Longstreet's Strategy

[Rick C.]

General Longstreet wished to redeploy his corp and position himself between W=
ashington and the Union Army. How feasible was it that such a redeployment w=
ould have been capable of execution?The Union Army was fully on site and ent=
renched in defensive positions after Day 1.Could Longstreet have actually be=
en able to occupy the space between the AOP and Washington?
Secondly, if Lee had recognized the inherent futility of attacking a well en=
trenched foe of superior numbers possessing favorable terrain what were his o=
ptions short of returning to Virginia? I have always thought that a nighttim=
e withdrawal of Ewell and Hill's corps and a march to Harrisburg would have f=
orced the AOP out of their Day 2 plan of defensive action and put them in a p=
osition of having to follow Lee. This may have provided Longstreet a better o=
pportunity to slip into his desired position. In any event,this was possible=
until Day 2 began.=

 

[civilken]

it probably would have been a lot better for gen. lee to listen to long street by day two the union had fortified culp ''s Hill and cemetery which made it virtually impossible for the Confederacy to take those positions but they weren't mind readers and they had no idea of knowing. It is so easy to go back and look at the fight the truth is Robert E Lee was an audacious general he love to be in control of the situation and not have to depend on what the enemy was going to do I am a big fan of general long street and this kills me to say it Robert E Lee was no slouch and he was going to take those hills he had done it before and he had no reason to believe he could do it this time..

 

[Southern Unionist]

He only said this because he didn't have cavalry reports. Too many Union reinforcements coming in from Washington from that direction. The only thing he knew for sure was that what he saw in front of him didn't look good.

 

[GABoy]

Yes, all of the above plus....I keep going back to 2 things. One, Longstreet's idea of getting in and around, between the AoP and possibly Washington, to then fight on ground of their (ANV) choosing. That, and Lee's insistence that the enemy is there, and we will attack him there. Two headstrong generals with two completely opposing ideas of how to fight this fight, and who is to say amongst us what might have been? I believe that given the state of the other two corps, the ANV was doomed from the start, no matter what.

 

[John S. Carter]

He only said this because he didn't have cavalry reports. Too many Union reinforcements coming in from Washington from that direction. The only thing he knew for sure was that what he saw in front of him didn't look good.

c

 

[John S. Carter]

Lee and his Army had been victorious in the last two years,except at Sharpburg,would this affected Lee's over confidence in his Army and in himself ?Is this why he did not regard what Longstreet was trying to warn him of "REMEMBER CHANELSORBURG".?Wasn't Lee ill on those days?Was there ever a battle when Lee left the field to the North.?Would had even ,again the IF,had listened to STONEWALL.?

 

[Tom Elmore]

Just an opinion, but Lee had to protect his potential line of retreat to Virginia via the fords at Williamsport and/or Shepherdstown, or risk the destruction of his army and/or his wagon trains. He could not be certain of opening a new line through Emmitsburg, so he had to keep his existing lines through Fairfield and/or Cashtown open. That limited his options to maneuver in the vicinity of Gettysburg. Moving around either Meade's left or right would have given the Federal cavalry an opportunity to cut off his two existing supply lines near Gettysburg. Moving his army to Harrisburg would likewise give his opponents a great chance of cutting his retreat at several points further south, particularly at Chambersburg, Greencastle or Hagerstown. Playing a waiting game was not an option for Lee, because Federal militia forces were already mobilizing to disrupt his lines of retreat. In this instance, Longstreet was thinking of ways to improve a tactical advantage in a battle on Northern soil, but Lee had to consider the larger strategic perspective and give his army an opportunity to fight another day (which turned out to be nearly two more years). Lincoln certainly understood this as well, which is why he was so upset that Meade did not try to press Lee before he could get back across the Potomac. Personally I think Meade would have received a bloody nose for making the attempt against Lee's fortified position near Hagerstown, but it would have been worth the effort if it shortened the war.

 

[infomanpa]

Is this why he did not regard what Longstreet was trying to warn him of "REMEMBER CHANELSORBURG".?

Okay....now there's a town that I never heard of.

 

[Southern Unionist]

Wasn't Lee ill on those days?

Yes, and some doctors believe he may have experienced a mild heart attack the week before. He was definitely feeling a sense of urgency to get something done, for a variety of reasons. He thought his time might be short, and the trend toward a long war of attrition was not in the South's favor. He wanted to push the pace. And that he did.

Was there ever a battle when Lee left the field to the North?

That's a questionable claim in light of Sharpsburg / Antietam. The Yankees, especially Hooker, pushed Lee all day long, though at an unacceptably high cost. People keep calling that battle a draw, but when I walk the field and think through the sequence of events, I don't see it that way. The South didn't seem to be able to hold anything longer than a few hours, and Lee's invasion was stopped.