My reading leads me to believe that the Confederacy had enough food for army and people through the end of 1863. The loss of the Mississippi River and Middle Tennessee caused shortages in the sugar/molasses and pork categories that could never be made up after that time.Could Northrop been successful in feeding the army or was it a bridge too far for the confederacy.
St. John, of the Nitre & Mining Bureau.After he was relieved in Feb. of 1865 who took his place?
Northrop was under the Secretary of War. The QMG was responsible for a lot, but not feeding the troops (except the providing of the transportation of the food on the railroads and steamships).Northrop was under the quartermaster general. Was he responsible only for food logistics or also for clothing distribution?
You are right, thank you.Northrop was under the Secretary of War. The QMG was responsible for a lot, but not feeding the troops (except the providing of the transportation of the food on the railroads and steamships).
So, Northrop had to find food and QMG provide the transport of it? Right? I supposed QMG had to provide the transports also for ordinance bureau... Hadn't he?Northrop was under the Secretary of War. The QMG was responsible for a lot, but not feeding the troops (except the providing of the transportation of the food on the railroads and steamships).
Yes and yes.So, Northrop had to find food and QMG provide the transport of it? Right? I supposed QMG had to provide the transports also for ordinance bureau... Hadn't he?
YesIt wasn't just the Armys that he was responsible for, he was also responsible for the prisons and the POWs wasn't he?
So, although independent and equal bureau under war department, they all depended on the QMG for transport, which is a big and strategic part of logistics. I imagine the QMG desk crowded with requests ...Yes and yes.
A request only made it to the QMG's desk if it were critical and could not be handled by the lower levels of the QM Department -- maybe a dozen or so times in the war (cannon from Norfolk to the Mississippi River, shafts for the ironclads building in New Orleans, cotton to Wilmington for the blockade runners, corn from SW Georgia to Richmond, lines of food supplies (NOT individual shipments) for the AOT and ANV, and a few that don't come quickly to mind).So, although independent and equal bureau under war department, they all depended on the QMG for transport, which is a big and strategic part of logistics. I imagine the QMG desk crowded with requests ...
Great explainA request only made it to the QMG's desk if it were critical and could not be handled by the lower levels of the QM Department -- maybe a dozen or so times in the war (cannon from Norfolk to the Mississippi River, shafts for the ironclads building in New Orleans, cotton to Wilmington for the blockade runners, corn from SW Georgia to Richmond, lines of food supplies (NOT individual shipments) for the AOT and ANV, and a few that don't come quickly to mind).
If a shipping problem rose to the QMG level, it would be sent back down to the RR Bureau head and then usually down to the local QM or railroad superintendent for resolution. Communication was so slow, even with the telegraph, that the great majority of requests were filled by the local QM or the Transportation Agent. The lack of rolling stock and the conflicts regarding what should get the limited shipping space got a lot of attention at the local level, but was (as a national issue) not solvable.