Hindman's brigade? Shaver's brigade? What??

[Billy1977]

Hello everybody, I was wondering if somebody here could clear up some confusion I have about the structure of Hardee's III Corps at the outset of the Battle of Shiloh. Now from what I understand Hardee's corps consisted of three brigades (Thomas Hindman, Pat Cleburne and S.A.M. Wood) with no intermediate divisional echelon, just three brigades answering to Hardee. OK, now in reading the U.S. Army's Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh it refers to the first shots fired in the battle in the early morning hours of 6 April at Fraley Field southwest of Benjamin Prentiss's divisional camp. It says that Maj. Aaron Hardcastle's 3rd Mississippi Infantry Battalion (of Wood's brigade) was deployed forward of the rest of Wood's brigade as skirmishers and that it was Hardcastle's battalion which fired the first shots against Maj. Powell's reconnaissance patrol (sent out by Peabody). That they exchanged shots for about an hour but then Powell thought he was about to be outflanked on his left so he ordered a retreat. In the course of the retreat they were falling back to Seay Field and they met several companies of Col. Moore's 21st Missouri which were coming up to assist them and that Moore took command but was soon wounded in the leg and himself ordered a retreat to the northeast corner of Seay Field.

Alright, now is where it gets confusing for me. The Staff Ride Handbook says that to the right of S.A.M. Wood's brigade was what it refers to as "R.G. Shaver's brigade". From what I understood Col. Robert Shaver was commander of the 7th Arkansas Infantry Regiment within Hindman's brigade. While I could understand if Hindman was wounded and Shaver was bumped up to command Hindman's brigade in his absence, this was literally the first shots being fired in the battle so I don't see how anything could have incapacitated Hindman yet so I don't understand how Shaver could be in command of Hindman's brigade at this point. In looking further in the Staff Ride Handbook one or two pages later it shows a map of the Fraley Field fighting and the map even shows Wood's brigade and to its right "Shaver's" brigade. So it can't be a simple typo, they must have really meant it to be read as Shaver's brigade. Anybody have any idea what the answer to this is, why Hindman's brigade would be commanded by Robert Shaver at the very outset of the battle?

 

[Sid J.]

Hello everybody, I was wondering if somebody here could clear up some confusion I have about the structure of Hardee's III Corps at the outset of the Battle of Shiloh. Now from what I understand Hardee's corps consisted of three brigades (Thomas Hindman, Pat Cleburne and S.A.M. Wood) with no intermediate divisional echelon, just three brigades answering to Hardee. OK, now in reading the U.S. Army's Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh it refers to the first shots fired in the battle in the early morning hours of 6 April at Fraley Field southwest of Benjamin Prentiss's divisional camp. It says that Maj. Aaron Hardcastle's 3rd Mississippi Infantry Battalion (of Wood's brigade) was deployed forward of the rest of Wood's brigade as skirmishers and that it was Hardcastle's battalion which fired the first shots against Maj. Powell's reconnaissance patrol (sent out by Peabody). That they exchanged shots for about an hour but then Powell thought he was about to be outflanked on his left so he ordered a retreat. In the course of the retreat they were falling back to Seay Field and they met several companies of Col. Moore's 21st Missouri which were coming up to assist them and that Moore took command but was soon wounded in the leg and himself ordered a retreat to the northeast corner of Seay Field.

Alright, now is where it gets confusing for me. The Staff Ride Handbook says that to the right of S.A.M. Wood's brigade was what it refers to as "R.G. Shaver's brigade". From what I understood Col. Robert Shaver was commander of the 7th Arkansas Infantry Regiment within Hindman's brigade. While I could understand if Hindman was wounded and Shaver was bumped up to command Hindman's brigade in his absence, this was literally the first shots being fired in the battle so I don't see how anything could have incapacitated Hindman yet so I don't understand how Shaver could be in command of Hindman's brigade at this point. In looking further in the Staff Ride Handbook one or two pages later it shows a map of the Fraley Field fighting and the map even shows Wood's brigade and to its right "Shaver's" brigade. So it can't be a simple typo, they must have really meant it to be read as Shaver's brigade. Anybody have any idea what the answer to this is, why Hindman's brigade would be commanded by Robert Shaver at the very outset of the battle?

From Daniel page 149:

"Sometime before the battle, Hardee awkwardly formed a provisional Division ... Hindman's command comprised the brigades S.A.M. Wood and Hindman's own, now under Colonel R.G. Shaver"

Hardee mentions this in his report, bottom of page 568. See Also Shaver's Report on page 573 and Wood's Report page 591.

 

[Billy1977]

Thanks Eric Calistri! As I was walking the dog earlier (but after I posted my question) I was thinking "I wonder if Hardee formed some kind of "unofficial" divisional structure within his corps and this bumped Shaver up to command of Hindman's "old" brigade." I should have read Hardee's after-action report in the ORs first anyway (and Shaver's and Wood's...)

OK this makes a lot of sense. Thanks again.

So what happened to Hardee's other two brigades (Cleburne's and Adley Gladden's)? Were they formed into a second provisional division or did they continue to operate as two individual brigades answering directly to Hardee?

 

[Sid J.]

Thanks Eric Calistri! As I was walking the dog earlier (but after I posted my question) I was thinking "I wonder if Hardee formed some kind of "unofficial" divisional structure within his corps and this bumped Shaver up to command of Hindman's "old" brigade." I should have read Hardee's after-action report in the ORs first anyway (and Shaver's and Wood's...)

OK this makes a lot of sense. Thanks again.

So what happened to Hardee's other two brigades (Cleburne's and Adley Gladden's)? Were they formed into a second provisional division or did they continue to operate as two individual brigades answering directly to Hardee?

The Army of the Mississippi organization is pages 382-383 shows Gladden in Withers Div of Bragg's (2nd) Corps. Of course, it also shows Hardee with 3 Brigades Hindman, Cleburne and Wood, not showing the change Hardee, Shaver and Wood all mention in their reports.

I think this where Daniels "awkward" comes in.

Corps -- Division --- Brigades

Hardee -----Hindman -----Shaver & Wood
|-----------------------------Cleburne. [Edit] plus Gladden

if that makes sense, (and it probably shouldn't.)

 

[Billy1977]

So if I understand you correctly you're saying that Hardee formed only one provisional division (under Hindman, with Hindman's old brigade now under Shaver plus Wood's brigade) and left Cleburne's brigade independent? Hardee mentions Gladden's brigade being attached to his (Hardee's) corps before the Battle of Shiloh meaning Gladden's brigade would have been (at least temporarily) detached from Jones Withers's division of Bragg's II Corps and attached to Hardee's corps. So I'm guessing Cleburne's and Gladden's brigades answered directly to Hardee while he let Hindman control Shaver's and Wood's brigades together as a provisional division?

 

[Sid J.]

So if I understand you correctly you're saying that Hardee formed only one provisional division (under Hindman, with Hindman's old brigade now under Shaver plus Wood's brigade) and left Cleburne's brigade independent? Hardee mentions Gladden's brigade being attached to his (Hardee's) corps before the Battle of Shiloh meaning Gladden's brigade would have been (at least temporarily) detached from Jones Withers's division of Bragg's II Corps and attached to Hardee's corps. So I'm guessing Cleburne's and Gladden's brigades answered directly to Hardee while he let Hindman control Shaver's and Wood's brigades together as a provisional division?

You are absolutely correct, I think that nails it down. I went back and fixed my org diagram above. Thanks!

 

[novushomus]

So if I understand you correctly you're saying that Hardee formed only one provisional division (under Hindman, with Hindman's old brigade now under Shaver plus Wood's brigade) and left Cleburne's brigade independent? Hardee mentions Gladden's brigade being attached to his (Hardee's) corps before the Battle of Shiloh meaning Gladden's brigade would have been (at least temporarily) detached from Jones Withers's division of Bragg's II Corps and attached to Hardee's corps. So I'm guessing Cleburne's and Gladden's brigades answered directly to Hardee while he let Hindman control Shaver's and Wood's brigades together as a provisional division?

That is essentially correct.

It was a very awkward structure - Hindman's two brigades were deployed together, with Cleburne's brigade to the left flank of Hindman's provisional division and Gladden's to the right. Hardee would have to ride between the two to exercise any effective direct control. Of course, the entire Confederate tactical deployment was awkward from Beauregard's insistence on stacking the army corps in tandem, but this made it even more so. Its also a worthwhile observation that Jones M. Withers's other two brigades (John K. Jackson's and James Chalmers's) were the only organized and combat effective rebel troops at the end of the battle. Perhaps had Gladden not been detached, there would have been a third organized brigade to press Grant's final line, for whatever minuscule difference it would have made.

 

[Billy1977]

Thanks Eric Calistri and Novushomus, that clears it up. Off-topic but I wonder why Beauregard came up with a battle plan that involved stacking the corps to have them attack in sequence rather than putting Polk's, Bragg's and Hardee's corps all on line together with Breckinridge's reserve corps behind them. Was the terrain too restrictive for that? Maybe there wasn't enough room for them to be deployed in a linear way? Because it sounds to me like Beauregard's plan was more like simply feeding corps after corps into a meatgrinder one after the other, when one is fought out and whittled down bring the next corps up to replace it. That sounds like a terrible plan to me.

 

[Sid J.]

Thanks Eric Calistri and Novushomus, that clears it up. Off-topic but I wonder why Beauregard came up with a battle plan that involved stacking the corps to have them attack in sequence rather than putting Polk's, Bragg's and Hardee's corps all on line together with Breckinridge's reserve corps behind them. Was the terrain too restrictive for that? Maybe there wasn't enough room for them to be deployed in a linear way? Because it sounds to me like Beauregard's plan was more like simply feeding corps after corps into a meatgrinder one after the other, when one is fought out and whittled down bring the next corps up to replace it. That sounds like a terrible plan to me.

Well, it looked good on paper, I'm sure. I don't think anyone had enough relevant experience to properly critique the attack plan. Shiloh was a hard lesson in command and control for both sides. I'm pretty sure if Beauregard or Johnston had a do-over they'd change that.

 

[novushomus]

Thanks Eric Calistri and Novushomus, that clears it up. Off-topic but I wonder why Beauregard came up with a battle plan that involved stacking the corps to have them attack in sequence rather than putting Polk's, Bragg's and Hardee's corps all on line together with Breckinridge's reserve corps behind them. Was the terrain too restrictive for that? Maybe there wasn't enough room for them to be deployed in a linear way? Because it sounds to me like Beauregard's plan was more like simply feeding corps after corps into a meatgrinder one after the other, when one is fought out and whittled down bring the next corps up to replace it. That sounds like a terrible plan to me.

There were several factors, most probably being terrain. In his recent book, Timothy Smith talks about the shape of the Shiloh battlefield (being narrow at the North and South and wider in the middle) and that was probably a significant factor.

Another thing to consider is that the corps essentially deployed in the order that they had camped on the night of April 5-6. Beauregard already believed the element of surprise was lost, and, with his Napoleonic fetish perhaps thought a column of corps would be the simplest formation to drive Grant's army into the Tennessee. It doesn't waste daylight hours by waiting for the corps to come on line, especially Bragg's relatively large corps (the one that Johnston wanted to stack on the right to drive Grant into Owl Creek, away from the river).

Also, had the Confederates taken time to redeploy into a wider formation, Peabody's expedition would have more time to find the Confederate vanguard and potentially more time to alert Prentiss and Sherman of the impeding rebel attack.

 

[Saruman]

It doesn't waste daylight hours by waiting for the corps to come on line... Also, had the Confederates taken time to redeploy into a wider formation, Peabody's expedition would have more time to find the Confederate vanguard and potentially more time to alert Prentiss and Sherman of the impeding rebel attack.

That's the best explanation I've seen so far to account for the CSA stacked corps formation at Shiloh. Is it your own conception or did you read it in a book?

 

[novushomus]

That's the best explanation I've seen so far to account for the CSA stacked corps formation at Shiloh. Is it your own conception or did you read it in a book?

That's my own observation. Timothy Smith's argument about the Confederate deployment revolves around the shape of the terrain, while Cunningham never really delved into the subject except to note Johnston's plan versus Beauregard's deviation. I've not, unfortunately, read Larry Daniel to see what he has to say on the subject.

 

[Billy1977]

Probably a dumb question on my part, but how closely did the Confederates actually stick to the "stacked corps" battle plan once things got rolling? Because I've seen maps like this one (granted, it's Wikipedia so take it for what it's worth)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Shiloh_Battle_Apr6pm.png

which shows the corps in more of a linear formation. Was the end result more of a mixture of the stacked corps plan and the linear attack plan? Maybe starting out as one and with confused command and control, units getting intermingled etc. inadvertently causing it to shift from a strictly "stacked" plan to more of a "linear" one by default? Or did they truly carry out the fighting on 6 April all the way to the end of the day with a stacked plan?

And many thanks for the very intelligent and informative replies, I love this forum.

 

[Yankeedave]

One benefit of stacking them is you tended to mingle and mix with your own units maybe brigade and division. looking at my copy...the rebs hit at five am. In april. Came out of the darkness.i dont think it was a surprise. pickets were driven in. If it had the yanks would have been caught in bed not cooking as is suggested.

 

[rpkennedy]

Probably a dumb question on my part, but how closely did the Confederates actually stick to the "stacked corps" battle plan once things got rolling? Because I've seen maps like this one (granted, it's Wikipedia so take it for what it's worth)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Shiloh_Battle_Apr6pm.png

which shows the corps in more of a linear formation. Was the end result more of a mixture of the stacked corps plan and the linear attack plan? Maybe starting out as one and with confused command and control, units getting intermingled etc. inadvertently causing it to shift from a strictly "stacked" plan to more of a "linear" one by default? Or did they truly carry out the fighting on 6 April all the way to the end of the day with a stacked plan?

And many thanks for the very intelligent and informative replies, I love this forum.

Things went to crud pretty quickly. The formations fell apart almost immediately while units would move to the sound of firing, moving away from other units in their line.

The stacked formation wouldn't be so bad if the terrain was more open and the troops were veterans but neither was the case here. It's a good example of something looking pretty good on paper while the execution was a disaster.

R

 

[Yankeedave]

While your mucking it up and you are under your own relative troops and leaders leaders.

 

[Billy1977]

Came out of the darkness.i dont think it was a surprise. pickets were driven in. If it had the yanks would have been caught in bed not cooking as is suggested.

While I'm certainly no expert on the battle and I still have MUCH to learn I tend to think of it as being less of a surprise in the strictest tactical sense, as in nobody was bayoneted in their tents as you said, however the way I look at it is that on the operational and strategic levels it was very much a surprise in that Grant and Sherman clearly did not think their army was going to be attacked at all at Pittsburg Landing, thinking instead that the Confederates would sit on their hands, wait in Corinth behind their entrenchments, allow Buell's Army of the Ohio to link up with Grant's army and move an overwhelming force against Corinth, basically wishful thinking that the rebels would act exactly as Grant wanted them to act.

In his memoirs Grant tries to explain away the lack of entrenchments at Pittsburg Landing and Sherman in his own memoirs tries to explain it away as well, but to me it's pretty clear that because they had no entrenchments whatsoever, not a single breastwork was thrown up in advance of 6 April, not a single rifle pit was dug etc. it shows me that Grant and Sherman very strongly believed that their army was in no danger of being attacked at its lodgement area at Pittsburg Landing. When it was in fact attacked on the morning of 6 April and its men had to fight a hasty defense using whatever cover was available, fighting behind trees and hay bales etc., which is absolutely not preferable to having some kind of field fortifications already constructed, in other words having to fight at a disadvantage compared to how they would have fought defensively had they had entrenchments, to me that says they were surprised on the operational and strategic level, that they basically had their Pittsburg Landing lodgement area set up as if it were a massive tent camp for an army on training maneuvers in the middle of Ohio or something, definitely not a posture I would want an army to be in when it's operating very deep in enemy territory with tens of thousands of the enemy waiting at Corinth less than 20 miles away.

To me (and no offense to those here who are of the Grant or Grant and Sherman fan club) that's an example of egregious negligence that really should have cost both Grant and Sherman their careers. It's amazing that Halleck only sidelined Grant into a figurehead position as his second-in-command for the Corinth campaign instead of shunting him off to some little recruiting post in Illinois to sit out the rest of the war or something like that. But when one considers that McClellan should have really been court-martialed for treason and spent the rest of his life in prison for deliberately denying Maj. Gen. John Pope's army reinforcements and letting it get the poop kicked out of it at Second Manassas/Second Bull Run so Pope's career would be ruined and he wouldn't be a rival to McClellan as the top dog Union general, yet nothing happened to McClellan over it, he kept his job as commander of the Army of the Potomac until Lincoln finally had enough of him after Antietam, I guess it's not that surprising after all.

 

[Yankeedave]

I guess some value was seen in grant and sherman and halleck did a quick class on them before he went east. And nobody dug in early on. It was a point halleck stressed on them in person. It was taught at west point.

 

[novushomus]

Probably a dumb question on my part, but how closely did the Confederates actually stick to the "stacked corps" battle plan once things got rolling? Because I've seen maps like this one (granted, it's Wikipedia so take it for what it's worth)
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Shiloh_Battle_Apr6pm.png

which shows the corps in more of a linear formation. Was the end result more of a mixture of the stacked corps plan and the linear attack plan? Maybe starting out as one and with confused command and control, units getting intermingled etc. inadvertently causing it to shift from a strictly "stacked" plan to more of a "linear" one by default? Or did they truly carry out the fighting on 6 April all the way to the end of the day with a stacked plan?

And many thanks for the very intelligent and informative replies, I love this forum.

The formation broke down almost immediately once the attack started, with corps, divisions, and brigades losing unit integrity and regiments and brigades become entangled and intermixed. Stacking like this, on such a rough battlefield, can be a poor idea, especially with green troops. The Confederate chain of command (and subsequently command and control) went to hell. Only two brigades, John K. Jackson's, and James Chalmers's, of Jones M. Withers's division, were cohesive and combat effective by nightfall on the first day. A.P. Stewart's brigade had several regiments detached from it by other officers. By mid-day, Stewart had only one original regiment and several that gotten attached to him.

By 11 it had the gotten the units so badly intermingled that Polk and Bragg got together in an impromptu conference and decided to split control of the field. Bragg assumed command of the all the Confederate forces on the right of the attacking rebel line, Polk command of the center, with Hardee commanding the left. However, apparently, Hardee was never informed and as the battle developed, Polk commanded the left and Bragg commanded the right. Stewart and Cleburne wounded up commanding only pieces of their original commands, and those are two examples off the top of my head.

One benefit of stacking them is you tended to mingle and mix with your own units maybe brigade and division. looking at my copy...the rebs hit at five am. In april. Came out of the darkness.i dont think it was a surprise. pickets were driven in. If it had the yanks would have been caught in bed not cooking as is suggested.

There is not really any benefit to stacking like this, aside that it prevented a three hour deployment when the attack began in the morning, at least not in the battlefield conditions of Shiloh and the level of training and experience of the Army of the Mississippi. The formation removed control of the reserves from the corps and division commanders. So when brigades like Cleburne's ran into stiff opposition the creek in front of Shiloh Church, support didn't even come from Cleburne's own corps, as Hardee had no reserves of his that he could control, it came from the Second Corps brigades like J. Patton Anderson's and First Corps brigades like Bushrod Johnson's. So units from three different corps got entangled just to carry one position.

The troops and officers are not experienced, and when you compile this with officer casualties (like Bushrod Johnson or William Bate), then it takes a lot longer to get the troops organized and moving forward, and they can't really stop to restore unit integrity and get brigades back with their proper parent formations without losing initiative.

When looking at Shiloh, its striking how much Beauregard directly controlled the reserve brigades (compared to Johnston, who just directly led them into position) and other assaults of the war. While Johnston was trying to feed brigades into the right (to push between Grant and the Tennessee), Beauregard was dispatching the reserve brigades mostly to his center and left. In most attacking scenarios, the corps and division commanders attack in two lines (front line and support/reserve) and have local control over their own reserves that attacking in such a formation provides, which they can commit as they judge necessary. Even divisions in tandem can attack with success, like at Chancellorsville with Jackson's Second Corps, but even then the disorganization caused by the friction of Federal resistance and units pushing through each other as they advanced led to delays and the need to reorganize. With the reserves centralized by putting the corps all in one line, it arguably slowed down the commitment of reinforcements and made it much less efficient.

 

[novushomus]

I also want to say to Billy1997 thank you for this thread and the opportunity to discuss this in detail.