How were prisoners interrogated?

A. Roy

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I've been reading about the Battle of Gettysburg, and I know that this not by far the only reference that I have read to interrogation of prisoners. However, it reminds me that I've often wondered how interrogations were conducted. In this case, Gen Robert E. Lee mentions in one of his reports:

"The enemy retired to a range of hills south of Gettysburg, where he displayed a strong force of infantry and artillery. It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg." (OR ser. 1, v. 27, pt. 2: Reports, p. 317)

I'm thinking there must be some fellow members who are familiar with intelligence-gathering during the CW. I'm wondering about questions like these:

1. How were prisoner interrogations conducted during the war?

2. What methods were used to determine whether a given prisoner was telling the truth?

3. What kinds of tactics were used during an interrogation -- e.g., the carrot vs. the stick?

4. Were there some particular commanders or officers who were especially effective as interrogators. and how did they operate?

5. In the end, how valuable was intelligence gained through interrogation, in terms of strategic outcomes? Are there some outstanding examples of such intelligence being particularly useful?

AR
 
In the case of the storming of Battery Wagner on Morris Island, the Confederate deserter was threatened with execution if he was lying about the Confederate evacuation. He wasn't lying. Ditto at Por Hudson when Nickerson threatened a deserter with death if he was lying. In that incident, the Confederate soldier lied about the Confederate strength and Nickerson was dishearted to "learn" that he was vastly outnumbered.
 
I cannot recall an instance of a formal interrogation of prisoners taken at Gettysburg, but there were informal queries of prisoners on both sides, and I do recall instances where they outright refused to provide useful information or deliberately fabricated or inflated their numbers to mislead their opponent, all without consequence to themselves.

But prisoners, as we can see from the official records, were overwhelmingly truthful in identifying their command, so analysts (had they existed) could have pieced together a reasonably complete assessment of an opposing army's organization, strength and leadership in a given battle.

I am also reminded of the time "Stonewall" Jackson put a number of his literate cadre to work reading letters from captured mail bags to glean useful intelligence on his opponent.

Both sides perused newspapers from hostile territory to glean information, a practice that continues to this day.

One recent example uncovered of an informal interrogation in the Gettysburg campaign: Teamster Loren W. Young from the 1st Vermont Cavalry was wounded and captured at Hanover, Pennsylvania by J.E.B. Stuart's cavalry. A Confederate officer asked him, "Yank, how many men have your people around here?" Young responded, "Enough to lick the devil out of you." The guard informed him that he was speaking to Brigadier General Fitzhugh Lee. But Young was not punished for his insolence.
 
Modern soldiers are trained to only voluntarily divulge name, rank, and serial numbers. Not so with Civil War soldiers, many of whom seem all too willing to talk after being captured. However, most of the rank & file would know little of value except what unit they were part of. Prisoner interviews could determine what units were on the field against you and a rough order of battle.
 
I don't know much about the Gettysburg Campaign, but the contemporaneous Tullahoma Campaign intel system of the Army of the Cumberland is accessible.

IMG_0245.webp

June 1863 the Armies of the Cumberland & Tennessee faced each other across an 80 mile wide front.

Everyone who crossed that line, prisoners, deserters, ladies returning from visiting relations, peddlers, self liberating slaves, literally anybody was questioned.

IMG_0765.webp


Both Generals Bragg & Polk had their headquarters at Shelbyville TN. This is a detail of the tactical map given to commanders for the advance June 24, 1864.

The kind of granular detail that came, in part, from interviews is evident.

midtn1863.webp

This is a detail of General Polk's map of his corps operations area. Compare his map with the Murfreesboro to Franklin section of Rosecrans' line.

IMG_0251.webp

In the legend of the Army of the Cumberland map are instructions for officers to mark any new information & return the map to Capt. Merrill's topographic unit. Based on this flow of fresh intel, new maps were printed & distributed. Not mentioned in the legend is Sergeant Finegen & "His Motley Crew."

A gifted artist & architect, Nathan Finegen joined an Ohio cavalry regiment. The 14th Army Corps / Army of the Cumberland was a hotbed of innovation nurtured by General Rosecrans. The topographic office was the most advanced in the world. Seconded to Captain Merrill, Finegen was allowed to engage his unique amalgam of talents.

Finegen gathered a "motley crew" of itinerant preachers, peddlers, theatricals & set about learning everything they could about Middle Tennessee & Northern Georgia. The notoriously impatient General Sherman delayed the final preparations of the Atlanta Campaign for five days so that, "Sergeant Finegen & his motley crew can complete their work."

As a result, Sherman ordered an advance at Rocky Face Ridge along a road that Johnston did not know existed. A local drover had shown Finegen where is was.

Finegen, scouts, cartographers, innovative printing technology & 20,000 three color maps produced by a solar copy machine combined to provide Army of the Cumberland commanders with unprecedented situational awareness. There is no better example of intel gathering leading to actionable evidence.

XXXXX

IMG_5745.webp

Major Broome's paper has been published. As usual, my copy sprouts Post-It notes.

Monographs, 1991.

Broome, Doyle D. "Intelligence Operations in the Army of the

Cumberland during the Tullahoma and

Chickamauga Campaigns." Fort

Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research

Library Digital Library School of Advanced

Military Studies Monographs, 1989

Major Brooke wrote a most remarkable paper. He analyzes Rosecrans use of intel in the meticulously planned Tullahoma Campaign & contrasts it with utilization during the Chickamauga Campaign. He supports his conclusions with pages of the actual intel reports that Rosecrans was receiving. Needless to say, the reports are fascinating.

IMG_5746.webp

Public Domain

The intel log from 11 July, a week after the end of the Tullahoma Campaign on 4 July. Bragg was across the Tennessee River, what was he going to do? A deserter reports… & D.A.V., a scout / spy reports…


IMG_5747.webp

Public Domain

After taking Chattanooga, Rosecrans was receiving all manner of reports on what Bragg was going to do. Halleck will report that an Army of Northern Virginia corps had boarded cars for Atlanta. It is very interesting to read the actual reports that informed Rosecrans' decisions.
 
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Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners wasn't enacted until 1929. I haven't found any guidelines or training for soldiers on expectation of them by their army if they were captured.

Gotta love that GI trick of separating Germans in WW II. Those willing to talk were put into one group. Then the second group was told they were going to the Soviet Union. Sing like a canary!

Here's a video on a chaplain who was interrogated by Jeb Stuart.

Thanks to Union Corp emblems, a Union prisoner could be identifed with his corps. Not that the Confederates lugged huge intelligence files on the officers around of every brigade, division or corps. It was generally from pre-war friendships or acquaintenceships, "Ah so-and-so, he was always ________." Lee knew Meade would be cautious and would not make mistakes.
 
I don't have Fisher's book on Union intelligence in front of me (it is in storage) but if memory serves, he alludes to use of physical coercion against Confederate prisoners of war by Sharpe's operatives to get them to talk. How common this was, I have no idea. Given the police practices of the time, I suspect the use of violence against uncooperative prisoners (especially unidentified civilians) was likely resorted to on many occasions by both sides. I would also guess it was the sort of thing that didn't get talked about much much less put on paper.
 
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Ditto at Por Hudson when Nickerson threatened a deserter with death if he was lying. In that incident, the Confederate soldier lied about the Confederate strength and Nickerson was dishearted to "learn" that he was vastly outnumbered.
I seem to recall reading that some commanders intentionally sowed disinformation through phony deserters so as to confuse the enemy.
AR
 
But prisoners, as we can see from the official records, were overwhelmingly truthful in identifying their command, so analysts (had they existed) could have pieced together a reasonably complete assessment of an opposing army's organization, strength and leadership in a given battle.
That's interesting to hear. So prisoner interrogations were a useful means to gain intelligence. I don't recall ever reading that soldiers were given training in resisting interrogation, at least in any consistent manner.
AR
 
Nothing like those damned black hats fellers at Gettysburg. The Confederates knew they weren't militia.
 
June 1863 the Armies of the Cumberland & Tennessee faced each other across an 80 mile wide front.

Everyone who crossed that line, prisoners, deserters, ladies returning from visiting relations, peddlers, self liberating slaves, literally anybody was questioned.
I thought about you when I posted this question. I know you're knowledgeable about the Tullahoma campaign and how intelligence-gathering entered into it.

Do you know how consistent the questioning was that took place? Was there anything like a standard set of objectives or questions that were used? That seems like a long borderline to try to collect information.

AR
 
I thought about you when I posted this question. I know you're knowledgeable about the Tullahoma campaign and how intelligence-gathering entered into it.

Do you know how consistent the questioning was that took place? Was there anything like a standard set of objectives or questions that were used? That seems like a long borderline to try to collect information.

AR

I recommend reading Broome's paper. It is the only source I know of that is focused on the intel… One thing to consider is that there was a wide variety of sources. They interviewed civilians of all sorts coming through the lines, for example. What that meant, of course, was that multiple points of view made the intel credible. There is nothing that supports the favorite trope that Bragg somehow fooled Rosecrans with multiple false reports, for example.

Surely, if there was something in particular that was a subject of interest, guidance of some sort would have been issued… interesting question.
 
I guess that in itself could be useful. I wonder how interrogations would stack up (in terms of usefulness) against observations in the field using binocs, or information gleaned by scouts and cavalry.

AR

I encourage reading Boone's paper. One of the sources was an anonymous civilian that traveled regularly from south of Atlanta to Nashville. What he reported was likely only confirmed in bits & pieces from other sources. Actual scouting was given the highest credibility, which makes sense. In the process of going through hundreds of independent reports, patterns appear.

Keep in mind that the Cumberlanders were very good at intercepting Bagg's messages. The intercepts were called "contrabands'" which can be confusing.
 
Strange as it may seem to us, the news papers were a prime source of intel. Soldier letters to the editor were often unfiltered, for example. The New York Times printed "contrabands" of messages that did not make it to Richmond. A remarkable absence of elemental discretion
Was the norm.

The Nashville Daily Union paper for 1862 will, I am sure, surprise you with the wealth of intel that can be gleaned. Read more here.

Link

 
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Major Brooke wrote a most remarkable paper. He analyzes Rosecrans use of intel in the meticulously planned Tullahoma Campaign & contrasts it with utilization during the Chickamauga Campaign. He supports his conclusions with pages of the actual intel reports that Rosecrans was receiving. Needless to say, the reports are fascinating.
These intel logs are so cool! They give a fascinating view into what kind of information was gathered.

I'm just curious about the two images you posted. Are these transcriptions of single continuous log that was kept, or are they collected by Maj Brooke or someone else from separate documents?

AR
 
These intel logs are so cool! They give a fascinating view into what kind of information was gathered.

I'm just curious about the two images you posted. Are these transcriptions of single continuous log that was kept, or are they collected by Maj Brooke or someone else from separate documents?

AR

I should have been more explicit. The book is a paperback reproduction of the Fort Leavenworth staff college paper. I encountered it online… a long time ago. I recently ordered the hard copy & took the photos of those pages.

The intel log entries are chosen by the author to support the narrative. Rosecrans made very good use of the intel during the Tullahoma Campaign. In contrast, during the Chickamauga campaign he allowed his judgement of Bragg's ability to cloud his analysis. It is an interesting conclusion.

As you say, perusing the original messages is very interesting. Are you familiar with the Thomas Eckert papers?

Eckert ran the Military Telegraph office in Washington. The signal ledgers were supposed to be destroyed. To everyone's surprise, they appeared out of the blue (+/-) 10 years ago.

16,000 original telegraphic messages, including Dana's eye's only ledger, are here for you to read.

Link

 
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As you say, perusing the original messages is very interesting. Are you familiar with the Thomas Eckert papers?

Eckert ran the Military Telegraph office in Washington. The signal ledgers were supposed to be destroyed. To everyone's surprise, they appeared out of the blue (+/-) 10 years ago.
I think you have mentioned this resource during other discussions. So great that they exist!
AR
 
Rosecrans made very good use of the intel during the Tullahoma Campaign. In contrast, during the Chickamauga campaign he allowed his judgement of Bragg's ability to cloud his analysis. It is an interesting conclusion.
I wonder what made the difference. Anyway, during the Tullahoma campaign, he must have had staff dedicated to the collation and analysis of the data coming in.
AR
 

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