Harriet Lane vs Brooklyn, the CS Plan

[DaveBrt]

Head Quarters District of Texas New Mexico & Arizona
Houston Texas
March 12th 1863

Brig Gen Scurry
Comdg &c

Sir,
I am instructed by Major Genl Magruder to represent to you his view as to the practicability of employing the Harriet Lane, when properly constructed in capturing at a favorable time the Federal steamer Brooklyn.
The following plan and scheme are regarded by General Magruder as approaching near to a certainty of success.
The Harriet Lane must be dismantled and after her masts rigging &c have been removed decks must be constructed similar to the River steamers and raised sufficiently high to enable heavy anchors suspended on Derricks from the Bow and stern to be dropped on the deck of the Brooklyn. Th height of the Brooklyn to be determined by officers sent out for the purpose.
The Brooklyn must be approached by night or in a dense fog. The rest of the Gun Boats will be employed in conjunction with the Harriet Lane.
I am Sir very respy
Your obt Svt
Edward P. Turner
Capt & AAG

 

[AndyHall]

That's nuts.

This memo was written about the time (March 1863) that the civilian (Confederate) prize court awarded possession of Harriet Lane to the C. S. Navy. Several weeks before, the navy had sent Lt. J. N. Barney to take command of the vessel and evaluate its suitability for commerce-raiding. Barney's report (ORN I:19, 838-40) is somewhat indifferent about the ship's prospects. He generously suggested that if the Navy agreed to turn her command over to Magruder's pal, a civilian named Leon Smith, "it would be in his power to render more efficient service than I, under the circumstances, could do." Seems clear that Lt. Barney didn't much want the job.

The navy ultimately decided they didn't want her as a commissioned warship, and after taking some of the larger guns, turned her back over to General Magruder. In his proposal above, Marauder is looking to replicate, line-by-line, capturing the U.S. Sloop-of-War Brooklyn in exactly the same way Harriet Lane was taken, by boarding using drop-down ramps similar to the ancient Roman corvus.

But honestly, I think it's a whole different thing, trying this same tactic against a 20-gun warship with as many as 300 men aboard, offshore. Magruder succeeded in retaking Galveston on January 1 through a combination of audacity and good luck, and then U.S.S. Morning Light and Velocity (both sailing ships) at Sabine Pass sooner after, but trying the same thing yet again, against Brooklyn, one of the most powerful vessels of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, is not really rational. Add to that the fact that after the loss of Harriet Lane, the Federals at Galveston were on alert for the Confederates to use exactly that tactic again; a month prior to Turner's memo above, Commodore Bell, in charge of the blockading squadron off Galveston, speculated that the Confederates might be converting Harriet Lane into a ram (ORN I:19: 614), Night or fog notwithstanding, such an attack on Brooklyn would not be much of a surprise.

Magruder was capable and energetic officer, but in this case he sounds like the guy at the blackjack table in Las Vegas who wins a couple of high-stakes hands and decides he's figured out the system -- he's looking for a fall.

 

[georgew]

That's nuts.

This memo was written about the time (March 1863) that the civilian (Confederate) prize court awarded possession of Harriet Lane to the C. S. Navy. Several weeks before, the navy had sent Lt. J. N. Barney to take command of the vessel and evaluate its suitability for commerce-raiding. Barney's report (ORN I:19, 838-40) is somewhat indifferent about the ship's prospects. He generously suggested that if the Navy agreed to turn her command over to Magruder's pal, a civilian named Leon Smith, "it would be in his power to render more efficient service than I, under the circumstances, could do." Seems clear that Lt. Barney didn't much want the job.

The navy ultimately decided they didn't want her as a commissioned warship, and after taking some of the larger guns, turned her back over to General Magruder. In his proposal above, Marauder is looking to replicate, line-by-line, capturing the U.S. Sloop-of-War Brooklyn in exactly the same way Harriet Lane was taken, by boarding using drop-down ramps similar to the ancient Roman corvus.

But honestly, I think it's a whole different thing, trying this same tactic against a 20-gun warship with as many as 300 men aboard, offshore. Magruder succeeded in retaking Galveston on January 1 through a combination of audacity and good luck, and then U.S.S. Morning Light and Velocity (both sailing ships) at Sabine Pass sooner after, but trying the same thing yet again, against Brooklyn, one of the most powerful vessels of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, is not really rational. Add to that the fact that after the loss of Harriet Lane, the Federals at Galveston were on alert for the Confederates to use exactly that tactic again; a month prior to Turner's memo above, Commodore Bell, in charge of the blockading squadron off Galveston, speculated that the Confederates might be converting Harriet Lane into a ram (ORN I:19: 614), Night or fog notwithstanding, such an attack on Brooklyn would not be much of a surprise.

Magruder was capable and energetic officer, but in this case he sounds like the guy at the blackjack table in Las Vegas who wins a couple of high-stakes hands and decides he's figured out the system -- he's looking for a fall.

Actually there was a bit more to it. There is correspondence from Col. Sulakowski, Engineers, setting the date for turning over the Lane to his men for reinforcement. They were going to iron the bows like the River Defense boats at Algiers with railroad iron and remove the masts and standing rigging. Sulakowski mentioned that it would be necessary to dredge across Red Fish? bar again to get her back into the lower bay. When Lt. Barney and the CSN types arrived to take charge of her, she had basically been stripped of anything portable. I suspect her boilers might have had more ironing. It sounds to me as if they intended to ram and then board their target. A lot of her ordnance had already been removed and their present owners unlikely to give it back.

 

[AndyHall]

Red Fish Bar is an oyster-shell reef running east-west across the middle of Galveston Bay. It would have been a major obstacle at that time for moving a relatively deep-draft vessel like Harriet Lane from the upper bay to the lower, or vice-versa.

No question they intended to ram and board, because that's how Lane herself was taken. But that's a far cry from taking Brooklyn.

 

[1stMS-Arty]

while searching the OR's for something else I came across this reference to the Harriet Lane in vol. 15 pages 1034 & 1035:

 

[georgew]

while searching the OR's for something else I came across this reference to the Harriet Lane in vol. 15 pages 1034 & 1035:
View attachment 101394 View attachment 101395

That's the one.