisons Landing to Aquia; Richmond is fortified. There's no point going for a field battle if there's no chance to sustain an attack on Richmond, not least because Lee can either face McClellan in the field or withdraw into his fortifications depending on what's better for Lee; McClellan has to consider the prospect that if he faces a field battle it's because Lee thinks he can win it, while if Lee withdraws into the Richmond fortifications McClellan can't do anything to him.

Had McClellan been reinforced, he would be aiming for this - to either fight a battle that McClellan might win, or for Lee to fall back into the Richmond fortifications (if McClellan was strong enough) which McClellan would then try to work through with regular approaches.

 

[Saphroneth]

Nor were his superiors disappointed as to his manner of carrying out those orders, as large forces arrived at Aquia Creek in time to potentially aid Pope's army. It was only after landing the troops at Aquia that inexcusable errors occurred, according to General-in-Chief Halleck's official report...

Notice that in the above, McClellan, who was in command of all those corps, was described not at all, viz. was a non-entity.
He got his shot at redemption in the Antietam campaign. But once the smoke cleared he got the sulks again which proved the same after a victory at Antietam as it was from a defeat at the Seven days in the Peninsula, so he had to go away.

But McClellan was doing a lot during the post-withdrawal period. Halleck's write-up of events doesn't mention McClellan specifically, but part of why is probably that a lot of what McClellan is doing is that he's trying to get the transportation to actually permit 2nd and 6th Corps to move to join Pope.

That's McClellan rapidly sorting out logistical problems that Halleck had created; Halleck chooses to say that the delays were "neither creditable nor excusable" because otherwise he has to blame himself!


As for post-Antietam, I realize there's a risk of this doing the usual McClellan-go-round sprawl over all McClellan-related topics but I should point out that McClellan is repeatedly asking Halleck in October for approval to attack into the Shenandoah valley, where Lee is; Halleck asked for McClellan's plans for approval, and then stonewalled giving that approval.

When McClellan changed plans to one Halleck approved, McClellan bridges the Potomac the same day and moves south to Warrenton in only slightly over a week; for this, McClellan is fired.

 

[RedRover]

** Jackson's original force was 7 brigades. AP Hill brought another 7. Longstreet had 10 to total 24. This left 18 brigades facing McClellan, with Hood's 2 divisions at Hanover Junction. Lee's mobile force is the size of ca. 15 Federal divisions, and he decided to strike Pope with around half his force. This, of course, gave McClellan an opportunity to attack that he wanted to take, but Halleck forbade it.

"Halleck forbade it," you conclude? Except he never did.

It was McClellan who determined that without large reinforcements he could do nothing against Lee, and perhaps he was right. McClellan lamented the Army wouldn't send him more reinforcements. But there was no order not to fight with the troops on hand.

For example, you will fail to find any War Department or Army HQ standing orders to commanders not to fight at a disadvantage in numbers or circumstances.

McClellan was aware, for example, as early as May 21 he might have to forego reinforcements... and fight anyways...

Without the reinforcements, caution seems to have been the primary mode.

Until the end of July, McClellan's plan was to cross the James and go after Petersburg, once Burnside arrived; this changed to a direct attack on Richmond but he was still promised Burnside to arrive in a few days. The time interval where the plan is to go after Richmond directly is very short, no more than a week.

Like you say, that was all out the window by late July. From McClellan, July 28:

I presume had Burnside accepted the command of the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula, Burnsides' troops would have reinforced it.

Halleck orders McClellan to withdraw from Harrisons Landing to Aquia; Richmond is fortified. There's no point going for a field battle if there's no chance to sustain an attack on Richmond, not least because Lee can either face McClellan in the field or withdraw into his fortifications depending on what's better for Lee; McClellan has to consider the prospect that if he faces a field battle it's because Lee thinks he can win it, while if Lee withdraws into the Richmond fortifications McClellan can't do anything to him.

Had McClellan been reinforced, he would be aiming for this - to either fight a battle that McClellan might win, or for Lee to fall back into the Richmond fortifications (if McClellan was strong enough) which McClellan would then try to work through with regular approaches.

More magical and mythical reinforcements.

But McClellan was doing a lot during the post-withdrawal period. Halleck's write-up of events doesn't mention McClellan specifically, but part of why is probably that a lot of what McClellan is doing is that he's trying to get the transportation to actually permit 2nd and 6th Corps to move to join Pope.

That's McClellan rapidly sorting out logistical problems that Halleck had created; Halleck chooses to say that the delays were "neither creditable nor excusable" because otherwise he has to blame himself!

Military men are in what's called a hierarchy, where subordinates are held to account, because without them, an officer, like General-in-chief Halleck, can't do anything. Halleck, and his subordinates Pope and McClellan, were held to account by comparing their orders, to what they accomplish.
Halleck's immediate commanders included the Secretary of War, and the President. As mentioned, amidst the disaster at Second Manassas, Halleck did manage to concentrate the army in its immediate aftermath. Between Halleck's immediate subordinates they all concluded in the aftermath of the campaign that Pope had to go. Ultimately he had failed in his instructions to "keep the enemy in check till we can get reinforcements to your army..."
But they felt though McClellan did work to get reinforcements to Pope as instructed, he had not been as useful as he might have been. In other words a non-entity earn who earned his pay and that was about it.
Secretary Hay recorded in his diary that if McClellan didn't do anything wrong, it wasn't because he didn't waste alot of time and energy of his superiors countermanding his orders and instructions...

Hay then notes the President retained some faith in McClellan because he thought he was prone to craziness impeding his military efficiency, where Hay and many others felt McClellan was just insubordinate and sulky to cover for his incompetence.

As for post-Antietam, I realize there's a risk of this doing the usual McClellan-go-round sprawl over all McClellan-related topics but I should point out that McClellan is repeatedly asking Halleck in October for approval to attack into the Shenandoah valley, where Lee is; Halleck asked for McClellan's plans for approval, and then stonewalled giving that approval.

Did the "R" word (reinforcements) come up in that correspondence? No reason to answer, I am asking a rhetorical question.

When McClellan changed plans to one Halleck approved, McClellan bridges the Potomac the same day and moves south to Warrenton in only slightly over a week; for this, McClellan is fired.

You know he wasn't canned because he crossed the Potomac and moved to Warrenton.

 

[Saphroneth]

Like you say, that was all out the window by late July. From McClellan, July 28:

I'm unsure as to your point; McClellan is hoping for Burnside to turn up and perhaps more reinforcements. Remember that at the Harrisons Landing meeting Halleck said he didn't know what would be available as reinforcements.

McClellan's most recent instructions from Lincoln were to wait for reinforcement, this of course not forthcoming.

More magical and mythical reinforcements.

It's unclear what you mean here either. McClellan fought the Seven Days against a stronger army and since then Lee has been reinforced by the equivalent of a Federal corps (26 regiments); McClellan has been reinforced by about a third of that. Lee's army is still stronger, or at least will be as soon as he calls in Jackson.

This is not an unrealistic possibility to prepare for. Why was Lincoln so willing to promise McClellan tens of thousands of reinforcements in early July but not three weeks later?

Military men are in what's called a hierarchy, where subordinates are held to account, because without them, an officer, like General-in-chief Halleck, can't do anything. Halleck, and his subordinates Pope and McClellan, were held to account by comparing their orders, to what they accomplish.
Halleck's immediate commanders included the Secretary of War, and the President. As mentioned, amidst the disaster at Second Manassas, Halleck did manage to concentrate the army in its immediate aftermath. Between Halleck's immediate subordinates they all concluded in the aftermath of the campaign that Pope had to go. Ultimately he had failed in his instructions to "keep the enemy in check till we can get reinforcements to your army..."
But they felt though McClellan did work to get reinforcements to Pope as instructed, he had not been as useful as he might have been. In other words a non-entity earn who earned his pay and that was about it.

Okay, that is what they think; are they correct? Halleck is saying that there are failures in energy in sending forward 2nd and 6th Corps somewhere, but as of the 26th Franklin's 6th Corps (at Alexandria) have two days' rations in their bags, whatever ammunition they were physically carrying, and a grand total of 16 horses in the entire corps (hauling 4 guns). Their wagons and animals are still down on the Peninsula.

This force physically cannot advance to join Pope. It has no scouting, no supplies, and less than a single battery of artillery. Halleck directs McClellan to send "an efficient officer" to sort the situation out, and McClellan does - he sends himself, travelling overnight.

McClellan arrives at Alexandria 8AM on the 27th and spends the next day and a half scouring Washington for wagons, horses and cavalry, which he successfully locates; 6th Corps is able to advance starting at 6AM on the 29th.

This is hardly being a "non-entity who earned his pay and that was about it".

 

[Saphroneth]

Did the "R" word (reinforcements) come up in that correspondence? No reason to answer, I am asking a rhetorical question.

The main concern was which route to take. Halleck made clear that 30,000 reinforcements would be available going east of the Blue Ridge (i.e. not into the Shenandoah) but only 15,000 going west of the Blue Ridge (i.e. into the Shenandoah) but McClellan nonetheless preferred the western route, and said so. He proposed his plan within a day of Halleck asking what McClellan's plans were, and Halleck did not approve the plan for weeks.

Also during this period is a pretty severe supply crisis going on where the Army of the Potomac has a dire clothing shortage and some regiments have actual food riots. The scramble to move the army out for the Maryland Campaign had some long term consequences and the supplies to make this good were slow-walked (a major delivery only being made after McClellan had escalated this far enough that the President was asking questions and making a special investigation - it turned out that the supplies were being issued to the defences of Washington, not the field army); I mention this for completeness' sake. The main limiting factor here is that Halleck had asked for McClellan's plans for approval, and when McClellan sent his plans to move into the Shenandoah Halleck did not approve or reject them.

 

[67th Tigers]

"Halleck forbade it," you conclude? Except he never did.

Because issuing an order requiring someone to adopt one course-of-action isn't the same as forbidding them from adopting the other COA?

McClellan was standing on Malvern Hill with Hooker and the cavalry, with Kearny's division and the 5th Corps on their way, when he received Halleck's order forbidding an advance, and requiring McClellan to retreat to Washington. McClellan then moved back off Malvern during the night.

It's just McClellan obeying orders...

 

[RedRover]

I'm unsure as to your point; McClellan is hoping for Burnside to turn up and perhaps more reinforcements. Remember that at the Harrisons Landing meeting Halleck said he didn't know what would be available as reinforcements.

McClellan's most recent instructions from Lincoln were to wait for reinforcement, this of course not forthcoming.

There you go with the "reinforcements" thing again. If only they existed.

It's unclear what you mean here either. McClellan fought the Seven Days against a stronger army and since then Lee has been reinforced by the equivalent of a Federal corps (26 regiments); McClellan has been reinforced by about a third of that. Lee's army is still stronger, or at least will be as soon as he calls in Jackson.

This is not an unrealistic possibility to prepare for. Why was Lincoln so willing to promise McClellan tens of thousands of reinforcements in early July but not three weeks later?

McClellan was the man on the ground, and he said Lee's army was very powerful. I'm not among those inclined to doubt that. I just think McClellan was whipped, and he wasn't willing to risk a rematch with the forces at hand.

The simple answer to your question is that there was a war on, and frankly very little of it was being actively waged around Harrison's landing. A few weeks after Lincoln was at Harrison's landing he sent Halleck there to see if he could get through to General McClellan. The President told Halleck the deal. McClellan must either accept 20,000 actual reinforcements to attack, or withdraw from the Peninsula. McClellan says to Halleck fine. Then when Halleck gets back to Washington, McClellan wires that its not enough but he doesn't want to withdraw. So its back to the drawing board.

Had McClellan just said to Halleck he needed more than 20K on the 26th of July the movement off of the Peninsula would have commenced that day, instead of after the 4th of August. Halleck reported...

Point being McClellan made the decision to leave the Peninsula when he shortly afterward noted to Halleck he required more than the 20,000 allotted by the administration to try Richmond again: From the 28th and 30th of July...

General Halleck and the administration read McClellan's messages and arguments, but they didn't change their mind. They even suggested on the 30th he advance on Richmond as it appeared Lee had detached, which was a good as a reinforcement of McClellan in their view. But ultimately as the general was obviously not going to oblige the wishes of his superiors and commence either an attack on Richmond or withdrawal plans from the Peninsula, he received the orders cut on the 3rd of August ordering him off.

Okay, that is what they think; are they correct? Halleck is saying that there are failures in energy in sending forward 2nd and 6th Corps somewhere, but as of the 26th Franklin's 6th Corps (at Alexandria) have two days' rations in their bags, whatever ammunition they were physically carrying, and a grand total of 16 horses in the entire corps (hauling 4 guns). Their wagons and animals are still down on the Peninsula.

This force physically cannot advance to join Pope.

Well it didn't join Pope before he was trounced, that's a fact. Afterward Pope was carping about how he wasn't reinforced, etc. No room for two McClellans, so Pope had to go. As mentioned he had not managed to hold out to be reinforced.

 

[RedRover]

Because issuing an order requiring someone to adopt one course-of-action isn't the same as forbidding them from adopting the other COA?

Try to locate where Halleck tells McClellan he can't attack Richmond and Lee. You won't find it as it was McClellan telling Halleck, etc. he couldn't do so. That being the case, he was ordered off. He had already been informed by Halleck's visit in late July that it was fight or evacuate.

The only course of action forbidden to McClellan was doing nothing.

McClellan was standing on Malvern Hill with Hooker and the cavalry, with Kearny's division and the 5th Corps on their way, when he received Halleck's order forbidding an advance, and requiring McClellan to retreat to Washington. McClellan then moved back off Malvern during the night.

It's just McClellan obeying orders...

He didn't have to withdraw Hooker. He could have fought Lee again about Malvern Hill etc. by August 7. There was no one in the world that could have prevented McClellan from fighting a battle on the 7th. Lee says he was game. McClellan obviously saw no advantage in it, as he could not have gotten the rest of the army up until the next afternoon (or as he mentioned, before next daylight, when he presumed it was necessary) so he didn't.

To Halleck he clearly noted that if Lee attacked Hooker before he could get off, he would be obliged to move to his support and fight...

So McClellan obviously had no orders that prevented him from delaying embarkation of his artillery in case of a battle on the 7th etc.

 

[67th Tigers]

Try to locate where Halleck tells McClellan he can't attack Richmond and Lee. You won't find it as it was McClellan telling Halleck, etc. he couldn't do so. That being the case, he was ordered off. He had already been informed by Halleck's visit in late July that it was fight or evacuate.

The only course of action forbidden to McClellan was doing nothing.

McClellan was actually advancing to attack Richmond again when he received an order requiring him to retreat to Aquia Landing. Why do you think McClellan was free to disobey orders? Why do you think an order to do something wouldn't also forbid doing the exact opposite?

 

[RedRover]

McClellan was actually advancing to attack Richmond again when he received an order requiring him to retreat to Aquia Landing.

He wasn't attacking Richmond. He had secured Malvern Hill, and on August 5 requested reinforcements so he could attack Richmond.

To which General Halleck responded, not with any forbiddance to the attack on Richmond but simple notice there were no reinforcements to send...

McClellan was very consistent that if he was not reinforced, he wouldn't attack Richmond. So he was ordered to evacuate the Peninsula to Aquia Creek. But he could have decided at any point his army had the opportunity he didn't need the reinforcements to go for Richmond. He considered it. But he stuck with his common mode.

Why do you think McClellan was free to disobey orders?
Why do you think an order to do something wouldn't also forbid doing the exact opposite?

I didn't say McClellan was free to disobey orders. I said he was free to fight, even to attack Richmond if the opportunity offered. I don't presume McClellan's orders to evacuate his army from the Peninsula, which took a couple weeks, was tantamount to an order not to fight. He's in the enemy's country, and was sent there to take their capitol.

Nor was fighting Lee or attacking and taking Richmond the "opposite" of his orders to evacuate the Peninsula. You won't find any orders telling him not to fight. Nor any "forbidding" him from taking Richmond.

For example. All after his evacuation from the Peninsula orders. On August 6 McClellan noted that if Hooker couldn't get away from Malvern Hill before the morning of the 7th of August, when Lee was bearing down, McClellan was ready to fight a battle to get him out if necessary, and delayed embarking artillery, etc. In this he was not disobedient to any orders. And even if he joined in battle on the 7th against Lee he wouldn't have been disobedient. And if he beat Lee, by some means, and followed up a victory, he wouldn't have been disobedient either, and he was aware of that as he noted in his writings of the time.

And he was aware of that fact. Noting on the 8th of August that he wished General Lee would attack him, as he'd bear down on him, and then go for Richmond...

Doesn't quite sound like he's gonna be court-martialed for attacking Richmond.

On August 10, he was prepared to strike at Richmond again...

So we can see that McClellan was aware that whenever he felt he could whip and take Richmond, he might try it. Well he didn't ultimately try it because he wasn't reinforced.

Then on August 11 McClellan noted in another private letter to his wife, croaking that the authorities wouldn't let him attack Richmond...

Almost convincing, except he hadn't even asked the "powers" about his plan until the next day, on August 12, when he reported to Washington his inclination to attack and see if he could take Richmond. This makes clear his previous evening claim, that he was not allowed to attack, was false. Note he says he wouldn't act on his own because (a) he didn't feel authorized, and of course (b) because this was another opportunity to call for "reinforcements" Washington had already told him he wouldn't get...

So he's following the same line as from late July, and from just several days earlier at Malvern. When he's decided against attacking Richmond, like the above chance to attack, which by the 11th he said he wasn't going to make; the next day he requests authority and calls for reinforcements he was already told he won't get. That way he can pretend he didn't make the decision.

Halleck did not respond negatively to the above. Didn't respond at all.

This stuff drove General Halleck nuts. August 9, General Halleck had observed to his wife...

"I feel almost broken down every night with the heat, labor, and responsibility. I have felt so uneasy for days about Gen. Pope's army that I could hardly sleep. I can't get Gen. McClellan to do what I wish..."


General Lee was also aware that McClellan remained a threat to Richmond. Lee continued defending it against McClellan even as he was commencing the evacuation of the Peninsula, and for several days thereafter against its threat. Lee reporting...

 

[67th Tigers]

Yes, McClellan was willing to fight Lee, but Halleck's orders prevented him from doing so. If, however, Lee was goaded into attacking McClellan, then McClellan would have the opportunity to fight Lee, and maybe pursue him into Richmond.

Halleck was, unfortunately, living in a fantasy world conjured by Meigs.
Meigs, from a desk at Washington, considered moving an army of 105,000 men (including 12,500 sick) plus tens of thousands of animals to be trivial. Ingalls, who was on the ground, knew Meigs was living in a fantasy world. Halleck listened to Meigs, and ignored Ingalls and McClellan, as does Dan.

On 12th July Meigs opined the 30 ships available could easily lift 30,000 men, plus another 12,000 from Burnsides transports. He never wavered from this opinion. Halleck ordered McClellan to ship off his sick and stores, provide Burnside artillery and a cavalry regiment and then move his army. This was done as rapidly as possible.

On the 7th August, Ingalls informed Meigs of the reality of the situation:

On the 11th August, Ingalls had to remind Meigs that it took six weeks to move the army to the Peninsula, using better facilities. Meigs repeated his belief that the army could have been moved easily, and Ingalls replied on the 15th this:

Was Ingalls lying and the whole of the Army of the Potomac engaged in a conspiracy? Or was Meigs deluded? There is no real space between these two options.

I should note, of the 30 steamers Meigs believes available, it took 21 of them to move 5 batteries and a regiment of cavalry to Burnside...