Hood on Cleburne

[Luke Freet]

Doing research for my senior seminar paper on Patrick Cleburne and his legacy. I had come across a quote from John Bell Hood praising Cleburne as a general, and I decided to look up the quote from his memoir Advance & Retreat. I'd like to share it because it's pretty interesting.

Note: the original text was a single paragraph; I added the spacing to facilitate easier reading.

"Major General Cleburne had been distinguished for his admirable conduct upon many fields, and his loss, at this moment, was irreparable. In order to estimate fully the value of his services at this particular juncture, I will , in a few words, advert to our past relations. He was a man of equally quick perception and strong character, and was, especially in one respect, in advance of many of our people. He possessed the boldness and the wisdom to earnestly advocate, at an early period of the war, the freedom of the negro and the enrollment of the young and able-bodied men of that race. This stroke of policy and additional source of strength to our Armies, would, in my opinion , have given us our independence.

He was for the first time under my immediate command at New Hope Church where his Division, formed for action according to my specific instructions, achieved the most bril liant success of Johnston's campaign. He had full knowledge of all the circumstances and difficulties which attended the battles of the 20th , and 22d of July. It will be remembered that he called at my headquarters after these two engagements, and communicated to me Hardee's unfortunate words of caution to the troops, in regard to breastworks, just before the battle of the 20th.

He knew also in what manner my orders at Spring Hill had been totally disregarded. After cur last brief interview which was followed so quickly by his death, I sought to account for his sudden revolution of feeling and his hopefulness, since he had been regarded as not over sanguine of the final triumph of our cause. I formed the conviction that he became satisfied on the morning of the 30th of November, after having reviewed the occurrences of the previous afternoon and night, and those of the 20th and 22d of July, that I was not the reckless, indiscreet commander the Johnston-Wigfall party represented me; that I had been harshly judged, and feebly sustained by the officers and men ; that I was dealing blows and making moves which had at least the promise of happy results , and that we should have achieved decided success on two occasions around Atlanta as well as at Spring Hill.

He therefore made a sudden and firm resolution to support me in all my operations, believing that my movements and manner of handling troops were based upon correct principles. It has been said he stated, upon the morning after the affair of Spring Hill, that he would never again allow one of my orders for battle to be disobeyed, if he could prevent it. For these reasons his loss became doubly great to me. The heroic career and death of this distinguished soldier must ever endear the memory of his last words to his commander, and should entitle his name to be inscribed in immortal characters in the annals of our history" (John Bell Hood, Advance & Retreat, 296-297).

There's a lot to be said here. For one, while this is quite soaring praise from Hood, he is writing years after the fact in regards to the Army of Tennessee's martyr, whom he, by his order to attack at Franklin, is most responsible for Cleburne's death.

It also reaks of passive aggrandizement and justification for Hood. He emphasizes how much Cleburne respected him. He praises Cleburne for informing him of Hardee's apparent indiscretions at Peachtree Creek & Atlanta. He says that Cleburne backed him on the Spring Hill issue.

Whether Hood truly believed in Cleburne's ability at the time is disputable.

 

[JD-reb]

Doing research for my senior seminar paper on Patrick Cleburne and his legacy. I had come across a quote from John Bell Hood praising Cleburne as a general, and I decided to look up the quote from his memoir Advance & Retreat. I'd like to share it because it's pretty interesting.

Note: the original text was a single paragraph; I added the spacing to facilitate easier reading.

"Major General Cleburne had been distinguished for his admirable conduct upon many fields, and his loss, at this moment, was irreparable. In order to estimate fully the value of his services at this particular juncture, I will , in a few words, advert to our past relations. He was a man of equally quick perception and strong character, and was, especially in one respect, in advance of many of our people. He possessed the boldness and the wisdom to earnestly advocate, at an early period of the war, the freedom of the negro and the enrollment of the young and able-bodied men of that race. This stroke of policy and additional source of strength to our Armies, would, in my opinion , have given us our independence.

He was for the first time under my immediate command at New Hope Church where his Division, formed for action according to my specific instructions, achieved the most bril liant success of Johnston's campaign. He had full knowledge of all the circumstances and difficulties which attended the battles of the 20th , and 22d of July. It will be remembered that he called at my headquarters after these two engagements, and communicated to me Hardee's unfortunate words of caution to the troops, in regard to breastworks, just before the battle of the 20th.

He knew also in what manner my orders at Spring Hill had been totally disregarded. After cur last brief interview which was followed so quickly by his death, I sought to account for his sudden revolution of feeling and his hopefulness, since he had been regarded as not over sanguine of the final triumph of our cause. I formed the conviction that he became satisfied on the morning of the 30th of November, after having reviewed the occurrences of the previous afternoon and night, and those of the 20th and 22d of July, that I was not the reckless, indiscreet commander the Johnston-Wigfall party represented me; that I had been harshly judged, and feebly sustained by the officers and men ; that I was dealing blows and making moves which had at least the promise of happy results , and that we should have achieved decided success on two occasions around Atlanta as well as at Spring Hill.

He therefore made a sudden and firm resolution to support me in all my operations, believing that my movements and manner of handling troops were based upon correct principles. It has been said he stated, upon the morning after the affair of Spring Hill, that he would never again allow one of my orders for battle to be disobeyed, if he could prevent it. For these reasons his loss became doubly great to me. The heroic career and death of this distinguished soldier must ever endear the memory of his last words to his commander, and should entitle his name to be inscribed in immortal characters in the annals of our history" (John Bell Hood, Advance & Retreat, 296-297).

There's a lot to be said here. For one, while this is quite soaring praise from Hood, he is writing years after the fact in regards to the Army of Tennessee's martyr, whom he, by his order to attack at Franklin, is most responsible for Cleburne's death.

It also reaks of passive aggrandizement and justification for Hood. He emphasizes how much Cleburne respected him. He praises Cleburne for informing him of Hardee's apparent indiscretions at Peachtree Creek & Atlanta. He says that Cleburne backed him on the Spring Hill issue.

Whether Hood truly believed in Cleburne's ability at the time is disputable.

I agree. Hood's words are aimed at vindication for himself more than praise for Cleburne.

 

[Rebforever]

General Hood wrote what he believed. That is good enough for me.


X correction

 

[Nathan Stuart]

In my view, Hood's writings could never be wholly trusted, and thought he exceeded the normal degree of self-serving exhibited in reporting by senior officers of the time.

Hood had numerous flaws as an Army commander. Apart from his propensity to distort (or misrepresent) the facts in his favor, one of his many character flaws was his inability to admit (and learn from) his own mistakes and to also shift fault to others.

To illustrate. Can recall Hood's severe criticism of Cleburne following the escape of Schofield's Army at Spring Hill. On the early morning of Nov. 30, 1864, Hood held a breakfast conference with an unknown group of officers of various ranks, at Rippavilla (Cleburne was not present). Apparently, during the heated exchanges that ensued, Hood unfairly attributed the blame for the lost opportunity at Spring Hill on Cleburne (as well as others). After the conference, on that same day, when Cleburne heard about Hood's criticism of him, he met with his colleague Brown, to express his anger about Hood's attempt to blame him and to show his affectation caused by this unfair criticism. Brown recalled this meeting with Cleburne and what Cleburne had said to him, in a letter he wrote to Cheatham in 1881. The relevant extract is shown below:

…"When he came up we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feelingthat he had heard that the Commanding General was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility of allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject, and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said: 'No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel,' and said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and he should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, so soon as we were awayfrom the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry, and evidently was deeply hurt, under the conviction that the Commander-in-Chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemyduring the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of a command occupying a position on the left, and concluded by saying that 'of course the responsibility rests with the Commander-in;Chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the nightof the movement of the enemy.' The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders for both of us from yourself or the Commanding General. As he left he said: 'We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment, ' but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin."…
(Source: 'Southern Historical Papers', Vol. IX, at pp 588-89)

If Cleburne's understanding here is accepted as being accurate, then this episode demonstrates the disingenuousness of Hood's expressed views, that he was two-faced and that he was capable of disparaging senior commanders, even to lower subordinates, behind their backs – all behaviors not generally associated with a credible leader. Cleburne's sense of honor and devotion to duty, however, prevented him from immediately and directly challenging Hood – he carried out orders, without questioning them.

At least by this stage of the war, and in the period beyond, thought Hood had no regard for anyone, but himself. The contents of Hood's postwar memoirs need to be 'taken with a grain of salt'.

 

[Rebforever]

In my view, Hood's writings could never be wholly trusted, and thought he exceeded the normal degree of self-serving exhibited in reporting by senior officers of the time.

Hood had numerous flaws as an Army commander. Apart from his propensity to distort (or misrepresent) the facts in his favor, one of his many character flaws was his inability to admit (and learn from) his own mistakes and to also shift fault to others.

To illustrate. Can recall Hood's severe criticism of Cleburne following the escape of Schofield's Army at Spring Hill. On the early morning of Nov. 30, 1864, Hood held a breakfast conference with an unknown group of officers of various ranks, at Rippavilla (Cleburne was not present). Apparently, during the heated exchanges that ensued, Hood unfairly attributed the blame for the lost opportunity at Spring Hill on Cleburne (as well as others). After the conference, on that same day, when Cleburne heard about Hood's criticism of him, he met with his colleague Brown, to express his anger about Hood's attempt to blame him and to show his affectation caused by this unfair criticism. Brown recalled this meeting with Cleburne and what Cleburne had said to him, in a letter he wrote to Cheatham in 1881. The relevant extract is shown below:

…"When he came up we rode apart from the column through the fields, and he told me with much feelingthat he had heard that the Commanding General was endeavoring to place upon him the responsibility of allowing the enemy to pass our position on the night previous. I replied to him that I had heard nothing on that subject, and that I hoped he was mistaken. He said: 'No, I think not; my information comes through a very reliable channel,' and said that he could not afford to rest under such an imputation, and he should certainly have the matter investigated to the fullest extent, so soon as we were awayfrom the immediate presence of the enemy. General Cleburne was quite angry, and evidently was deeply hurt, under the conviction that the Commander-in-Chief had censured him. I asked General Cleburne who was responsible for the escape of the enemyduring the afternoon and night previous. In reply to that inquiry he indulged in some criticisms of a command occupying a position on the left, and concluded by saying that 'of course the responsibility rests with the Commander-in;Chief, as he was upon the field during the afternoon and was fully advised during the nightof the movement of the enemy.' The conversation at this point was abruptly terminated by the arrival of orders for both of us from yourself or the Commanding General. As he left he said: 'We will resume this conversation at the first convenient moment, ' but in less than three hours after that time this gallant soldier was a corpse upon the bloody field of Franklin."…
(Source: 'Southern Historical Papers', Vol. IX, at pp 588-89)

If Cleburne's understanding here is accepted as being accurate, then this episode demonstrates the disingenuousness of Hood's expressed views, that he was two-faced and that he was capable of disparaging senior commanders, even to lower subordinates, behind their backs – all behaviors not generally associated with a credible leader. Cleburne's sense of honor and devotion to duty, however, prevented him from immediately and directly challenging Hood – he carried out orders, without questioning them.

At least by this stage of the war, and in the period beyond, thought Hood had no regard for anyone, but himself. The contents of Hood's postwar memoirs need to be 'taken with a grain of salt'.

There is that danged "reliable source" again. You are scrapping the bottom of the pan on this one, my friend.

 

[jackt62]

The contents of Hood's postwar memoirs need to be 'taken with a grain of salt'.

I tend to agree, although the same could be said of many CW memoirs including Grant's or Sherman's. But certainly Hood had a large axe to grind when he devoted much attention in his memoirs to going after or defending himself against Joe Johnston and others.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

There is that danged "reliable source" again. You are scrapping the bottom of the pan on this one, my friend.

Especially from 1864 and onwards, thought that there was plenty in the bottom of the pan to scrape, regarding Hood. Also consider the recollections by John C. Brown to be a credible source.

No doubting Hood's bravery and dedication or his reputation for recklessness. But by 1864, he was patently unfit for Army command, as subsequent battlefield events would prove. His best years as a combat Division commander were behind him.

Believe that valid criticism can be directed at his Army leadership performance, as well as his character flaws that rendered him unfit for Army field command.

Believe the following two descriptions are authoritative summations of Hood's incapacity for Army command.

…"He was a simple man, often tactless and crude, more of a fighter than a general. Confederate and Union generals alike never doubted his combative ability, but seriously doubted his abilities to direct an army strategically. In ….war, Hood's was a simple , naïve code – to attack head on."….

('Autumn of Glory' by Thomas Connelly, at page 322).

And consistently,

…"John Bell Hood was a sad anachronism, a disabled personality prone to miscalculation and misperception. Unfortunately, he was also a fool with a license to kill his own men."….

('The Confederacy's Last Hurrah' by Wiley Sword, at page 263)

Thought Hood was an individual who repeatedly told untruths in his written messaging. Whether these were intentional or not in each instance, does not need to be determined here. One could describe him as being a serial liar after reading his various secret correspondences (unknown to Johnston) sent to Bragg, Seddon or Davis during the first half of 1864, that were designed to undermine Johnston and elevate his own position. He misrepresented the condition of the Army and lied about Johnston's willingness to fight and about his own readiness to counter Sherman. Refusing also to accept any responsibility (as usual) for his own failures, Hood would choose convenient scapegoats. He blamed Hardee and subordinate officers as well as openly criticized the Army for its lack of fight, after the fall of Atlanta. Similarly, he blamed Cleburne and others following the lost opportunity at Spring Hill. Hood's officers had neither trust nor confidence in him and his soldiers viewed him as reckless. Connolly mentions (ibid. at page 431) that Hood's focus on aggressive tactics, meant that he associated valor and success with casualty counts, and this was virtually psychotic. Personally thought that his behavior at this time indicated that he was at least obsessional, to the extent that he had lost touch with reality and rational thought (and this could easily have extended to his evaluations of subordinates). True to form for distorting the truth, Hood substantially understated his reported casualties during the Tennessee campaign and even falsely declared to Richmond a victory at Franklin. He also ignored orders for reporting to Richmond the condition of the Army after its destruction at Nashville and subsequently sent contradictory and misleading correspondences to Beauregard that the Army was largely intact(it was not until Taylor's visit over 3 weeks later, that the truth was discovered).

Thought Hood demonstrated a pattern of behavior in his inscribed correspondences for telling falsehoods (which included his views of fellow officers). Have little doubt that Hood's propensity for writing untruths likely carried over past the war and into his postwar memoirs, with inaccuracies likely amplified by the passage of time.

(Interestingly, and perhaps not irrelevant to this finding, Hood's grades in 'ethics' at West Point apparently ranked 52nd. in a class of 55).

 

[Rebforever]

Especially from 1864 and onwards, thought that there was plenty in the bottom of the pan to scrape, regarding Hood. Also consider the recollections by John C. Brown to be a credible source.

No doubting Hood's bravery and dedication or his reputation for recklessness. But by 1864, he was patently unfit for Army command, as subsequent battlefield events would prove. His best years as a combat Division commander were behind him.

Believe that valid criticism can be directed at his Army leadership performance, as well as his character flaws that rendered him unfit for Army field command.

Believe the following two descriptions are authoritative summations of Hood's incapacity for Army command.

…"He was a simple man, often tactless and crude, more of a fighter than a general. Confederate and Union generals alike never doubted his combative ability, but seriously doubted his abilities to direct an army strategically. In ….war, Hood's was a simple , naïve code – to attack head on."….

('Autumn of Glory' by Thomas Connelly, at page 322).

And consistently,

…"John Bell Hood was a sad anachronism, a disabled personality prone to miscalculation and misperception. Unfortunately, he was also a fool with a license to kill his own men."….

('The Confederacy's Last Hurrah' by Wiley Sword, at page 263)

Thought Hood was an individual who repeatedly told untruths in his written messaging. Whether these were intentional or not in each instance, does not need to be determined here. One could describe him as being a serial liar after reading his various secret correspondences (unknown to Johnston) sent to Bragg, Seddon or Davis during the first half of 1864, that were designed to undermine Johnston and elevate his own position. He misrepresented the condition of the Army and lied about Johnston's willingness to fight and about his own readiness to counter Sherman. Refusing also to accept any responsibility (as usual) for his own failures, Hood would choose convenient scapegoats. He blamed Hardee and subordinate officers as well as openly criticized the Army for its lack of fight, after the fall of Atlanta. Similarly, he blamed Cleburne and others following the lost opportunity at Spring Hill. Hood's officers had neither trust nor confidence in him and his soldiers viewed him as reckless. Connolly mentions (ibid. at page 431) that Hood's focus on aggressive tactics, meant that he associated valor and success with casualty counts, and this was virtually psychotic. Personally thought that his behavior at this time indicated that he was at least obsessional, to the extent that he had lost touch with reality and rational thought (and this could easily have extended to his evaluations of subordinates). True to form for distorting the truth, Hood substantially understated his reported casualties during the Tennessee campaign and even falsely declared to Richmond a victory at Franklin. He also ignored orders for reporting to Richmond the condition of the Army after its destruction at Nashville and subsequently sent contradictory and misleading correspondences to Beauregard that the Army was largely intact(it was not until Taylor's visit over 3 weeks later, that the truth was discovered).

Thought Hood demonstrated a pattern of behavior in his inscribed correspondences for telling falsehoods (which included his views of fellow officers). Have little doubt that Hood's propensity for writing untruths likely carried over past the war and into his postwar memoirs, with inaccuracies likely amplified by the passage of time.

(Interestingly, and perhaps not irrelevant to this finding, Hood's grades in 'ethics' at West Point apparently ranked 52nd. in a class of 55).

Sorry to say, I am not convinced of the above.

 

[Nathan Stuart]

Sorry to say, I am not convinced of the above.

Appreciate the respectful reply.

One has their own interpretations - that's their prerogative.

The fallibility of recorded historical accounts is that these can be subject to different/varying interpretations.

It's a much more difficult process to investigate and ascertain the mindsets behind the actions - especially as the past becomes more distant.

Perhaps that's what makes the study of history more interesting.

 

[C. Cash]

A sidenote. Stating the obvious here to most of you but the Southern men almost always refer to the May 27, 1864 Battle of Pickett's Mill by the name of the battle fought 2 days previous: New Hope Church. Hood does that here as do most Confederates including Sam Watkins, Gen. Johnston etc. But of course they are referring to Pickett's Mill.