After routing the AotP at Chancellorsville, there were only several options available to Lee. Hold fast and defend the Rappahannock line, transfer part of the army to the Vicksburg front, or mount an offensive into a northern state. The Confederate cabinet had discussed the western option but Lee was firmly opposed. Similarly, maintaining a defensive posture was contrary to Lee's aggressive doctrine, and would only have led to the enemy's eventual regrouping for its own offensive move. So the Gettysburg incursion was Lee's favored strategy; it would not only relieve war-torn Virginia and allow the ANV to replenish its own food and forage but possibly deal a blow to northern morale with a victory on northern soil. These overall scenarios would not have been totally unknown to the soldiery and given Lee's past experience in 1862 of initiating a bold move against Maryland, the likelihood of an invasion of Pennsylvania was not exactly a state secret. But what was unclear was the actual trajectory, path, and timing that such an invasion would take. Hooker and the AotP were initially slow to react to Lee's move and remained somewhat uncertain as to its objective, which is why the battle at Gettysburg began as a chance encounter between the two armies.