Golden Thread Little Round Top, How Important?

[Neil of the Nene]

Having just returned from a trip to the US including two days at Gettysburg I am left with a military strategy question.

I had always understood that the occupation of LRT by Confederate forces could have been disastrous to the Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Had guns have been mounted on the hill they could have disrupted the Union line from the flank, possibly forcing a retreat from the position.

The guide on the bus tour I took said that he believed that the occupation of LRT by either side was not significant.

Having stood on the hill I cannot understand his statement. It looked to me, and I am no military strategist, that Southern guns there could have proved troublesome at least and disastrous at worst.

Do any of you have a view?

 

[cash]

How much room was there for artillery pointing to the north? Maybe room for one, possibly two guns. How is that going to force a Union retreat?

Add to that the Sixth Corps was arriving behind Little Round Top. How long do the confederates hold onto the ground? Not long.

Also, remember the Third Corps wasn't in position, so the first group of troops who could be hit in the flank were far to the north, somewhere in the vicinity of the Pennsylvania Memorial.

 

[Tom Elmore]

I imagine the psychological impact on the Federals would be far greater. A noisy (if not particularly dangerous) enemy presence on a high eminence sitting squarely on your flank (or behind if you were on Cemetery or Culp's Hill) would make anyone nervous. Also controlling Little Round Top means you also control the Taneytown Road, which was a major route for Federal supply trains, including ammunition wagons, which were massed within easy artillery distance. That eminence provided a commanding view of the surrounding area and thus was of great value as an intelligence and communications platform, as evinced by the valuable information gleaned by the Federal signal station established on the summit.

 

[Carronade]

I imagine the psychological impact on the Federals would be far greater. A noisy (if not particularly dangerous) enemy presence on a high eminence sitting squarely on your flank (or behind if you were on Cemetery or Culp's Hill) would make anyone nervous.......

A point worthy of consideration. A year later Grant would identify a key flaw in the AofP, that they were constantly worrying about what Lee would do to them, rather than what they could do to Lee. That feeling must have been even stronger in 1863, with Chancellorsville fresh in memory, the army groping to catch up with the invading Confederates, and the meeting engagement of July 1 having gone mainly against them. A sudden appearance of rebels on the opposite flank would have everyone thinking Lee had pulled off another coup.

"In war, the moral is to the physcial as three is to one."
- Napoleon

 

[Yankeedave]

Lose of lrt means the line is flanked. I mean i guess the yanks could have held the line, but they would have been boxed in on three sides. A salient would have formed stemming from the salient created by Sickles. And positions like that are hard to hold, again Sickles at Gettysburg, or Lee at Spottsylvania. I dont know what to say about the bus driver. As a kid i rode on of the double decker buses that use to be available. I rode up top and with the headphones from them i still couldn't here what the man said.

 

[theoldman]

Warren at the time thought it was important to occupy and hold.

 

[Rio Bravo]

I would say that LRT was critically important, for the loss of this salient would have imperiled the entire Union position.

 

[CW3O]

While it is true that only a few guns could have found a home on LRT it was still very important as the one of the flank anchors of the Union line. In military terminology it was key terrain for that very reason. Loss of that position would have exposed the entire line to a flanking attack, and one going downhill. This assumes of course that the Confederate forces could have held the position and reinforced it to the point where offensive action from there was possible. Coupled with one of Lee's frontal assaults such an action might have been devastating to the Union position. The Confederates didn't take it and if they had I wonder about their ability to hold it and reinforce it to the point necessary to use it as a springboard for further offensive action.

 

[cash]

While it is true that only a few guns could have found a home on LRT it was still very important as the one of the flank anchors of the Union line. In military terminology it was key terrain for that very reason. Loss of that position would have exposed the entire line to a flanking attack, and one going downhill. This assumes of course that the Confederate forces could have held the position and reinforced it to the point where offensive action from there was possible. Coupled with one of Lee's frontal assaults such an action might have been devastating to the Union position. The Confederates didn't take it and if they had I wonder about their ability to hold it and reinforce it to the point necessary to use it as a springboard for further offensive action.

But it didn't anchor the Union line. Sickles' move forward negated that. The Union line was actually about a half mile away. And the Sixth Corps was arriving on hand to retake it very quickly.

 

[CW3O]

Cash,

I will disagree about it anchoring the line. It was, by command design, the anchor of the line. Sickles' silly move forward only made it appear not to be the anchor. The nearly half mile gap you mention would have allowed Confederate forces to nearly surround Sickles with ease or get a running head start toward the Union flank as it briefly existed.

We are in agreement that this is all an unlikely scenario, the presence of the Union Corp moving to the position and the likely inability of the Confederates to reinforce any success on LRT in sufficient numbers to meet such a force put a quick end to the notional idea of LRT being used to Confederate advantage.

 

[cash]

Cash,

I will disagree about it anchoring the line. It was, by command design, the anchor of the line. Sickles' silly move forward only made it appear not to be the anchor. The nearly half mile gap you mention would have allowed Confederate forces to nearly surround Sickles with ease or get a running head start toward the Union flank as it briefly existed.

We are in agreement that this is all an unlikely scenario, the presence of the Union Corp moving to the position and the likely inability of the Confederates to reinforce any success on LRT in sufficient numbers to meet such a force put a quick end to the notional idea of LRT being used to Confederate advantage.

In order for it to be the anchor of the line, the line has to reach to it. Once Sickles moved out, the line no longer reached to it. It was no longer the anchor of the line.

I have to believe that a bunch of confederates running across open ground toward the flank of the Union line would have been noticed and dealt with. I can see Freeman McGilvery pivoting a few artillery pieces and using canister to blow them away with the Sixth Corps coming in to mop up the few survivors.

 

[ErnieMac]

I think the importance of LRT has been inflated by the movie Gettysburg. The scene with Colonel Vincent telling Chamberlain that the Union Army ends here has set that stage. Two unsupported regiments of Alabamans pushing back a regiment of Maine troops was not going to turn the battle, especially when eight brigades of the Sixth Corps were at the base of the hill. I find the arguments suggesting Barksdale's Mississippians or Wright's Georgians coming close to achieving a Confederate victory in a similar light. As gallant as those efforts were there were far too few men to change the final result without ready reinforcements which were not forthcoming.

 

[James N.]

Welcome to the forums from the host of the Stonewall Jackson Forum!

 

[kel1985]

IMHO,
The position was strong militarily, look at the lay of the land and the approach. It gave Union guns a great position to rain hades down upon the Confederates. IF (and that's a big if), the Confederates would have been able to take AND hold the position on LRT, they would have made things very hot for the Union line. However, they didn't have enough troops available as reinforcements to come up behind the Texans and Alabamians, and as I believe I saw earlier on this thread, the 6th Corps was available just a short distance away to wrest the position from them.
All of that being said, it was an important position to hold for the Union army, but no more important than Culp's Hill for essentially the same reasons. I don't think that had the Confederates taken LRT, that they would have "won" the battle.
Again, IMHO.

 

[CW3O]

In order for it to be the anchor of the line, the line has to reach to it. Once Sickles moved out, the line no longer reached to it. It was no longer the anchor of the line.

I have to believe that a bunch of confederates running across open ground toward the flank of the Union line would have been noticed and dealt with. I can see Freeman McGilvery pivoting a few artillery pieces and using canister to blow them away with the Sixth Corps coming in to mop up the few survivors.

The line was meant to reach it, Sickles' stupidity altered the commanders intent. If I remember correctly, as I have no sources currently available, the 6th Corps and possibly the 3rd? weres moving to tie in with Sickles' and complete the intended line with LRT being the anchor. When Sickles altered his orders it left the line without an anchor.

Your assessment of what would happen if the Confederates manged to seize LRT is most likely correct.

 

[1SGDan]

What CW3O has said has some merit. The position at LRT represented the left end of the Union line and therefore planned, intended, or not WAS the anchor of the Federal position at that end. Where I disagree is that when Sickles bungled his move the position at LRT did not become less important but more.

 

[cash]

The line was meant to reach it, Sickles' stupidity altered the commanders intent. If I remember correctly, as I have no sources currently available, the 6th Corps and possibly the 3rd? weres moving to tie in with Sickles' and complete the intended line with LRT being the anchor. When Sickles altered his orders it left the line without an anchor.

Your assessment of what would happen if the Confederates manged to seize LRT is most likely correct.

Sickles moved the Third Corps. I think we are in agreement that when Sickles moved the Third Corps forward, it left the Union line without an anchor, therefore LRT was not the anchor of the line in actuality. I agree it was supposed to be the anchor.

 

[cash]

What CW3O has said has some merit. The position at LRT represented the left end of the Union line and therefore planned, intended, or not was the anchor of the Federal position at that end. Where I disagree is that when Sickles bungled his move the position at LRT did not become less important but more.

It was an important position for what it meant to the Union being able to fire artillery from it. It was not so important if the confederates took it, because they couldn't aim enough artillery from it to endanger the Union line and the Sixth Corps would quickly retake it. It may have been intended to anchor the Federal line, but once Sickles moved forward it anchored nothing.

 

[1SGDan]

It was an important position for what it meant to the Union being able to fire artillery from it. It was not so important if the confederates took it, because they couldn't aim enough artillery from it to endanger the Union line and the Sixth Corps would quickly retake it. It may have been intended to anchor the Federal line, but once Sickles moved forward it anchored nothing.

You have answered the question in the first five words of your post. If it was important to the Union than it was equally important to the enemy.

 

[cash]

You have answered the question in the first five words of your post. If it was important to the Union than it was equally important to the enemy.

Not equally so. It could hurt the confederates more than it could hurt the Union.