Iuka - Victory as Failure

[Nathanb1]

As I said, oozing out of one escapade into another......someone should do a book on HER.

 

[1SGDan]

The All Important Plan
With the critical information in hand Grant was eager to get started. His concept of the operation was to call Rosecrans north (minus details to provide early warning of a movement by Van Dorn) from Jacinto to cooperate with MG Edward O.C. Ord's division. Ord's men, reinforced by BG Leonard Ross' division from Bolivar, totaled around 6,000 men of all arms. They would return to Iuka via the Burnsville Road while Rosecrans, with about 9,000 troops, would march east along the railroad. Grant hoped to catch Price between these pincers and force him to relinquish the town. By his estimate he had four days to act before Van Dorn could pose any threat to the thus depleted defenses at Corinth.

Rosecrans was also eager to act but he had a plan of his own. Acting on a suggestion from BG Charles S. Hamilton, his Third Division commander, Rosecrans proposed that he avoid the unnecessary trek north and begin operations from his current location at Jacinto. He argued that an advance in this fashion would allow him to seal off the Jacinto and Fulton Roads in Price's rear. Thus denied the only real escape routes Price would be caught between the jaws of a Union vise, Ord's division attacking from the north and his forces suddenly appearing in his rear.

The plan immediately appealed to Grant who saw the great possibility of success that it offered. He was further convinced in the knowledge that Rosecrans had spent time in Iuka and was "personally familiar with the ground." He was also impressed with a map of the area that Rosecrans had drawn up that would facilitate movement. The plan was approved and everything pointed to a grand victory. Grant was so completely convinced of the validity of the plan years later while writing his memoirs he noted that he felt at the time if Price was still in Iuka when the Federal columns converged there "his annihilation was inevitable." The march to Iuka was no longer about regaining the town but about the destruction of Price's Army.


Author's Note : I may be traveling here for the next couple of days please be patient.

 

[1SGDan]

Game On
In Iuka Price was also hearing about a different plan. A courier arrived from Van Dorn announcing that he had been named overall commander in Mississippi by Jefferson Davis. He also informed Price that he had reconsidered a joint venture against Corinth and wished him to move toward unification. Although Price wanted to comply the call from Van Dorn had come too late. His cavalry had already detected the first Union movements down the Burnsville Road. BG Dabney Maury's division was pushed out to establish a line of defense. The idea of attempting a move away while under imminent threat did not appeal to Price who sent a message to Van Dorn stating that he would move as quickly as possible but was now preparing for the expected Federal assault. The wagons were loaded and all preparations made for a getaway but the first business at hand was the threat from Ord's troops on the Burnsville Road. He also strengthened the position there by adding BG Henry Little's division to extend the line. There was no thought of a threat from the rear.

Indeed the Federal forces were gathering for a strike from Burnsville. The attack was scheduled for 0430 on the 19th. Unfortunately Rosecrans plan began to unravel almost from the start. BG David Stanley's division had been led astray by a guide and did not arrive at Jacinto until 2100 on the 18th. The attack would have to be delayed. Rosecrans estimated that an early start on the 19th would have his troops in place by 1400. Grant doubted the distance (18-20 miles) could be covered in that time and began altering the plan even more. In a message to Ord Grant claims to have instructed him to attack at the first sound of guns to the south. Ord claims he did not receive the message until 1000 when he was informed of Rosecrans' delay and told "not to be too rapid with your advance this morning."*

To the south Rosecrans was doing his best to make up for lost time. The cavalry vanguard broke camp at 0430 and the infantry units were all on the road by 0600. The march was invigorated by the news of the Confederate defeat at Antietam and made excellent time. The march proceeded unabated to Barnett's Crossroad. Here the column was expected to split. Hamilton was to continue on to the Fulton Road while Stanley would turn north on the Jacinto Road. But events produced a drastic and fatal change to the original plan. The cavalry screen in that area, eight companies of the 3rd Michigan, encountered Confederate cavalry in their path. In a short skirmish the enemy was driven off but the lead elements of Hamilton's division, Col. John Sanborn's brigade, opted to stop and await orders. A messenger from the cavalry advance brought back word that the true distance between the two roads was more than five miles. Rosecrans knowledge of the area and his map makers had failed him. This was double the distance that he had considered in his plan. The extra distance would take his separate columns out of mutual support range. Doubts about his plan began to creep into his thinking and he decided to forego the advance on the Fulton Road, both divisions would move north on the Jacinto Road. They would block the side door but the back door would remain unprotected.

At 1230 two Grant staffers arrived to discuss matters with Rosecrans. One claimed to have given Rosecrans a message from Grant but Rosecrans later denied it. The one thing that was certain was that there was a complete misunderstanding about how the battle would be initiated. Ord acting on Grant's directive was to wait for the sound of guns from the south while Rosecrans told his visitors that Ord would start the battle to gain the enemy's full attention allowing him to gain a position in the rear. The ambitious plan was falling apart with each step.

*This begs the question of why if the attack was scheduled for 0430 a 1000 message found Ord still in camp. One of these two men is telling the wrong tale.

 

[1SGDan]

Battle Joined
It was not long after Rosecrans started his full strength march north up the Jacinto Road that his cavalry advance made contact with Armstrong's Confederate outriders. The time was about 1300 and they were still eight miles from their objective. The Confederate troopers were stretched extremely thin but contact with the enemy, even these small numbers, made Rosecrans' predicted 1400 arrival time even more unrealistic. The outnumbered Rebel riders were easily pushed back to the Moore house where they consolidated to form a line. Company K of the 3rd Michigan cavalry attacked but was repulsed and the fusillade of fire chasing them back nearly took down the leadership group of the division. BG Hamilton had ridden forward with members of his staff to investigate the gunfire at the head of the column. The general was barely missed but LT Schraum, commanding the escort, was brought down with a bullet in his chest. Several others were unhorsed when their mounts fell to the volley. The close call convinced Hamilton to call up his infantry. A messenger was sent to Col. John Sanborn, commander of the lead brigade, for a regiment. He detailed the lead regiment, the 5th Iowa, for the duty. The Iowans hustled to the front where they were ordered to deploy skirmishers to drive the pesky Confederate troopers away. As three companies were being shaken out for skirmishing detail two enemy messengers made a mad dash through a barrage of bullets that killed one. The other reached Price with the disturbing news of Rosecrans' approach from the south about 1430. Still expecting a major action on the Burnsville front he had little to commit to a blocking action on the Jacinto Road. His lone reserve brigade, commanded by BG Louis Hebert, set out at the double quick for the two mile march to action.

Back at the Federal column the infantry were easily handling the Confederate cavalry, driving them back to within about a mile of town. Here the played out troopers passed through the approaching column of Confederate infantry. BG Hebert stopped his men on a hill overlooking an intersection of the Jacinto Road and a connecting trail to the Fulton Road. Across the intervening ravine was the approaching Yankee infantry. Eager to dissuade them from further advance Hebert called for a section of guns from Clark's Missouri battery. The two guns were ordered into a clearing in full view and range of the enemy infantry. The attempt was short lived as the gunners were driven off before they could place their guns in battery. Failing artillery Hebert sent skirmishers from the 3rd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted) to harass the enemy and gain time for him to deploy the rest of his command. The thin line drove off the skirmishers of the 26th Missouri, who had relieved the exhausted men of the 5th Iowa. The two sides settled down to establish their lines and place their artillery.

On the Union side the 5th Iowa came on line to the right of the Jacinto Road followed by the 11th Ohio Light Artillery. The six pieces (2-6lb rifled guns, 2-6lb smoothbore guns, and 2-12lb howitzers) were placed nearly hub to hub on the only available ground, which was also dangerously exposed. To the right of the 5th Iowa, the 26th Missouri lengthened the line. On the left of the guns the untested 48th Indiana extended north from the Jacinto Road with the 4th Minnesota falling in on their left. By coincidence of the order of march that day the only battle tested regiment in the brigade came up last. The 16th Iowa found that all available space had been filled and they settled for a reserve position behind the battery and 48th Indiana.

On the other side of the ravine the Confederates deployed their forces. The 3rd Texas Cavalry formed a skirmish line across the entire front. The consolidated 14/17th Arkansas straddled the road with two guns behind them on higher ground. To their right was the 1st Texas Legion supported by the remaining two guns of Clark's Battery. On the left was the 3rd Louisiana, backed by the 40th Mississippi and supported by four guns of Dawson's St. Louis Battery. The small battle field was extremely crowded with more troops to follow. The stage was set for what many would call the most furious three hours of battle fought during the entire war.

 

[rhp6033]

Game On
In Iuka Price was also hearing about a different plan. A courier arrived from Van Dorn announcing that he had been named overall commander in Mississippi by Jefferson Davis. He also informed Price that he had reconsidered a joint venture against Corinth and wished him to move toward unification. Although Price wanted to comply the call from Van Dorn had come too late. His cavalry had already detected the first Union movements down the Burnsville Road. BG Dabney Maury's division was pushed out to establish a line of defense. The idea of attempting a move away while under imminent threat did not appeal to Price who sent a message to Van Dorn stating that he would move as quickly as possible but was now preparing for the expected Federal assault. The wagons were loaded and all preparations made for a getaway but the first business at hand was the threat from Ord's troops on the Burnsville Road. He also strengthened the line there by adding BG Henry Little's division to extend the line. There was no thought of a threat from the rear.

Indeed the Federal forces were gathering for a strike from Burnsville. The attack was scheduled for 0430 on the 19th. Unfortunately Rosecrans plan began to unravel almost from the start. BG David Stanley's division had been led astray by a guide and did not arrive at Jacinto until 2100 on the 18th. The attack would have to be delayed. Rosecrans estimated that an early start on the 19th would have his troops in place by 1400. Grant doubted the distance (18-20 miles) could be covered in that time and began altering the plan even more. In a message to Ord Grant claims to have instructed him to attack at the first sound of guns to the south. Ord claims he did not receive the message until 1000 when he was informed of Rosecrans' delay and told "not to be too rapid with your advance this morning."*

To the south Rosecrans was doing his best to make up for lost time. The cavalry vanguard broke camp at 04300 and the infantry units were all on the road by 0600. The march was invigorated by the news of the Confederate defeat at Antietam and made excellent time. The march proceeded unabated to Barnett's Crossroad. Here the column was expected to split. Hamilton was to continue on to the Fulton Road while Stanley would turn north on the Jacinto Road. But events produced a drastic and fatal change to the original plan. The cavalry screen in that area, eight companies of the 3rd Michigan, encountered Confederate cavalry in their path. In a short skirmish the enemy was driven off but the lead elements of Hamilton's division, Col. John Sanborn's brigade, opted to stop and await orders. A messenger from the cavalry advance brought back word that the true distance between the two roads was more than five miles. Rosecrans knowledge of the area and his map makers had failed him. This was double the distance that he had considered in his plan. The extra distance would take his separate columns out of mutual support range. Doubts about his plan began to creep into his thinking and he decided to forego the advance on the Fulton Road, both divisions would move north on the Jacinto Road. They would block the side door but the back door would remain unprotected.

At 1230 two Grant staffers arrived to discuss matters with Rosecrans. One claimed have given Rosecrans a message from Grant but Rosecrans later denied it. The one thing that was certain was that there was a complete misunderstanding about how the battle would be initiated. Ord acting on Grant's directive was to wait for the sound of guns from the south while Rosecrans told his visitors that Ord would start the battle to gain the enemy's full attention allowing him to gain a position in the rear. The ambitious plan was falling apart with each step.

*This begs the question of why if the attack was scheduled for 0430 a 1000 message found Ord still in camp. One of these two men is telling the wrong tale.

Commanders, from Lincoln on down, seemed to always want to create a "pincer movement" catching the enemy in between opposing forces. The problem is, as Napoleon complained, that coordinating the movement of widely seperated armies is next to impossible. It "might" work if the enemy stays still, but he's unlikely to do so. Moreover, the well-known defense against such a movement is to pick one of the "pincers", hit it hard with everything you've got, then after defeating that force turn and face the other force. Examples:

1) Lincoln thought he could coordinate three Union armies to capture Jackson in the valley in early 1862, but it didn't work.

2) At Chancellorsville in 1863 Hooker tried to force Lee into a vice between forces advancing at Harper's Ferry and the main force crossing the river(s) several miles upstream, yet Lee defeated each one in turn.

(3) In the spring of 1864 Lincoln and Halleck tried the same thing in the Red River campaign, with troops under Banks moving north-east from New Orleans and others moving south-east from Little Rock, with Shreveport as the combined objective. Both forces were defeated in turn.

It seems to me that the distances and communications system of the time simply didn't allow for such a strategy, except by accident. You need real-time intelligence of the enemie's location and direction of movement, as well as that of your own men, combined with a speed of response which was rare in a Civil War army of that time.

 

[1SGDan]

Battle Rages
As soon as the opposing batteries were brought on line they began exchanging fire. Amidst the barrage both sides had senior officers arrive. Rosecrans immediately called up reinforcements from BG Jeremiah Sullivan's brigade to secure his flanks. The 10th Iowa and the 12th Wisconsin Battery (2 guns) were sent to the left. The battery commander, LT L. D. Immell, was as distrusted by LTC Warren Lothrop, chief of artillery, as he was despised by his men. Lathrop felt compelled to ride along to supervise the placement of the guns. They found poor ground for both artillery and infantry. The guns were placed in the best available spot covering a large field. The 10th Iowa deployed in a dense wood line and to avoid being flanked sent three companies further into the trees on the left. The 10th Missouri was sent to the far right to cover any possible flanking effort there. The move put them squarely into the sights of the Confederate gunners. They lost heavily to the enemy guns despite going into the prone "under the most trying conditions."

Hebert was also adjusting his lines when division commander BG Henry Little appeared with Col. John D. Martin's brigade. Lack of activity on the Burnsville front had convinced Price that he could safely bolster Hebert by diminishing his Burnsville Road line. The 3rd Texas Cavalry skirmish line was also extended by Company F of the 3rd Louisiana. Martin's brigade was then split with the 37th and 38th Mississippi extending the main line to the right and the 36th Mississippi and 37th Alabama to the left.

At 1715 the rebel yell was raised and the Confederate line surged forward. As the line disappeared in the ravine a short pause was called to allow the 3rd Texas Cavalry to reform and take its place in the center of the line. The consolidated 14/17th Arkansas was pushed into the second line with the 40th Mississippi. The depression gave them protection from the line of sight weapons and they advance to within 150 yards of the Union line. The Confederate guns then lifted their fire to prevent fratricide. As the line revealed itself the entire left of the Federal position greeted them with a massive volley and canister. The crowded battlefield was a target rich environment and despite the thick cloud of smoke that settled into the area losses mounted. The 11th Ohio Battery was playing havoc on the 3rd Texas Cavalry who had the misfortune to emerge directly in front of the guns. They were being decimated and there was only one solution – attack! The entire Confederate line oriented toward the guns in a desperate effort to silence them. The battery and supports on each side bore the brunt of the assault. For the unblooded 48th Indiana, on the left, the pressure was too much. The inexperienced men were facing the veterans of the 1st Texas Legion and a portion of the 3rd Texas Cavalry. The regiment fell apart at the first volley, running for the rear. Col Norman Eddy rode into the fleeing men to restore order. He was joined by Brigade Commander Col. Sanborn who shot down two of the fleeing men. Whatever success the two had at turning the men back to the task at hand disappeared when Eddy was brought down by five bullets. The 48th bolted for good. Sanborn gave up on trying to stem the panic and went to the 16th Iowa. The veterans there lost their cool and let loose a volley into the mixed stream of men coming toward them, killing mostly Hoosiers.

The Hawkeyes regained their composure and attacked the Texans pushing them back. The Confederate attack had thus far failed to quiet the 11th Ohio battery which continued to batter the 3rd Texas Cavalry. It was 1800 and night was only a short time away but there was still time for action and Col. Whitfiled's 1st Texas Legion made good use of it. In an exchange of volleys Col. Chambers of the 16th Iowa was brought down. The Iowans took 75 additional casualties before they too collapsed leaving the battery completely uncovered on the left.

On the right of the guns the 5th Iowa was giving a much better account of itself. The 3rd Louisiana appeared barley 50 yards away after emerging from the ravine. At this range the volleys were extremely effective. For fifteen minutes the two sides stood toe to toe. Losses mounted at a fearful rate but neither side gained the upper hand. The 5th was taking a fearful beating and to prevent another collapse Col. Matthies ordered a bayonet assault which temporarily pushed the Cajuns away. They regrouped and Matthies attempted another charge. The lines surged together and the fighting became very close. Two Confederates were shot down as they reached out for Federal banners. It was now around 1815. Darkness was only moments away but there was still enough time for more killing to be done before sunset would put a stop to the deadly chaos.

 

[1SGDan]

RHP
You have hit the nail on the head . This problem will certainly be reflected in my assessment of this operation.
Dan

 

[1SGDan]

Expired Image Removed

 

[Nathanb1]

Excellent information, Dan. I just remembered after looking at the map that this is one of the few battles fought on my (future) birthday. Furthermore, as I was discussing this with the hubby, I remembered that we've pretty much narrowed down his great-grandfather's service to the 3rd Texas Cavalry. Nice to read about what they went through.....and especially as written by you. Even a tired teacher's brain can comprehend this!

 

[1SGDan]

N1
Thank you for the kind words. it was not a good day for any of the troops involved. 7800 men packed into a space about a half mile wide and at close range. Missing was not an option. The results were fairly predictable.
Dan

 

[Nathanb1]

N1
Thank you for the kind words. it was not a good day for any of the troops involved. 7800 men packed into a space about a half mile wide and at close range. Missing was not an option. The results were fairly predictable.
Dan

And it's one of those battles no one ever heard of when I was growing up. Gee. It wasn't in Virginia.

 

[NedBaldwin]

Dan -- Great thread; well written; I am looking forward to the concluding parts.

 

[1SGDan]

Battle at the Guns
The departure of the 16th Iowa made the entire left flank of the hard fighting gunners of the 11th Ohio vacant. The 4th Minnesota supposedly extending the Federal line in that direction had been badly mishandled. The commander, Col. John Sanborn, had been elevated to brigade command and in the absence of any other candidates the regimental command fell to inexperienced Cpt. Ebenezer LeGro. The captain was in over his head and it was reflected in the farcical manner in which he deployed his 407 men. Orders and counter orders finally got the regiment into position on the left of the 48th Indiana. It was a poor position but it made no difference for at the first volley LeGro backed the regiment into the tree line and essentially sat out the battle.

On the right the 5th Iowa had its hands full just trying to survive. Matthies called on Col. George Boomer's 26th Missouri for support. Boomer readily complied by ordering Maj. Ladislaus Koniuszeski to take the four left companies of the regiment to the aid of the beleaguered 5th Iowa . The Missourians rushed up the back slope of the ridge and entered the fight by walking into a volley from the 3rd Louisiana. Stunned the men began to reverse direction and Boomer decided to take command from the confused major to avoid a rout. He appealed to Cpt. DeWitt Brown to stem the tide but he could gain only partial control. Failing his mission Brown did the only thing he could think of; he yelled charge! The company obeyed but Boomer realized that more men would be needed. He rode down the slope to find the remaining six companies of his regiment gone. Without help Boomer had no choice but to order his four companies to retreat. It was too late for most of the 162 men that had gone up the slope. They had lost 21 killed and 76 wounded or missing. The 5th Iowa, without them, was also forced to abandon the ridge.

The 11th Ohio Battery was now on their own. There were no horses left to remove the guns even if it had been possible. It was not. The 1st Texas Legion and 3rd Texas Cavalry now had complete freedom to focus on the Buckeye gunners. The artillerymen refused to give up their pieces without a fight. As the Texans closed on the battery the left section fell first to a charge bayonets. Still the remaining gunners refused to yield. W. P. Helm of the 3rd Texas Cavalry recalled;

"Sword and bayonet were crossed, muskets, revolvers, knives, ramrods, gun swabs all mingled in the death dealing fray."

Despite the heroism of the artillerymen the inevitable happened. The Confederates won the guns and captured the surviving crews. In a remarkable display of respect for the valor of their fight the survivors were sent on their way to their own lines. One rebel remarked that they had too much "spunk" to be held captive.

The 3rd Louisiana duplicated the feat at the Federal battery section on the extreme left of the Union line. The ridge was cleared of Federals. The time was 1830 and the fighting in the center stopped. Darkness and the loss of key leaders prevented the Confederates from exploiting their triumph. The wild back and forth affair left both sides exhausted and badly beaten up but not yet finished.

 

[1SGDan]

Battle on the Left
As the brutal fighting at the guns was playing itself out another initiative was just beginning on the far left. MG Price had arrived to assess the situation and was discussing plans with BG Little. The two men understood the need for more pressure on the Union line and were urging the 37th and 38th Mississippi forward against the Union left. A bullet barely missed Price and instantly killed General Little. As commander of the right wing of Martin's brigade his death left the regimental commanders with no guidance (Price had ridden off to consult with Hebert). The two regiments were left to their own devises. Neither leader stepped up to the challenge.

Col. Fleming Adams, of the 38th, allowed his men to follow an anonymous order to fall back. This removed his regiment from any further involvement in the battle. Col. Robert McClain of the 37th became confused by orders to avoid shooting into the backs of the 1st Texas Legion. The Texans were nowhere to be found in his front so he simply followed the path beaten into the ground that they had left behind when they turned oblique to attack the 11th Ohio guns. The route took them across the front of the 10th Iowa and 12th Wisconsin Battery. With plenty of time to prepare Col. Perczel of the 10th and Immell's guns greeted the 37th warmly. Having been abandoned by Adams and the 38th McClain found himself alone on the field facing what he believed was a full Federal brigade. The devastating blast from the two Wisconsin guns and the 10th Iowa must have felt like a full brigade as it left 78 Mississippians dead or wounded. McClain's shocked men answered with a few feeble volleys before retiring from the field. The fight on the left was over.

Posting two days worth for possible travel.... again!

 

[1SGDan]

Battle Ends
Understandably the Union leadership was unhappy with the outcome at the ridge. Sanborn's brigade was in shambles and nearly all the artillery was lost. BG Jeremiah Sullivan gathered two reserve regiments, the 17th Iowa and the 80th Ohio, with a design to win back the center of the ridge. The 17th was a poor choice for such a mission. The commander, Col. John Rankin, had asked for and received approval of his resignation but because the second in command was missing, the major under arrest, and his replacement not yet on the scene he had accompanied the unit to Iuka. Rankin rapidly confirmed his reputation as an incompetent by seriously bungling the deployment of his men for the move up the slope. Nevertheless he boldly ordered them forward. They were met by a barrage of bullets that badly rattled the inexperienced Iowans. Rankin complicated matters when he fell from his horse unconscious. Some believed that he had drunkenly ridden into a tree limb and knocked himself out. It was recorded as being thrown from his horse. Whatever the truth command fell to Captain John Young but he could not restore order. The 17th dissolved into a mob of panic stricken men fleeing for the safety of the rear.

The 80th Ohio fared better. Their advance was met by skirmishers from the 1st Texas Legion and the commander, Lt. Col. Matthias Bartilson was among the first to fall. Wounded he retired from the field. For the first time all day the junior officers rose to the challenge. The company commanders managed to hold the line firm in the face of increased resistance. Sullivan, meantime, had assembled an ad hoc battalion of refugees form the 26th Missouri, 48th Indiana, 16th Iowa, and 4th Minnesota soldiers and led them through the 80th Ohio. The twilight attack caught the battered rebels at the guns unprepared and they were driven down the hill relinquishing the guns.

The 3rd Louisiana again counter attacked the Federals who were pushed back to a line just in front of the unmanned artillery pieces. The respite gave the 1st Texas Legion the opportunity to strike another blow. Three companies of Texans rose up and delivered a volley into the left flank of Sullivan's line before charging. Temporarily stunned the Union line recoiled but regrouped to meet the Confederate attack. Sullivan got help from an unexpected source. Cpt. Young had convinced the 17th Iowa to return to the fight. They released a jittery volley that partially struck the backs of Sullivan's line. It was impossible to tell friend from foe in the fading light. Sullivan compensated by moving his line back to join Young,ceding the guns once again, but they continued to take fire from the rear. The 4th Minnesota had finally been spurred into action. Regrettably they were firing blindly into the dark and into the backs of their own men.

In one final act of battle a reserve regiment from each side clashed on the extreme right. The 11th Missouri had been diverted to the far fight were the sounds of the 5th Iowa battle with the 3rd Louisiana indicated they might serve the best purpose. They moved into the trees and ran into the 37th Alabama and 36th Mississippi who were attempting a flanking movement around the right end of the Union line. The fight opened at less than 30 meters with the 11th firing the first volley. The Confederates responded and then came on with bayonets lowered. The two lines collided in a wild frenzy. The Missourians managed to hold their ground during three separate rushes. After nearly an hour of close deadly combat the Confederates gave up the effort and retreated into the darkness. The stand cost the 11th Missouri 75 casualties while Col. John Martin leading the left section of his brigade reported 77 men lost.

Despite the chaos in the Federal ranks the Confederates had had enough. They dragged away what cannon they could and returned to the other side of the ravine. It was 2000 and the Battle of Iuka was over. Exhausted by the back and forth struggle and badly beaten up both sides fell on their arms for desperately needed rest.

 

[1SGDan]

Aftermath and Retreat
Darkness stopped the carnage between the opposing forces but nervous troops on both sides continued to create havoc by firing into any movement. This generally resulted in friendly troops being added to the already enormous casualty reports. Unable to move without eliciting fire there was little effort to recover the wounded from the field. Eventually things settled down and the only sounds were the cries of the abandoned wounded men. Those that could fell asleep while the commanders met to discuss options for the coming day.

MG Price had every intention of renewing the fight at first light but faced opposition from his subordinate leaders. Hebert felt his troops had been fought out. The loss of Little and the monumental casualty lists left them disheartened and unlikely to put up a good fight. Cavalry commanders Armstrong and Adams concurred with his assessment against resuming the struggle. Unmoved Price was adamant; the battle would be rejoined at sunrise. Finally MG Dabney Maury roused Price to talk again. Maury argued that Grant had not yet been heard from and fighting a two sided battle put them at great risk. The split portions of his command could be defeated in detail. Besides, Maury reminded him, an order from Van Dorn had arrived calling for the unification of the two forces. The opportunity for a clean getaway was now while the two Union forces seemed to be working at cross purposes. Reluctantly Price saw the validity of Maury's view. Retreat might be the only means to save his army and the essential supply trains that had been replenished courtesy of Murphy's failure. The Fulton Road was open and they could be gone before a coordinated effort by Grant and Rosecrans could trap them in the city. Orders were sent out for the retreat to begin at 0300.

MG Rosecrans was also contemplating renewed action. But without word from Grant he was unsure of exactly what opposed him across the ravine. He had to consider the possibility that Price had shifted his entire force down from Iuka. As the early morning hours came increased activity in the Confederate position indicated something major was afoot. Was the enemy reinforcing or retreating? It was unclear. Undeterred Rosecrans prepped his force for the renewal of combat. Hamilton's battered troops were replaced by the fresh division of BG David Stanley. A message was sent to Grant pleading for the assistance of an attack in his sector. Finally he found BG Stanley and gave him personal instruction for the morning operation. A bayonet assault across the entire front would be executed at sunrise.

At Grant's headquarters Ord's division was being sectioned off to support another operation. A report of activity against Corinth caused Grant to detach BG Thomas Davies division for a move in that direction. There was apparently little concern for Rosecrans plight on the Jacinto Road. At 0330 Rosecrans' dispatch arrived describing the situation. Grant then instructed Ord to use his remaining force to attack as early as possible.

In Iuka, preparations for retreat took on a frenzied attitude. The teamsters of the supply train were threatened with death by hanging if they stopped for any reason. The threat of being caught in column weighed heavily on Price's mind and he pushed his men unmercifully. By morning the only troops left in town were the cavalry rearguard. On the Jacinto Road the captured guns were spiked (there were no animals available to draw them off.) and regiment by regiment the troops were marched east to intersect with the troops from Iuka and the unguarded Fulton Road.

 

[1SGDan]

Conclusion and Assessment
At first light BG Stanley's troops stood prepared to execute the attack order issued By Rosecrans. But a decided lack of activity on the opposite ridge caused Rosecrans to order a company sized reconnaissance by the 39th Ohio. The Buckeyes pushed their way through the unimaginable gore of the previous day's battle to discover that the Confederates were gone. A company of the 2nd Iowa Cavalry was ordered to dash to Iuka to determine the status there. They were followed by the 39th Ohio and Battery M of the 1st Missouri Artillery. They arrived on the outskirts of town just in time to see the departure of the last of the Confederate rearguard. A few rounds from the Missouri battery crashed into town in a wasted effort to disrupt them. There was no sign of movement from Ord's front.

Ord's men would finally begin arriving at 1000. A brief effort at pursuit was given up as Grant's concerns about the safety of Corinth overrode thoughts of Price's departure. The great Union vise had failed to materialize. Instead of crushing Price he was allowed to escape, wounded but still very much combat effective. The failure of Rosecrans' elaborate plan to defeat Price can be attributed to many factors but key among them are;

-The aforementioned inability to coordinate the movement of two distant bodies of troops. Grant significantly contributed to this problem by establishing his headquarters separate from both Ord and Rosecrans. By putting his headquarters in Burnsville he increased the already elongated time required to transfer information between the two commands. Operations of this kind are difficult to control in a world of real time communication. They were almost impossible under the communication standards of the Civil War.

-Lack of unified command focus. Grant seemed to lose interest in the operation shortly after he authorized it. He became more concerned with Corinth than with operations against Price's army. When the post battle question of why Ord and he did not support Rosecrans was asked the best he could do was to blame the dreaded acoustic shadow. Both he and Ord failed to hear the sound of battle on Jacinto road. This fails to explain the confusion about who was to initiate the battle. No substantive effort was ever made on this front.

-Rosecrans trusted too much in what he thought he knew of the surrounding terrain. When he learned the distance between Jacinto and Fulton Road was greater than he expected he allowed himself to second guess the entire plan. By removing the force from the Fulton Road he pretty much gave up the chance to succeed in his pre operation expectations. A simple reconnaissance of the route of march could have spared him this.

-The unexpected appearance and hard fighting of the Confederate troops. Little's division carried out a vitally important blocking action. The only real problem with their performance on Jacinto Road was over aggressiveness. It was enough to be in front of Rosecrans they did not need to attack him. All this did was to add to their casualty rolls.* Nevertheless their efforts saved Price from certain defeat.

Although he was encumbered by the failure of inexperienced troops and poor subordinate leadership (see the 4th Minnesota, 48th Indiana, 17th Iowa…) Rosecrans would still have to concede the obvious. The desired end state was no where to be found. The Battle of Iuka saw the pre-operation commander's intent go completely unsatisfied. The enemy that was supposed to be crushed was gone and the possibility of their unification with Van Dorn revived. Iuka was won but it was a victory smothered with failure. It was a failure for which the price would be paid at Corinth.

*Confederate losses at Iuka are hard to pin down. They have been estimated by various studies at between the reported 652 to as high as 1500. By evaluating reports from leaders on both sides one thing is clear. The reported loss is nowhere near the actual. Union losses were reported at 790 and have not been questioned.

 

[1SGDan]

Order of Battle *
Union
Army of the Mississippi
2nd Division
1st Bde – 27th Ohio, 43rd Ohio, 63rd Ohio, 39th Ohio, Battery M 1st Missouri Artillery, 8th Battery Wisconsin Light Artillery, Battery F 2nd US Artillery
2nd Bde -26th Illinois, 47th Illinois, 11th Missouri, 8th Wisconsin, 2nd Battery Iowa Light Artillery, 3rd Battery Michigan Light Artillery
3rd Division
1st Bde – 48th Indiana, 5th Iowa, 16th Iowa, 4th Minnesota, 26th Missouri, 11th Battery Ohio Light Artillery
2nd Bde – 10th Iowa, 17th Iowa, 10th Missouri, 80th Ohio, Company F 24th Missouri, 12th Battery Wisconsin Light Artillery
Cavalry – 2nd Iowa, 3rd Michigan, companies Band E 7th Kansas
Unattached – Jenk's Company Illinois Cavalry

Confederate
Army of the West
1st Division
1st Bde – 16th Arkansas, 2nd Missouri, 3rd Missouri, 1st Missouri cavalry (Dismounted), Wade's Missouri Battery
2nd Bde – 14th/17th Arkansas, 3rd Louisiana, 40th Mississippi, 1st Texas Legion, 3rd Texas Cavalry (Dismounted), Dawson's St. Louis Battery, Clark Missouri Battery
3rd Bde – 7th Mississippi Bn, 43rd Mississippi, 4th Missouri, 6th Missouri, 3rd Missouri Cavalry(Dismounted), Guibor's Missouri Battery, Landis' Missouri Battery
4th Bde – 37th Mississippi, 36th Mississippi, 38th Mississippi, 37th Alabama
Cavalry – Adams's Mississippi Regiment, 2nd Arkansas, 2nd Missouri, 4th Mississippi, 1st Mississippi Partisan Rangers

*Taken from The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka &Corinth; Peter Cozzens

 

[1SGDan]

Bibliography
Books
Official Records Volume XVIIa
The Darkest Days of the War: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth; Peter Cozzens
Edge of Glory: A Biography of General William S. Rosecrans; William M. Lamers
Army of the Heartland; Thomas Connelly
Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant; U. S. Grant
Roster and Record of Iowa Troops in the Rebellion, Vol. I; Guy E. Logan
Unit Histories
History of the Fourth Regiment of Minnesota Infantry during the Great Rebellion 1861-1865; Alonzo L. Brown
With Fire and Sword; S. H. M. Byers
Bugle Echoes – The story of the 47th; B. C. Bryner
The Drums of the 47th; Robert J. Burdette
Lone Star Defenders – A Chronicle of the Third Texas Cavalry; S. B. Barron
A Southern Record: The History of the Third Regiment Louisiana Infantry; W. H. Tunnard
Articles
A Battery at Close Quarters; A paper read before the Ohio Commandery of the Loyal Legion; Henry Neil and John Sanborn
The Battle of Iuka; C. S. Hamilton, taken from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume II

 

[NedBaldwin]

Grant significantly contributed to this problem by establishing his headquarters separate from both Ord and Rosecrans. By putting his headquarters in Burnsville he increased the already elongated time required to transfer information between the two commands.

I dont agree with this. Burnsville put him with Ord -- on the 19th Ord would report in person to Grant -- and still gave him rail and telegraph communications with the rest of the Department.