Member Review Little Phil

The book certainly provokes thought and discussion; I for one, concur with Wittenberg's analysis and conclusions about Sheridan. In addition to the previously noted problems with Sheridan's command during the Overland Campaign and Cedar Creek, Sheridan's vindictiveness towards officers Averell, Crook, and Warren belie the notion that Sheridan exhibited superior leadership abilities.
When Eric presents arguments regarding Averell, he's working in his cavalry "wheelhouse" and his opinions should be given weight. The little-known battles of Carter's Farm and Moorfield in July 1864 were well-executed victories by Averell at a time when the Valley was in flux. (I also recommend his study of the 1863 Battle of White Sulphur Springs). All of that needs to be considered when assessing Sheridan's dismissal of Averell in September.
 
The dispute between Crook and Sheridan was over stated. Sheridan relied heavily on Crook during the war and after. Crook was at Sheridan's wedding.
Averell was clearly fired for political reasons. Stanton and Halleck tagged Averell as a McClellan supporter and Grant also specifically said he could be sent away.
Firing Warren was Grant's fault. He was prying the Vth Corp away from Meade and the way he did it was probably illegal. But Grant had Lincoln and Stanton's complete support. No one questioned it until the Republican party shed itself of Grant.
 
Wittenberg allowed Sheridan to cover that. It was explained in his report that Stanton did want him to come to Washington. That suggests that there was something to discuss that Stanton did not want to go over the wires. The Confederacy had so many spies in the lower valley and in Washington, D.C. that Sheridan's movements were detected.
Sheridan may have been away, but I think Crook and Emory did get a little careless. I think scouts detected the Confe.derate movement at Cedar Creek, but I think the information was disregarded
As has been posted about Grant in another thread, the buck stopped ......
 
The dispute between Crook and Sheridan was over stated. Sheridan relied heavily on Crook during the war and after. Crook was at Sheridan's wedding.
Averell was clearly fired for political reasons. Stanton and Halleck tagged Averell as a McClellan supporter and Grant also specifically said he could be sent away.
Firing Warren was Grant's fault. He was prying the Vth Corp away from Meade and the way he did it was probably illegal. But Grant had Lincoln and Stanton's complete support. No one questioned it until the Republican party shed itself of Grant.
I think we'll disagree about Warren to the extent that is intended in any way to exonerate Sheridan. Grant may have taken advantage of the opportunity but Sheridan was the guy aggressively pushing for it and the guy who baked the facts.
 
You're doing the same thing Eric did in the book - just from the other side. :smile coffee:
The idea of relieving Warren did not spring from April flowers from Sheridan's head. Both Meade and Grant had said some very negative things about Warren.
Eric Wittenberg could have addressed the bigger question as to whether in some of these smaller fights the personal commitment of the commander to see and control the battlefield made a difference.
Tolstoy's theory that the leader made little difference in the big battles. Their influence was in logistics and strategic choices. But in the smaller battles, it might not have been the same.
 
The idea of relieving Warren did not spring from April flowers from Sheridan's head. Both Meade and Grant had said some very negative things about Warren.
Eric Wittenberg could have addressed the bigger question as to whether in some of these smaller fights the personal commitment of the commander to see and control the battlefield made a difference.
Tolstoy's theory that the leader made little difference in the big battles. Their influence was in logistics and strategic choices. But in the smaller battles, it might not have been the same.
If this were a criminal case about Warren Sheridan gets convicted as well. The evidence is that Grant approved Sheridan's decision but it's impossible to remove from that what Grant was told. To repeat, and as was later determined, Sheridan's decision was highly flawed. Much of Sheridan's testimony at the Court of Inquiry was rejected. We have an analogy in the two Porter courts/boards regarding the testimony of Pope and McDowell. The difference is that when the Schofield Board issued its findings Porter was still around. Little Phil includes less than positive opinions about Sheridan's character flaws.
 
If this were a criminal case about Warren Sheridan gets convicted as well. The evidence is that Grant approved Sheridan's decision but it's impossible to remove from that what Grant was told. To repeat, and as was later determined, Sheridan's decision was highly flawed. Much of Sheridan's testimony at the Court of Inquiry was rejected. We have an analogy in the two Porter courts/boards regarding the testimony of Pope and McDowell. The difference is that when the Schofield Board issued its findings Porter was still around. Little Phil includes less than positive opinions about Sheridan's character flaws.
That's a possible rebuttal. But Grant in fact got rid of all the existing corp commanders in the both the Potomac army and the James army. Guys losing their commands was part of the war. Grant gave Lincoln a long list of people that he wanted fired, including some of Grant's friends.
There were plenty of hard feelings in the post war army. Congress restricted the army budget and Grant's reconstruction policies were not universally popular.
 
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Wittenberg did not concern his narrative with the fact the cult of personal risk taking got a lot of these guys killed. The younger Dahlgren during the war, and Custer out on plains were notable casualties. But Meigs also lost his son. Sheridan's reports list some high level officers that were KIA. Sheridan was lucky, as you wrote, not to become one of those casualties.
 
That's a possible rebuttal. But in fact got rid of all the existing corp commanders in the both the Potomac army and the James army. Guys losing their commands was part of the war. Grant gave Lincoln a long list of people that he wanted fired, including some of his Grant's friends.
There were plenty of hard feelings in the post war army. Congress restricted the army budget and Grant's reconstruction policies were not universally popular.
I'm simply connecting Sheridan's role in the Warren incident and Eric's views about his character. IMHO, he's correct on that one.
 
Wittenberg did not concern his narrative with the fact the cult of personal risk taking got a lot of these guys killed. The younger Dahlgren during the war, and Custer out on plains were notable casualties. But Meigs also lost his son. Sheridan's reports list some high level officers that were KIA. Sheridan was lucky, as you wrote, not to become one of those casualties.
I think that culture was an entrenched aspect of the times for most of these guys. Stonewall doing a recon at the front in the gloaming of a forest with no fixed lines, etc, etc, etc
 
Wittenberg included some material suggesting that Grant thought Sheridan was superior to Sherman. That was surprising to me. But perhaps Grant thought Sherman was too obsessed with logistical details and too worried about interference by the enemy.
Wittenberg wrote that most people considered Sheridan's personal influence on his command was a powerful positive asset. In the cavalry divisions, about 9,000 men, it was probable that each trooper had seen Sheridan many times and was inspired by his confidence.
 
I think Sheridan became the hardest of Grant's hard warriors. And it was important in Virginia because of the proximity of the agricultural resources of the Shenandoah Valley to Richmond. I think the remorseless nature of the destruction of the upper valley affected Lee's thinking about the value of guerilla warfare. I don't know if remarks attributed to Lee by Porter Alexander were actually uttered by Lee, but they would have been a logical factor in compelling a negotiated surrender rather than a resort to widespread guerilla warfare.
 
Wittenberg included some material suggesting that Grant thought Sheridan was superior to Sherman. That was surprising to me. But perhaps Grant thought Sherman was too obsessed with logistical details and too worried about interference by the enemy.
Wittenberg wrote that most people considered Sheridan's personal influence on his command was a powerful positive asset. In the cavalry divisions, about 9,000 men, it was probable that each trooper had seen Sheridan many times and was inspired by his confidence.
If memory serves, Grant made some comments to that effect on his world tour post-Presidency. By that time he and Sherman had somewhat fallen out over politics.
 
While I pretty aggressively disagree with the OP on most of his counter-arguments, the fact that he is making them means that I accomplished what I set out to do--make people think and stimulate discussion. As I have said many times, I genuinely don't care whether people agree or disagree with me. If I cause people to think and reconsider their positions--regardless of whether they agree with me--then I have achieved what I intended with this book.
 
While I pretty aggressively disagree with the OP on most of his counter-arguments, the fact that he is making them means that I accomplished what I set out to do--make people think and stimulate discussion. As I have said many times, I genuinely don't care whether people agree or disagree with me. If I cause people to think and reconsider their positions--regardless of whether they agree with me--then I have achieved what I intended with this book.
I like the book. It does raise some interesting lines of inquiry. Take care of those wrists. :smile coffee:
 
1. Sheridan could have been sent out to Burkeville and Lynchburg on his own, without a battle at Five Forks.
2. Warren could have been ordered to headquarters and Griffin made acting Vth corp commander. Meade had done something similar before and doing it before a crisis arose would have better protected Warren's ego and his standing.
3. Ord and Gibbon could have been brought over to the US left flank before Five Forks if it was known that they were the divisions most likely to keep up a successful pursuit.
4. Grant could have given Sheridan written permission to give orders directly to the 5th Corp division commanders. The rain, the condition of roads, and exigencies of battle could have been used as excuses. That would have been similar to what occurred at Chattanooga, were all the divisions were re-aligned.
 
Farnsworth, Dahlgren, Meigs, the Confederate Stuart, McPherson in Georgia, Hays in Virginia, and high ranking members of Sheridan's staff: all evidence that it was very dangerous work these young men were engaged in. By March 1864. Gregg eventually just resigned, probably under pressure from Sheridan.
 

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