Here's a thought...

Elennsar

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Lee in command.

Hardee and Richard Taylor for the two infantry corps.

Forrest for cavalry.

And Bragg as chief of staff.

Promising? Crazy?
 
I'm not sure really because Lee was untested outside the Eastern theater. His two attempts to fight outside Virginia lead to failure and neither was that well managed. In the Eastern theater it will go well but in the West...maybe not

Hardee is a definate choice for Corps Command. In my opinion he was the best Corps Commander in the Confederacy - along with Longstreet.

Taylor...not sure. Dont know enough about him. Seems, from what I know, to have the potential but his effectiveness may be questionable depending on the amount of experience in actual fighting he has by the time he gets Corps Command.

Forrest is again a natural choice for Cavalry Command but I would rather think him better suited for a quasi-indepent role. You know, supporting the Army in its campaigns but not generally attached to it - kind of like Mosby.

Bragg might do a good job as chief of staff but the problem of his personality and natural talent for alienating everyone cames into it and problems might occur.

Overall I think the set up would have potential but I have my doubts as to its effectiveness.

In an ideal world, of course, this is what I would have as the command set up for a Confederate Army:

Army Commander - Robert E. Lee - there is no better Confederate Army commander than Lee that I can think of so the choice is a bit limited.

Corps Commanders - Hardee and Longstreet - Hardee and Longstreet were the best Corps Commanders in the Confederacy in OTL (arguably) so that's selfevident

Cavalry Commander - John A. Wharton or JEB Stuart - Either one of them talented Cavalrymen and consistantly reliable. Mainly I'd chose one of them because it leaves Forrest free.

Chief of Staff - John C. Pemberton - personally I believe him to be the best Staff Officer the Confederacy had, just not a field commander.
 
Could you elaborate on why Wharton?

As for East vs. West, I wasn't - intentionally at least - thinking of switching Lee's theater, just musing on who besides his historical team (Longstreet, Jackson, Stuart) was viable.

Pemberton as a staff officer seems promising from what you've said, as does Bragg (his personality aside). Both had the kind of good points you want there.
 
Could you elaborate on why Wharton?

Well, I was thinking of an East or West thing.

For the Eastern Theater I would want Stuart becauase, Gettysburg aside, he was devoted to his duties as ANV Cavalry Commander and was rarely if ever remiss in performing those duties.

The West, on the other hadn, was a bit more difficult. Naturally Forrest jumps out at you as the best but, as I said, I prefer him in a more indepent role than Army Cavalry Commander.

Morgan's a possibility but his decision to ride off into Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio was a mark against him for me, impulsiveness that lead to ruin.

Wheeler is useful in close quarters with the Army but less than effective further away from it. For performing all the tasks required of a Cavalry Commander attached to an Army Wheeler seems to fall short, not least for his habit of losing control of logistics and seeking fights.

Wharton appears to be an adventurous but more cautious commander than Wheeler or Morgan. He performed consistantly well and next to Forrest he was probably the best Cavalryman that Confederacy had between the Mississippi and the Appalachians, a bit too ambioutus perhaps - he had his faults and failures of course but so did everyone.

The fact that Wharton wasn't the showman many of his contemporary Cavalrymen were and that he was killed by a subordinate before the War was over - leaving little in the way of literary work behind - means that he's quite unknown.

More about Wharton here if your interested: http://www.terrystexasrangers.org/biographies/submitted/wharton.html

And, just because I think it would highlight why I think Wharton would be a good Army Cavalry Commander, this is an extract from the closing points of that Article:

Galveston's Judge James Love writing during the Spring of 1863 observed that Morgan's and Forrest's commands were known for their many successes in independent actions. He went on, however, to state that Wharton's abilities were more important but less noticeable. Wharton's men could work successfully with the main army picketing the front between battles and during general engagements would hold the flanks. Robert Bunting some six months later made such similar observations that one suspects that Love and Bunting must have spoken among themselves on this matter or at least have discussed the matter with someone in common
 
Very much appreciated. And this "Wharton's men could work successfully with the main army picketing the front between battles and during general engagements would hold the flanks. " is of enormous importance in making a good cavalryman.

Its not flashy, but the flashy stuff tends to be of limited importance. Good picketting and holding the flanks is vital.
 
A thought---

How about this at Gettysburg:

Bobby Lee
Commander of the Army

William Hardee

John Hood

J.E.B. Stuart

Three Crops Commander

R. H. Anderson

A.P. Hill

Lafayette Mclaw

Jubal Early

Henry Heth

William Pender

Richard Taylor

L. A. Armistead

D. H. Hill

Nine Division Commanders

Wade Hamliton
Cavalry Commander


James Longstreet takes over the Army of the Tennessee.

He bring with him Ewell, Rodes, Johnson, Pickette to the west with him. I think they would have added some bite to the Army of the Tennessee..

Jeb Stuart should have been one of Lee's Corps Commander taking over Jackson place....

a muse...
 
That would be good for the Army of Tennessee, not so good for the ANV. I don't know if Hood is really suited for command higher than the brigade level, and those are some pretty shaky division commanders Lee is left with. What about leaving Stuart where he is and sending Hampton to the west in place of Rodes or Ewell?

It probably comes down to: No matter how you divide it up, there isn't enough Really Great Talent to go around.
 
It probably comes down to: No matter how you divide it up, there isn't enough Really Great Talent to go around.

Agreed. Which in my reading is something the Confederacy has to compensate for by taking the best advantage of the RGT it has - but that's another topic.

Health permiting, I wonder how Issac Trimble would have done in division command. Jackson seriously wanted him to take his old division, but anyone who thinks Jackson's judgement of men is infalible is talking about some other Jackson.
 
The Confederacy: A Shortness of Time

First, anyone born after World War II, cannot come up with a way for the Confederate armies, to win the Civil War. The Civil War was lost by the Confederacy, by the officers chosen and only those individuals available in 1861 to 1865. There was too little time for the Confederacy to recognize and raise latent talent. There were also political and regional differences.


Not every potential Confederate could reach high command in Virginia. The Confederacy prided itself over the importance of the state over the national government. There were fewer trained officers from states other than Virginia, so they normally would be assigned, and many times choose, an area other than Virginia. Plus to win the war, the war had to be won in many areas outside Virginia. One Confederate state, could never mean victory.
If an individual has no previous military training, it was nearly impossible to rise in high Confederate rank. It was virtually impossible in Virginia, until late in the war.


Hardee was a Georgian

Richard Taylor Non Military trained, Kentucky born;lived in Louisiana

Nathan Bedford Forrest-Non military trained; born in Tennessee; never reived an important command by Confederate authorities in Richmond.

Braxton Bragg born in North Carolina; lived in Louisiana

All these officers had backgrounds and experience in 1861, which made it easier for the Confederate authorities to use them in areas other than Virginia. The Confederates did not have, unlike many students of the Civil War, more than 100 year hindsight. They only had a short time to make decisions as best they could.
 
So any speculation that something different might possibly have worked is completely moot and we should just assume that the Confederacy was completely and totally doomed.

That kills about half of what's interesting about history (weighing how things worked or didn't) and turns it into a dull recital of what occured, with no speculation and no analysis.
 
The Confederacy was not doom until end of 1863. They could have pulled it if Pres. Davis would have changed his persecution of the war. His compartmentalization of the war was a big bust and led to their defeat.

If they would have consolidated their forces as Lee desire in 1862 or early 1863. They may have pulled it off a victory or a desirable peace with the North...

a muse
 
The frustrating part of concentrating Confederate resources is that there are four major areas the Confederacy has to keep more-or-less safe in 1863 or 1862.

Virginia
The Atlantic coast.
Tennessse.
The Mississippi.

From what I've determiend in figuring out what could have been sent to Lee for a what-if Gettysburg, it boils down to which two you feel like risking. You can't hold all four with the force desirable.

If you reinforce Virginia from the Atlantic coast, you open unpleasant possibilities for suddenly aggressive Yankees.

If you reinforce Tennessee, where do you take the troops from? That area suffers.

Meanwhile, the Mississippi is hard to hold properly without weakening somewhere else.

I think it could be solved, but you'd need to make sure whatever you did in the areas beefed up made up for exposing other places.

There just aren't enough troops and good leaders to go around.
 
And thus any what if assuming a Confederate victory of any consequence, let alone of the war, has to figure out how to deal with that.

The Confederacy could not win if it was a matter of protecting all its territory. The evidence is scanty that it would be able to hold out to win a favorable peace by a Fabian don't-worry-about-battles (it must be noted that Fabius had the distinct advantage that Hannibal had difficulty taking the cities in Italy, something that does not apply to either the British in the Revolution or the Union in the Civil War).

That leaves somehow, some way figuring out how to effectively concentrate what troops it can raise to accomplish its objectives.

The thought originally posed was not intended to be "Lee in the West" or "bring Bragg, etc. East". It was meant as "would these men be able to form a good army?"

That's not to say there's something off topic about suggesting transfering, just that it wasn't what I was thinking about.

There's no point worrying about the ability to transfer officers if those officers are without merit - for instance, Polk would be a burden to any commander.

On the other hand, it has been suggested (by Trice I believe) that Hardee had some good metal in him, so a commander more skilled than Johnston, Hood, or Bragg might have been able to make a decent corps commander out of him.

Taylor had a credible record, so I would generally say I'm confident in him.

Bragg appears to have been the type who should have been staff. As a line officer, his inability to effectively fight battles nulifies his strengths. Which is a shame, because something like Stones River is not an unwinnable scenario. However, Bragg lost it for a reason other than unreliable subordinates or Rosecrans's greatness.

However, his good points are too easily dismissed. I would want an officer like Bragg in my army if I could find a way to effectively use his talents. He was a good disciplinarian and when healthy and focused could plan strategy well.

Meanwhile, he was a conscienous worker at keeping things organized.

So chief of staff seemed not inappropriate.

Lee's record at army command is the best in the Confederacy. That speaks for itself.
 
On the other hand, it has been suggested (by Trice I believe) that Hardee had some good metal in him, so a commander more skilled than Johnston, Hood, or Bragg might have been able to make a decent corps commander out of him.

Hardee was a good Corps commander in reality as well as this hypothetical set up. When on the attack he hit as hard as Jackson or Longstreet ever did, when on the defense he was generally good and on the march or on manuever he was ever consistant and reliable if not superb.

The worst performances of his career in the Confederacy were under Hood - after he was feeling overlooked and underaprieciated by the Davis administration - and at Missionary Ridge where the whole Army seemed to perform badly except for Cleburne's division.

It's hard to claim that he was, in reality, anything less than, at the minimum, a decent Corps Commander. Under Lee he may have been great but, personally, I think he was great anyway. He certainly had no equal in Corps Command in the Confederate West at any rate.
 
Hardee was a good Corps commander in reality as well as this hypothetical set up. When on the attack he hit as hard as Jackson or Longstreet ever did, when on the defense he was generally good and on the march or on manuever he was ever consistant and reliable if not superb.

I'm not entirely sure. Hardee did fairly well at Stones' River in at least some regards, but his performance at Chattanoga was not good, nor his performacne under Hood (as you mention below).

The rest of the army doing poorly too, or feeling unappreciated, are not good excuses.

I wish I could remember what he did in the Kentucky campaign offhand. That campaign in general was bungled, but the bungling doesn't seem to rest on the shoulders of anyone above anyone else - besides Polk being actively insubordinate, which is a seperate problem from bad decision making.

My main gripe with Hardee is not so much his performance in battle as that he was part of the anti-Bragg faction. And while thinking poorly of Bragg is not exactly something I fault him for, that faction existing tied up energy and time that should have been spent on fighting the Yankees. That is a problem.

Can't argue that he wasn't the best Western corps commander, but his competion is...let's see if I remember right:

Leonidas Polk (shudder)
Alexander P. Stewart
Daniel H. Hill
John B. Hood
Benjamin Cheatham (who had a drinking problem - not sure how well he fought it, but it was an issue he had to face)

No one else is coming to mind (not counting cavalrymen Forrest and Wheeler).

None of those present stiff competition for "best in the West".
 
It's hard to claim that he was, in reality, anything less than, at the minimum, a decent Corps Commander. Under Lee he may have been great but, personally, I think he was great anyway. He certainly had no equal in Corps Command in the Confederate West at any rate.
Seems I just posted on another thread my evaluation of Hardee. Hardee was as good as there was in command of a division ... and maybe a Corps. Under someone with more competence than Davis, maybe even the AoT.

But Hardee was too much of a soldier to mess with the boss. He was almost there. Just a bit short.

Ole
 
I'm not entirely sure. Hardee did fairly well at Stones' River in at least some regards, but his performance at Chattanoga was not good, nor his performacne under Hood (as you mention below).

The rest of the army doing poorly too, or feeling unappreciated, are not good excuses.

I wish I could remember what he did in the Kentucky campaign offhand. That campaign in general was bungled, but the bungling doesn't seem to rest on the shoulders of anyone above anyone else - besides Polk being actively insubordinate, which is a seperate problem from bad decision making.

My main gripe with Hardee is not so much his performance in battle as that he was part of the anti-Bragg faction. And while thinking poorly of Bragg is not exactly something I fault him for, that faction existing tied up energy and time that should have been spent on fighting the Yankees. That is a problem.

Can't argue that he wasn't the best Western corps commander, but his competion is...let's see if I remember right:

Leonidas Polk (shudder)
Alexander P. Stewart
Daniel H. Hill
John B. Hood
Benjamin Cheatham (who had a drinking problem - not sure how well he fought it, but it was an issue he had to face)

No one else is coming to mind (not counting cavalrymen Forrest and Wheeler).

None of those present stiff competition for "best in the West".

Old Ben Cheatham is resting over in Mt. Olivet cemetery here in Nashville. He made it home in one piece and upright under his own power. Not bad, for the Civil War. He was in the middle of the ruckus and commanded admirably until the end. The civil war was enough to make a man drink. Ben could and did hold it.
 
Old Ben Cheatham is resting over in Mt. Olivet cemetery here in Nashville. He made it home in one piece and upright under his own power. Not bad, for the Civil War. He was in the middle of the ruckus and commanded admirably until the end. The civil war was enough to make a man drink. Ben could and did hold it.

Still, its an issue. Even a person who can hold their liquor is not going to be in a state to command while under its influence - command is hard enough cold sober.
 

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