Lee's Mega Army... Do or Die!

[wausaubob]

What happened when Grant constructed an army of about 115,000, perhaps, with the much better logistical support enjoyed by the United States?
1. The army's supply wagon train was so large and moved so slowly, that it dictated the operational pace.
2. Grant almost immediately detached most of the cavalry units to that their enormous forage demands would be separated from the infantry.
3. He sent back most of the artillery so that its forage needs were also separated from the infantry.

Any army that exceeded 60,000 men found its logistical problems became the center of the operational limits. At that size the armies began to split up to move and concentrate to fight.
Fun stuff, very imaginative. But hardly important.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm not sure how that contests my point. What I'm saying is that the men who would form this army all clearly ate something historically, so the amount of food available to the Confederacy plus the amount the AoNV historically foraged was enough to feed them (if not necessarily well).

The question is whether they had the capacity to move this food to Richmond, and to carry it with them. We know they had enough wagons for Lee's historical army to manoeuvre successfully, but it's quite likely they didn't have the wagons to manoeuvre with double the size of force.

 

[Saphroneth]

Now, the interesting thing is that there was a European solution to the problem of the cumbersome individual army (assuming for a moment that the wagon supplies are sufficient), and it was to break the army up into smaller combined-arms formations sized to fit down a road in a day and have manageable amounts of wagons, while also being able to fight an action by themselves.

A corps, which was conceptually on the order of 30,000 men.

In American usage (largely due to the dwindling size of brigades and thus divisions, but also due to the segregation of the cavalry into a separate formation) the corps didn't really fulfil the duty it was supposed to, with Union corps approaching the size of divisions later in the war. Lee's corps managed to stay within shouting distance of the right size, though, and with this in mind it's possible to see how a hypothetical larger Confederate army could operate. One option is the four-corps formation - four corps in a diamond or square formation, advancing down two parallel roads (or three if available). No matter where they run into an enemy, the reinforcing corps can add to the flanks and thus extend the line, and this force is comparatively nimble because each corps is self-contained. The idea is that one corps can fight a delaying battle while the others come in on the flanks.

Various commanders tried to constitute formal arrangements to fulfil the old corps requirements, such as the "wing" structure or the "grand division" structure, but none really stuck.



We certainly know that it was possible for a large army to manoeuvre effectively, it was being done in the pre-rail days by Napoleon and his foes (Leipzig had 600,000 men on the field, with the largest three national armies being 160,000, 145,000 and 115,000 strong), but that's with a full corps structure and experienced staff officers.

 

[leftyhunter]

I think Davis's fear were overblown. He needed to be a visionary if the Confederacy was going to prevail. May of 1863 was the peck of Lee's army before the decline and defeated of the cause. It was time for a hail Mary move...

Perhaps but Davis did have a valid point. When Burnside landed at New Bern he did plan going inland to Goldsboro but Lincoln ordered Burnside and the bulk of his men to assist General McCellen during the Peninsula Campaign. A weakning of the defenses surrounding New Bern does leave the critical railroad junction at Goldsboro quite vulnerable.
I know we all like to Monday Morning Quarterback civil war figures which is fine since they certainly don't mind.
To be fair I have always argued that Davis while far from walking on water did the best he could under very trying circumstances.
I don't know of any other secessionist leader in a similar situation who did any better then Davis.
Anyone is free to PM me if they know of one leader who performed better under trying circumstances.
Leftyhunter

 

[wausaubob]

It worked for Napoleon in Europe. But then it did not work when the Russians traded space for time. So the logistical problem was there, it was just waiting to be exploited.
Fun stuff by 5fish as always. But the problem for the Confederacy was that the United States could sustain 3 field armies and the Confederacy could not just abandon any of the three fronts.
If General Rosecrans finds only small inadequate forces in his front, he had already demonstrated the capacity to outflank them. History demonstrates what type of operations Sherman would conduct if he found no force in opposition in his front.

 

[Saphroneth]

It worked for Napoleon in Europe. But then it did not work when the Russians traded space for time. So the logistical problem was there, it was just waiting to be exploited.

I think the current scholarly understanding is that the Russians wanted to fight Napoleon - most of the casualties Napoleon took actually happened in the peak of summer - and that an advance as far as Smolensk was quite logistically sustainable by Napoleon without major strain.
The logistical "problem" you're talking about is also on a completely different scale. The Grande Armee began invading Russia at the Niemen river and maintained about 160,000 men as far as Borodino, meaning an advance of over five hunded straight-line miles during the June-September campaign season (two and a half months).
Going that far north from the line of the Rappahanock gets you clear into Montreal (or Maine), while going south the same distance from the same starting point reaches Savannah. If that's what a problem looks like then I think Grant and Lee would both quite like that kind of problem!

 

[Jimklag]

Now, the interesting thing is that there was a European solution to the problem of the cumbersome individual army (assuming for a moment that the wagon supplies are sufficient), and it was to break the army up into smaller combined-arms formations sized to fit down a road in a day and have manageable amounts of wagons, while also being able to fight an action by themselves.

A corps, which was conceptually on the order of 30,000 men.

In American usage (largely due to the dwindling size of brigades and thus divisions, but also due to the segregation of the cavalry into a separate formation) the corps didn't really fulfil the duty it was supposed to, with Union corps approaching the size of divisions later in the war. Lee's corps managed to stay within shouting distance of the right size, though, and with this in mind it's possible to see how a hypothetical larger Confederate army could operate. One option is the four-corps formation - four corps in a diamond or square formation, advancing down two parallel roads (or three if available). No matter where they run into an enemy, the reinforcing corps can add to the flanks and thus extend the line, and this force is comparatively nimble because each corps is self-contained. The idea is that one corps can fight a delaying battle while the others come in on the flanks.

Various commanders tried to constitute formal arrangements to fulfil the old corps requirements, such as the "wing" structure or the "grand division" structure, but none really stuck.



We certainly know that it was possible for a large army to manoeuvre effectively, it was being done in the pre-rail days by Napoleon and his foes (Leipzig had 600,000 men on the field, with the largest three armies being 160,000, 145,000 and 115,000 strong), but that's with a full corps structure and experienced staff officers.

I'm shocked, shocked I say! that you would have a European solution to the problem. In fact, I'm most shocked that it took you so many posts to get around to it.

 

[wausaubob]

Fun. Regardless of whether there is a solution, there definitely is a problem. The problem is posed clearly in von Clausewitz, although he was too obscure to get credit for posing the problem. Once the army gets national in size, it takes up an enormous amount of road space. It has to forage, or have magazines, and a train, and probably some combination of all three.
I don't see any need for the United States to fight this Confederate 150,000 man army. Just hover close enough to force it to concentrate, and another Antietam will happen.

 

[Saphroneth]

I'm shocked, shocked I say! that you would have a European solution to the problem. In fact, I's most shocked that it took you so many posts to get around to it.

Hey, it's hardly my fault I have perspective.


More seriously, the reason this one probably couldn't be implemented in the US is that the armies in question had functionally been preparing for it (and getting practical staff experience in it) for decades by the time of the big central European campaigns where the corps worked as intended. It's pretty clear from the organizational efforts in the American Civil War ("grand divisions", "wings") that people did understand the concept, it's just that there was no permanent organizational level on the right scale because "corps" had become co-opted.*

It might be significant that Sherman's March to the Sea was conducted by 60,000 men in two armies, because that functionally meant that they were two "standard" corps in actual size.

* The interesting thing here is that the Union pretty much had to learn it out of books, because not only had they not had a war in which they needed corps before but nor had their opponent in the War of 1812. The British didn't form permanent corps in the Peninsula because Wellington was on top of everything enough for him to pretty much command every division and sometimes every battalion individually.
This meant that Wellington's army was incredibly effective, because Wellington was a genius, but it also meant that he was sui generis and that his system didn't really work for anyone else (he found the corps structure he tried in 1815 to be an encumberance) and it's interesting to consider if this delayed British adoption of a proper corps structure.

I don't see any need for the United States to fight this Confederate 150,000 man army. Just hover close enough to force it to concentrate, and another Antietam will happen.

That's Fabian tactics, which would certainly work given long enough - good call. This of course constrains what Lee will try to do with his army, and I'd expect that if he did have such a huge army he'd probably try and force an early engagement by threatening Washington or some other very important target.

It just goes towards the reasons that if Lee got reinforcements he'd probably want 15,000 men or 30,000 rather than 70,000. This is more doable and doesn't ruin his manoeuvre capability quite so much.

 

[Brendan]

Probably he would have mounted a full echelon attack and overwhelmed Howard's Cowards at the line hinge (they're the weakest point of the line, and Lee's Day 2 attacks were intended to focus the main attack on them) or just spread his flanks wider until he could cut one or both of the roads the Union army had for communication.

It's important to understand what Lee was trying to do to understand his operations at Gettysburg. He wasn't just launching attacks on what looked weak, he was trying to compel Meade to react - and in both cases he got the reaction he wanted, but bad luck (an unlucky casualty in his commanders on day 2, for example) meant that his actual decisive stroke hung fire.

With so many tens of thousands of extra men, Lee can spread his line much wider safely, and since historically he was already trying to turn both flanks of the Union army I could see him compelling Meade to thin his centre too much to avoid the AotP being flanked.

"Howard's Cowards?" Seriously? I know you're having fun playing armchair general, but these were real people, many of whom gave their lives so we can live in a free, united country. Show some respect.

 

[Saphroneth]

"Howard's Cowards?" Seriously? I know you're having fun playing armchair general, but these were real people, many of whom gave their lives so we can live in a free, united country. Show some respect.

It's the nickname they had at the time among their own army because they'd been routed twice in 1863 already by that point (Chancellorsville and then Day 1 Gettysburg), and I admit I have trouble remembering their numerical designation as 11th Army Corps.

I'll try to refer to them by their numerical designation in future. (Though I have little trouble with the use of comical nicknames for my own nation's armed forces, in general - the Blind Half-Hundred, the Flying Foreskins and the like...)

 

[Brendan]

It's the nickname they had at the time among their own army because they'd been routed twice in 1863 already by that point (Chancellorsville and then Day 1 Gettysburg), and I admit I have trouble remembering their numerical designation as 11th Army Corps.

I'll try to refer to them by their numerical designation in future. (Though I have little trouble with the use of comical nicknames for my own nation's armed forces, in general - the Blind Half-Hundred, the Flying Foreskins and the like...)

Well, if you've served in the Army of the Potomac, feel free to use it! All others can go scratch.

The distinction these men later won in TN, GA, and SC proved the moniker wrong anyhow. The 11th Corps' real problem was the terrible decisions made by Howard, Barlow, and others in their tenure in the AotP. It's hard to stop an assault when your commanders have got you facing the wrong direction. The stance of the 75th Ohio and 17th Connecticut and other 11th Corps units at East Cemetery Hill likewise shatters the stereotype.

 

[Saphroneth]

The distinction these men later won in TN, GA, and SC proved the moniker wrong anyhow. The 11th Corps' real problem was the terrible decisions made by Howard, Barlow, and others in their tenure in the AotP. It's hard to stop an assault when your commanders have got you facing the wrong direction. The stance of the 75th Ohio and 17th Connecticut and other 11th Corps units at East Cemetery Hill likewise shatters the stereotype.

I'm sure they weren't as bad as the stereotype, but the fact remains that troops simply are not as able to fight under trying conditions after a rout. It's how military psychology works and has been for all of history, and Meade's judgement in placing 11th Corps at the one point in the line where a force has to withstand pressure from two directions at once is... questionable.

 

[Jimklag]

Wellington was a genius, but it also meant that he was sui generis and that his system didn't really work for anyone else

Same thing with Lee and Jackson. Lee's style of command didn't work with Ewell because he was not Jackson and he was used to extremely detailed orders from his superior. It was Lee who didn't adapt to his subordinates - not the other way round. Lee should have known that Ewell and Hill could not be treated the same way as Jackson and Longstreet.

 

[Saphroneth]

Oddly enough Wellington also had a Hill who commanded an independent command, and Hill's command (his own division plus some others) was arguably Wellington's only really skilled independent command.

This is probably a skill which Wellington's sheer brilliance significantly harmed in the British Army, though there's no real way to quickly construct a working high command team - especially with the ACW habit of divisional commanders and even corps commanders going in harms' way and getting wounded or killed. IIRC McClellan's approach was to wait until he'd seen how people performed in combat before formalizing corps stucture, though he was overruled, while the "command" structure of the AoNV came about almost by accident as troops arrived at Yorktown.

I've seen one argument that the reason why Lee went with a two-corps structure was because his third most senior subordinate was someone he did not want in corps command, and that he'd got rid of the man before Jackson got himself shot so was already planning a switch to three-corps.

 

[5fish]

In Lee's original plans he wanted to cut his supply lines. He never did but I do not think he got as deep into southetn PA. as he originally planned he would so cutting his supply lines never was a option. Southern PA. was rich farm land and I guess Lee's mega army could have survived the summer forging off the land.

What the AoP going to do as one of Lee's Corps makes it to Harrisburg?

Or if Lee sends 35,000 men towards Philadelphia? Think of the out cries...

 

[Saphroneth]

Southern PA. was rich farm land and I guess Lee's mega army could have survived the summer forging off the land.

That's not really something that can be relied on, not for an army that big. It needs so much land to support itself it might not work - Sherman's army marching through Georgia was able to function, but it was having trouble towards the end and it couldn't have marched back successfully. Fortunately it was marching towards waiting supply ships.

What the AoP going to do as one of Lee's Corps makes it to Harrisburg?

This is actually something that could have been done with different march routes, even without an extra corps. If Lee's army is big enough to take the other march route but isn't obviously too big to successfully fight (i.e. an extra 15,000-20,000 men in a fourth corps?) then it'd be the ideal way to compel an engagement - one corps marches to Harrisburg and either captures it or bombards it, so Lincoln really wants Meade to fight.
This analysis was done by dandan_noodles a year or two ago, and I'll just post it as I think we've gotten to the point it's most relevant. This assumes only three corps not four (i.e. the historical forces).



As far as we can tell, Lee had four main objectives going into PA, in order of least to most ideal.

1. Forage supplies
2. Inflict heavy casualties on the Union
3. Humiliate the Union north of the Potomac
4. Kill the Army of the Potomac

Meade has three main objectives

1. Stay between Lee and Washington and Baltimore
2. Don't lose a battle
3. Drive Lee out of PA

July 1 is the fastest the leading edge of the Union army can get to Gettysburg (and get destroyed by concentric attacks), which is the furthest north they can concentrate the army, and it'll take three days to completely concentrate the army.

Lee can complete at least two or three out of four of his objectives by picking better march routes; he foraged tons of supply and hobbled the AotP for ten months historically, and with clearer roads, he can humiliate the Union by bagging a state capital. Meade would be compelled to move the army through Gettysburg to liberate Harrisburg, but would have to attack Hill and Longstreet entrenched on Seminary Ridge-ish, since that position can threaten their supply/communication lines if they move to the north towards Harrisburg, and he might as well attack while the ANV is divided. The earliest he could make the attack would be July 2nd, when two of his army's three wings were up, but he'd still have an exposed flank to the north, and Ewell would have plenty of time to sweep down from the north and outflank the Union once they get stuck in.

There are four main possible courses of events if Hill and Longstreet diverge at Hagerstown and converge at Gettysburg, with Ewell taking Harrisburg.

1. Meade plants himself on the Pipe Creek Line, and no battle happens. Lee completes objects 1. and 3. Meade is replaced in a matter of weeks, and the morale of the AotP drops another notch. Better than historical Lee.

2. Lee assaults Meade on the Pipe Creek Line. Objectives 1. 2. and 3. complete, so he's ahead of the historical outcome, though he would probably have to retire from the field, with secure lines of retreat through the gaps in South Mountain.

3. Meade attacks Hill and Longstreet, then Ewell comes down on their northern flank. Objectives 1. 2. and 3. complete right there if he retires from the field to the Pipe Creek Line. If Meade then retires to the fishhook, Lee has a chance at 4., since that limits him to two lines of retreat after having taken heavy casualties. If Lee then carries out a well handled echelon attack, he can take either the Taneytown road or the Baltimore pike; losing either would compel Meade to retreat (leaving behind lots of baggage and heavy weapons) or get killed right there. If he does retreat, he would have to beat the ANV in a footrace to Westminster, or else the AotP will be cut off from its base of supply and Lee goes four for four.

4. Meade plants himself on the fishhook. Lee gets 1. 2. and 3. per reality+fall of Harrisburg, and there's a chance he can double down on objective 3. if two of his best division commanders don't get downed in the first minutes of their attacks en echelon and he drives them from the field.

 

[Jimklag]

if two of his best division commanders don't get downed in the first minutes of their attacks en echelon

I have a little problem with the concept that the only reason Lee's echelon attack on July 2 failed is the loss of two divisional commanders. Assuming all else goes at it actually did historically, Mahone still ignores Anderson and sits on his hands and the lack of coordination between the two wings, what makes you think two fewer casualties is going to make that much difference.

 

[Saphroneth]

I have a little problem with the concept that the only reason Lee's echelon attack on July 2 failed is the loss of two divisional commanders. Assuming all else goes at it actually did historically, Mahone still ignores Anderson and sits on his hands and the lack of coordination between the two wings, what makes you think two fewer casualties is going to make that much difference.

Well, the way an echelon attack works is that formations fire off in sequence (in this case, from Confederate right to Confederate left). One of the casualties broke the sequence.

Per dandan on Lee's day-two echelon attack:


The right wing of Anderson's division got all the way up to the copse of trees; it failed because his left wing brigades failed to follow the sequence, and because Pender was wounded before he could restart the echelon attack with his division.


Without Pender being wounded, the echelon attack restarts and strikes Howard's corps. (the other division commander was Hood, whose incapacitation neutered the Confederate attack in his sector - without his being incapacitated there's good reason to think that that attack would have been successful as Longstreet was already doing very well on that flank even without Hood's help.)

Thus Hood's attack on the left Union flank succeeds without his wounding; thus Howard's Corps are hit 2:1 from both sides at the hinge without Pender's wounding; thus the Union army is left with one viable retreat path and the line broken at the hinge. At this point Meade has no real option but to retreat.

 

[Jimklag]

it failed because his left wing brigades failed to follow the sequence

It still stops at Mahone.