How was the smaller CSA able to survive so long?

[ForeverFree]

From another thread:

With all those deductions from an already much smaller Confederate army, does Williams indicate how so few remaining Confederates were able hold off that 2,778,304 Federal army –over 3 million if Williams' figures are added to it? If Williams' estimates that an addition of 500,000 men to the Confederate army would have made it the approximate size of the Federal army he would have virtually the entire free male population (all races) in the Confederate army.

This issue comes up often - how was the CSA able to survive so long with smaller numbers? It deserves a separate thread. I hope that folks who are knowledgeable on the subject can discuss.

As conjecture and speculation only, the following might be reasons why the Union's advantage in soldier enlistments did not lead to a quick end to the war:
• the Union had to do occupation duty in the Border states, which was a diversion of troops from fighting Confederates
• a number of troops were engaged in protecting the frontier, which was sometimes a euphemism for fighting Indians
• in many cases, the Union had to attack fortified and entrenced positions. Frontal assualts against such positions often proved fatal, and the use of siege warfare was a response
• the Confedracy instituted what would be called a stop-loss program today ~ Confederate soldiers served for longer durations than the average Union soldier. Thus the CSA was able to maintain troop levels, to an extent, while the Union was forced to recruit more men, who had less experience than CSA vets
• the Union had to do occupation duty in large parts of the Confederacy. These troops were vital, of course, but they could not be dedicated to destroying the Confederate army and navy
• the Confederates made use of slave labor, which enabled more white men to fight in the CSA army and navy. (The Union countered by engaging fugitive slaves, or slaves in occupied lands, to provide labor to the USA.)
• some of the Union war apparatus was used to harbor and protect war refugees/displaced or runaway slaves

To repeat, I only make the above comments as conjecture and speculation. But it does not seem to me that simply having more enlistees is the single, decisive factor in determining military victory. Although it can certainly be one of several decisive factors, and even the most important one.

My own feeling is that while the Union's manpower advantages did not result in a quick and easy war, it did prevent the large-scale invasion of USA land by Confederates. Thus, war damage was limited to Confederate soil. And that made for a huge difference in the quality of life for the two sides.

Consider that, the Confederacy lost land almost from the start, in the west especially. By the end of 1863, much of the western part Confederacy was either under effective Union control, or, Confederate movement there was strategically impeded. By the end of the war, some southerners were so short of food that women were rioting in the streets for bread. The Confederate economy was in shambles. Cities in the southeast especially took major damage. The physical destruction to the CSA was in the hundreds of millions of dollars, compared to very little damage in the USA.

I think that the ways in which the Union's manpower advantages made for a much better quality of life in the Union states is very under-appreciated. Simply put, the Union had much less civilain suffering and physical ruin within the borders of its section. That might have been decisive in maintaining continued support for the war among most of the Union people.

These are just some ideas. I hope some of the experts can weigh in.

- Alan

 

[rhettbutler1865]

Good thread; covered before, but nice re-visit...

 

[ReadingThroughHistory]

Many Southerners fought very hard to defend their soil. As you pointed out, the Rebs had to defend while the Federals had to occupy, conquer, and hold. The amount of manpower it took to overtake such a large section of land is noteworthy. Traditional fighting made way for siege warfare. Siege warfare made way for Sherman's Total War type of fight against the enemy's people and resources. That's what finally brought the South to their knees and won the war.

 

[OpnCoronet]

To me, the in the historical perspective, the war did not last too long at all. it was about avg. for the length of the major wars of inv0lving the United States.
While objectively, considering the overwhelming advantage of the north in almost all important aspects of war winning assets, in 1860-1861, those aspects were almost wholly potential, i.e., they did not exist to any appreciable degree at the beginning of the war, they had to be developed and deployed. In that respect the North as in WWI and II, the time required to do so, was quite rapid and almost totally unexpected by almost everyone, including many northerners.
As already noted on this board, the war in the West was in an almost continuous and progressive state of collapse, from the very beginning of war(beginning with the csa losing Mo. Ky and Md.) But, for Bragg's strategic thrust into Ky. in 1862, the war in the West would probably have ended a year earlier than it did in real life. What lengthened the war in the West was not southern armies, but, the vast(relatively) distances invading armies had to cover and the almost total unpreparedness of the North, in the beginning to fight a mobil war over great distances with mass armies., considering the North started out with practically nothing, IMO, the time consumed was nothing short of miraculous.
Also, from a psychological point of view, many who read the history of the War, become infected with the idea, of lost time, because of being fixated, on the war in Va. Psychological, because, IMO, the war in the East, seemed longer because a string of impressive confederate victories, within a relatively short time, made time to seem to slow down, while almost everyone in the East, tended to judge the success of the war by defeating Lee and the ANV. Actually the time between McClellan and Meade was not very long at all. The number of impressive victories by Lee over very unimpressive northern commanders only made it seem so long.

 

[Silverfox]

While it is true the North did not suffer much physical damage---There still were many fellows not returning from many battlefields. True on both sides---One wonders what contributions were missed because of these deaths---And did the brave die in greater numbers because they were brave?

 

[1SGDan]

A great deal is made of this supposedly notable achievement, however, by comparison, it is really not that remarkable. The south is roughly the same size as Europe. The armies of just one of the European countries, Germany, held out just as long as the Confederacy against even longer odds. Even more amazing was the fact that they grew their zone of influence while the Confederacy shrank from day one. The length of time taken to subdue the rebellion had more to do with the amount of area to be conquered versus the average rate of travel available.

 

[JCM6395]

You covered it pretty well in my view. Further south they advanced the more troops were required to guard the rail lines to protect the supply shipments feeding the advancing armies. South fought on its home turf...big advantage there in Virginia.

 

[Patrick H]

Alan, I'm no expert but your opening points all seem very logical and reasonable to me. I think the fact that the war was mostly fought in Confederate lands was a contributing factor, too.

 

[OpnCoronet]

As it usually is in such matters, it is a matter of perspective. As already noted, the time from McClellan to Meade, is relatively short, as was that between Meade and Grant and from the beginning of Grant's Overland Campaign to Appomattox, it was just a very little less than a year.
It was not particularly southern valor that decided the time line, but the time required to bring the talent and resources required for victory to be produced and deployed and that time line was bvery quick indeed, relative to where the North started from, i.e., almost nothing except the potential.

 

[hrobalabama]

Not only fought on home soil, but also the ineptness of the early Union generals and War Deparftment.

 

[CSA Today]

From another thread:



This issue comes up often - how was the CSA able to survive so long with smaller numbers? It deserves a separate thread. I hope that folks who are knowledgeable on the subject can discuss.

As conjecture and speculation only, the following might be reasons why the Union's advantage in soldier enlistments did not lead to a quick end to the war:
• the Union had to do occupation duty in the Border states, which was a diversion of troops from fighting Confederates
• a number of troops were engaged in protecting the frontier, which was sometimes a euphemism for fighting Indians
• in many cases, the Union had to attack fortified and entrenced positions. Frontal assualts against such positions often proved fatal, and the use of siege warfare was a response
• the Confedracy instituted what would be called a stop-loss program today ~ Confederate soldiers served for longer durations than the average Union soldier. Thus the CSA was able to maintain troop levels, to an extent, while the Union was forced to recruit more men, who had less experience than CSA vets
• the Union had to do occupation duty in large parts of the Confederacy. These troops were vital, of course, but they could not be dedicated to destroying the Confederate army and navy
• the Confederates made use of slave labor, which enabled more white men to fight in the CSA army and navy. (The Union countered by engaging fugitive slaves, or slaves in occupied lands, to provide labor to the USA.)
• some of the Union war apparatus was used to harbor and protect war refugees/displaced or runaway slaves

To repeat, I only make the above comments as conjecture and speculation. But it does not seem to me that simply having more enlistees is the single, decisive factor in determining military victory. Although it can certainly be one of several decisive factors, and even the most important one.

My own feeling is that while the Union's manpower advantages did not result in a quick and easy war, it did prevent the large-scale invasion of USA land by Confederates. Thus, war damage was limited to Confederate soil. And that made for a huge difference in the quality of life for the two sides.

Consider that, the Confederacy lost land almost from the start, in the west especially. By the end of 1863, much of the western part Confederacy was either under effective Union control, or, Confederate movement there was strategically impeded. By the end of the war, some southerners were so short of food that women were rioting in the streets for bread. The Confederate economy was in shambles. Cities in the southeast especially took major damage. The physical destruction to the CSA was in the hundreds of millions of dollars, compared to very little damage in the USA.

I think that the ways in which the Union's manpower advantages made for a much better quality of life in the Union states is very under-appreciated. Simply put, the Union had much less civilain suffering and physical ruin within the borders of its section. That might have been decisive in maintaining continued support for the war among most of the Union people.

These are just some ideas. I hope some of the experts can weigh in.

- Alan

At the same time, the Federal armies found the troops, gunboat and other resources to open new fronts or armed threats over far flung regions of the CSA forcing the much smaller Confederate army to disperse troops to meet the enemy's threats to those areas. In many historical instances, having a large country (in geographical size) would be an advantage for the defender, but definitely not the case for the large in size but population challenged Confederate States.

My argument is not so much with you as it with lefty hunter who has a source that claims that that three- fourth of the Confederate army had deserted by 1864. In addition his source purports that nearly 500,000 Southerners (black and white) joined the Federal army or were unionist partisans, and that if they had not done so the Confederate army would be approximately the same size as the Federal army.

The 1860 census shows that the 11 Confederate States (including what later became West Virginia) had a total population of 9,103,372. Of that number 5,598,374 were free, if half were male it would be 2,799, 167 (all races ages and conditions of health). From that number, plus perhaps a 100,000 or so from Border States and a few from Northern states, the Confederate States built an army.

I don't take Lefty Hunter's source seriously, but it would be interesting to hear whether the author (David Williams) explains Confederate near manpower parity and staying power for four years to gross Federal ineptitude, desertion or to some other cause. So far, Lefty hunter hasn't said that Williams attributes it to Confederate man for man superiority.

 

[E_just_E]

I think that the answer to this question likely centers on a. readiness and b. tactics.

In the beginning, both sides though that this was going to be a short war, so they recruited for 90 days. After the first Bull Run/Manassas, perceptions changed and they really started recruiting for what it might take. They were not ready for a while. I'd venture to say that they were not ready until late 1862/early 1863.

The tactics were likely due to the absurd closeness of the 2 capitals: Washington and Richmond are 106 miles apart and google maps lets me know that it will take less than 35 hours to walk the distance. So, at least 50% of the war effort was to defend the capitals, and the other 50% of the war effort (in the East) was to try to move towards territory, assume defensive positions right away and wait for the other party to send his troops to mass suicide. That does not move fast. Had the Federals and Confederates moved their capitals (back) to Philadelphia and Montgomery (let's say,) things would had been different.

We all know how effective Sherman's march was. Any doubt that, if 100% of the war effort of the Union on day 1 was similar, with an appropriate large force, determined and knowledgeable leaders and a singular objective (Richmond.,) the outcome would had been different? No doubts on that here....

 

[NedBaldwin]

I'm with Dan and OpnCornet -- I dont think the length of the war is that notable.
Given the unpreparedness of the US at the start of 1861, mobilization took time.
Given the geographical extent and logistical constraints, moving armies took time.
After that, I think leadership was a critical issue -- I think it was why the US accomplished little in the east between may 1862 and may 1864.

 

[nextcity]

The topography of Virginia and the choice of Richmond as the the capital of the Confederacy, for the primarily east-west orientation of its river systems, the natural "shielded" transportation corridors of the Shenandoah and Luray Valley, etc. made it very difficult to conquer.

Had Virginia's topography been like that of Tennessee, for example...and had the Confederate capital remained at Montgomery, I suspect the ACW would not have lasted four years.

 

[MaryDee]

Gary Gallagher's The Confederate War has a lot of your answers, some of which have been stated above. He especially stresses the fact that Confederate morale was closely tied to the successes of Robert E Lee and the ANV, even though other Confederate armies and generals were, for the most part, doing miserably.

 

[KansasFreestater]

• the Confedracy instituted what would be called a stop-loss program today ~ Confederate soldiers served for longer durations than the average Union soldier. Thus the CSA was able to maintain troop levels, to an extent, while the Union was forced to recruit more men, who had less experience than CSA vets

Also, in the Confederacy, new recruits were incorporated into existing regiments, where the newbies could quickly learn what they needed to know from all the veterans around them.

In the Union, in contrast, because of the constant need to reward political friends and maintain public support for the war, political supporters would be offered the plum of a commission as colonel if they could organize a new regiment, all of whom were new recruits. So you had people who didn't know what they were doing, in leadership positions over other people who had no idea what they were doing, with no or few veterans in the regiment to quickly break the new guys in. Which resulted in horrific waste of lives.

 

[Silverfox]

McClellan added at least a year to the war with indecision---He would when a battle and then retreat---Fear of Stonewall added some time---He would win and then look for another opportunity to attack---After Stonewall's death there was much hard fighting but Lee did not win large battles on the offense---only on the defense. The only chance was to give Stonewall more men and turn him loose up North---Did not happen. It would have had to happen early in war to be successful and be a negotiated peace.

 

[KansasFreestater]

Many Southerners fought very hard to defend their soil. As you pointed out, the Rebs had to defend while the Federals had to occupy, conquer, and hold. The amount of manpower it took to overtake such a large section of land is noteworthy.

Indeed, many Europeans thought there was no way the North could win, since the Southern landmass was so huge.

 

[cash]

I don't think four years is long at all. My question is why did they lose so soon? They had a huge territory that had to be conquered, they had armies and a navy, they had interior lines, they were on the defensive, and they were generally defending territory with which they were familiar, yet it only took four years to subdue them. That's a short time.

 

[Lt.Drake]

When you consider the ability of an army in the field, on an active campaign against another army, you are actually looking at a bunch of different factors. We've seen time and time again throughout history, instances wherein a smaller army defeated a larger one, and instances where a tiny force withstood an impregnable force for longer than imaginable before succumbing, such as the Spartans at Thermopylae or the Brits at Rourkes Drift.

We have to look at the following factors:

Weapons and Equipment: Despite the "ragged rebel mythos, most Southern units were as well-armed as their northern counterparts, sometimes better, sometimes worse. They usually had adequate uniforms and gear (even if it was stolen or homemade), and solder-for-soldier, they were equal in this regard.

Logistics and supply: Notwithstanding having less miles of railroads, most Confederate units were kept stock in the ubiquitous 'beans, bullets and band-aids' necessary to keep an army going.

Leadership: Okay, so the South got many of the best commanders at the outset of the war, and maintained an overwhelming number of good leaders, some of which (like J.B. Gordon) were citizen soldiers. The army of the North struggled under the command of men who had never had military experience, were sub-par commanders, or did not know how to utilize the lay of the land, their troops, and all the factors of military strategy to win decisive victories until halfway through the war.

Numbers: The North got the lion's share of personnel, outnumbering the South by more than 4-1, and this trend continues throughout the war

Strategy: For the most part, the South fought a defensive war, and when combined with decent leadership, a defensive war (combined with the guerrilla tactics employed by men like Mosby, Forrest, Morgan and Quantrill), it was an uphill battle (no pun intended) for the Union to seize and hold crucial areas of the South.

X-Factors: We need to look at the psychology of the fighting men and commanders. Many of the Confederate soldiers and commanders felt backed against the wall when their states were invaded, and believing that their own homes and families were in danger gave them a psychological boost in battle the Union soldiers could not match. If a cornered rattlesnake is the most dangerous, then the Union found themselves holding the snake by the tail for almost three years.

It should also be stated that many of the Confederate soldiers had been farmers, hunters and woodsmen, and Then, like today, if you take a store clerk from New York, and put him up against a farm boy from Arkansas, it's not gonna be much of a fight.


I'd like to delve into this more, but we're gettin' hammered by a heck of a storm. I'll come back and write more if I don't get blown off. lol