Hood: Excellent or Failure

[JCSettle]

John Bell Hood: The General who sent his men into the bloody charges of Jonesboro in September, 1864, and again at Franklin that November, then could not hold his ground at Nashville in December. I have never understood how Hood, who was so prosperous in the East with Lee, slowly degrades himself as the commander of the Army of Tennessee. His plans were not the failure. The assault on Franklin was a well executed attack, and even though it didn't drive the Federals immediately, it did eventually lead to their pull out that night. Hood was a excellent strategist, but he lacked numbers and comprehension of the fact he could not pull it off with his force. If had a force of maybe 50,000, and assaulted the flanks not just the center, He would have took Franklin. The casualties, unfortunately, would have still been heavy. That could not be changed. No matter where he attacked, the Federals were well entrenched and ready for anything. Hood could have also side stepped east or west to force the Federals to move.

Hood: Excellent or Failure; you decide.

 

[Billy Yank]

Hood = "Berserker." Hood and his Texans performed well under Longstreet's command, but later on with an independent command and the South's fortunes in the balance, things just didn't go too well for him. His reputation eventually "tanked," and his fiancee broke-off their engagement. 1861-1863 Excellent. 1864+ Failure. (My opinion.)

 

[Chattahooch33]

The attack at Franklin did not accomplish anything. The Federals didnt leave due to the attack, they left to further consolidate in Nashville which was the primary goal anyway. Schofield wanted to stay and see if Hood would attack again, which he was planning to do the next morning, and therefore destroy the AoT for good.
You say it was a 'well executed attack'.
It was not. There was a further distance of open ground than Pickett's Charge and absolute no artillery support to soften up the Fed line. The Confederate attacking front was squeezed by the Harpeth on the right causing a logjam and crunching together that disintegrated into mob rush in the osage abatis on that section. It was the dumbest attack\grandest charge of the war. Brunt force and determination almost succeeeded if Opdycke wasn't a johnny on the spot to stem the tide.

Hood was too old school for his own good.

 

[cash]

I think anyone who wants to answer this first needs to read Stephen Hood's new book on General Hood. Much of what we think we know about Hood has been affected by incredibly bad scholarship.

 

[CheathamHill]

inb4 Jacobson

 

[Carronade]

There were a lot of people who performed well at say brigade or division level but faltered when moved up, especially to army command. There's even a term for it, the Peter Principle, although it was coined for business use: people are promoted to their level of incompetence. They do well at one level, they move up, the process continues until they reach a level where they can't perform effectively. It's a bit tongue-in-cheek, but there's an element of truth to it.

 

[OpnCoronet]

Hood was an excellent officer. He was given an impossible job, too late, with inadequate means.

 

[rhp6033]

Hood was an excellent brigade commander, then division commander, until the first phase of his career in the civil war ended with his wounding at Gettysburg. When his men were sent to Chickamauga he joined them despite not being fully recovered, and was seriously wounded again at Chickamauga. The leadership vacume and confusion created by his wounding seriously impacted Hood's attack and prevented them from pushing the Union troops off the field.

But after that, he had serioius problems. He was not well suited for corps and army command. He complained to Davis about Johnston, causing Johnston's removal just outside the defenses of Atlanta, and his own appointment there. His attack (the next day?) had a solid plan if the odds had been even, but was overcome by the greater numuber of Union troops and their ability to put artillary into action on short notice. As it was he set the stage for the the AoT for the rest of the war: throwing itself at superior union forces and taking huge losses it couldn't afford to take.

At Franklin, he didn't really force the Union forces across the river, they wanted to join Thomas in Nashville. Hood hoped to cut them off, defeating a comparitively smaller portion of the Union forces in detail. The attack ended up throwing the creme of the remaining AoT against cannon and entrenchments at Franklin, losing the best in the process (Cleborne, etc.). A better commander would have looked harder for other flanking options, Forrest thought he found a good way to cross and get behind the enemy.

And what did he really expect to accomplish against Nashville? It's defenses were so solid that even Bragg never dreamed of pounding his army against them. He didn't have enough men to beseige it, they could only sit outside one portion of the city while trains brought reinforcements several times a day in from elsewhere. His men fought bravely at Nashville but were essentially outnumbered and outflanked by Union cavalry fighting dismounted with repeating rifles.

After Nashville, the AoT was so effectively destroyed as a fighting force that it was dismembered and it's various parts sent elsewhee (Mobile, N. Carolina, etc.). At that time it was estimated that one-third of the remnant was so sick, wounded, or crippled that they were unable to serve further, so those were simply sent home.

 

[Carronade]

""If [he] had a force of maybe 50,000, and assaulted the flanks not just the center,.....""

A lot of generals would have done well if they had twice as many troops as they did....

 

[1SGDan]

Hood was the CW personification of the Peter Principle.

 

[Billy Yank]

I think anyone who wants to answer this first needs to read Stephen Hood's new book on General Hood. Much of what we think we know about Hood has been affected by incredibly bad scholarship.

My compliments Col. Cash. Bad scholarship or zero scholarship, perhaps. I used to despise revisionist history, but it becomes necessary to correct the record, sometimes, doesn't it? Too much pettifoggery at the base; I fear.

 

[Chattahooch33]

Hood was an excellent officer. He was given an impossible job, too late, with inadequate means.

He was an excellent division commander.
He wasn't necessarily given an impossible job, just one out of his, and probably 97% of all other generals, capability.

 

[Nathanb1]

A better commander would have looked harder for other flanking options, Forrest thought he found a good way to cross and get behind the enemy.

LOL. The way to win. WWFD? I may have a t-shirt made.

Certainly--after having been there and seen the terrain (Nod to Ed Bearss there!).....what were you thinking, General Hood? I still can't quite wrap my mind around it....and I'm not one of those "Lee should have known not to make Pickett's Charge" people....I simply can't understand the place nor what he was thinking the Yankees were going to do.

 

[Nathanb1]

""If [he] had a force of maybe 50,000, and assaulted the flanks not just the center,.....""

A lot of generals would have done well if they had twice as many troops as they did....

Even if you had 50,000 there, there is no where to use them. Well, except perhaps piling up enough bodies to walk across the Harpeth.

 

[Billy Yank]

There were a lot of people who performed well at say brigade or division level but faltered when moved up, especially to army command. There's even a term for it, the Peter Principle, although it was coined for business use: people are promoted to their level of incompetence. They do well at one level, they move up, the process continues until they reach a level where they can't perform effectively. It's a bit tongue-in-cheek, but there's an element of truth to it.

My compliments Sgt. Carronade. Although this may sound absurd, I'd like to think had Hood been given Ewell's Corps at Gettysburg, he most likely would have done better with Culp's Hill, etc. given his aggressive nature...even though that command was not even remotely considered for him. Hood's appointment to the Army of Tennessee, on the other hand, was doomed, in my opinion, but your Peter Principle argument does generally hold water, all things considered.

 

[5fish]

S
I have written about it before Hood wanted to catch and destroy this one union army. Franklin was his last shot at doing it. If the union army crosses the river game over for they would make it safely to Nashville. The assault was an all or nothing shot for Hood achieving his goal. There were no other good choice for Hood in achieving his goal. He made the only choice he had, attack!!! Which he did.... Hood was a good commander up and down the line. He should not have been in charge due to his wounds.... He was a physical wreak ..

 

[OpnCoronet]

He was an excellent division commander.
He wasn't necessarily given an impossible job, just one out of his, and probably 97% of all other generals, capability.

It was certainly a job that even Lee did not want any part of....I'd say the odds against any general, were 100%

 

[ole]

Even if you had 50,000 there, there is no where to use them. Well, except perhaps piling up enough bodies to walk across the Harpeth.

This. Hood couldn't swing to the west, nor could he swing to the east, as Forrest advocated. It was up the middle or let Schofield leave for Nashville unimpeded.

He almost pulled it off. Had it not been for Opdyke's refusal to be posted in advance of the defensive line. One renegade general's counter-attack all but finished Hood's force.

 

[OpnCoronet]

As an aside, Schofield, should have been crushed at Springhill, except for Polk.

 

[Rio Bravo]

Hood was aggressive, bold, and personally brave , but his Franklin-Nashville campaign had been a Disaster reducing the AOT from a strength of 40,000 to less than 20,000 at a time when the South just could not cope with this loss of fighting men !