Jefferson Davis and Atlanta.

[Musket Man]

This question may have been discussed at one time and I apologize if it has.

At what point during Shermans march through Georgia did Davis know he was going to loose Atlanta? In my opinion, he had to realize that he just didn't have the resources to defeat Sherman. By the time he replaced Johnston with Hood, it seemed to be the beginning of the end.

Do you guys/gals think if he had replaced Johnston earlier that the outcome would have been differently? Just from what I've read it seems the Union had a lot of momentum going right out of the gate. I've heard some people say that Hood would have been more agressive than Johnston and could have possibly slowed or stopped Sherman.

Thanks
Donald

 

[nitrofd]

This question may have been discussed at one time and I apologize if it has.

At what point during Shermans march through Georgia did Davis know he was going to loose Atlanta? In my opinion, he had to realize that he just didn't have the resources to defeat Sherman. By the time he replaced Johnston with Hood, it seemed to be the beginning of the end.

Do you guys/gals think if he had replaced Johnston earlier that the outcome would have been differently? Just from what I've read it seems the Union had a lot of momentum going right out of the gate. I've heard some people say that Hood would have been more agressive than Johnston and could have possibly slowed or stopped Sherman.

Thanks
Donald

If he had replaced Johnston before Rocky Face Ridge things mat have been different but it still would have been a matter of time.

 

[highplainsdrifter59]

Davis was keeping his hopes high up until the end. The hope was to hold on long enough to force Lincoln into not winning his re-election and the new regime bringing a peace accord to the table that would keep the Confederacy as a new nation.

Militarily wise, there was no big hope in keeping Sherman from taking Atlanta, time would have permitted it to happen with the overwhelming odds of manpower, artillery, supplies and such.

I do agree with the earlier poster that after Rocky Face, the continued falling back of Johnston wasn't in the best interest of checking Sherman's advance. The north Georgia mountain ranges were the hopeful equalizer in the troop size difference Johnston faced. I may not really point to Rocky Face as the end all but it sure was the beginning of it.

The ax to me fell after the Kennesaw/New Hope line was vacated. This would put us around the first few days of July 1864. The open area and now Sherman back on the W&A rail line to supply his army, it was over!

 

[Jamieva]

Davis at least publicly and in his writings was always very slow and reluctant to see what we all know was obvious now. He thought they would lose Atlanta at the moment Hood left town.

I think Atlanta would have falled even quicker if Hood was in command earlier. he would've had bigger fights leading into Atlanta and either been driven off or his army thoroughly defeated leaving Sherman with a leisurely stroll into Atlanta.

 

[trice]

This will be a bit different than most responses. I actually think that the Confederacy had a good chance of holding Atlanta against Sherman's advance, but failed to take the steps needed to take advantage of their chance.

It seems obvious to many today that Atlanta would inevitably fall. It was not at all obvious to professional soldiers here and in Europe in 1864. When the Civil War was over, a new British textbook declared that nothing new had been discovered in the American war -- Sherman engaged in a long correspondence to convince the author (leading British military historian and teacher of the day) that Atlanta demonstrated several new ideas in warfare -- successfully, because the revised 2nd edition acknowledged that Sherman was right.

Before 1864, no example existed of supporting an army on such a campaign over hundreds of miles on a single LOC. No comparable example of the use of a RR existed at the time (the French mobilization via RR for the war in Italy in 1859 can be used as an example of a fiasco). The USMRR organization, the Sherman's strategic use of that capability, and his masterful system of protecting his LOC from the Confederates are what enables the campaign to Atlanta. The Prussians, facing the same logistical challenge and led by an early RR investor in Helmuth von Moltke, adopted the USMRR organization wholesale as they ramped up for the Austro Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars.

In the military wisdom of the day, the long advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta through the mountainous, rough, scantily-inhabited countryside looked daunting, filled with opportunities for counter-attacks and roadblocks. How would you supply the advancing army? How keep it up-to-strength?

I believe the real problem was Confederate leadership. With Jackson dead, J. E. Johnston was surely the 2nd best Confederate general; the problem is that he was not good enough to stop Sherman (and probably not Thomas if he had commanded). Lee might have been good enough to hold Atlanta, maybe even to smash the advance in the hills -- but that would put Johnston in Virginia against Grant, and I don't think Johnston could stop Grant as well as Lee did.

I think the real problem is well defined in what is now an old book: Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History by Richard McMurry. The AoT had good men and leaders in it, but the ANV had more better trained ones. The ANV was better organized, better drilled, better fed and supported, better disciplined. The artillery was better equipped. Most important of all, the high command of the ANV functioned as a unit (with Longstreet's I Corps the premier example of a corps-level organization in the Confederacy). The AoT command structure was filled with a back-biting, fractious, dis-functional group that defeated itself often during the war. Lee might have been able to reshape it in time (but then Lee had shaped the ANV by shipping the commanders he didn't want to other parts back in 1862).

Joe Johnston was, I think, the wrong man. He was skilled enough, knowledgeable enough, intelligent, courageous and disciplined enough. He could do everything needed -- but somehow he never got it all sorted out and did what he needed at the right time. He seemed to always be waiting for the perfect moment that never came.

Behind him, there were few good choices and many bad ones. Hardee seems doubtful, Polk looks bad, Hood demonstrated his shortcomings, Cheatham not enough, S. D. Lee too bloody-and-small-minded. Cleburne was too junior and needed some time with a Corps to prove out. Taylor might have been the man, but he was off in Louisiana and would have needed time to establish himself.

Johnston did his job and did it well, handled his troops in some difficult spots, was unflappable in a crisis -- and got driven back a hundred miles without staging a real fight. He was passive when he should have been aggressive, always seeming to fight hard and then fall back again. There is no sign he really had a plan (or at least no sign he shared it with anyone) other than doing something in the moment, sometime vaguely defined that never came.

Johnston, I think, was the perfect man for Sherman to face. Sherman was tentative and generally bad on the tactical offensive. Johnston's efforts gave Sherman time to survive some mistakes, let him off easily when he was in a bad spot, let Sherman call the tune and dictate the pace. Johnston reacted to Sherman,moved as Sherman moved, fell back when he might have thrust. Sherman gained confidence as he moved forward, and his troops gained confidence in him as he moved the ball forward time after time.

IMHO, the Confederates needed a different approach. Their forces probably should have been in 4 corps, not 3. That would allow them to use 3 with the main force and the 4th to threaten Sherman's flanks/LOC as he moved south. It also would have allow them to develop another commander at the Corps level (spot for Cleburne?).

Sherman's entire campaign depended on that RR LOC, first back to Chattanooga (almost entirely a single RR track), then back to Nashville (2 RRs through Franklin and Murfreesboro), Nashville back to the North (3 RR/river routes). The Confederates wanted to strike that LOC, but Johnston wanted somebody else to do it and never struck at it himself. Sherman devoted large resources into protecting his LOC (in particular sending expedition after expedition to keep Forrest far away). Break that LOC and keep it broken for a few days and Sherman would have ground to a halt; shut it down for a week or more and Sherman would be retreating.

IMHO, the Confederacy needed someone like Stonewall Jackson (he had his faults too, I just think he would have been more aggressive and the type Sherman could not get comfortable with). What is needed above Atlanta is the same sort of turning moments and strikes against the Union seen in Virginia with Lee-Jackson-Longstreet-Stuart in 1862-64. Johnston did nothing like that, and that is the real problem with his campaign.

 

[novushomus]

I believe the real problem was Confederate leadership. With Jackson dead, J. E. Johnston was surely the 2nd best Confederate general; the problem is that he was not good enough to stop Sherman (and probably not Thomas if he had commanded). Lee might have been good enough to hold Atlanta, maybe even to smash the advance in the hills -- but that would put Johnston in Virginia against Grant, and I don't think Johnston could stop Grant as well as Lee did.

I think the real problem is well defined in what is now an old book: Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History by Richard McMurry. The AoT had good men and leaders in it, but the ANV had more better trained ones. The ANV was better organized, better drilled, better fed and supported, better disciplined. The artillery was better equipped. Most important of all, the high command of the ANV functioned as a unit (with Longstreet's I Corps the premier example of a corps-level organization in the Confederacy). The AoT command structure was filled with a back-biting, fractious, dis-functional group that defeated itself often during the war. Lee might have been able to reshape it in time (but then Lee had shaped the ANV by shipping the commanders he didn't want to other parts back in 1862).

Joe Johnston was, I think, the wrong man. He was skilled enough, knowledgeable enough, intelligent, courageous and disciplined enough. He could do everything needed -- but somehow he never got it all sorted out and did what he needed at the right time. He seemed to always be waiting for the perfect moment that never came.

Behind him, there were few good choices and many bad ones. Hardee seems doubtful, Polk looks bad, Hood demonstrated his shortcomings, Cheatham not enough, S. D. Lee too bloody-and-small-minded. Cleburne was too junior and needed some time with a Corps to prove out. Taylor might have been the man, but he was off in Louisiana and would have needed time to establish himself.

Taylor was actually in route to Mississippi when the Atlanta Campaign began. In the aftermath of the Red River Campaign, Taylor was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned command of the Department of Mississippi, Alabama, and East Louisiana. Taylor's move stopped the crisis in command west of the Trans-Mississippi (with Taylor feuding with Kirby Smith and criticizing him openly) and also solved the vacancy created by the assignment of Polk's corps to the Army of Tennessee (which meant that Polk, the Department's nominal commander, would not be present).

When Hood was promoted to command the army, Bragg recommended Taylor as a permanent replacement for Hood's corps and then when Hardee balked at being passed over by the junior Hood, Bragg also recommended that Taylor and Hardee swap places. That would be an interesting what-if, given Hardee's recalcitrant performance under Hood. It would also place Taylor in Cheatham's place at Spring Hill, but that is for another thread.

I don't know how Taylor would have done with an army command. He was junior to both Hardee and Hood, so I am not sure that promotion would have gone over well. It would also have meant that he little experience before becoming an army commander. In Louisiana, Taylor commanded essentially a small field army against Commissary Banks. Managing the Army of Tennessee against Sherman and Thomas would be another matter.

IMHO, the Confederates needed a different approach. Their forces probably should have been in 4 corps, not 3. That would allow them to use 3 with the main force and the 4th to threaten Sherman's flanks/LOC as he moved south. It also would have allow them to develop another commander at the Corps level (spot for Cleburne?).

Where would the troops for a fourth corps come from? At Dalton, Johnston wanted a third corps (with Lovell or Whiting in command) but only had seven infantry divisions on hand and had to split them with four with Hardee and three with Hindman/Hood. Polk's Army of Mississippi gave him three more infantry divisions that became Stewart's corps (the most capable of the Confederate corps commanders in the Army of Tennessee).

A fourth corps means that either troops are transferred from other departments or the army's modestly sized existing corps are thinned out to create the troops for a new one.

There is also the question you raise of corps leadership. Loring, Cheatham, and French were senior to Cleburne and unless Johnston could get a promotion through Confederate Congress, that corps would most likely go to Cheatham (an aside, when Hood was promoted, Hardee recommended that Cheatham take Hood's old corps, over Cleburne). I'm also not sure if Cleburne would have been a good corps commander. He had one performance at Jonesboro which was not exactly stellar.

If Johnston had created a fourth corps, it would probably would have gone to:

1. Stewart, Johnston's first choice within the Army of Tennessee and his pick that ended up replacing Polk. Johnston considered Stewart the only division commander in the Army of Tennessee capable of a corps.
2. Cheatham, Hardee's pick for a corps command. Also one of the most senior major generals within the army only behind Loring.
3. Richard Ewell, as Johnston requested him if Davis would not approve Stewart.
4. Mansfield Lovell, unlikely as his association with the fall of New Orleans clouded his career, but he was floating around, a senior major general, and available.
5. W.H.C. Whiting. Would not have passed Davis's muster most likely as Whiting had been a key critic of Davis's army reforms. Whiting was also junior as a major general and had not seen major combat since the Seven Days Battles.

If a fourth corps had been created under Hood, it would have probably gone to the following:
1. Cheatham
2. Taylor
3. Cleburne
4. Lovell

Hood had requested both Longstreet or Wade Hampton III for his old corps. Stewart's promotion and transfer left him with Stevenson as the only experienced commander in the corps. Hood did not trust or get along with Stevenson and so requested these men specifically. Longstreet (if he would even serve under a former junior) was still recovering from his Wilderness wounds and with Stuart's death Lee needed Hampton then more than ever. Bragg recommended Taylor, but Richmond settled on S.D. Lee.

Sherman's entire campaign depended on that RR LOC, first back to Chattanooga (almost entirely a single RR track), then back to Nashville (2 RRs through Franklin and Murfreesboro), Nashville back to the North (3 RR/river routes). The Confederates wanted to strike that LOC, but Johnston wanted somebody else to do it and never struck at it himself. Sherman devoted large resources into protecting his LOC (in particular sending expedition after expedition to keep Forrest far away). Break that LOC and keep it broken for a few days and Sherman would have ground to a halt; shut it down for a week or more and Sherman would be retreating.

Hood launched a raid in the latter days of Atlanta with the railroad to Chattanooga in mind. However, it was too little and under Wheeler's leadership, entirely inadequate. Johnston did not think a raid were possible

 

[trice]

Hood launched a raid in the latter days of Atlanta with the railroad to Chattanooga in mind. However, it was too little and under Wheeler's leadership, entirely inadequate. Johnston did not think a raid were possible

Yes, Hood did -- and like most Hood operations it was poorly planned and managed. The man had a great eye for terrain and a talent for making troops move -- but he was a disaster when it came to consistency and operational command. Good strategic vision to some extent, and an excellent tactical commander, but in the essential operational middle-area he was very deficient.

Wheeler was worse -- he rarely or never did well if allowed to stray more than 24 hours away from a higher HQ. His commands tended to melt away under his hand, his horses to break down from the deadly combination of lack of care and hard use. Personally brave, a loyal comrade and a hard fighter, Wheeler had horrible judgement as an independent commander and needed to be strongly controlled by his superior. He was a horrible choice to lead a deep-penetration cavalry raid, and the difference between the results he and Forrest would have in the coming weeks raiding against the same Union forces guarding Sherman's LOC.

Johnston thought the raiding of Sherman's LOC was very worthwhile, indeed almost essential to his campaign, and he constantly called for Forrest and others to be sent to do it. Johnston just was unwilling to use his own forces to do the raiding.

 

[trice]

Taylor was actually in route to Mississippi when the Atlanta Campaign began. In the aftermath of the Red River Campaign, Taylor was promoted to Lieutenant General and assigned command of the Department of Mississippi, Alabama, and East Louisiana. Taylor's move stopped the crisis in command west of the Trans-Mississippi (with Taylor feuding with Kirby Smith and criticizing him openly) and also solved the vacancy created by the assignment of Polk's corps to the Army of Tennessee (which meant that Polk, the Department's nominal commander, would not be present).

Taylor was coming too late for what would be needed, IMHO. He was west of the Mississippi until a month after the Red River Campaign ended. When he came east and assumed Polk's old command, he was really replacing S. D. Lee who was being called to Atlanta to replace the recently killed Polk (June 14, 1864) in command of his Corps.

When Hood was promoted to command the army, Bragg recommended Taylor as a permanent replacement for Hood's corps and then when Hardee balked at being passed over by the junior Hood, Bragg also recommended that Taylor and Hardee swap places. That would be an interesting what-if, given Hardee's recalcitrant performance under Hood. It would also place Taylor in Cheatham's place at Spring Hill, but that is for another thread.

Bragg, of course, had come to Atlanta to get even. He was a man who held grudges. He conspired with Hood to get rid of Johnston, and he had an ax sharpened for Hardee if he could use it.

I don't know how Taylor would have done with an army command. He was junior to both Hardee and Hood, so I am not sure that promotion would have gone over well. It would also have meant that he little experience before becoming an army commander. In Louisiana, Taylor commanded essentially an small field army against Commissary Banks. Managing the Army of Tennessee against Sherman and Thomas would be another matter.

Taylor had shown well in the 1862 Valley Campaign before heading West. In 1863, he built up his forces from nothing and was successful in a number of small battles (such as Fort Bisland and Irish Bend). Banks Army was too big for him to stop as it went to Port Hudson, Part of the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Vicksburg from the West, he then raided all the way to the outskirts of New Orleans, where he learned Port Hudson had fallen and withdrew. In 1864, Taylor commanded against heavy odds in the Red River Campaign. After Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, he pursued and threatened to destroy Banks' entire force.

At that point, around May of 1864, you can easily argue that Taylor is the most successful and experienced independent commander the Confederacy has outside of Robert E. Lee and a purely cavalry commanders (Forrest). He has more successful experience in independent command than Hood or Hardee or any of the other men considered for corps command in the AoT.

He also had a good pedigree (Zachary Taylor, his Dad) and good connections (Jefferson Davis 1st wife was Taylor's sister and Braxton Bragg knew him well from Mexico, Louisiana and the early operations at Pensacola). Stonewall Jackson and Dick Ewell spoke glowingly of Taylor's knowledge of the military profession and history.

Hood had, essentially, no independent command experience before he replaced J. E. Johnston in July 1864 and was only about six months senior to Taylor. Hardee had some, but really Taylor had more. Hardee did serve under Hood (who was given a temporary promotion, never confirmed, to deal with the situation). The same could have been done for Taylor.

Taylor did have problems with rheumatoid arthritis that might have flared up. That's what sent him home from Mexico in 1846 when he was with his Dad, and it struck him again in 1862 when he went to Louisiana. He'd been OK afterwards.

Taylor did well everywhere he went in the ACW. Hood clearly was beyond his skills and scope as commander of an army, presiding over the destruction of the AoT and a series of defeats (the battles around Atlanta, the loss of that crucial city, losing contact with Sherman, and the fiascos at Spring Hill, Franklin and Nashville.) As with any what-if, we have no way of knowing what would have actually happened if Taylor was in command. I'd just guess he would have done better than Hood.

 

[trice]

Where would the troops for a fourth corps come from? At Dalton, Johnston wanted a third corps (with Lovell or Whiting in command) but only had seven infantry divisions on hand and had to split them with four with Hardee and three with Hindman/Hood. Polk's Army of Mississippi gave him three more infantry divisions that became Stewart's corps (the most capable of the Confederate corps commanders in the Army of Tennessee).
A four corps means that either troops are transferred from other departments or the army's modestly sized existing corps are thinned out to create the troops for a new one.

No more troops needed, just a reorganization, It might have been done in a variety of ways and the units might have changed. The Corps had no need to be that size.

What I am aiming at is creating a combined-arms force of about 10-12,000 men to be used independently of the main army for the Confederacy. Such a force can maneuver against Sherman's flank and rear the way Jackson, Ewell, and Early used the Shenandoah to strike against the Union rear in Virginia. Sherman will have to detach strong forces to deal with them -- which means either from his thrust against Atlanta or from the effort to control Forrest back in Mississippi.

The main AOT would be a little weaker, but it would not matter much if Sherman has to detach 10,000 or so men to go after the 4th Confederate Corps. Cavalry alone rarely did any lasting damage to a RR (unless Forest was in command); a full corps under a good commander could keep the RR closed unless forced off by heavy forces, and Sherman could not survive without the RR in north GA.

There is also the question you raise of corps leadership. Loring, Cheatham, and French were senior to Cleburne and unless Johnston could get a promotion through Confederate Congress, that corps would most likely go to Cheatham (an aside, when Hood was promoted, Hardee recommended that Cheatham take Hood's old corps, over Cleburne). I'm also not sure if Cleburne would have been a good corps commander. He had one performance at Jonesboro which was not exactly stellar.

It is hard to find any corps commander in the 1864 AoT who looks particularly good. At Jonesboro, the Rebels were so outnumbered that it is close to a miracle they were not completely destroyed. Sherman's failings and mono-focus on the RR are the major reason's they were not.

Cleburne was a good candidate to be moved up; Hardee thought he needed more experience first when asked. One of the real problems in the AoT was a shortage of people who look like they are up to Corps command with almost none looking like they can think on their feet the way the commander of an independent small force needs to be.

If Johnston had created a fourth corps, it would probably would have gone to:

1. Stewart, Johnston's first choice within the Army of Tennessee and his pick that ended up replacing Polk. Johnston considered Stewart the only division commander in the Army of Tennessee capable of a corps.
2. Cheatham, Hardee's pick for a corps command. Also one of the most senior major generals within the army only behind Loring.
3. Richard Ewell, as Johnston requested him if Davis would not approve Stewart.
4. Mansfield Lovell, unlikely as his association with the fall of New Orleans clouded his career, but he was floating around, a senior major general, and available.

5. W.H.C. Whiting. Would not have passed Davis's muster most likely as Whiting had been a key critic of Davis's army reforms. Whiting was also junior as a major general and had not seen major combat since the Seven Days Battles.

Cheatham, Ewell and Whiting I can't see commanding a force like I think this should be.

Stewart is someone that I don't know about. Maybe, given the chance, he would have shown well in independent command.

Lovell might have had the ability, but his career was burned by the disaster in New Orleans and he was probably politically untouchable in "the South".

If a fourth corps had been created under Hood, it would have probably gone to the following:
1. Cheatham
2. Taylor
3. Cleburne
4. Lovell

Hood had requested both Longstreet or Wade Hampton III for his old corps. Stewart's promotion and transfer left him with Stevenson as the only experienced commander in the corps. Hood did not trust or get along with Stevenson and so requested these men specifically. Longstreet (if he would even serve under a former junior) was still recovering from his Wilderness wounds and with Stuart's death Lee needed Hampton then more than ever. Bragg recommended Taylor, but Richmond settled on S.D. Lee.

Hood's request for Longstreet and Hampton were pretty unrealistic. Lovell, as noted, was politically untouchable (not too different than Grant wanting to bring McClellan back in some ways). S. D. Lee is a general I think of as stolid. He led too many troops into meat-grinders for my taste (Tupelo, Ezra Church)

 

[novushomus]

Taylor was coming too late for what would be needed, IMHO. He was west of the Mississippi until a month after the Red River Campaign ended. When he came east and assumed Polk's old command, he was really replacing S. D. Lee who was being called to Atlanta to replace the recently killed Polk (June 14, 1864) in command of his Corps.

S.D. Lee replaced the promoted Hood, not the deceased Polk. Stewart took Polk's place in the first weeks of July and Lee arrived to take Hood's old corps on July 26.

Bragg, of course, had come to Atlanta to get even. He was a man who held grudges. He conspired with Hood to get rid of Johnston, and he had an ax sharpened for Hardee if he could use it.

Bragg had a reason of course. Davis was probably going to get rid of Johnston, and he was both repudiating Johnston as a commander and his policy of defensiveness (something which Hardee was thought to have continued).

Taylor had shown well in the 1862 Valley Campaign before heading West. In 1863, he built up his forces from nothing and was successful in a number of small battles (such as Fort Bisland and Irish Bend). Banks Army was too big for him to stop as it went to Port Hudson, Part of the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Vicksburg from the West, he then raided all the way to the outskirts of New Orleans, where he learned Port Hudson had fallen and withdrew. In 1864, Taylor commanded against heavy odds in the Red River Campaign. After Mansfield and Pleasant Hill, he pursued and threatened to destroy Banks' entire force.

Taylor organized a division (Mouton's), but the remainder of forces (Walker's division was organized in Arkansas, and Green's cavalry from Texas) came from elsewhere in the Trans-Mississippi department. As did the core of Mouton's forces (transferred from the Army of Tennessee).

He did an excellent job at Mansfield, but he was defeated at Pleasant Hill. If the depth of the Red River weren't falling (thus risking the Federal squadron supporting Banks), or if Nathanael Banks were a more aggressive Union general (or a more competent general like A.J. Smith had been in command), then Taylor's pursuit might have been checked and the Red River Campaign might have ended in a Confederate reversal or defeat.

This is not to denigrate Taylor, who was successful and was a good general, but to illustrate in my opinion that his success may not have transferred to the Army of Tennessee and its' strategic situation.

Hood had, essentially, no independent command experience before he replaced J. E. Johnston in July 1864 and was only about six months senior to Taylor. Hardee had some, but really Taylor had more. Hardee did serve under Hood (who was given a temporary promotion, never confirmed, to deal with the situation). The same could have been done for Taylor.

Hardee served under Hood, but was recalcitrant about it and resented it. He ended up threatening to resign and would wind up transferring because, in his viewpoint, the assignment of a junior over him was an insult to his honor. Some have attributed his poor performances at Peach Tree Creek and Bald Hill to this resentment. Seniority and honor were very important in the Confederate army.

Hood had been promoted to lieutenant general for Chickamauga, and had seen combat with that rank at Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, New Hope Church, and Kolb's Farm as a lieutenant general. While his tenure had been mediorce, he had experience at that rank. Hardee had even more experience, being one of the senior corps commanders in the Confederacy.

Taylor was a major general during the Red River campaign. He had just been promoted to a lieutenant generalcy to take Polk's old department. He had encountered anything that would suggest another jump to a full generalcy. That is unprecedented for the Confederate army. He had not even seen combat with his new rank to justify such a promotion.

Taylor did have problems with rheumatoid arthritis that might have flared up. That's what sent him home from Mexico in 1846 when he was with his Dad, and it struck him again in 1862 when he went to Louisiana. He'd been OK afterwards.

His arthritis however made him irritable and prone to sarcasm. Given how unpopular Bragg proved with his dyspepsia, Taylor's bouts of irritability might have caused even deeper rifts than already existed in the Army of Tennessee's command structure, especially in his openness about criticizing subordinate who did not meet his standards. Then again, if Taylor had proved capable of giving them victories, they might have been more tolerable of it than they were of Bragg's.

Taylor did well everywhere he went in the ACW. Hood clearly was beyond his skills and scope as commander of an army, presiding over the destruction of the AoT and a series of defeats (the battles around Atlanta, the loss of that crucial city, losing contact with Sherman, and the fiascos at Spring Hill, Franklin and Nashville.) As with any what-if, we have no way of knowing what would have actually happened if Taylor was in command. I'd just guess he would have done better than Hood.

I will say this. Taylor was more educated than Hood, and his military knowledge from his reading impressed old army West Pointers like Ewell. Though there does not seem to be much difference between Hood and Taylor as tacticians, Taylor was definitely superior as a operations officer and I think would have been much better at maneuver.

He might have, but then he might have not. Such is the nature of what-ifs.

 

[novushomus]

No more troops needed, just a reorganization, It might have been done in a variety of ways and the units might have changed. The Corps had no need to be that size.

What I am aiming at is creating a combined-arms force of about 10-12,000 men to be used independently of the main army for the Confederacy. Such a force can maneuver against Sherman's flank and rear the way Jackson, Ewell, and Early used the Shenandoah to strike against the Union rear in Virginia. Sherman will have to detach strong forces to deal with them -- which means either from his thrust against Atlanta or from the effort to control Forrest back in Mississippi.

The main AOT would be a little weaker, but it would not matter much if Sherman has to detach 10,000 or so men to go after the 4th Confederate Corps. Cavalry alone rarely did any lasting damage to a RR (unless Forest was in command); a full corps under a good commander could keep the RR closed unless forced off by heavy forces, and Sherman could not survive without the RR in north GA.

You could do it, but I think it would need more men. Stewart was actually given command of his own division and Bate's briefly at Rocky Face Ridge when Johnston needed three maneuver elements.

Hardee's corps began the campaign with 21,947 present for duty and Hood's corps was 21,310 present for duty.
You would have to take a division from Hardee and Hood each to avoid cannibalizing one of the corps (or otherwise completely reorganize the army, which Bragg had done to the army's detriment at Chattanooga).

So you would end up with a corps of two divisions - and as the campaign goes on, that two divisions is going to dwindle. Additionally, that corps will need more transportation, its own artillery, etc. A corps of 12,000 men does not have a lot of sustained power in combat. Additionally, the divisions of Stevenson, Walker, and Bate had pretty poor combat records. A corps made up of those divisions might not perform so well and might actually be detrimental to the army.

One of the reason's Lee was able to detach a light force with Early was, with combat had destroyed Johnson's division, bringing the Second Corps from 21,000 to 12,000 (a much smaller force) and forcing the creation of a new division (Gordon's) from Johnson's remnants and from elements of the other divisions in the corps (reducing them in size). Additionally, Early was able to get Breckinridge's division which was originally from the Valley.

It is hard to find any corps commander in the 1864 AoT who looks particularly good. At Jonesboro, the Rebels were so outnumbered that it is close to a miracle they were not completely destroyed. Sherman's failings and mono-focus on the RR are the major reason's they were not.

Stewart ends up the best of the bunch. He was an excellent tactician in a bad situation.

Cleburne was a good candidate to be moved up; Hardee thought he needed more experience first when asked. One of the real problems in the AoT was a shortage of people who look like they are up to Corps command with almost none looking like they can think on their feet the way the commander of an independent small force needs to be.

Except Cleburne did not perform well with a corps at Jonesboro. That is my one caution about it.

There were some good commanders there. Walthall was an excellent division commander whom no one talks about. He might have made a fine corps commander. The only problem is that he wasn't made a division commander until the campaign was well under way.

Cheatham, Ewell and Whiting I can't see commanding a force like I think this should be.

I don't think they should have, but those were Johnston's preferred options outside of Stewart.

Stewart is someone that I don't know about. Maybe, given the chance, he would have shown well in independent command.

He actually did pretty well with attacking Sherman's garrisons after the fall of Atlanta during Hood's maneuvers to Alabama. He was extremely tactically articulate. Of the six corps commanders who served the Army of Tennessee during the Atlanta Campaign, he has the best record.

I highly recommend this book if you are interested in reading more about him: https://www.amazon.com/dp/0807129704/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

Lovell might have had the ability, but his career was burned by the disaster in New Orleans and he was probably politically untouchable in "the South".

We are in agreement, for the most part. Lovell also did not do so well under Van Dorn at Corinth either.

 

[JeffBrooks]

There are lots of possible reasons that Cleburne was never given a corps command. He wasn't a West Pointer and Davis was hesitant about generals who weren't graduates of the academy. He was an Irish immigrant in a society where family roots were valued and the Irish were rather looked down upon. And, of course, he had authored the memorandum suggested that slaves be emancipated and enrolled in the army. This not only made him suspect, but meant that other commanders (Walker and Bate especially) would be loath to work with him.

Then we have Hardee, his superior and close friend. Did Hardee lobby for Cleburne to be promoted? Or did he quietly argue against it? If the latter, would it be because he didn't want to lose his most effective division commander or because he recognized that Cleburne's abilities might have found their fullest potential as a division commander.

Cleburne, as pointed out, didn't do especially well when briefly commanding a corps at Jonesboro. It's hard to see how anyone could have been effective in that situation, but perhaps Cleburne would have been another example of the Peter Principle and Hardee sensed this.

Maybe Cleburne would have been rather like Hood. Brilliant brigade commander, outstanding division commander, mediocre corps commander, and walking disaster as an army commander.

 

[JeffBrooks]

Joe Johnston was, I think, the wrong man. He was skilled enough, knowledgeable enough, intelligent, courageous and disciplined enough. He could do everything needed -- but somehow he never got it all sorted out and did what he needed at the right time. He seemed to always be waiting for the perfect moment that never came.

One could argue that it did come at Cassville and that Hood, or fate, botched the whole thing. But then, the buck stops with Johnston, doesn't it?

There is no sign he really had a plan (or at least no sign he shared it with anyone) other than doing something in the moment, sometime vaguely defined that never came.

This accusation is always thrown at Johnston in the context of the Atlanta Campaign. Why? Lee didn't seem to have any master plan to stop Grant, did he? The disparity in forces in both Georgia and Virginia in 1864 was such that both commanders had little choice but to respond to the actions of their opponents.

 

[Jamieva]

There are lots of possible reasons that Cleburne was never given a corps command. He wasn't a West Pointer and Davis was hesitant about generals who weren't graduates of the academy. He was an Irish immigrant in a society where family roots were valued and the Irish were rather looked down upon. And, of course, he had authored the memorandum suggested that slaves be emancipated and enrolled in the army. This not only made him suspect, but meant that other commanders (Walker and Bate especially) would be loath to work with him.

Then we have Hardee, his superior and close friend. Did Hardee lobby for Cleburne to be promoted? Or did he quietly argue against it? If the latter, would it be because he didn't want to lose his most effective division commander or because he recognized that Cleburne's abilities might have found their fullest potential as a division commander.

Cleburne, as pointed out, didn't do especially well when briefly commanding a corps at Jonesboro. It's hard to see how anyone could have been effective in that situation, but perhaps Cleburne would have been another example of the Peter Principle and Hardee sensed this.

Maybe Cleburne would have been rather like Hood. Brilliant brigade commander, outstanding division commander, meiocre corps commander, and walking disaster as an army commander.

Couldn't have been any worse than Cheatham who also did not have a West Point background

 

[JeffBrooks]

Couldn't have been any worse than Cheatham who also did not have a West Point background

Which, in my opinion, lends credit to the idea that the main obstacle to his promotion was the emancipation manifesto.

 

[Jamieva]

Which, in my opinion, lends credit to the idea that the main obstacle to his promotion was the emancipation manifesto.

Agreed

 

[novushomus]

Couldn't have been any worse than Cheatham who also did not have a West Point background

Cheatham was also senior to Cleburne and didn't require a promotion to legally command a corps. Cheatham's own record as a division commander was good, if not as stellar as Cleburne's.

 

[Shermanwasaterrorist]

First, I didn't go through all replies before my reply so, forgive me if I'm repeating any similar to same reply.
Second, I'm a diehard Southerner raised by my grandparents right in the path of Sherman's March to the Sea so, my younger days education were extremely lop sided regarding any and every thing ACW, The South, Sherman etc. just like any other truly southern born and bred person but, the rare good thing about the internet is it has provided me every avenue of research that I have fully exploited to acquire knowledge, factual and correct knowledge not available to me or us 40 years ago.
I have read all CSA OR'S and every CSA correspondence from beginning to end with a major focus on 1864 to the end of the OR'S of the conflict. I have to say I became very disappointed with the lack of coherence, slightly delusional and utter disregard of GA and SC displayed by JD there are numerous times throughout his correspondence to Bragg and Beauregard that show his Only concern was that of Richmond. His own words reflect that he truly knew everything was for naught but, so did most in the know at that time. My own interpretation of Davis' correspondence during the mid to end of '64 is that of a man looking out for number 1and nothing else. There was no attempts by him to go down with the ship nor to really listen to any of his western theater commanders. He rarely responded to legitimate requests to resupply or provide relief to the shambles of an army in the theatre. His only concern was that of Richmond. I am by no means a military strategist but, I have recently pondered if Davis had kept the CSA government in AL, GA OR MS instead of making Richmond home base how things would've fared?
P.s. I know the limitations of supplies, soldiers, ammo etc. Was wafer thin to non existent during this time. I think Davis wasn't operating at full capacity in the logic department and his own words are evidence he was by no means Presidential late war

 

[atlantis]

He knew when he appointed Johnston to command. Johnston whatever his faults was meant to be a scapegoat. Davis could not just write off Atlanta yet the appointment of Johnston a man Davis had no confidence in is telling. Requests for additional forces were turned down and without a concentration of forces Johnston's ability to counter flanking movements was limited.

 

[trice]

One could argue that it did come at Cassville and that Hood, or fate, botched the whole thing. But then, the buck stops with Johnston, doesn't it?

I do think Hood bears most responsibility for Cassville, but my point about Johnston is that he was the wrong man all along, from before the campaign started.

It is undeniable that Johnston took a battered, disgruntled and disheartend AoT from Bragg (through Hardee) and turned it around, revitalized it, and got it in shape to fight in the Spring. He did that very well. The problem was with everything else he did (or what he did not do).

Someone has to be responsible for the Snake Creek Gap fiasco. Wheeler certainly looks bad -- but Johnston doesn't seem to have done much to find out what the territory was like, to prepare his defense for a flanking move, or to make a defense in depth.

When the AoT pulled back from Rocky Face Ridge, they failed to destroy the RR tunnel (Wheeler was told to do it and didn't). But Johnston had been sitting in place there for at least 2 months: why didn't have a plan in place to take it out?

Johnston seems to have never had a real plan, found fault with other's plans and never wanted to present one of his own. His behavior is the same in Virginia in 1862 as it is in 1864 in Georgia. If a man like George Thomas had been holding the road to Atlanta for the Confederacy, Sherman would have run into prepared positions at every turn; the AoT would have fallen back into a new prepared line every time it dropped back. Unflappable in a crisis and capable of handling it on the fly, Johnston also seemed incapable of being organized and pre-planned.

Johnston's biggest flaw seems to have been that he was always waiting for the perfect moment. He didn't impose his will on the enemy; he waited for them to let him strike a sure stroke. Those moments never came.

Successful generals are not like that. They face uncertainty and the uproar of battle by making events turn their way. They act where Johnston waited. It isn't that simple; you need the talent to carry through to success -- but whatever it is, Johnston didn't have it.

That's why I say Johnston was the wrong man. I don't really think the Confederacy had the man they needed in 1864 (surely not Bragg or Hood which would leave ... Beauregard???)

This accusation is always thrown at Johnston in the context of the Atlanta Campaign. Why? Lee didn't seem to have any master plan to stop Grant, did he? The disparity in forces in both Georgia and Virginia in 1864 was such that both commanders had little choice but to respond to the actions of their opponents.

To begin with, Johnston was much closer in numbers to Sherman than Lee was to Grant.

An attacker needs a surplus of troops in much cases, because he will generally take heavier casualties and his army will bleed troops to detachments to gaurd the LOC as they advance. Grant handled that by shifting his base along the water route as he advanced, leaving himself more or less isolated from Washington at times; Sherman was stuck with a single RR and could not stray more than three days wagon haulage from it, limiting the range of his movements.

Sherman had a harder task in many ways -- yet Johnston let him maneuver the AoT into retreating time after time after time without a serious fight. Grant, with what might be called an easier task, with multiple ways to get at Lee and Richmond, with more resources to deploy, took a year to take Richmond and destroy the ANV. Sherman advanced about the same distance against Johnston/Hood, took Atlanta but blew the opportunity to destroy the AoT at Jonesborough and let them escape.

The difference comes down to Lee and the ANV and the fighting they did. Lee didn't "respond" to what Grant did -- he struck hard and tried to make the initiative his own. He succeeded in the Shenandoah and against Butler. He came close against the AoP, might have succeeded against someone other than Grant/Meade, hammered the AoP at The Wilderness at least as bad as he did Hooker at Chancellorsville. Grant and the AoP stood up to that, took the initiative and fought on -- Lee continued to fight, bled the AoP at every chance until at Cold Harbor another chance was taken away by the ANV and the AoP seemed to be done. Then Grant took one more risk, tried for one more killing stroke -- and Lee blocked him again despite Beauregard's dissembling.

Lee had much more detailed plans for dealing with Grant and was alert and watching when Grant moved, moving instantly. Johnston seems unprepared for anything other than a direct assault on Rocky Face, is surprised by a flanking move, and immediately falls back and is hustled along by Union movements time-after-time. Johnston's retreat is a mish-mash, yielding valuable territory easily, failing to destroy the RR tunnel, etc. Johnston can never find a spot to attack, rarely has a prepared position to fall into, never maneuvers to gain the initiative himself.

Left to himself, Johnston would probably have held Atlanta longer IMHO -- but would have lost it just the same, maneuvered out, probably with an AoT in batter shape. Hood was beyond his depth, seeing opportunity and trying to grab it, but never really doing what would have worked and handicapped by the fractured command mess he had helped create.

What the AoT needed was a credible force to maneuver against Sherman's LOC. That is what Lee was so successful at doing through the Shenandoah in 1862-63-64. It is what Johnston never did. Dividing the AoT into 4 smaller corps is an attempt to get to that, a detachable force of 10,000 or so of all arms under an independent, aggressive commander, and set it loose against Sherman's rear.

That force needs to be big enough to fight off decent-sized Federal attacks. It needs to stop traffic on the RR not for an hour or a day, but for a week or more. It needs to move and strike, dance away before it is crushed. It needs to be a constant threat, so that Sherman has to slow his advance and detach troops to crush that will-of-the-wisp.

I doubt the Rebels have that commander, but they needed him. That's why I mention people like Taylor (in LA) and Forrest (in MS). It is very unlikely they would have been given the post, but they look like the type that is needed. Doing what Johnston did has little chance; doing what Hood did seems to have less.