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I've seen some comments regarding the 1864 Campaigns, suggesting that Lee should have sent troops from his command to reinforce troops in Georgia against Sherman. This certainly was a fear had by General Grant, who in early July warned Sherman of his fears that Early, with the Army of the Valley District, fresh off the D.C. Raid, would board trains and move through the Carolinas to Atlanta. This was unfounded, as Early simply withdrew back into the Valley, where he continued to embarass Union troops, at Kernstown & Chambersburg. Meanwhile, Sherman's first major target, once he crossed the Chattahoochee, was to cut the Georgia Railroad, the city's eastern connection to Augusta, in part to prevent such a move. I should do more reading into the O.R.s, but as for Hood's tenure, I've found no instance where he requested troops from Lee's department.
However, after a recent thread, I decided I would dive into this topic, and want to cover what I consider the most plausible scenario.
So, Lee would not have been able to send anything down to Johnston in May or most of June. Maybe in early July he could start considering such a transfer, but I'd say let's go with Early August for when he decides he could send troops. By then, he was well established on the Petersburg-Richmond Front, having repulsed Grant's Third Offensive at the Crater; meanwhile, Early had successfully turned back Hunter from Lynchburg, had threatened D.C., defeated Crook at Kernstown, and launched a cavalry raid into Pennsylvania.
It would be historically around this period that Lee would part ways with a portion of his army at Petersburg to reinforce the Valley. This force consisted of an infantry division (Joseph Kershaw's), a cavalry division (Fitzhugh Lee's) & an artillery battalion (Cutshaw's), under the command of R. H. Anderson. After an ineffectual month in the valley, Lee recalled Kershaw's Division & Cutshaw's Battalion to Richmond, which Union intelligence picked up on, resulting in the battles of Opequeon & Fisher's Hill.
So the first question is: Who does Lee send?
Many suggest that Lee send Early's Second Corps to reinforce Hood. This was postulated by Grant at the time, but I consider it unlikely, given the makeup of the force and the role Lee wanted it to play. While small, Early's Corps, reinforced by Wharton's Infantry Division and the valley cavalry, were able to tie down Union forces almost three times their number, allowing Lee to breathe easier around the Richmond-Petersburg Front. If Early is sent to Georgia, this would free up massive Union forces to bolster Grant around Petersburg, likely ending the siege by winter. Plus, Early's force was mostly either Virginians or North Carolinians, upper south troops who were easier reinforced and supplied by their home states by operating in Virginia, rather than sending them to Georgia (of the 10 brigades in Second Corps, 3 were from Virginia, 3 were from North Carolina, 2 were from Georgia, & 1 each from Alabama & Louisiana).
A better choice would have been Kershaw's Division. Major General Joseph Kershaw's Division numbered 4582 officers & men PFD at the end of July (O.R. Volume 40 Part 3 pg. 761) and was made up entirely of brigades hailing from the deep south (2 from Georgia, 1 from South Carolina, & 1 from Mississippi). These men were chosen by Lee to reinforce Early historically, and so if Lee decided to bolster Hood over Early, this would have been the troops he considered.
Second Question: How would the reinforcements reach Hood?
The railroad situation needs to be address. It is not my field of expertise, and I imagine another user will come in to In early August, before the Fourth Offensive, Lee still have control over the Weldon Railroad, which connected him to North Carolina. While it was in range of enemy interdiction and had been damaged by prior cavalry raids in May & June, it was still technically operational and could have been utilized by Kershaw to move his men. It would have been tricky, and Grant would have found out about the movement almost immediately, but it could be done.
Getting them out of Petersburg is only the first issue. The next issues is getting them through the Carolinas. I can't talk about the state of the Carolina railroads, that is not my field of expertise, but considering they weren't under immediate Union incursions, this section probably would be relatively simple for the Confederates, though frustrations would be had about rail gauges.
The third and most difficult challenge would be getting them to Hood through Georgia. The direct line to the city from the east (the Georgia Railroad, connecting to Augusta) had been cut during Sherman's First Offensive, and would not be properly rebuilt. Kershaw could still move into the city via a circuitous route ending along the Atlanta & Macon Railroad.
I would love for a railroad expert to come in and estimate how much time it would have taken for Kershaw to arrive in Atlanta given these issues. I will operate under the assumption that they leave on the 6th of August (as historically Kershaw's Division left for the Valley).
Third Question: How would Kershaw's transfer affect events in the East?
One question often ignored by those who insist that Lee send troops to Johnston or Hood or Bragg or whoever is how such a move would affect events in the East. Certainly, the argument has some weight in 1863, when Lee is facing cautious commanders like Hooker & Meade. However, Grant was a far more difficult and dangerous opponent. Lee was gambling hard by detaching troops to Early, as it weakened his front against an opponent who was doing everything to tie him down. The absence of Kershaw's troops around Petersburg could be felt at Globe Tavern, where Beauregard & Lee struggled with limited manpower on the first three days of battle, letting an opportunity to cripple the V Corps go to waste.
If Kershaw was sent to Georgia, the long distance movement would remove 4.5k infantrymen from Lee's control, and it would be difficult to impossible to rapidly return this force in case of emergency. It would be especially bad in the Shenandoah; historically, Grant sent Sheridan with two divisions of his cavalry to the valley to reinforce the VI, XIX & West Virginia Corps already there. It took until news of Kershaw's withdrawal for Sheridan to feel confident enough to go on the offensive, resulting in Opequon & Fisher's Hill. While the fall of Atlanta arguably helped push his decision along (according to Patchan, Grant & the War Department initially insisted Sheridan play it cautious to avoid another defeat like Kernstown; but with Atlanta's fall, he was given free reign to do as he pleased), it is certain that Kershaw's absence would have given Sheridan the same circumstance in which he would fight the deciding battle of the Valley Campaign. And in its aftermath, most likely a Confederate defeat (unless a few butterflies go their way), there is no way that Early would even consider going for a Cedar Creek-style battle, as that would require him to receive fresh infantry. Kershaw's Division carried most of the heavy fighting in that battle.
Lee obviously blundered historically with his mid-September decision to recall Kershaw from the valley, as there was no time for Kershaw to reach Lee before Early got pulverized. To send Kershaw to Hood would have been even more dangerous, as it would leave both Richmond-Petersburg & the Valley weak.
Question Four: How would Kershaw's Division affect the situation around Atlanta?
This is a question dependent on when Kershaw's Division arrives. It is possible his movement would encourage Sherman to make different moves than historical, but if Kershaw doesn't arrive before Sherman embarks on the Jonesborough Offensive, then I see no way that Kershaw would save Atlanta.
If he does arrive in time, Kershaw would be a large, veteran division, fresh from Richmond, and probably would be a much stronger offensive weapon than most of the divisions of the Army of Tennessee (besides Cleburne's Division). Could 4.5k Infantry have turned the tide at Jonesborough? Hard to say, likely not. It could have helped to cover the rail lines better than Hood could historically, especially with the departure of Wheeler's Corps around the same time.
I could go on, but it's getting late, and most of what I'd have to say depends on how long it'd take to transport one decent sized division across the Confederacy.
However, after a recent thread, I decided I would dive into this topic, and want to cover what I consider the most plausible scenario.
So, Lee would not have been able to send anything down to Johnston in May or most of June. Maybe in early July he could start considering such a transfer, but I'd say let's go with Early August for when he decides he could send troops. By then, he was well established on the Petersburg-Richmond Front, having repulsed Grant's Third Offensive at the Crater; meanwhile, Early had successfully turned back Hunter from Lynchburg, had threatened D.C., defeated Crook at Kernstown, and launched a cavalry raid into Pennsylvania.
It would be historically around this period that Lee would part ways with a portion of his army at Petersburg to reinforce the Valley. This force consisted of an infantry division (Joseph Kershaw's), a cavalry division (Fitzhugh Lee's) & an artillery battalion (Cutshaw's), under the command of R. H. Anderson. After an ineffectual month in the valley, Lee recalled Kershaw's Division & Cutshaw's Battalion to Richmond, which Union intelligence picked up on, resulting in the battles of Opequeon & Fisher's Hill.
So the first question is: Who does Lee send?
Many suggest that Lee send Early's Second Corps to reinforce Hood. This was postulated by Grant at the time, but I consider it unlikely, given the makeup of the force and the role Lee wanted it to play. While small, Early's Corps, reinforced by Wharton's Infantry Division and the valley cavalry, were able to tie down Union forces almost three times their number, allowing Lee to breathe easier around the Richmond-Petersburg Front. If Early is sent to Georgia, this would free up massive Union forces to bolster Grant around Petersburg, likely ending the siege by winter. Plus, Early's force was mostly either Virginians or North Carolinians, upper south troops who were easier reinforced and supplied by their home states by operating in Virginia, rather than sending them to Georgia (of the 10 brigades in Second Corps, 3 were from Virginia, 3 were from North Carolina, 2 were from Georgia, & 1 each from Alabama & Louisiana).
A better choice would have been Kershaw's Division. Major General Joseph Kershaw's Division numbered 4582 officers & men PFD at the end of July (O.R. Volume 40 Part 3 pg. 761) and was made up entirely of brigades hailing from the deep south (2 from Georgia, 1 from South Carolina, & 1 from Mississippi). These men were chosen by Lee to reinforce Early historically, and so if Lee decided to bolster Hood over Early, this would have been the troops he considered.
Second Question: How would the reinforcements reach Hood?
The railroad situation needs to be address. It is not my field of expertise, and I imagine another user will come in to In early August, before the Fourth Offensive, Lee still have control over the Weldon Railroad, which connected him to North Carolina. While it was in range of enemy interdiction and had been damaged by prior cavalry raids in May & June, it was still technically operational and could have been utilized by Kershaw to move his men. It would have been tricky, and Grant would have found out about the movement almost immediately, but it could be done.
Getting them out of Petersburg is only the first issue. The next issues is getting them through the Carolinas. I can't talk about the state of the Carolina railroads, that is not my field of expertise, but considering they weren't under immediate Union incursions, this section probably would be relatively simple for the Confederates, though frustrations would be had about rail gauges.
The third and most difficult challenge would be getting them to Hood through Georgia. The direct line to the city from the east (the Georgia Railroad, connecting to Augusta) had been cut during Sherman's First Offensive, and would not be properly rebuilt. Kershaw could still move into the city via a circuitous route ending along the Atlanta & Macon Railroad.
I would love for a railroad expert to come in and estimate how much time it would have taken for Kershaw to arrive in Atlanta given these issues. I will operate under the assumption that they leave on the 6th of August (as historically Kershaw's Division left for the Valley).
Third Question: How would Kershaw's transfer affect events in the East?
One question often ignored by those who insist that Lee send troops to Johnston or Hood or Bragg or whoever is how such a move would affect events in the East. Certainly, the argument has some weight in 1863, when Lee is facing cautious commanders like Hooker & Meade. However, Grant was a far more difficult and dangerous opponent. Lee was gambling hard by detaching troops to Early, as it weakened his front against an opponent who was doing everything to tie him down. The absence of Kershaw's troops around Petersburg could be felt at Globe Tavern, where Beauregard & Lee struggled with limited manpower on the first three days of battle, letting an opportunity to cripple the V Corps go to waste.
If Kershaw was sent to Georgia, the long distance movement would remove 4.5k infantrymen from Lee's control, and it would be difficult to impossible to rapidly return this force in case of emergency. It would be especially bad in the Shenandoah; historically, Grant sent Sheridan with two divisions of his cavalry to the valley to reinforce the VI, XIX & West Virginia Corps already there. It took until news of Kershaw's withdrawal for Sheridan to feel confident enough to go on the offensive, resulting in Opequon & Fisher's Hill. While the fall of Atlanta arguably helped push his decision along (according to Patchan, Grant & the War Department initially insisted Sheridan play it cautious to avoid another defeat like Kernstown; but with Atlanta's fall, he was given free reign to do as he pleased), it is certain that Kershaw's absence would have given Sheridan the same circumstance in which he would fight the deciding battle of the Valley Campaign. And in its aftermath, most likely a Confederate defeat (unless a few butterflies go their way), there is no way that Early would even consider going for a Cedar Creek-style battle, as that would require him to receive fresh infantry. Kershaw's Division carried most of the heavy fighting in that battle.
Lee obviously blundered historically with his mid-September decision to recall Kershaw from the valley, as there was no time for Kershaw to reach Lee before Early got pulverized. To send Kershaw to Hood would have been even more dangerous, as it would leave both Richmond-Petersburg & the Valley weak.
Question Four: How would Kershaw's Division affect the situation around Atlanta?
This is a question dependent on when Kershaw's Division arrives. It is possible his movement would encourage Sherman to make different moves than historical, but if Kershaw doesn't arrive before Sherman embarks on the Jonesborough Offensive, then I see no way that Kershaw would save Atlanta.
If he does arrive in time, Kershaw would be a large, veteran division, fresh from Richmond, and probably would be a much stronger offensive weapon than most of the divisions of the Army of Tennessee (besides Cleburne's Division). Could 4.5k Infantry have turned the tide at Jonesborough? Hard to say, likely not. It could have helped to cover the rail lines better than Hood could historically, especially with the departure of Wheeler's Corps around the same time.
I could go on, but it's getting late, and most of what I'd have to say depends on how long it'd take to transport one decent sized division across the Confederacy.
Bringing the