Lee's objective in the Gettysburg campaign.

[E_just_E]

There is not a clear consensus about Lee's final objective in the Gettysburg campaign. Legend has it that it was Harrisburg. Based on troop movements, I think that it was far on the other side of the Susquehanna River.

Let's see where the troops were stationed on June 28, 1863:

Longstreet and Ewell were at Chambersburg, PA right on what is now I-81. Hill was a few miles south on the same road at Hagerstown, MD. JEB Stuart was on a raid, just to the west of Washington DC and he have been moving to the East of the main force, I suspect for diverting the majority of the Union Troops from the Confederate troops that were moving North further to the West. Interestingly, Jubal Early's troops were at Wrightsville, which is a Susquehanna Crossing. The next day (6/29), Ewell's troops move close to Harrisburg (another Susquehanna Crossing.) On the 30th, Longstreet and Hill go towards Gettysburg via Chambersburg Rd. Ewell returns towards Gettysburg from the North, while Stuart is at Hanover Crossing (where he participated in the battle of Hanover.) Early is at York, close to Wrightsville. The next day, The Federals arrive at Gettysburg, find Longstreet, Hill and Ewell (later), Jubal Early comes from York, while Stuart goes from Hanover to York and then goes up north to Carlisle, pretty close to Harrisburg.

And then we know what happened.

Here is my theory. Early's responsibility was to see whether they can cross the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. Apparently he thought that it was less than optimal. At that point Ewell was sent to see whether a Harrisburg crossing was better and 2 different meeting points were determined: York for the South, Wrightsville, crossing and Carlisle for the North, Harrisburg, crossing. The Harrisburg crossing was worse than the Wrightsville apparently so they all converge to Gettysburg to take the York Road for the Wrightsville crossing and Early moves to York. Then Gettysburg happened. Early went to support the rest and Stuart, slowed down by the Hanover scrimmage, arrives at York and finds nobody, so he is heading to the second rendezvous point Carlisle, where he finds what happened and goes to Gettysburg. Late.

So I think that Lee's objective was the non-well guarded second biggest Union City: Philadelphia.

Hard to explain the battle of Gettysburg if Harrisburg was the objective. They could have invaded Harrisburg with no problem at that point. And this explains the JEB Stuart movements as well...

Here is a map of the Gettysburg Campaign and the movements with the dates, for reference:

Expired Image Removed

Thoughts?

 

[rpkennedy]

Harrisburg would be a problem because of the fairly large-scale entrenchments guarding the approaches to the city (not to mention the problem of crossing the Susquehanna River with bridges destroyed).

I agree with you that Philadelphia was probably the goal but it wasn't a particularly realistic one, especially with an enemy following behind. The defenses at Harrisburg would slow up any advance until the AotP could move against Lee's rear or flank. Lee simply wasn't going to have the time necessary to march all of the way to Philly.

R

 

[E_just_E]

Harrisburg would be a problem because of the fairly large-scale entrenchments guarding the approaches to the city (not to mention the problem of crossing the Susquehanna River with bridges destroyed).

I agree with you that Philadelphia was probably the goal but it wasn't a particularly realistic one, especially with an enemy following behind. The defenses at Harrisburg would slow up any advance until the AotP could move against Lee's rear or flank. Lee simply wasn't going to have the time necessary to march all of the way to Philly.

R

Agree Re: Harrisburg. But I think that Lee did not know the situation, thus the dispatching of Ewell over there.

Hard to talk about what ifs but, if they decided to cross at Wrightsville on the 29th (doable, other than Stuart) and then destroyed that bridge, there were not many crossings left for the Federals, who were at Fredicksburg the 28th. Once you cross from Wrightsville to Columbia, Lancaster and Philly are a pretty straight line, with the Feds likely having to cross at Holtwood/Bethesda, PA, plus being a day at least behind... Leaving a couple of brigades at that crossing, or if Stuart was directed there and destroyed that bridge after he crossed it, might had been an interesting story.

Still I don't know. But that second thinking and the Ewell to Harrisburg move, I think, was a mistake...

 

[cash]

Your dates are just a bit off. Compare to Ewell's report. Ewell wasn't at Chambersburg on 28 June. He was in Carlisle and Mechanicsburg. Rodes entered Carlisle on 27 June. Jenkins, who was with Ewell, entered Mechanicsburg on 28 June.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0044;view=image;seq=445;page=root;size=100

According to Ewell's report, Lee ordered him to take Harrisburg. If Harrisburg wasn't a target, that would be a funny thing to order.

Lee's actual order was, "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it."

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...aro0045;view=image;seq=916;page=root;size=100

Early says in his report that he was ordered to go to Wrightsville, destroy the bridge, and then rejoin Ewell in Carlisle.
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/c...ture it;view=image;seq=466;size=100;page=root

All that argues for Harrisburg. Once Early rejoined Ewell, they would be able to cross the Susquehanna and take Harrisburg.

 

[cash]

Harrisburg would be a problem because of the fairly large-scale entrenchments guarding the approaches to the city (not to mention the problem of crossing the Susquehanna River with bridges destroyed).

I agree with you that Philadelphia was probably the goal but it wasn't a particularly realistic one, especially with an enemy following behind. The defenses at Harrisburg would slow up any advance until the AotP could move against Lee's rear or flank. Lee simply wasn't going to have the time necessary to march all of the way to Philly.

R

The confederates weren't worried about the troops guarding Harrisburg, as they were militia.

 

[E_just_E]

Your dates are just a bit off. Compare to Ewell's report. Ewell wasn't at Chambersburg on 28 June. He was in Carlisle and Mechanicsburg. Rodes entered Carlisle on 27 June. Jenkins, who was with Ewell, entered Mechanicsburg on 28 June.

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=take Harrisburg;rgn=full text;idno=waro0044;didno=waro0044;view=image;seq=445;page=root;size=100

According to Ewell's report, Lee ordered him to take Harrisburg. If Harrisburg wasn't a target, that would be a funny thing to order.

Lee's actual order was, "If Harrisburg comes within your means, capture it."

http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;q1=capture it;rgn=full text;idno=waro0045;didno=waro0045;view=image;seq=916;page=root;size=100

Early says in his report that he was ordered to go to Wrightsville, destroy the bridge, and then rejoin Ewell in Carlisle.
http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar;cc=moawar;idno=waro0044;q1=capture it;view=image;seq=466;size=100;page=root

All that argues for Harrisburg. Once Early rejoined Ewell, they would be able to cross the Susquehanna and take Harrisburg.

That's based on the official reports. But we know that the Wrightsville bridge was never destroyed. And if the objective was Harrisburg (or crossing at Harrisburg, where the bridge was destroyed) why didn't they go North to meet with Ewell, instead of East? Gettysburg was out of the way to go to Harrisburg...

 

[brass napoleon]

I don't think Lee's true objective was any city in particular. Even if he captured a major city, he couldn't possibly have held it. His true objective was to seize the initiative, feed his army off of the enemy, relieve northern Virginia from the war at least for the short-term, and perhaps even score a Cannae against his opponent in enemy territory.

 

[rpkennedy]

That's based on the official reports. But we know that the Wrightsville bridge was never destroyed. And if the objective was Harrisburg (or crossing at Harrisburg, where the bridge was destroyed) why didn't they go North to meet with Ewell, instead of East? Gettysburg was out of the way to go to Harrisburg...

The bridge at Wrightsville was burned and left unusable by the Confederates.

R

 

[rpkennedy]

The confederates weren't worried about the troops guarding Harrisburg, as they were militia.

While I agree that militia wasn't going to stand long, crossing the river in the face of fortifications, even those manned by militia, wasn't a great prospect.

R

 

[cash]

Agree Re: Harrisburg. But I think that Lee did not know the situation, thus the dispatching of Ewell over there.

Hard to talk about what ifs but, if they decided to cross at Wrightsville on the 29th (doable, other than Stuart) and then destroyed that bridge, there were not many crossings left for the Federals, who were at Fredicksburg the 28th. Once you cross from Wrightsville to Columbia, Lancaster and Philly are a pretty straight line, with the Feds likely having to cross at Holtwood/Bethesda, PA, plus being a day at least behind... Leaving a couple of brigades at that crossing, or if Stuart was directed there and destroyed that bridge after he crossed it, might had been an interesting story.

Still I don't know. But that second thinking and the Ewell to Harrisburg move, I think, was a mistake...

Ewell wasn't instructed to cross at Wrightsville. His instructions were to destroy the bridge and then rejoin Ewell in Carlisle. There was no desire to cross at Wrightsville.

The object was first to take Harrisburg. Once that was done, they could move to Philadelphia or some other place.

On 23 February, Stonewall Jackson had ordered Jed Hotchkiss to produce a map from the Valley up to Harrisburg, and then from Harrisburg to Philadelphia.

 

[E_just_E]

The bridge at Wrightsville was burned and left unusable by the Confederates.

R

Looks like that local militia might had destroyed that bridge, while Ewell who allegedly had orders to do it, wanted to cross.

Interesting.

 

[cash]

That's based on the official reports. But we know that the Wrightsville bridge was never destroyed. And if the objective was Harrisburg (or crossing at Harrisburg, where the bridge was destroyed) why didn't they go North to meet with Ewell, instead of East? Gettysburg was out of the way to go to Harrisburg...

We know the Wrightsville Bridge was destroyed, but it was destroyed by its defenders. As Early says, he was to destroy the bridge at Wrightsville and then rejoin Ewell.

Divisions of corps often marched on different roads.

 

[cash]

Looks like that local militia might had destroyed that bridge, while Ewell who allegedly had orders to do it, wanted to cross.

Interesting.

Early didn't want to cross it. He wanted to destroy it. The defenders didn't know that, though.

 

[cash]

I don't think Lee's true objective was any city in particular. Even if he captured a major city, he couldn't possibly have held it. His true objective was to seize the initiative, feed his army off of the enemy, relieve northern Virginia from the war at least for the short-term, and perhaps even score a Cannae against his opponent in enemy territory.

He didn't need to hold anything. Capturing the capital of Pennsylvania would be a political disaster for the Republicans.

Food was a secondary objective at best.

Lee didn't go north primarily to get food. He went north to win the war. He knew the confederacy couldn't defeat the Union militarily. He wanted to inflict a political defeat on the Republicans. If he could take Harrisburg, threaten Philadelphia, and defeat the Army of the Potomac, forcing it to retreat from Pennsylvania, he would show the Lincoln administration couldn't protect a key northern state. That would translate to political defeat that October in Ohio and Pennsylvania for the Republicans. Imagine Clement Vallandigham as Governor of Ohio, pulling Ohio troops back. It's not beyond possibility for it to lead to Lincoln's defeat in November of the following year. That's how the confederacy could win the war.

 

[W. Richardson]

The bridge at Wrightsville was burned and left unusable by the Confederates.

R

I was under the impression the Union forces burned/blow up the bridge ?

Major Granville Haller believed that he had made every necessary arrangement to blow up one 200-foot span of the lengthy Columbia Bridge. Lieutenant Delaplaine Ridgway, volunteer Capt. E. K. Smith, and their militia artillery crew had moved two fieldpieces into position in Columbia to fire exploding shells at the huge bridge. Haller instructed Ridgway to stay ready to shell Wrightsville if necessary. Major Charles Knox soon reported that enemy infantry was forming to cross the bridge. A few more Confederate cavalrymen rode around the overturned railroad cars and dashed into the viaduct for an instant, firing their revolvers at Knox before disappearing from view. Seeing Rebels bringing artillery into Wrightsville, Jacob Frick knew that time was running out. About 7:30 p.m., supposing that all of his men were safely across the river, Frick gave Knox the order to light the fuse. Knox signaled demolition supervisor Robert Crane, who had previously positioned four men, John Q. Denney, Jacob Rich, John Lockard, and an old black man named Jacob Miller, at the mined span on the western end. They applied matches to the fuses and ran back toward Columbia, out of the blast area. Crane reported that "every charge was perfect and effective." The 33-year-old Denney had been a lieutenant in the 2nd Militia during the Emergency of 1862, serving under Capt. William G. Case, the constructor of "Fort Case." He operated the Henry Clay Furnace near Chickies Rock just upriver from Columbia and had considerable experience in blasting. The efforts to topple the span failed, however, as the charge "simply splintered the arch. It scarcely shook the bridge." A Harper's Weekly correspondent in Columbia reported, "But when the period of destruction arrived, three reports were heard in quick succession, followed by a cloud of smoke, which led us to believe that some of the cannon guarding the entrance at Columbia had been taken to this part of the bridge and fired at the entering rebels." West of Wrightsville, Gordon Bradwell heard the explosion, and "looking toward town, we saw the timbers of the bridge rising high into the blue sky." The detonation did have one benefit for the defenders—according to Lt. W. C. Mathews, it chased Company G of the 38th Georgia out of the bridge. Years later he wrote, "That company, the advance guard in the attack, thus accomplished the honorable exploit of penetrating farther north [east] than any company in the Army of Northern Virginia, of which fact the survivors are to this day justly proud."

Meanwhile, a few Confederate artillery rounds howled into the river, with a couple landing dangerously close to the bridge. F. X. Ziegler had spent Sunday working in Columbia's telegraph station. The 46-year-old left the building and stood in Front Street near Gay Street. He had a good view of Tanner's errant shells splashing into the Susquehanna "about half way across."

Having failed to topple one of the spans with explosives, Frick felt that it was his duty to set a portion of the bridge on fire. He again turned to railroader Robert Crane, who ordered the civilian
volunteers to attempt this dangerous task. Former artillery commander, Capt. E. K. Smith, a civil engineer by trade, helped supervise the workers. A few men had previously rolled large barrels of coal oil and kerosene from a small Columbia refinery onto the bridge. Now they dragged the fuel, boards, and wood shavings to the specified location, where they knocked in the barrelheads and soaked the kindling and the oak floor with the volatile liquids. In search of more fuel, Crane sent a man back to Front Street in Columbia's mercantile district. He procured additional coal oil from the shop of Anthony J. Hindermeyer.
Shortly before 8:00 p.m. Colonel Frick gave the order. John Denney and his three companions threw torches onto the oil-soaked floor and timbers. Persifor Frazer, still leading Frick's horse, was just then emerging from the eastern end. He "saw a curl of smoke rising from the pier where the mine had been placed, and shortly afterward a column of flame mounted high in the sky." Soon the span was fully engulfed, filling the evening sky with glowing cinders. Colonel Clement Evans' Georgians rushed into the "splendid bridge," but they lacked anything to fight the fire except their hands and coats. Evans opined, "Two or three pieces of artillery judiciously placed on the opposite side" could have saved the bridge.

Mingus, Scott L. (2009-03-09). Flames Beyond Gettysburg: The Gordon Expedition, June 1863 (Kindle Locations 4336-4376). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.


Respectfully,

William

 

[E_just_E]

I was under the impression the Union forces burned/blow up the bridge ?


Respectfully,

William

Local PA Militia did. Allegedly Ewell had orders to destroy it. But this is not the size of Burnside's bridge...

here is a picture of the modern bridge:

Expired Image Removed

 

[W. Richardson]

Local PA Militia did. Allegedly Ewell had orders to destroy it.

Yes, but local militia isn't Confederate forces......As stated destroyed it.

There, Early met with Gordon and again instructed him to proceed to the Susquehanna and secure the Columbia Bridge, if possible.51

Mingus, Scott L. (2009-03-09). Flames Beyond Gettysburg: The Gordon Expedition, June 1863 (Kindle Locations 3510-3511). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Respectfully,

William

 

[W. Richardson]

Early didn't want to cross it. He wanted to destroy it. The defenders didn't know that, though.

There, Early met with Gordon and again instructed him to proceed to the Susquehanna and secure the Columbia Bridge, if possible.

Mingus, Scott L. (2009-03-09). Flames Beyond Gettysburg: The Gordon Expedition, June 1863 (Kindle Locations 3510-3511). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.


Respectfully,

William

 

[dlofting]

I agree with Brass Napoleon on this. I think Lee's objective was to move the war out of Virginia into an area where he could supply his troops and win a battle on "Northern soil". I think he intended to be guided circumstances and positioned his corps (cavalry included) appropriately. Unfortunately for him the Army of the Potomac moved a bit faster than he anticipated.

 

[W. Richardson]

I don't think Lee's true objective was any city in particular. Even if he captured a major city, he couldn't possibly have held it. His true objective was to seize the initiative, feed his army off of the enemy, relieve northern Virginia from the war at least for the short-term, and perhaps even score a Cannae against his opponent in enemy territory.

BN,

You nailed it !!

Respectfully,

William