- Joined
- May 18, 2005
- Location
- Spring Hill, Tennessee
Today, the Confederate Army of Tennessee had finally arrived south and west of Columbia, Tennessee. Hood displaced his corps to envelope the southern environs of the city and distributed his artillery to cover the entire Federal front that confronted him.
Schofield's 4th and 23rd Corps occupied the city itself and had rapidly thrown up earthworks to prevent the on-rushing Rebel cavalry from gaining the place. The Yankee infantry had arrived just in time from a rapid forced march from Lynnville, Tennessee about fifteen miles south on the Pulalski Pike.
All day long, Forrest's cavalry continued to harass and poke at the Union troops looking for weaknesses. Schofield had his back to the Duck River, and realized that massed enemy forces were arriving in his front very quickly. He distributed cavalry and some infantry brigades to the north side of the river, but kept the vast bulk of his forces on the southern side of the river along the heights just south of Columbia.
Mansions were destroyed with impunity at this point. Structures that had survived three long years of war were now burned to the ground by the Federals in an attempt to clear their fields of fire. Dozens of them were set ablaze and lost to history - their firing of course, blamed by the Federals on the advance of the Rebels in hopes of instilling a resentment among the locals.
The next day, November 27th, Hood assembled his corps commanders at the Warfield House on Pulaski Pike south of Columbia. There, he informed his corps commanders of his intent to envelope the enemy forces at Columbia. With all luck, the Federals would retain their positions on the south side of the river and in the environs of Columbia.
Forrest was to force a crossing of Duck River early on the morning of the 28th at several different point as far as twelve miles east of the city - the farthest point being Hardison's Mill on Lewisburg Pike that was an artery that could provide easy and direct travel to Franklin or part-way to Spring Hill.
He directed S. D. Lee to retain two divisions of his corps in front of the Federal army with all of the army's artillery excepting two batteries. They were to direct heavy fires and feints on the enemy positions to maintain the enemy's attention to his front.
The remaining two corps, under Frank Cheatham and A. P. Stewart - supplemented by Ed Johnson's division, were to march east and cross Duck River in trail of Forrest. Evidence suggests that this infantry movement was to take place on the 28th - with the forces marching as far east as Hardison's Mill in order to use the speed and efficiency of Lewisburg Pike. Cavalry scouts had been informed that they should meet up with Cleburnes Division on the morning of the 29th near Caney Springs - a small hamlet a short distance east of Hardison's Mill.
From there, they would march rapidly on to cut the Columbia Pike - at or near Spring Hill. This would leave the enemy forces in a desperate situation. With nearly half their force on the south side of Duck River, a size-able portion of their forces on the north side of the river and 2/3 of the Rebel infantry in their rear and massed artillery in their front, they could be easily crushed by a rapid and aggressive assault by the Rebel troops in their rear.
Unfortunately for Hood, at dawn the next morning - November 28th, he was informed that all the Federal troops had withdrawn from Columbia and moved to the north side of Duck River.
His scheme of maneuver was slightly altered, but the over-all concept of the operation would remain the same. That morning, he quickly set his engineers to work to locate a suitable fording site within a relatively short distance east of Columbia. Luckily, he found one less than five miles southeast of the city.
Troops were immediately dispatched to prepare the site for accommodating the pontoon bridge. In J. B. Hood's mind, this classic envelopment of the enemy was sure to end in success.
Or so he thought...
Schofield's 4th and 23rd Corps occupied the city itself and had rapidly thrown up earthworks to prevent the on-rushing Rebel cavalry from gaining the place. The Yankee infantry had arrived just in time from a rapid forced march from Lynnville, Tennessee about fifteen miles south on the Pulalski Pike.
All day long, Forrest's cavalry continued to harass and poke at the Union troops looking for weaknesses. Schofield had his back to the Duck River, and realized that massed enemy forces were arriving in his front very quickly. He distributed cavalry and some infantry brigades to the north side of the river, but kept the vast bulk of his forces on the southern side of the river along the heights just south of Columbia.
Mansions were destroyed with impunity at this point. Structures that had survived three long years of war were now burned to the ground by the Federals in an attempt to clear their fields of fire. Dozens of them were set ablaze and lost to history - their firing of course, blamed by the Federals on the advance of the Rebels in hopes of instilling a resentment among the locals.
The next day, November 27th, Hood assembled his corps commanders at the Warfield House on Pulaski Pike south of Columbia. There, he informed his corps commanders of his intent to envelope the enemy forces at Columbia. With all luck, the Federals would retain their positions on the south side of the river and in the environs of Columbia.
Forrest was to force a crossing of Duck River early on the morning of the 28th at several different point as far as twelve miles east of the city - the farthest point being Hardison's Mill on Lewisburg Pike that was an artery that could provide easy and direct travel to Franklin or part-way to Spring Hill.
He directed S. D. Lee to retain two divisions of his corps in front of the Federal army with all of the army's artillery excepting two batteries. They were to direct heavy fires and feints on the enemy positions to maintain the enemy's attention to his front.
The remaining two corps, under Frank Cheatham and A. P. Stewart - supplemented by Ed Johnson's division, were to march east and cross Duck River in trail of Forrest. Evidence suggests that this infantry movement was to take place on the 28th - with the forces marching as far east as Hardison's Mill in order to use the speed and efficiency of Lewisburg Pike. Cavalry scouts had been informed that they should meet up with Cleburnes Division on the morning of the 29th near Caney Springs - a small hamlet a short distance east of Hardison's Mill.
From there, they would march rapidly on to cut the Columbia Pike - at or near Spring Hill. This would leave the enemy forces in a desperate situation. With nearly half their force on the south side of Duck River, a size-able portion of their forces on the north side of the river and 2/3 of the Rebel infantry in their rear and massed artillery in their front, they could be easily crushed by a rapid and aggressive assault by the Rebel troops in their rear.
Unfortunately for Hood, at dawn the next morning - November 28th, he was informed that all the Federal troops had withdrawn from Columbia and moved to the north side of Duck River.
His scheme of maneuver was slightly altered, but the over-all concept of the operation would remain the same. That morning, he quickly set his engineers to work to locate a suitable fording site within a relatively short distance east of Columbia. Luckily, he found one less than five miles southeast of the city.
Troops were immediately dispatched to prepare the site for accommodating the pontoon bridge. In J. B. Hood's mind, this classic envelopment of the enemy was sure to end in success.
Or so he thought...
Bringing the