Longstreet did not want to attack the Federals on Day 3 and wanted to redeploy around the Federal left, find ground between Meade and Washington and force the AoP to attack.
But after day 2, how practical was this plan? Wasn't Meade's line of retreat, communications and supply from the Southeast, exactly where Longstreet wanted to go? And wouldn't this have been fairly well protected or at the very least, scouted? The federals had the interior line, so if they caught on that the ANV was redeploying, can't they quickly beat them to the punch? Can you even withdraw Ewell's corps and sidestep them behind Seminary Ridge without being detected on the that flank? Doesn't Meade get suspicious and send out competent cavalry recon on Day 3 if all he experiences is minor skirmishing?
So my question is - how practical was Longstreet's plan given tactical situation on July 3rd?
But after day 2, how practical was this plan? Wasn't Meade's line of retreat, communications and supply from the Southeast, exactly where Longstreet wanted to go? And wouldn't this have been fairly well protected or at the very least, scouted? The federals had the interior line, so if they caught on that the ANV was redeploying, can't they quickly beat them to the punch? Can you even withdraw Ewell's corps and sidestep them behind Seminary Ridge without being detected on the that flank? Doesn't Meade get suspicious and send out competent cavalry recon on Day 3 if all he experiences is minor skirmishing?
So my question is - how practical was Longstreet's plan given tactical situation on July 3rd?
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