Lee Flanks on day 2....does it matter

[mikeck]

I've always been curious about this and -until now- didn't have a place to ask it.

I think a little much has been made of Longstreets recommendation to move along the left flank of the Union line, but let's explore. I don't see how it's practical at all.

Let's assume the ANV moved around the left flank of the Union army (southern flank) and after some marching, takes up an ideal
Defensive position. The argument, as it goes, is that Meade, having the enemy army between his own army and DC would be compelled to attack. But is that true? Would he have had to?

Washington DC was heavily garrisoned at the time with around 50 forts packed full of heavy artillery as well as 10's of thousands of artillery troops and infantry waiting for deployment. If I'm Meade and Lincoln and Halleck are screaming for me to attack, I think I'm pointing out that Lee moving on DC would be suicide. He would run into the heavy federal forts and artillery which would delay him for at least a few days. Lee would be MAD to attempt a siege or even neutralization of those forts with an intact and concentrated Union Army of 90k men in his rear. He would be crushed between the forts and the army with his avenue of retreat jeapordized.

Lee could not have moved on Baltimore and the AoP would have followed and likely trapped him there.

Finally, Lee could not afford to wait in such a defensive position. The AoP could draw supplies and reinforcements unfettered from Harrisonburg. Meanwhile, the confederate line of supply was stretched. Add in a confident and powerful Union cavalry, Lee would be getting weaker as Meade got stronger.

So am I correct? Was a flanking move unrealistic and an attack the only option?
I don't see how a flanking March works so long as Lincoln recognizes Lee's precarious position and doesn't demand an attack.

 

[Scott Bowden]

Lee was too good a soldier to have undertaken such a move. I discuss and analyze this option in great detail in my Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0306812614/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

 

[redbob]

Lee's right flank was "in the air" on the second and third days to the point that when Wilcox's Alabama Brigade advanced during the Pickett-Pettigrew-Trimble assault on the third day, they were receiving fire from the front, side and rear as they advanced. With their shorter interior lines and superior number of reserves, the Union could have moved laterally to counter any Confederate moves on either flank.

 

[WJC]

I am not so sure that Longstreet thought about any move on Baltimore or Washington. I believe he saw the move as a way to capture the Federal supply train which was lightly guarded, secure that ground between Meade and Washington and win the battle there and then.

 

[Hussar Yeomanry]

It also assumes Meade does nothing. Sits there and allows it to happen.

However this is unlikely for on Day 2 he has Butterfield (his Chief of Staff) issue (preliminary) instructions to at least contemplate/ make preparations for withdrawing to a line based on the Plum Run (a very short distance behind the position he was currently holding) should it become necessary. [These were later used against him by Butterfield to make it look like Meade didnt think he could hold at Gettysburg and was therefore being unecesarily defeatist]

This should not be confused with his similarly sounding Pipe Creek circular that was issued a couple of days before the battle and was where before events got in the way he was thinking the battle would (or at least might) be fought.

EDIT: More info can be found here if required https://civilwartalk.com/threads/ge...-a-hypothesis-about-the-retreat-order.144081/

 

[tony_gunter]

The best results I have when gaming Gettysburg is to shift the Confederate army the other direction to Wolf Hill.

<shrug/>

Either way, you gain a path to Taneytown, and the federal army simply withdraws down the Baltimore Pike. Not sure what you've really gained at this point except for some free shoes and stories for the grandkids.

 

[E_just_E]

Let's assume the ANV moved around the left flank of the Union army (southern flank) and after some marching, takes up an ideal
Defensive position. .

The issue with this is the terrain. It is all downhill from the BRT (Union L Flank) till way after the Mason Dixon line.

The best nearby defensive position was due west by Cashtown on the mountain there, and Lee had an open road there.

 

[mikeck]

I am not so sure that Longstreet thought about any move on Baltimore or Washington. I believe he saw the move as a way to capture the Federal supply train which was lightly guarded, secure that ground between Meade and Washington and win the battle there and then.

Well I guess that's kind of my point. By moving around the south and setting up southeast of the AOP between it and DC, would that have ACTUALLY compelled Meade to attack? I would think not

 

[WJC]

Well I guess that's kind of my point. By moving around the south and setting up southeast of the AOP between it and DC, would that have ACTUALLY compelled Meade to attack? I would think not

Thanks for your response.
What, then do you think Meade would have done?

 

[mikeck]

I guess I can narrow the question down. Let's assume that Lee DOES successfully move around the left of the AoP and occupies a position of strength between the AoP and Washington...ignoring whether or not he could have...assume he did.

Does Meade- in fact- HAVE to attack? I don't think he does.

If I remember, this is the fact pattern of Gingrich's "Grant Comes East" series of alternate history.

I guess my question is more directed to those who claim that had Lee listened to Longstreet and moved around south of the AoP, Meade would have had to attack the ANV and the battle would have likely been a confederate victory.

I'm curious if my theory is correct: that Lee
Could have done nothing to threaten the Union in such a position and in fact, would have withered on the vine while Meade gained strength

 

[mikeck]

Thanks for your response.
What, then do you think Meade would have done?

I think- absent a direct order from Halleck or Lincoln, Meade attempts to work his way around the southern (left) flank of Lee's army so as to cut off its supply line. His cavalry was in a position to do some damage. He need not
Sever it Completely, but even partial restrictions would I allow Meade to gain strength while Lee loses or, or best case, stays the same.

Eventually, when astride Lee's line of supply for some time, Meade might attack. I can't see him committing to a frontal assault but depending on Terrain, attempting to move around the southern Flank of Lee completely and either rolling him up or simply holding that position until Lee's army dissipates. If Lee attempts to move north, the AoP is concentrate and can strike at his rear

I'm NOT an expert at this however so I'm generally interested in what others think

Like i said before, this is the plot for the alternate history "Grant Comes East". In that book though, the author stays faithful to the "established truth" that simply because Lee was between the AoP and Washington, Meade would be compelled to attack

 

[E_just_E]

I think- absent a direct order from Halleck or Lincoln, Meade attempts to work his way around the southern (left) flank of Lee's army so as to cut off its supply line. His cavalry was in a position to do some damage. He need not
Sever it Completely, but even partial restrictions would I allow Meade to gain strength while Lee loses or, or best case, stays the same.

Eventually, when astride Lee's line of supply for some time, Meade might attack. I can't see him committing to a frontal assault but depending on Terrain, attempting to move around the southern Flank of Lee completely and either rolling him up or simply holding that position until Lee's army dissipates. If Lee attempts to move north, the AoP is concentrate and can strike at his rear

I'm NOT an expert at this however so I'm generally interested in what others think

Like i said before, this is the plot for the alternate history "Grant Comes East". In that book though, the author stays faithful to the "established truth" that simply because Lee was between the AoP and Washington, Meade would be compelled to attack

Speaking of supplies, the other issue with Lee moving SE and taking a defensive position at (let's say) Pipe Creek, is that his supply train was all the way to Chambersburg, west and on the other side of South Mountain from Gettysburg, and would have taken a good 3 days to be reunited with it, if Union Cavalry did not get to it first, of course...

 

[Sorah_45thVA]

I'm of the believe that Lee saw Gettysburg as a high water mark, of course he would be far from defeated after this but I think he got his blood up and had a feeling that it was now or never.

 

[mikeck]

Lee very well may have. Personally, I believe that Lee rejected a flanking move (if Longstreet really did recommmed a flanking move) for the reasons I stated AND, strategic considerations. I think Lee KNEW that things were getting to a point where they could not win. He needed to not only score a victory but actually DESTROY the AoP; like Thomas did to Hood at Franklin/Nashville ...or at least scatter it like after first Manassas

It's very difficult to destroy an army by attacking on the flank. You can "roll them up" but the routed troops will move past the troops holding position and rally. If the army retreats, it has an open route in the direction opposite of the flanking axis. So here, hitting Meade in the flank might send the AoP retreating to Harrisonburg.

Envelopment won't work due to the terrain and size of the armies in relation to one another.

No....Like Marlborough at Blenheim or Napoleon and Austerlitz, the best way to destroy an army (although Marlborough didn't really destroy it...but rendered it ineffective for a long time) is to attack in the middle, break it and move in behind forcing each half routing in opposite directions.

Maybe that was Lee's thinking. The Flanks had been reinforced and he felt he had an opportunity to destroy the AoP by cutting it in half.

Either way, besides retreat, I don't see how Lee has any option by early AM on the 2nd day except to attack Meade where he was

 

[mikeck]

Anyway, my first post and I appreciate the discussion and opinions.

 

[WJC]

Anyway, my first post and I appreciate the discussion and opinions.

You 'did good'! Thanks!

 

[WJC]

It's very difficult to destroy an army by attacking on the flank.

I don't know that Longstreet's 'plan' intended that. I get the distinct impression that he saw an opportunity to capture Meade's supply trains and place the rebel army in a defensive position on what he thought was 'good ground' southeast of Gettysburg and make Meade try to attack them.

 

[WJC]

I'm of the believe that Lee saw Gettysburg as a high water mark, of course he would be far from defeated after this but I think he got his blood up and had a feeling that it was now or never.

In one of our earlier threads (during the past year), we discussed Lee's thinking at this point in the war. Some suggested that Lee knew 'it was over'. I don't recall the thread: perhaps someone else remembers.
I agree that Lee seems to have been determined to fight on Day 3 come what may. I also believe that we put far more significance on the defeat at Gettysburg than most rebels did then. We see it as 'the high watermark', they saw it as just another battle.

 

[infomanpa]

Well I guess that's kind of my point. By moving around the south and setting up southeast of the AOP between it and DC, would that have ACTUALLY compelled Meade to attack? I would think not

Because of their fears, I'm thinking that the Lincoln/Halleck team would have ordered Meade to attack, regardless of what he thought.

 

[mikeck]

Because of their fears, I'm thinking that the Lincoln/Halleck team would have ordered Meade to attack, regardless of what he thought.

You may be right. Grant had to completely alter his original plan of moving amphibiously to North Carolina and forcing Lee to move south; Lincoln feared leaving Washington uncovered.

Heck, they were Leary about allowing Grant to clear out the garrisons to bolster his army...the fear that Early's attack was designed to play on. Both armies were anchored to their capitals like a backyard dog tied to a tree

Very possibly Meade's rational assessment that the ANV was no threat to DC false on Halleck's deaf ears