Lack of Will?

[JerryD]

Reading an interesting little book published in 1937 called "The Collapse of the Confederacy". One thing that makes it interesting is that it's the earliest work I have read from an African American on the war. The author was Charles H. Wesley, who was the third African American to receive a PHD from Harvard and was a pioneer in the area of Black Studies.

His premise was was that despite what he called the popular perception that the South were all united and fought valiantly against overwhelming numbers and resources and only lost after being totally conquered, the truth was that the southern people became despondent and lost the will to fight. He starts off from the premise that almost every war for independence involved a smaller, poorer force fighting against a larger, more powerful one, and that the one true indicator of success in these fights were the will of the people to continue the fight despite all setbacks. This was certainly the message Jefferson Davis was communicating to the very end, and was the prevailing wisdom in Great Britain at the beginning of the war. The thought of subjugating three million people and an area as broad as the CSA seemed impossible to people in 1861. Its also consistent with the modern formulation that national power equals military force multiplied by will. If there is no will, there is no national power despite how powerful the military force is, and if the will is indominable, then national power is almost unlimited.

Wesley documents through newspaper articles, correspondence, diaries and other sources that war enthusiasm in the south was high in the first two years, but as the CSA started to face adversity and suffered more and more defeats, the morale of the people turned, so that by the end of 1863 there was a notable sense of defeatism in the South that grew and became more prominent throughout 1864, and in the last six months of the war support for continuing the war all but collapsed.

Of note to me at least, is he identifies that two thirds of the free population did not own slaves and comprised a disproportionate percentage of the CSA rank and file. While many in this class fought valiantly to the end and supported the war to the very end, many in this class did not support the war and the grumbling of "rich man's war and poor man's fight" caused this class to desert in ever growing numbers as the war wore on.

What I found particularly interesting about the book is that this is the earliest book I have read that starts to dispute some of the Lost Cause mythology of the war, and it was written by an African American. While he certainly acknowledges the valor and honor of many who fought for the CSA and he does not spend any effort in moralizing about the evils of slavery, I suspect that due to being an African American in the 1930's he was not blinded to what was really going on in this war, so was able to bring a more critical eye to this subject.

 

[archieclement]

If their was no will and the south was a cowed people, the lost cause originated and was perpetuated by the north?

I would think repeated defeats in a conventional war will indeed lead to less support for a conventional war. But the expression "The north won the war, but lost the peace" would suggest to me the south still had a will.

 

[jackt62]

His premise was was that despite what he called the popular perception that the South were all united and fought valiantly against overwhelming numbers and resources and only lost after being totally conquered, the truth was that the southern people became despondent and lost the will to figh

Whether the southern population lost the will to fight or not is an enduring question. Gary Gallagher in his book "The Confederate War" draws the opposite conclusion. That the people continued the struggle as long as they did because they never lost the will to fight for their cause. I have read opinions on both sides of the question about the "will to fight" and it is possible to find evidence that would support either side of this issue. It is easy to find examples of southern disillusionment, such as high desertion rates, bread riots, and opposition to conscription and impressment but then again, reading accounts of rank-and-file soldiers in the major Confederate armies also shows an uncanny devotion to carry on the struggle until the bitter end.

 

[JerryD]

If their was no will and the south was a cowed people, the lost cause originated and was perpetuated by the north?

I would think repeated defeats in a conventional war will indeed lead to less support for a conventional war. But the expression "The north won the war, but lost the peace" would suggest to me the south still had a will.

I think you are talking about two totally different things. The author is speaking of the will to fight and put their lives and property on the line. The Lost Cause was perpetuated by people armed with pens and were trying to fumigate what they did and why they did it so that future generations would not look down on them. They certainly were not putting their lives at risk. They succeeded mainly due to northern willingness to accept their narrative in the name of national reconciliation. It was a face saving effort, and the North didn't want to further humiliate them.

 

[JerryD]

Whether the southern population lost the will to fight or not is an enduring question. Gary Gallagher in his book "The Confederate War" draws the opposite conclusion. That the people continued the struggle as long as they did because they never lost the will to fight for their cause. I have read opinions on both sides of the question about the "will to fight" and it is possible to find evidence that would support either side of this issue. It is easy to find examples of southern disillusionment, such as high desertion rates, bread riots, and opposition to conscription and impressment but then again, reading accounts of rank-and-file soldiers in the major Confederate armies also shows an uncanny devotion to carry on the struggle until the bitter end.

This is one of those questions that can never be finally resolved and will be endlessly debated. We didnt have scientific polling back in the 1860's so we will never know what the prevailing view was of the people. I think the closest we can get is that there clearly was a growing sense of defeatism as the war wore on, but whether it ever became the prevailing mood or not is anyone's guess. My own sense is that while many diehards were loyal to the bitter end (and beyond), the size of the armies and the numbers of deserters is evidence enough that by the end of the war the majority of the people thought defeat was unavoidable and had no appetite to continue the war in the face of what they felt was certain defeat.

 

[jackt62]

If anyones will broke, it was the North's who grew tired of trying to maintain reconstruction. The north also rather had a problem with desertion during the war in 200,000 deserting, if one suggests it's tied to national will.

Ironically, while both sides counted on diminishing their opponent's will to fight, it was definitely southern strategy (or maybe more accurate to say RE Lee's strategy), to attain southern independence by destroying the northern will to carry on the war. That almost happened, particularly in the summer of 1864.

 

[jackt62]

I think the closest we can get is that there clearly was a growing sense of defeatism as the war wore on, but whether it ever became the prevailing mood or not is anyone's guess

Northern morale was probably affected more so by battlefield victory or defeat than was southern morale. The southern cause sustained a long, slow move towards battlefield setbacks, interspersed by the inspiring victories achieved by Lee in the one-year period starting June 1862. Moreover, much of the southland was ground zero for the fighting armies, with direct impact on the southern public. But despite the fact of battlefield defeats, and the worsening situation for civilians (including Sherman's March), southern willpower seemed strong throughout. In contrast, northern opinion fluctuated from the highs achieved after Gettysburg and Vicksburg, to despondency during the Overland Campaign. The Confederacy was counting on this swing in northern opinion to sway it during the downcycle in the direction of obtaining a negotiated peace. It also helped the Confederate cause that a strong opposition to the war existed in the northern "peace" wing of the Democratic party.

 

[JerryD]

I always find it odd noting their "will" or views is neither vindicating or condemning them, but simply acknowledging the actual realities of the period.

If the north thought the south's "will" was broken, they seem to have been mistaken postwar.

At the risk of repeating myself, you are referring to a totally different will.

 

[archieclement]

At the risk of repeating myself, you are referring to a totally different will.

Not if one believed the war was over slavery and civil rights as many insist...........those would be directly tied to will then.

If the war was solely over independence, the will for it perhaps was, but as I said war is an extension of politics. Ending a war doesn't change political views. They were democrat before, and still democrat afterwards. One can certainly view the war as just over independence though

 

[Bruce Allardice]

Every losing, invaded side in a war loses some of its will to continue.
Compared to other 19th century nations getting defeated in a war, the Confederacy lost its will slower than most others. For example, the French surrendered in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 after less than a year.
One must compare the Confederacy's performance to that of other countries, not to some imagined perfection.

 

[JerryD]

Every losing, invaded side in a war loses some of its will to continue.
Compared to other 19th century nations getting defeated in a war, the Confederacy lost its will slower than most others. For example, the French surrendered in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 after less than a year.
One must compare the Confederacy's performance to that of other countries, not to some imagined perfection.

No doubt the resistance the CSA put off, starting from scratch, and seeing how close they came, was phenomenal. That is a large part of what makes the study of the war so fascinating.

 

[Philip Leigh]

Reading an interesting little book published in 1937 called "The Collapse of the Confederacy". One thing that makes it interesting is that it's the earliest work I have read from an African American on the war. The author was Charles H. Wesley, who was the third African American to receive a PHD from Harvard and was a pioneer in the area of Black Studies.

His premise was was that despite what he called the popular perception that the South were all united and fought valiantly against overwhelming numbers and resources and only lost after being totally conquered, the truth was that the southern people became despondent and lost the will to fight.

Attempting to demean the Confederate soldier's determination and fighting qualities, newer "historians" have jumped on the bandwagon. Among them is Adam Domby, as documented in this interview. He gleefully ridicules Confederate statues as "participation trophies," arguing the Confederacy should have been able to hold out longer than "only four years." Others like him make the point by comparing the length of the American Revolutionary War, at eight-and-a-half years, to the "short" four years for the Civil War. The point they miss, however, is the much higher casualty rate among Confederate soldiers as compared to Revolutionary War soldiers.

Soldier deaths during the Revolutionary War totaled 25,000, which was 1% of the population. In contrast, at least 300,000 Confederate soldiers died during the Civil War, which was about 5% of the available white population. That means the Confederate death ratio was five times the rate of the Revolutionary War in half the time. Thus, the Confederacy was sustaining annual per capita death rates at ten times those of America's Revolutionary War. Such casualties were unsustainable. If America were to engage in a war today and endure proportional losses, the number of dead soldiers would total nearly 17 million (5% of 330 million).

 

[Belfoured]

Attempting to demean the Confederate soldier's determination and fighting qualities, newer "historians" have jumped on the bandwagon. Among them is Adam Domby, as documented in this interview. He gleefully ridicules Confederate statues as "participation trophies," arguing the Confederacy should have been able to hold out longer than "only four years." Others like him make the point by comparing the length of the American Revolutionary War, at eight-and-a-half years, to the "short" four years for the Civil War. The point they miss, however, is the much higher casualty rate among Confederate soldiers as compared to Revolutionary War soldiers.

Soldier deaths during the Revolutionary War totaled 25,000, which was 1% of the population. In contrast, at least 300,000 Confederate soldiers died during the Civil War, which was about 5% of the available white population. That means the Confederate death ratio was five times the rate of the Revolutionary War in half the time. Thus, the Confederacy was sustaining annual per capita death rates at ten times those of America's Revolutionary War. Such casualties were unsustainable. If America were to engage in a war today and endure proportional losses, the number of dead soldiers would total nearly 17 million (5% of 330 million).

Soldiers in all wars participate with varying levels of commitment and their own trigger point for deciding when it's time to "pull out". In the US, this became even more complicated starting with the Civil War, when both sides had to resort to one degree or another to conscription. Casualty rates are a factor, but so are things like whether those casualty rates are yielding victories or defeats, what is happening on the individual's "home front", etc etc.

 

[jackt62]

Others like him make the point by comparing the length of the American Revolutionary War, at eight-and-a-half years, to the "short" four years for the Civil War.

That's one comparison that I've not run across, and probably because it's comparing apples to oranges. I for one, do not see any legitimate relationship between the varying length of the 2 conflicts, not least of which is that the Revolution was characterized by long periods of low-level inactivity, which tended to lengthen the conflict. And unlike the CW in which both combatants were aroused to high levels of passion and commitment to their respective causes, the British Crown did not have the same amount of "skin in the game" that would have led it to devote more and greater resources to achieving its goals.

 

[JeffFromSyracuse]

That's one comparison that I've not run across, and probably because it's comparing apples to oranges. I for one, do not see any legitimate relationship between the varying length of the 2 conflicts, not least of which is that the Revolution was characterized by long periods of low-level inactivity, which tended to lengthen the conflict. And unlike the CW in which both combatants were aroused to high levels of passion and commitment to their respective causes, the British Crown did not have the same amount of "skin in the game" that would have led it to devote more and greater resources to achieving its goals.

There's also the issue that one side of the Revolutionary War had a two month round trip to ask a question, let alone send reinforcements.

 

[Lubliner]

In my opinion the will to succeed in the fight was not overcome but by the loss of the fight. When the troops were deprived of adequate rest, proper food and care, and enough inventory to continue the fight, and being completely overrun this spirit of depression, loss, frustration, intimidation, etc. all of these feelings ended the war. When the useless effusion of blood and annihilation is eminent, there is nothing but vanity to die for. I am happy the south was not vain.
Lubliner.

 

[Belfoured]

Marvell

There's also the issue that one side of the Revolutionary War had a two month round trip to ask a question, let alone send reinforcements.

Not to mention significantly different "enlistment" methods for the two primary combatants, one of which was mostly "professional" while the other was entirely volunteer. The only thing resembling a genuine "conscription" factor was with the German troops, and their desertions were despite "low casualty rates".

 

[USS ALASKA]

University of Tennessee, Knoxville
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange
Chancellor's Honors Program Projects
Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative Work
Spring 5-2001

The Role of Confederate Nationalism and Popular Will in the Outcome of the Civil War
Brad H. Buchanan
University of Tennessee-Knoxville

This is brought to you for free and open access by the Supervised Undergraduate Student Research and Creative Work at TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chancellor's Honors Program Projects by an authorized administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Abstract
This project is a review essay focusing on the role of Confederate nationalism in the outcome of the American Civil War. A historical review essay's purpose is to focus on a theme by reviewing several books that touch upon that theme. The books are reviewed in turn, placed in context, and compared and contrasted before the author makes his or her own conclusions about the theme of the books and the essay.

I have read five books dealing with the underlying reasons for the Confederacy's defeat, with a special focus on nationalism and the will to fight. These books include:
• After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of Confederate Nationalism by Paul D. Escott, which argues that Confederate nationalism was crippled by economic disparity and Jefferson Davis's inability to meet the needs of the common people of the South.
• The Confederate War by Gary W. Gallagher. This book contends that the Southern people displayed remarkable will and fortitude and were simply defeated on the battlefield.
• Why the South Lost the Civil War by Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William N. Still, Jr., which identifies weak nationalism as the "proximate cause" of defeat.
• Why the Confederacy Lost, a collection of essays edited by Gabor S. Boritt that focuses on the military aspect of the war and the contingent nature of events.
• Behind the Lines of the Southern Confederacy by Charles W. Ramsdell. This study emphasizes economic difficulties and their effect on Confederate society.

Having read and analyzed the arguments set forth by these authors; I have come to the conclusion that an inadequate sense of Confederate nationalism was indeed the deciding factor in the war. Although this was the direct cause, it is also important to acknowledge the role of the Union in sapping Confederate will and making the war more costly than they were willing to endure. Federal military success and political maneuvering made the Confederate war goals (independence and the preservation of slavery) seem less valuable and the cost to achieve them seem too high. It was the weakness of Confederate nationalism, however, that made it possible for the Union war effort to reach the level of success that it did. A lack of distinction from the Union, religious doubts, and moral questions about slavery created a weak sense of nationalism among Confederates, which made it all the easier for their will to fight to be eroded. The lack of commitment by the majority of the people to the idea of a Southern nation created an attitude of acceptance toward reconstruction. If defeat is acceptable, then the will to continue fighting is undermined. This is what happened to the Confederacy and is the principal reason for its defeat.

https://trace.tennessee.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1451&context=utk_chanhonoproj

Cheers,
USS ALASKA