Longstreet on Gettysburg

[mattros]

According to some, Longstreet advised Lee before the battle of Gettysburg to maneuver the army in between the Northern army and Washington. This would force Meade to use offensive tactics and Lee defensive. I am wondering whether such a move would have been practical. For one thing, there was a sizeable number of troops guarding Washington (anyone know how many?). If Lee did this he would have Meade in front of him and a smaller enemy force to his rear. Where would his line of supply be, and where would his line of retreat be? I feel like it made more sense that since the ANV had defeated the Union army 3 times (Seven days, Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg ) and drew once (Antietam) and since it was closer in numerical strength to them in this campaign, that Lee should seek out and defeat Meade (which he tried to do). I feel like this was a sounder strategy, no?

 

[Private Watkins]

I'm sure there are lots of pros and cons and a case could be made either way... but this is what General Meade himself said about it later:

"Longstreet's advice was sound military sense; it was the step I most feared Lee would take."
--General George Meade on Longstreet's advice to General Lee at Gettysburg.

 

[Sbc]

Risky but a big payoff if executed with precision like Napoleon's strategy of the central position. Cavalry screens would be vital to such a plan.

 

[ErnieMac]

Several points I think you should consider before forming your opinion.

• It took Longstreet about 11 hours to move his troops into position to attack Devil's Den, Houck Ridge and the Peach Orchard. How much longer to get around Big Round Top and into position?
• Assuming Lee was moving the entire ANV, Ewell and Hill would have had to disengage and march along the outer lines to take position. Meade would have had a shorter march along inner lines.
• The road networks supported Meade's withdrawal toward Pipe Creek, Westminster MD and the Baltimore - DC area. The main roads behind Lee's lines initially led away from these areas. There were farm lanes and smaller roads available, but these were not as well suited to moving an entire army.
• Stuart would not rejoin Lee until late afternoon of the 2nd. Robertson and Jones cavalry brigades were not close at hand leaving only A.G Jenkins' brigade to perform scouting and screening.
• Longstreet's movements were observed during the 2nd as he moved to attack. There is no reason to suppose his further movements as well as those of Ewell and Hill would not have been noticed also since the Federals held the high ground. Meade would have had time to adjust unless we to assume Meade was just going to sit around waiting for something to happen.

 

[Sbc]

Sorry I was assuming such a manevour before a general engagement was begun at Gettysburg.

 

[FZ11]

I'm sure there are lots of pros and cons and a case could be made either way... but this is what General Meade himself said about it later:

"Longstreet's advice was sound military sense; it was the step I most feared Lee would take."
--General George Meade on Longstreet's advice to General Lee at Gettysburg.

Thanks,never saw this quote previously. Obviously Meade and Longstreet were correct.

 

[MBuehner]

Was it impossible for Lee to disengage and march south? Of course not, history has lots of examples. Heck, the Civil War has lots of examples (Lee's march to 2nd Manassas comes to mind). Was it practical? Well, thats a tougher question. Lee's main problem would have been he had very little cavalry to scout the roads and seize vital points ahead of the army. That in itself probably settled the issue in his mind. It was still possible (Lee had 2 brigades of cavalry guarding his supply lines he might have called up, and 1 that had been with Ewell that seems to have disappeared from history) but would have taken a mighty effort.

There are some positive factors to consider- the move would have shortened Lee's lines of communications and covered the southern mountain gaps he had cavalry covering. Also (and Lee likely couldnt have known this) while Meade had the inside track, Lee would have had the better road. Meade would have had a lot of trouble trying to march his larger, less nimble army, artillery, and wagon train down the Tanneytown road, which was more of a country lane than a real thoroughfare. Much of his army was also pretty worn out by the forced marches to get to Gettysburg (Lee had a significant head start in the campaign, the hard marching of the AoP was little credited but a huge factor in winning the battle). Lee would have had access to the much superior Emmittsurg Road and if history is any indication would have beaten Meade.

That being said, I think its VERY likely that Meade would have pulled back to his prepared Pipe Creek position instead of blindly chasing Lee south. There were multiple and better roads back to that position, and had Lee attacked him there it probably wouldnt have changed history much compared to the assaults on Cemetery Ridge.

 

[GABoy]

I may be misquoting here, but I want to say I remember Longstreeet's advice to Lee mentioning a maneuver behind Meade to get into a better position so that Meade would be forced to "...fight us on ground of our choosing...". This, to Meade or any general facing Lee's army, would have been sound advice and a cause of worry. But Lee was determined.........."...the enemy is there!"

 

[GABoy]

......Oh, and of course, this kind of discussion is always gonna lead to one of those many what ifs about this battle.

 

[tdftdf]

I'm sure there are lots of pros and cons and a case could be made either way... but this is what General Meade himself said about it later:

"Longstreet's advice was sound military sense; it was the step I most feared Lee would take."
--General George Meade on Longstreet's advice to General Lee at Gettysburg.

Thanks for Meade's quote!! His level-headedness helped save the union.

 

[jackt62]

Throughout his long life, Longstreet continued to insist that before the ANV's Pennsylvania raid, he obtained a commitment from Lee that the army would fight a defensive battle. Whether this is true or not, Longstreet is well known to have advocated for fighting defensively throughout the war, and his advice to turn the federal army's left flank and force the AOTP to attack the ANV is consistent with Longstreet's position. Of course, Lee overruled Longstreet in this matter and we know that Lee fought an offensive battle that was not successful.

But alternatively, as ErnieMac has already pointed out in his post, there were significant defects had Longstreet's plan been implemented. I would also add that Lee's conception of the Pennsylvania raid was to strike northern territory to sow fear and political discord among the population, seek out food and forage, and possibly divert federal attention from the Vicksburg front. Therefore, the raid was intended to be a "hit-and-run" operation for which Lee hoped to avoid a pitched battle with the AOTP. Longstreet's proposal was not consistent with Lee's thinking in that regard, and would have placed the ANV deep in enemy territory. Given the lack of Stuart's cavalry screen and sure-footed moves by the AOTP once Meade took command, Lee was in a tough situation no matter what. Once the two armies clashed at Gettysburg, Lee had to fight or run. In that case, it was obvious which choice Lee would take, regardless of the outcome.

 

[Rob9641]

I've always wondered how it might have played out if Lee had kept moving his army NORTHward to ground more to his advantage and forced the AOP to attack there. That's where he was going in the first place.

 

[E_just_E]

Sorry I was assuming such a manevour before a general engagement was begun at Gettysburg.

Need some time-frame, because that might mean Hooker and no Meade. Doubleday's Memoirs on the subject is probably the best source on the Federal side for the movements from Chancellorville to Gettysburg.

 

[Sbc]

Need some time-frame, because that might mean Hooker and no Meade. Doubleday's Memoirs on the subject is probably the best source on the Federal side for the movements from Chancellorville to Gettysburg.

We'll definitely while Hooker was moving slowly in pursuit. Elements of the ANV were well north and east of The AotP by 6/28/63. Cavalry was needed to steal a march further east or southwest. Lee lost control by allowing Staurt to act independently. Never would have happened under a stricter command structure.

 

[Terence MacManus]

We'll definitely while Hooker was moving slowly in pursuit. Elements of the ANV were well north and east of The AotP by 6/28/63. Cavalry was needed to steal a march further east or southwest. Lee lost control by allowing Staurt to act independently. Never would have happened under a stricter command structure.

Is this true? I had read a few authors that said Hooker did a pretty decent job of moving, especially in light of Lincoln and Halleck's constant concern about keeping forces between ANV and DC at all times.

I'm sure there are different opinions, of course. You all have probably read more than I have on the topic.

 

[ErnieMac]

Is this true? I had read a few authors that said Hooker did a pretty decent job of moving, especially in light of Lincoln and Halleck's constant concern about keeping forces between ANV and DC at all times.

I'm sure there are different opinions, of course. You all have probably read more than I have on the topic.

Hooker moved quickly once he started, but it wasn't until mid - June until the AoP started out of Fredericksburg. By that time Ewell was at Winchester.