Hood after Nashville

atlantis

Sergeant Major
Joined
Nov 12, 2016
After the defeat at Nashville, Hood fell back to Tupelo why there and not Florence Alabama. Tupelo seems more distant from Nashville and given the condition of the army wasn't it critical to quickly restore the order of battle. Also it was winter and the soldiers needed winter quarters as soon as possible.
 
An inspector general’s report of the condition of the Army of Tennessee at Tupelo was that it was little more than an unarmed mob. The only equipment most soldiers had was the clothes they wore. Virtually all of the horses, mules & vehicles were lost or abandoned. Entire regiments were reduced to low double digits of men present. The remnant of the A of TN was concentrated at Tupelo because that was where a depot had been established & they could get something to eat. PDSD must have reached plague proportions.

They had to concentrate far enough below the Tennessee River to not present a tempting target. An entire corps of Thomas’ pursuing force was loaded on riverboats & transferred to NewOrleans. 40 gunboats escorted the transports. Their ultimate destination was Mobile. Fortunately, the outright extermination of the A of TN was not a goal.
 
An inspector general’s report of the condition of the Army of Tennessee at Tupelo was that it was little more than an unarmed mob. The only equipment most soldiers had was the clothes they wore. Virtually all of the horses, mules & vehicles were lost or abandoned. Entire regiments were reduced to low double digits of men present. The remnant of the A of TN was concentrated at Tupelo because that was where a depot had been established & they could get something to eat. PDSD must have reached plague proportions.

They had to concentrate far enough below the Tennessee River to not present a tempting target. An entire corps of Thomas’ pursuing force was loaded on riverboats & transferred to NewOrleans. 40 gunboats escorted the transports. Their ultimate destination was Mobile. Fortunately, the outright extermination of the A of TN was not a goal.
I knew they were in rough shape didn't know it was that bad.
 
An inspector general’s report of the condition of the Army of Tennessee at Tupelo was that it was little more than an unarmed mob. The only equipment most soldiers had was the clothes they wore. Virtually all of the horses, mules & vehicles were lost or abandoned. Entire regiments were reduced to low double digits of men present. The remnant of the A of TN was concentrated at Tupelo because that was where a depot had been established & they could get something to eat. PDSD must have reached plague proportions.

They had to concentrate far enough below the Tennessee River to not present a tempting target. An entire corps of Thomas’ pursuing force was loaded on riverboats & transferred to NewOrleans. 40 gunboats escorted the transports. Their ultimate destination was Mobile. Fortunately, the outright extermination of the A of TN was not a goal.
Where can this report be found? Is it available in the net? It must be a impressive reading.
 
An inspector general’s report of the condition of the Army of Tennessee at Tupelo was that it was little more than an unarmed mob. The only equipment most soldiers had was the clothes they wore. Virtually all of the horses, mules & vehicles were lost or abandoned. Entire regiments were reduced to low double digits of men present. The remnant of the A of TN was concentrated at Tupelo because that was where a depot had been established & they could get something to eat. PDSD must have reached plague proportions.
IIRC, some 18,000 of the AoT that finally reassembled at Tupelo, in January 1865 about 3,000 were sent to reinforce Mobile. Many were given furloughs or simply took "walking furloughs," never to return.

Joe Johnston was returned to command the forces to try and stop Sherman on February 22, 1865. On February 6, 1865, Lee had been appointed General in Chief of all Confederate forces. Lee’s message to Johnston read:

"Assume command of the Army of Tennessee and all troops in the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Assign General Beauregard to duty under you, as you may select. Concentrate all available forces and drive back Sherman."

The first contingent of the Army of Tennessee (Stevenson’s Division of Lee’s Corps) to finally move to intercept Sherman began the long and circuitous trip from Tupelo on January 19, 1865. The men moved by way of patchwork railroads, dilapidated steamboats and marching by foot to finally reach, by February 25, within 80 miles of Charlotte. Although the numbers are still difficult to verify with great accuracy, the Army of Tennessee contingent that would eventually end up once more under the command of Joe Johnston was numbered as follows: Lee’s Corps – about 3,500 men; Stewart’s Corps – 1,200; and Cheatham’s Corps – 1,900 effectives. So in total, the Army of Tennessee was now about the size of an 1862 division (about 6,600 men). Even then, not all the men would be able to concentrate at Bentonville in time to take part in all or parts of the fighting from March 18-21, 1865.
 
Where can this report be found? Is it available in the net? It must be a impressive reading.
Do you have a copy of Autumn of Glory? If not you should order one. The footnotes are a goldmine for a person with access to the internet. The book is a classic, still in print from the U of Louisiana Press or used from Amazon or wherever.
 
Do you have a copy of Autumn of Glory? If not you should order one. The footnotes are a goldmine for a person with access to the internet. The book is a classic, still in print from the U of Louisiana Press or used from Amazon or wherever.
I agree. Actually both of Connelly's volumes on the Army of Tennessee: Volume 1: Army of the Heartland (1861-1862) and Volume 2: Autumn of Glory (1862-1865) are excellent.
 
Thank you for the tip - I always longed for a more detailed reading about the AoT (I have only McMurry "Two Great Rebel Armies").
Continuing to go on a bit of a tangent from the topic header here, but if you are looking for good books on the Army of Tennessee in general, your education won't be complete unless you also read Stanley F. Horn's "The Army of Tennessee." It's somewhat dated (1953), so you should always compare what he says with more modern research findings, but it's the first book that really gave the Army of Tennessee its due. Regarding McMurry's "Two Great Rebel Armies," personally I disagreed with at least some of his basic assumptions used in drawing his comparison conclusions, and in the conclusions he reached as a result. He does bring up some interesting assertions, but I'd give that book at best a "3 out of 5" stars, primarily because he doesn't back up his assertions with any quantitative data. Maybe it's just me, but I like "numbers." :wink:
 
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