Longstreet's Plan

MikeyB

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Sep 13, 2018
Longstreet did not want to attack the Federals on Day 3 and wanted to redeploy around the Federal left, find ground between Meade and Washington and force the AoP to attack.

But after day 2, how practical was this plan? Wasn't Meade's line of retreat, communications and supply from the Southeast, exactly where Longstreet wanted to go? And wouldn't this have been fairly well protected or at the very least, scouted? The federals had the interior line, so if they caught on that the ANV was redeploying, can't they quickly beat them to the punch? Can you even withdraw Ewell's corps and sidestep them behind Seminary Ridge without being detected on the that flank? Doesn't Meade get suspicious and send out competent cavalry recon on Day 3 if all he experiences is minor skirmishing?

So my question is - how practical was Longstreet's plan given tactical situation on July 3rd?
 
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So my question is - how practical was Longstreet's plan given tactical situation on July 3rd?
it had the same issue it hand on the 2nd. The road network don't support it.
Sure moving his corp alone might have been moved around the union left flank.
But The csa army basically needed 4+ good roads to move at full speed. one for each corp + one for the wagontrain. And it is simply not there.
 
It also was premised on Longstreet's ideal battle plan - take up a strong defensive position that poses a threat to Baltimore / D.C. area that would force Meade to attack.
 
Longstreet did not want to attack the Federals on Day 3 and wanted to redeploy around the Federal left, find ground between Meade and Washington and force the AoP to attack.

But after day 2, how practical was this plan? Wasn't Meade's line of retreat, communications and supply from the Southeast, exactly where Longstreet wanted to go? And wouldn't this have been fairly well protected or at the very least, scouted? The federals had the interior line, so if they caught on that the ANV was redeploying, can't they quickly beat them to the punch? Can you even withdraw Ewell's corps and sidestep them behind Seminary Ridge without being detected on the that flank? Doesn't Meade get suspicious and send out competent cavalry recon on Day 3 if all he experiences is minor skirmishing?

So my question is - how practical was Longstreet's plan given tactical situation on July 3rd?

Probably not very practical.

The only uninvolved unit Lee has is Pickett's division, the last to arrive. The other eight divisions have all been caught up in the fighting of the first two days, have taken heavy casualties, and are still in the front line. Meade, OTOH, has VI Corps in reserve.

If Lee simply sends Pickett to the right, he won't have enough strength to accomplish much. As noted by thomas aagaard above, the road network doesn't support much of a move that way. If the Rebels try to move down the Emmitsburg Road, they'll be in clear sight and within artillery range of the Union on Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops. If they want to travel further back, the roads are worse for the Confederates and the route longer. The Union actually has shorter routes on more protected, better roads to move reinforcements to the left flank.

Also, the Confederates are operating on exterior lines. If they extend to the right, the line becomes very thin and vulnerable to a Union assault on either the left flank or through the center. Realistically, the way to do this is to pull Ewell back first, either to shift around the ANV to the south or to relieve some other troops who will move south. This will be slow and Meade will quickly know about it.
 
Also worth noting: the Union Army at Gettysburg has two retreat/supply routes:
  • the Baltimore Pike
  • the Taneytown Road
These roads both lead back to the Big Pipe Creek Line. That line is very strong but also very long and these roads lead to opposite ends of it. If the ANV could get around Big Round Top and cut the Taneytown Road, the AoP will be unable to occupy the complete Big Pipe Creek position and the Confederates will be closer to the AoP wagons and supplies than the AoP is.

If the ANV can cut the Taneytown Road, the AoP will have to either:
  1. attack to drive the ANV off it and clear the supply/retreat route or
  2. retreat down the Baltimore Pike
 
The risk with redeploying around the federal left flank was that it would bring the ANV further away from their base of operations and more prone to being cut off and surrounded.
 
Meade later said this was the move he feared most. And, Grant's & Howe's brigades were deployed to defend against just such an eventuality.

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The risk with redeploying around the federal left flank was that it would bring the ANV further away from their base of operations and more prone to being cut off and surrounded.

On July 3rd at Gettysburg the ANV LOC/"supply" line (such as it was) ran back over South Mountain to Chambersburg and then down the Great Valley, across the Potomac, down the Shenandoah and eventually to Richmond. On most items, the ANV is really living off the land. Very little in the way of supplies is moving North to supply the ANV and most "supplies" are actually moving South down to Virginia. The only really important supplies for the ANV moving North are in an extra ammo train Lee had ordered up from the Shenandoah; that never made it to Lee because Yankee raiders attacked it down near the Potomac and destroyed most of it.

Lee's troops are actually better fed and supplied in PA than they had been for months down in VA. Other than long-range artillery ammo, they really don't have a supply problem yet on the morning of July 4th (they are down to about enough artillery ammo for one more day of fighting). They will be starting to have supply problems after that, though: any army living off the land does when in the close presence of the enemy.

In order to feed itself, an army living off the land generally needs to spread out over a wide area -- but an army with a strong enemy force nearby needs to concentrate to fight. This is why Lee orders a concentration as soon as he discovers that Meade and the AoP are closer and moving faster than Lee expected.

The problem at Gettysburg is that the ANV has taken too many casualties without winning a big victory. Before the battle, Lee had the option of pulling back behind South Mountain and simply waiting. Hold the gaps and see if the AoP wanted to attack uphill. If they don't want to try that, the Yankees can detour around the North end of South Mountain and try coming straight down the Great Valley (up towards Carlilse and then down what is now I-81 to Chambersburg). Lee would have lots of opportunities to delay or attack the Yankees. It might take the AoP a few weeks to make Lee pull out of that position and in the meantime Lee can strip the lands he holds and to the West of that of whatever he can lay hands on.

Three days at Gettysburg put an end to that option.

The problem with moving around the Gettysburg position below Big Round Top isn't one of supply. Moving in that direction actually puts Lee closer to his source of supply, but it does mean he will have to abandon the Chambersburg Pike as a supply route. Imboden and the supply train will have to pull back over the mountain and down the Great Valley to rejoin Lee further South. Lee will have to live off what he has and can gather as he moves until he can re-establish a link to the massive supplies he has in and with the train.

That's a problem. If the ANV is moving towards Emmitsburg, some kind of rear-guard will have to cover the retreat. In real-life this was essentially just Imboden, but in this situation Lee might need to assign more force to delay in the gap.
 
Meade later said this was the move he feared most. And, Grant's & Howe's brigades were deployed to defend against just such an eventuality.

Yes. If Lee can get a large force across the Taneytown Road he has already cut one of the two retreat routes Meade has (also one of the supply routes). It will be impossible to get back to the Big Pipe Creek line without using the Taneytown Road.

Lee's problem is that he needs to do that with a large force and he does not have one available. He has Pickett (6000?) and whatever he can scrape up from other parts of the line -- which makes the rest of the line over-extended and vulnerable to Union attack.

If Lee can get a major force attacking north along the Taneytown Road successfully (somehow), then the entire Round Tops-Cemetery Ridge-Cemetery Hill position has been turned and will collapse. The only available retreat route will be the Baltimore Pike. It is hard to see how to make that work, but if it can be done Meade is looking at a disaster.
 
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