Howard and Doubleday negligent?

[infomanpa]

As a lot of you know, after Reynolds replaced Buford's cavalry line with his fresh infantry on McPherson's Ridge, this location became the focus of the initial fighting on July 1. After Reynolds' death, generals Howard and Doubleday decided to try to maintain McPherson Ridge as long as possible. Eventually, this position was no longer tenable and in the late afternoon, Union troops were forced to fall back to Seminary Ridge. I was surprised that Edwin Coddington stated in his famous book that "Doubleday and Howard were both guilty of negligence" for not realizing earlier that McPherson Ridge could not be defended. He believed that they should have given orders to fall back to Seminary Ridge during the lull in fighting that occurred around noon. I think that the charge of "negligence" is unjustified here. What do you think?

 

[Ole Miss]

For two men handling things on the fly after Reynolds death, i believe they did pretty good. If I am not mistaken, neither man was familiar with the terrain of Gettysburg were they.
Regards
David

 

[PeterT]

"Doubleday and Howard were both guilty of negligence" for not realizing earlier that McPherson Ridge could not be defended. He believed that they should have given orders to fall back to Seminary Ridge during the lull in fighting that occurred around noon. I think that the charge of "negligence" is unjustified here. What do you think?

It is a big call. They were trying to delay the Confederates until the rest of the Federal troops came up. If they lost Seminary Ridge after falling back earlier, then Confederate troops occupy the town earlier and then take Cemetery Ridge. The whole situation changes.

 

[rpkennedy]

As a lot of you know, after Reynolds replaced Buford's cavalry line with his fresh infantry on McPherson's Ridge, this location became the focus of the initial fighting on July 1. After Reynolds' death, generals Howard and Doubleday decided to try to maintain McPherson Ridge as long as possible. Eventually, this position was no longer tenable and in the late afternoon, Union troops were forced to fall back to Seminary Ridge. I was surprised that Edwin Coddington stated in his famous book that "Doubleday and Howard were both guilty of negligence" for not realizing earlier that McPherson Ridge could not be defended. He believed that they should have given orders to fall back to Seminary Ridge during the lull in fighting that occurred around noon. I think that the charge of "negligence" is unjustified here. What do you think?

I'd have to go back and look but, IIRC, Doubleday wanted to fall back from McPherson's Ridge to Seminary Ridge in order to consolidate his position but was overruled by Howard who wanted him to hold his position.

Ryan

 

[WJC]

It is a lot easier for us 'armchair generals' to decide on the right course of action than it was for them at the time. Considering that 'experts' claim a good decision maker is only right 40% of the time, they did pretty well in slowing down the rebel advance, though at great cost.
I certainly wouldn't use the word "negligent".

 

[Iron Brigade]

I'd have to go back and look but, IIRC, Doubleday wanted to fall back from McPherson's Ridge to Seminary Ridge in order to consolidate his position but was overruled by Howard who wanted him to hold his position.

Ryan

According to Doubleday's report in the OR, he refrained from falling back to Seminary Ridge because he felt it was open to enfilade from Ewell's batteries.

I had hoped General Howard would have been able to connect with the right of my line, but after General Schurz had formed his division, there was a wide interval between the two corps. This gap might have been filled by my falling back to the Seminary Ridge, out unfortunately that ridge is open ground, and could have been, as it was afterward, enfiladed by Ewell's batteries throughout its whole extent.

 

[infomanpa]

According to Doubleday's report in the OR, he refrained from falling back to Seminary Ridge because he felt it was open to enfilade from Ewell's batteries.

I had hoped General Howard would have been able to connect with the right of my line, but after General Schurz had formed his division, there was a wide interval between the two corps. This gap might have been filled by my falling back to the Seminary Ridge, out unfortunately that ridge is open ground, and could have been, as it was afterward, enfiladed by Ewell's batteries throughout its whole extent.

That's very interesting in light of Coddington's discussion of this. He claims that Seminary Ridge was more defensible because it's flanks were covered in woods, whereas the flanks of the McPherson Ridge position were out in the open.

 

[infomanpa]

It is a lot easier for us 'armchair generals' to decide on the right course of action than it was for them at the time. Considering that 'experts' claim a good decision maker is only right 40% of the time, they did pretty well in slowing down the rebel advance, though at great cost.
I certainly wouldn't use the word "negligent".

I agree. Also, human emotion may have played a part. Remember, Reynolds had chosen McPherson Ridge to defend and perhaps Howard was hesitant to abandon a position for which a respected colleague just gave his life to defend.

 

[Tom Elmore]

That's very interesting in light of Coddington's discussion of this. He claims that Seminary Ridge was more defensible because it's flanks were covered in woods, whereas the flanks of the McPherson Ridge position were out in the open.

There may be some merit in this argument, but both flanks of the Union line on Seminary Ridge were vulnerable. Also, there is also one great advantage of the McPherson Ridge position near the Chambersburg Road where it is out in the open - and that is the two (western-most) railroad cuts, which were invisible to the Confederates until it was too late. They were used to great advantage by the Federals for most of the day, first thwarting Davis' brigade, and then Daniel's brigade: they brought any attack from the north to a standstill and channeled the attackers into the intervening gap. Without those two railroad cuts, I think Coddington's argument would have more validity.

It was also a brilliant ruse to place the colors of the 149th Pennsylvania alone in the field north of the Chambersburg Road, where they drew much attention from Confederate artillery and infantry - and away from the actual Federal positions.

Lastly, Stone and his successors did a masterful job of shifting their three large Pennsylvania regiments around to confront threats as they developed from the north or west, and the Confederates were unable to precisely coordinate their attacks to negate this advantage of interior lines, which enabled the Federals to block their piecemeal efforts against the McPherson Ridge line over several critical hours. The only misstep in my opinion was on one occasion when the 149th PA was placed north of the far western cut, which was like putting your back against a wall - something similar had earlier befallen the 147th NY.

 

[Iron Brigade]

That's very interesting in light of Coddington's discussion of this. He claims that Seminary Ridge was more defensible because it's flanks were covered in woods, whereas the flanks of the McPherson Ridge position were out in the open.

Yes, it is interesting. And I think that Doubleday's report says something about his judgement. He was aware of a wide interval between him and Schurz, but considered potential enfilading fire from Ewell to be a greater concern. I would think that consolidating your line in the face of heavy attack would be your first priority. But I think Coddington was a bit strong with "negligent", maybe "poor judgement under the circumstances"?

 

[MaryDee]

Coddington spends most of a chapter on this issue (approximately pp.299-315). It's worth the read to understand more about his conclusions.

 

[Dom71]

I remember Coddington's conclusions here and as it was my first read into the battle I saw no reason to find it extreme. Having read others now I would say maybe a bit unfair. I remember reading somewhere that it's possible Howard was attempting to erase the stain on the 11th corp. brought about by Chancellorsville by not withdrawing earlier. Might have been Sears, I would have to go back and look.

 

[infomanpa]

Lastly, Stone and his successors did a masterful job of shifting their three large Pennsylvania regiments around to confront threats as they developed from the north or west.

Agreed. I can't help but think about Stone every time I use the rest facility on Chambersburg Pike, which is located in the middle of his position.

 

[Dom71]

Agreed. I can't help but think about Stone every time I use the rest facility on Chambersburg Pike, which is located in the middle of his position.

View attachment 185560

Imagine you flashed back in time to the moment right while your doing your business

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think the word negligent is a bit strong. For what it's worth, here is Charles Wainwright's opinion as recorded in his journal entry for July 1 (p. 234):

"I did not like this advanced position at all, its right flank being exposed to a high ridge to the north, and approached by a number of ravines which afforded excellent cover by the attacking party."

Not sure what he means by ravines unless he is referring to the railroad cut and/or Willoughby Run.

I'm not sure that Wainwright believed the Seminary Ridge line was a better one, only that he didn't care for the McPherson Ridge position.

Personally, I believe either position was ultimately untenable and so the only real question is whether Doubleday's defense would have been as successful (in terms of preserving Cemetery Hill) with fewer losses had he adopted the Seminary Ridge line from the beginning. If yes, then he (and/or Howard) could be called negligent.

Related, I remember reading somebody (don't remember who or what) arguing that both McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge were untenable positions, and that Reynolds should have taken position on Cemetery Hill from the beginning. Has anyone read that argument? I think that would only have made sense had Reynolds intended to fight a delaying action and fall back toward Taneytown.

 

[Dom71]

I think the word negligent is a bit strong. For what it's worth, here is Charles Wainwright's opinion as recorded in his journal entry for July 1 (p. 234):

"I did not like this advanced position at all, its right flank being exposed to a high ridge to the north, and approached by a number of ravines which afforded excellent cover by the attacking party."

Not sure what he means by ravines unless he is referring to the railroad cut and/or Willoughby Run.

I'm not sure that Wainwright believed the Seminary Ridge line was a better one, only that he didn't care for the McPherson Ridge position.

Personally, I believe either position was ultimately untenable and so the only real question is whether Doubleday's defense would have been as successful (in terms of preserving Cemetery Hill) with fewer losses had he adopted the Seminary Ridge line from the beginning. If yes, then he (and/or Howard) could be called negligent.

Related, I remember reading somebody (don't remember who or what) arguing that both McPherson Ridge and Seminary Ridge we're untenable positions, and that Reynolds should have taken position on Cemetery Hill from the beginning. Has anyone read that argument? I think that would only have made sense had Reynolds intended to fight a delaying action and fall back toward Taneytown.

Interesting point on Reynolds Andy, I have not read anything on that, but he was killed so quickly after reaching the field perhaps their wasn't time to consider falling back to cemetery hill.

 

[MaryDee]

There is also Wainwright's contention in Diary of Battle that due to the strong German accent of the messenger sent from Howard, the 1st Corps thought they were supposed to hold Seminary Ridge at all hazards, instead of Cemetery Ridge. Wainwright says he didn't even know there was a cemetery! Per Wainwright, this reported misunderstanding delayed the evacuation of Seminary Ridge until it was almost too late.

How much Wainwright's anti-German bias (he had a lot of prejudices!) had to do with this contention is uncertain. Of course with artillery and rifles shooting everywhere, it would be hard to hear commands anyway.

 

[rpkennedy]

Personally, I believe that, while the position was vulnerable and costly to hold, the fight on McPherson's Ridge blunted the Confederate attack which allowed the troops to make a stand on Seminary Ridge. If not for the Iron Brigade, the Bucktail Brigade, and Biddle's Brigade, Heth's men may have rolled over McPherson's Ridge and broken the line on Seminary Ridge. By fighting at the forward ridge, the First Corps' left was able to conduct a defense in depth, nearly crippled Heth's Division and inflicted very heavy casualties on Pender's Division who had to pry them away from their fall-back position. And even when driven back, they were ultimately able to reform on Cemetery Hill and Ridge as well as Culp's Hill while the Confederates had to fight nearly the entire way there.

Ryan

 

[PeterT]

I remember Coddington's conclusions here and as it was my first read into the battle I saw no reason to find it extreme. Having read others now I would say maybe a bit unfair. I remember reading somewhere that it's possible Howard was attempting to erase the stain on the 11th corp. brought about by Chancellorsville by not withdrawing earlier. Might have been Sears, I would have to go back and look.

You are correct. Sears does say that what happened at Chancellorsville might have affected Howard's actions.

 

[Dom71]

You are correct. Sears does say that what happened at Chancellorsville might have affected Howard's actions.

Thanks @PeterT I knew I had seen it somewhere just wasn't sure who.