Last Staff Ride: Developing Lee's Right Flank

[EHParks]

Last March my elderly father suffered an accidental fall and died after several weeks following surgery. In reflecting on his life over the past year I began to realize what an influence he was on my love of history. My mother taught me how to read, my father showed me what to read - he especially loved biography, travel and military history.

He was a retired Vietnam veteran and graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff course at Fort Leavenworth which is where I first heard the term "staff ride" as a freshman in Junior High. Prior to this school assignment we had lived for three years in Northern Virginia, just between Occoquan and Manassas Junction in the then burgeoning suburbs of D.C. During those three years many weekends and summer vacations included trips to various historic places and of course, all the D.C. monuments and museums. Of those trips Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Harpers Ferry, and of course Gettysburg stand out in my memories most vividly.

My dad (what he preferred) was a lifelong participant in Scouting. Eagle Scout at age 14, Order of the Arrow member and later a Scoutmaster as a young Lt. in west Germany when I was a toddler. He assisted in all of our over nights, including several in the Shenandoah's and summer camps at Goshen Scout Camps on Lake Meriwether (donated to BSA by Marjorie Meriwether Post). One of those trips was a bicycle tour of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal trail from the upper falls all the way into Georgetown. Those visits, and hikes, along with living in the Tidewater area with its scrub tree woods and then still rural creeks and ravines have given me a lifelong appreciation for the lands and people that inhabited that area as the war raged over them.

Long story longer, I ended up here on CWT just out of general interest that thoughts about my dad had rekindled, such as standing in awe of Devil's Den and the Bloody Lane. And, after a lifetime of reading about military history (my earliest memory of this is copies at our home of the famous "Greenbook" U.S. Army history series (most of which are now digitized and online) on the Battle of the Bulge I began to read the various posts here about Captain Samuel R. Johnston and Longstreet's actions and movements on day one and two of Gettysburg with a series eye towards framing those events in a practical way, hence the term "staff ride" in its historical sense, instruction in warfare at the immediate level hopefully to be applied later.

Thanks for bearing with me this long, I hope this doesn't sound overly pompous, I'm not a military member or historian, but I think I have some insights to share in some following posts - including notes and documents referenced casually here - that can clarify some of the curious historical discrepancies in primary sources and later interpretations relating specifically to Lee, Longstreet and the right flank at Gettysburg. Unfortunately I was both sick and without my main computer and programs the last couple of weeks so I missed Allan Thompson and Phil Musket's online talks because I know they and the people hear will no doubt have great information to add to anything I miss or get wrong. Having access to my server back means I can complete some promised graphics illustrating various points and concepts of those days.

I have grown to love the old style book convention of paragraph headings before chapters so I may just post replies to myself here (health permitting) with titles like In Which I take Issue with Ranger Harman* - "By Some Blunder" Alexander and Pendleton - "Two Counter Marches" Confederate Veteran magazine etc.

Next: Part One - David McCullough on writing history - L'adduce, l'adduce, toujours l'adduce! - Route Marches and Approach Marches for Longstreet's Corps Day One and Two.

 

[EHParks]

Next: Part One - David McCullough on writing history - L'adduce, l'adduce, toujours l'adduce! - Route Marches and Approach Marches for Longstreet's Corps Day One and Two.

David McCullough expressed three thoughts in one of his speeches about writing history: Biography of a Year 1776

1) Read what they (the subjects) read.

2) Go to the places they went.

3) Share all your questions about your writings far and wide - you will be amazed at who and where information will come from and the answers you get to questions you never thought to ask.

To continue my reflections about my dad, on my ninth birthday he took a carload of my friends and me to see the movie Patton (from which I got the above butchered quote De l'audace...),

...audacity, more audacity, and ever more audacity probably best describes General Robert E. Lee's mindset during his campaign in Pennsylvania as he waged classic Napoleonic strategy and tactics on the North sending multiple columns of his army on divergent routes before concentrating his forces in a battleground of his own choosing, defeating bigger foes in detail. (notes on modern description of the quality of audacity in military science and modern troop movement doctrines from two PDF's where the concepts are discussed in full should be added here when I can find them later).

Lastly (for now), my main focus and question as some of you know has been on accurately placing Lee's forces in relation to the movements up to the launch of the attacks on day two, July 2nd, specifically how those forces arrived at the ongoing battle and how they were deployed subsequently. I'm not at all interested in the "Lost Cause" controversies, this is less "what-if" and more "why-if" in regards to basic facts such as the verified report from the signalmen and staff on Little Round Top sent at 1:30 p.m. noting the movement of "10,000 troops" moving from west to east observed in the Hagerstown/Fairfield/ Herr Ridge road area.

Round Top Mountain Signal Station
July 2, 1863.

Capt. Hall:

Saw a column of the enemy's infantry move into woods on ridge, three miles west of the town, near the Millerstown road. Wagon teams, parked in open field beyond the ridge, moved to the rear behind woods. See wagons moving up and down on the Chambersburg pike, at Spangler's. Think the enemy occupies the range of hills three miles west of the town in considerable force.​

Norton, M.
Taylor, M.
Signal Officers
[P.S.]-This is a good point for observation.​

Round Top Mountain Signal Station,
July 2, 1863, 1.30 P.M.

Gen. Butterfield:

A heavy column of enemy's infantry, about ten thousand, is moving from opposite our extreme left toward our right.​

HALL,
Officer, Signal Capt.​

Round Top Mountain Signal Station,
July 2, 1863, 2.10 P.M.

Gen. Butterfield:

Those troops were passing on a by-road from Dr. Hall's House to Herr's tavern, on the Chambersburg pike. A train of ambulances is following them.​

​

[O.R., XXVII, Part III, p. 488.]

 

[Scott Brown]

David McCullough expressed three thoughts in one of his speeches about writing history: Biography of a Year 1776

1) Read what they (the subjects) read.

2) Go to the places they went.

3) Share all your questions about your writings far and wide - you will be amazed at who and where information will come from and the answers you get to questions you never thought to ask.

To continue my reflections about my dad, on my ninth birthday he took a carload of my friends and me to see the movie Patton (from which I got the above butchered quote De l'audace...),

...audacity, more audacity, and ever more audacity probably best describes General Robert E. Lee's mindset during his campaign in Pennsylvania as he waged classic Napoleonic strategy and tactics on the North sending multiple columns of his army on divergent routes before concentrating his forces in a battleground of his own choosing, defeating bigger foes in detail. (notes on modern description of the quality of audacity in military science and modern troop movement doctrines from two PDF's where the concepts are discussed in full should be added here when I can find them later).

Lastly (for now), my main focus and question as some of you know has been on accurately placing Lee's forces in relation to the movements up to the launch of the attacks on day two, July 2nd, specifically how those forces arrived at the ongoing battle and how they were deployed subsequently. I'm not at all interested in the "Lost Cause" controversies, this is less "what-if" and more "why-if" in regards to basic facts such as the verified report from the signalmen and staff on Little Round Top sent at 1:30 p.m. noting the movement of "10,000 troops" moving from west to east observed in the Hagerstown/Fairfield/ Herr Ridge road area.

Can you wait three months?

 

[CowCavalry]

Last March my elderly father suffered an accidental fall and died after several weeks following surgery. In reflecting on his life over the past year I began to realize what an influence he was on my love of history. My mother taught me how to read, my father showed me what to read - he especially loved biography, travel and military history.

He was a retired Vietnam veteran and graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff course at Fort Leavenworth which is where I first heard the term "staff ride" as a freshman in Junior High. Prior to this school assignment we had lived for three years in Northern Virginia, just between Occoquan and Manassas Junction in the then burgeoning suburbs of D.C. During those three years many weekends and summer vacations included trips to various historic places and of course, all the D.C. monuments and museums. Of those trips Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg, Harpers Ferry, and of course Gettysburg stand out in my memories most vividly.

My dad (what he preferred) was a lifelong participant in Scouting. Eagle Scout at age 14, Order of the Arrow member and later a Scoutmaster as a young Lt. in west Germany when I was a toddler. He assisted in all of our over nights, including several in the Shenandoah's and summer camps at Goshen Scout Camps on Lake Meriwether (donated to BSA by Marjorie Meriwether Post). One of those trips was a bicycle tour of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal trail from the upper falls all the way into Georgetown. Those visits, and hikes, along with living in the Tidewater area with its scrub tree woods and then still rural creeks and ravines have given me a lifelong appreciation for the lands and people that inhabited that area as the war raged over them.

Long story longer, I ended up here on CWT just out of general interest that thoughts about my dad had rekindled, such as standing in awe of Devil's Den and the Bloody Lane. And, after a lifetime of reading about military history (my earliest memory of this is copies at our home of the famous "Greenbook" U.S. Army history series (most of which are now digitized and online) on the Battle of the Bulge I began to read the various posts here about Captain Samuel R. Johnston and Longstreet's actions and movements on day one and two of Gettysburg with a series eye towards framing those events in a practical way, hence the term "staff ride" in its historical sense, instruction in warfare at the immediate level hopefully to be applied later.

Thanks for bearing with me this long, I hope this doesn't sound overly pompous, I'm not a military member or historian, but I think I have some insights to share in some following posts - including notes and documents referenced casually here - that can clarify some of the curious historical discrepancies in primary sources and later interpretations relating specifically to Lee, Longstreet and the right flank at Gettysburg. Unfortunately I was both sick and without my main computer and programs the last couple of weeks so I missed Allan Thompson and Phil Musket's online talks because I know they and the people hear will no doubt have great information to add to anything I miss or get wrong. Having access to my server back means I can complete some promised graphics illustrating various points and concepts of those days.

I have grown to love the old style book convention of paragraph headings before chapters so I may just post replies to myself here (health permitting) with titles like In Which I take Issue with Ranger Harman* - "By Some Blunder" Alexander and Pendleton - "Two Counter Marches" Confederate Veteran magazine etc.

Next: Part One - David McCullough on writing history - L'adduce, l'adduce, toujours l'adduce! - Route Marches and Approach Marches for Longstreet's Corps Day One and Two.

Your dad sounds like he was a fine man. You can be proud and sounds like you are.

 

[EHParks]

David McCullough expressed three thoughts in one of his speeches about writing history: Biography of a Year 1776

1) Read what they (the subjects) read.

2) Go to the places they went.

3) Share all your questions about your writings far and wide - you will be amazed at who and where information will come from and the answers you get to questions you never thought to ask.

To continue my reflections about my dad, on my ninth birthday he took a carload of my friends and me to see the movie Patton (from which I got the above butchered quote De l'audace...),

...audacity, more audacity, and ever more audacity probably best describes General Robert E. Lee's mindset during his campaign in Pennsylvania as he waged classic Napoleonic strategy and tactics on the North sending multiple columns of his army on divergent routes before concentrating his forces in a battleground of his own choosing, defeating bigger foes in detail. (notes on modern description of the quality of audacity in military science and modern troop movement doctrines from two PDF's where the concepts are discussed in full should be added here when I can find them later).

Lastly (for now), my main focus and question as some of you know has been on accurately placing Lee's forces in relation to the movements up to the launch of the attacks on day two, July 2nd, specifically how those forces arrived at the ongoing battle and how they were deployed subsequently. I'm not at all interested in the "Lost Cause" controversies, this is less "what-if" and more "why-if" in regards to basic facts such as the verified report from the signalmen and staff on Little Round Top sent at 1:30 p.m. noting the movement of "10,000 troops" moving from west to east observed in the Hagerstown/Fairfield/ Herr Ridge road area.

The following maps help illustrate what I'm seeking to show, namely that period maps and primary recollections from Longstreet, Johnston, McLaws, Kershaw, Hood and others describe their forced route marches as having ended with their troops at rest, with stacked arms from approximately 8:00 a.m or so, as being within "musket shot" of Lee's H.Q. (at least the tents), with some, if not most east of Willoughby's Run initially and only later nearer 10:00 a.m. or more likely 11:00 a.m. when they began their movements to what modern military science would call staging or "jump-off" points - where they began the actual approach movements to behind Seminary Ridge where the attack will start. I believe, and want to show that some of what I thought were discrepancies related to the famous counter-march (or "By some blunder..." that E.P. Alexander will recollect later) diminish when you look at the situation as being two (if not three) separate stages of movement over the terrain above the Fairfield road and the controversial effects of the Black Horse Tavern road route as opposed to the concealed route along Willoughby's Run and the two Pitzer farms and their respective lanes. *note after I had seriously started to consider this I ran across an article from what I believe was in an online issue of Confederate Veteran I stumbled across which I think was entitled "Two Counter-Marches". I couldn't find it again for my notes, so I broke down and ordered all the past issues (including 18 out-of-copyright books) on a CD and will search when it gets here.

First image shows the terrain elevations of the area, Dr. E. Hall's house (referred to in the Signal Corps message as being visible) where it sits near the junction of Old Mill road and Herr Ridge Road between the Adam Butts farm and the Black Horse Tavern. Keeping in mind the site lines from Little Round Top at the approximate elevation of 440 - 480 feet (including Bream's Hill as it extends just over the Fairfield road) what isn't readily apparent is that just as you cross over W.R. on the Fairfield Road bridge and go up the road west you are exposed just as you crest the small hill where presumably Willoughby Road begins. So there is actually a fairly limited space in the declivity just below Herr Ridge that isn't visible to Union observation.

The second and third images are a close up, and then an extended view of the battlefield using Batchelder's isometric map for visual reference to the terrain, with emphasis on the aforementioned Dr. Hall's house, the bridge over W.R. and the paths and fields south of the Fairfield road.

Now to the crux of my speculation about that march, specifically as it relates to Longstreet, Johnston and McLaws and the "blunder" (as if any single action in the fog and friction of war caused this one delay and route approach error). I believe that when Captain Johnston was ordered by Robert E. Lee to assist Longstreet it was not as a guide (as Johnston insisted) but with an eye to helping Longstreet and Alexander place troops and artillery at the far end of Lee's left, in part because General Pendleton was unreliable in some things and Lee was first and foremost an Engineering officer and he implicitly trusted both Johnston and Alexander to carry that task out. (More later on Pendleton's primary report filed sixty days after the battle)

This is what I think developed that morning, after Lee sets the attack in motion (11:00 a.m or so) Longstreet is riding with Johnston as his units near his H.Q. are ordered to move into place from the woods behind Seminary Ridge when the initial head of the columns reach the bridge over Willoughby's Run* Johnston recognizes from his earlier reconnaissance that to cross over and up the road will expose them and tells Longstreet this, then where Johnston "turned left and you (McLaws) turned right", the men were marched along the road to and up Old Mill Road, either after crossing the bridge or marching to the nearby ford. They would have then moved into position where most modern maps have them located along Herr Ridge road adjacent and behind the Black Horse Tavern where they wait again until ordered to march behind Bream's and down the road descending from the tavern. We know what occurs here, but no one seems to be able to explain why this one tiny stretch of Black Horse road wasn't properly reconnoitered, or, maybe wasn't even readily apparent to those who did recon the area that morning, I count at least five separate references to different examinations of that ground, yet no one realizes the problem until actually arriving there.

I believe it wasn't recognized because it was never intended to be part of the approach march and the most serious blunder occurs when they turn right, and not left, onto the "ravine road" well hidden from observation according to Pendleton. Johnston was probably unaware of the problem because I think it very likely he and his patrol traveled first two mile down the road "through our pickets" down Willoughby's Run and then down Marsh Creek as far as the Eisenhower property where a creek bed runs south-southeast to the Emmitsburg road at the very southern end of the eventual line established later (and fortified on July 3rd). Pendleton will describe almost the exact same route he will take returning from his reported recon that morning.

 

[EHParks]

Can you wait three months?

I thought about it...no guarantee I can even complete these posts today BTW, I am pretty sure the bridge on the Fairfield Raod depicted here is our "missing bridge". I plan at least one more post with all of the primary source quotes I have, many from transcriptions I did of your wonderful Johnston letters here to show my over all thought process.

 

[EHParks]

David McCullough expressed three thoughts in one of his speeches about writing history: Biography of a Year 1776

1) Read what they (the subjects) read.

2) Go to the places they went.

3) Share all your questions about your writings far and wide - you will be amazed at who and where information will come from and the answers you get to questions you never thought to ask.

To continue my reflections about my dad, on my ninth birthday he took a carload of my friends and me to see the movie Patton (from which I got the above butchered quote De l'audace...),

...audacity, more audacity, and ever more audacity probably best describes General Robert E. Lee's mindset during his campaign in Pennsylvania as he waged classic Napoleonic strategy and tactics on the North sending multiple columns of his army on divergent routes before concentrating his forces in a battleground of his own choosing, defeating bigger foes in detail. (notes on modern description of the quality of audacity in military science and modern troop movement doctrines from two PDF's where the concepts are discussed in full should be added here when I can find them later).

Lastly (for now), my main focus and question as some of you know has been on accurately placing Lee's forces in relation to the movements up to the launch of the attacks on day two, July 2nd, specifically how those forces arrived at the ongoing battle and how they were deployed subsequently. I'm not at all interested in the "Lost Cause" controversies, this is less "what-if" and more "why-if" in regards to basic facts such as the verified report from the signalmen and staff on Little Round Top sent at 1:30 p.m. noting the movement of "10,000 troops" moving from west to east observed in the Hagerstown/Fairfield/ Herr Ridge road area.

Some of the main primary sources used excerpted:

Johnston to McLaws, June 27th 1892

General L. McLaws.

My dear General:-

Your letter of the 8th of June forwarded to me by Mr. Baylor, did not reach me until the 14th. It had been incorrectly addressed. I have been absent until now, or I would have written before this.

You have asked that I give my recollection of the events of the 2d of July. I do not mean to be a party to controversy with anyone, certainly not with General Longstreet, who always treated me with so much kindness and consideration when we were thrown together during the terrible struggle which received its death blow at Gettysburg, therefore I will confine myself to answering your questions as nearly as I can, avoiding comment.

My rank at the time of the battle of Gettysburg was that of Captain of Engineers; I was on the staff of the General commanding.

I bivouaced (sic) at Headquarters on the night of July 1st.

About daybreak on the morning of the 2nd, General Lee called me and said he wanted me to reconnoiter along the enemy's left and return as soon as possible; he said nothing about finding a route over which troops should be moved unobserved by the enemy, but it was not necessary as that was my duty as a reconnoitering Officer, and would be attended to without special instructions; indeed he said nothing about the movements of troops at all, and left me only with the knowledge of what he wanted which I had obtained after long service with him, and that he wanted me to consider every contingency, which might arise...

...It was about 4 a.m. when I started out, my general route was about the same that General Longstreet took when he made his march.

I crossed the creek on the same bridge he did and turned to the left at once and got onto the ridge where you subsequently formed your line.

... I recrossed the bridge and took the most direct route regardless of fences, to where I had left General Lee.

There was the usual delay in finding headquarters. I found General Lee sitting on a fallen tree near the Seminary in the same position no doubt you left him.

The General said that he wanted me to join General Longstreet.

No other instructions whatever were given me. I fully understood that to mean that I was to [copy offset to page blank] with General Longstreet to aid him in any way that I could. I am not sure, but think it must have been 9 a.m. when I joined General Longstreet. We did not move off promptly, nor was our march all that rapid. It did not strike me that General Longstreet was in a hurry to get into position. It might have been he thought hurrying was unnecessary.

We marched under cover of the ridge and woods until we got to the Fairfield Road; your column turned t(o?) the right to follow this road, and without being asked I told General Longstreet that you would disclose your movements to the enemy.

My Dear Bishop (George Peterkin):-

I have read an article by Perry on the battle of Gettysburgh(sic). In that article quotations are made from an address delivered by General Pendleton in which General Pendleton said: "That he, accompanied by General Long, Colonel Walker [Reuben Lindsay Walker Third Corps Artillery], and Captain Johnston made reconnaissance on our right on the second of July, and that later Colonel [Proctor - penciled in on m.s.] Smith and Captain Johnston completed the reconnaissance, and that he knew that the reconnaissance looked to an engagement on our right."

...He (Lee) said to General Longstreet I think you had better move on.

General Longstreet started off, I took a seat on the log beside Gen'l Lee, and sketched on the map that he was holding the topography of the line over which I had reconnoitered.

The General then said to me I want you to ride with General Longstreet.

General McLaws in a letter to me says: "I found Gen'l Lee sitting on a log near the seminary and said to him as I am to make the fight on the right, I think I had better make the reconnaissance. General Lee replied that Captain Johnston who is now making the reconnaissance was soon return.

I have said that I found Gen'l Lee sitting on a log near the seminary.

As I started from headquarters at 4 A.M. o the morning of the 2nd and did not return until about 7:00 A.M., and then joined General Longstreet and remained with him till the battle of the second day was over it is very evident I did not make a reconnaissance with Gen'l Pendleton on the second...

Johnston to Fitz Lee Feb. 16th 1878

Gen'l Fitzhugh Lee

My dear Gen'l

Your letter of the 14th inst. Has just been received. I purposely avoided fixing the time of day in my letter to you of 12th inst. Because I did not have a watch at that time and any notice that I took of the tine would be too unreliable to be of any use to you, and amid the excitement and anxieties of such an occasion one forms but a very incorrect idea of the passage of time. I will however give you a few thoughts that may help you by comparing them with what others have written.

I left Hd Qr about sunrise - say 4 o'clock - I had to ride about (4) miles.

More than half of this distance was covered by our pickets.

The remainder required a good deal of caution.

I could not have been absent more than three hours.

The Generals suspended their conversation to hear my report.

It was probably 8 o'clock when the conference closed - and an hour later when I joined the the head of Longstreet's Corps then about three miles from the Round Top by the route he had to march.

I cannot say where Gen. Longstreet's troops were at the time I made my report. My impression is that they were on the slope near Head Qr. If I am correct, they were about four miles from the position for attack taken by Gen. L.

I am confident that the reconnaissance that Maj. Clarke and myself made was the first one made on the enemy's left.

The one referred to by Gen. Pendleton & Long and myself. This was made with a view to selecting a position for Gen. Pendleton's artillery to cover Gen. Hill's right against a flank movement. It did not extend farther than three quarters of a mile from the Chambersburg Pike.

 

[EHParks]

Some of the main primary sources used excerpted:

General Pendleton's O.R.:

From the farthest occupied point on the right and front, in company with Colonels [A. L.] Long and Walker and Captain [S. R.] Johnston (engineer), soon after sunrise. I surveyed the enemy's position toward some estimate of the ground and the best mode of attack.

So far as judgment could be formed from such a view, assault on the enemy's left by our extreme right might succeed, should the mountain there offer no insuperable obstacle.

To attack on that side, if practicable, I understood to be the purpose of the commanding general.


Returning from this position more to the right and rear, for the sake of tracing more exactly the mode of approach, I proceeded some distance along the ravine road noticed the previous evening, and was made aware of having entered the enemy's lines by meeting two armed dismounted cavalrymen. Apparently surprised, they immediately surrendered, and were disarmed and sent to the rear with two of the three members of my staff present.

Having satisfied myself of the course and character of this road, I returned to an elevated point on the Fairfield road, which furnished a very extensive view, and dispatched messengers to General Longstreet and the commanding general.

Between this point and the Emmitsburg(sic) road, the enemy's cavalry were seen in considerable force, and, moving up along that road toward the enemy's main position, bodies of infantry and artillery, accompanied by their trains. This front was, after some time, examined by Colonel [William P.] Smith and Captain Johnston (engineers), and about midday General Longstreet arrived and viewed the ground.

A few more sources later when I find them...

 

[Reconstructed Rebel]

Great maps- I haven't seen them before

 

[Scott Brown]

I thought about it...no guarantee I can even complete these posts today BTW, I am pretty sure the bridge on the Fairfield Raod depicted here is our "missing bridge". I plan at least one more post with all of the primary source quotes I have, many from transcriptions I did of your wonderful Johnston letters here to show my over all thought process.

@EHParks , I think you are going to find @AThompson's research and findings quite interesting!