Member Review Grant's Memoirs

People should realize that the "Lee losing more on a percentage basis" argument only supports the fact that Grant was able to win by overwhelming advantages in men and materiel.
Actually, you don't even have to go by percentages. In actual numbers, armies commanded by Grant suffered about 150,000 casualties throughout the war. Those commanded by Lee suffered about 200,000 casualties. By real numbers, Lee was more of a butcher.

After Grant assumed overall command, he beat Lee in a year while suffering fewer union casualties than the union commanders had suffered against confederates in the east in the previous 3 years while making no progress.
 
Anyone with a basic grasp of logic should realize that complimenting Grant's generalship in the Overland campaign for having roughly the same percentage of casualties as Lee requires a perversion of mathematics. The methodology used actually favors bad commanders and demeans those who did more with fewer men.
Well, this just makes no sense whatsoever and is rather simplistic reasoning. First off, you take my comment completely out of context, which is your specialty, I realize. I was not complimenting Grant's Overland Campaign based on that fact. I was disputing the Grant as butcher narrative. Anyone with a basic grasp of logic and the English language should realize that. So your snarky comment misses the issue completely.

Second, success or failure has almost nothing to do with casualties. This is just simplistic reasoning that ignores the larger picture. Lee suffered tremendous casualties during the Seven Days that exceeded McClellans in raw numbers, but strategically he changed the course of the war. It would be simplistic to argue that Lee lost the Seven Days due to losing more men. You need to look at what he accomplished. Same is true of the Overland Campaign. True, Grant suffered tremendous losses. But look at what was accomplished. Lee was trapped, and the offensive ability of the ANV was crippled, and ultimate victory was just a matter of time.
 
No one takes him seriously today, but in the time period we were talking about he was seen as a leading expert.

I am not making the argument, btw, that Grant was a military genius. I just think he is finally getting a fairer assessment of his generalship.
He was never taken seriously; he was criticized during his own lifetime (The Marble Man). He was not an acadamic. The most widely read nonacademic North and South was Bruce Catton...guess who his favorite general was?
 
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Actually, you don't even have to go by percentages. In actual numbers, armies commanded by Grant suffered about 150,000 casualties throughout the war. Those commanded by Lee suffered about 200,000 casualties. By real numbers, Lee was more of a butcher.

After Grant assumed overall command, he beat Lee in a year while suffering fewer union casualties than the union commanders had suffered against confederates in the east in the previous 3 years while making no progress.
Excuse me, I thought we were talking about Lee vs Grant.
 
Can't we all agree that if one wants to know about USG they need to read more than his Memoirs? Or even Chernow or Brooks Simpson?
Why does one read history aside from gaining a basic conversational knowledge of the past?
The depth that any reader goes to in his reading depends on that reader's interest in learning as much about the subject as possible. Scholarly level reading would involve hard to find and unpublished sources. Few have the time and resources to do that but it seems to me there should be respect for those who have and of course can prove they have.
I repeat: not all opinions are equal.
 
He was never taken seriously; he was criticized during his own lifetime (The Marble Man). He was not an acadamic. The most widely read nonacademic North and South was Bruce Catton...guess who his favorite general was?
Do you believe the southern heritage groups have always based their beliefs on the work of academic historians?
 
Rather than outright inaccuracies, Grant was probably more concerned with downplaying certain incidents and occurrences. His relationships with non-favored officers such as Rosecrans, Wallace, and Thomas are presented from Grant's perspective, naturally. I don't believe he had much to say about his infamous Jewish expulsion order, among other things or how the army was surprised at Shiloh.
It's probably in vain at this point to bring it up, but I do appreciate that some folks here have continued to address the topic in the OP, that is, Grant's memoirs. I guess it's understandable that the floodgates have opened, as we all love to discuss old Sam...
AR
 
True. He killed loyal Americans. He was a traitor.
Maybe he was. But he was also a Human being. And who are we to judge men from 160 years ago who made mistakes? And I think its strane to base admiration on if the person "killed loyal Americans" or not. And you just bashed :laugh:
 
Maybe he was. But he was also a Human being. And who are we to judge men from 160 years ago who made mistakes? And I think its strane to base admiration on if the person "killed loyal Americans" or not. And you just bashed :laugh:
Yes, I may have bashed Lee, but I sure wouldn't waste years of my life writing a hit job against Lee.

Getting back to the accuracy issue with Grant's Memoirs. The few authors that have tried so hard to discredit Grant's Memoirs have their own problems with accuracy. Reasonable people can question the accuracy of certain parts of the memoirs, but some people are not very reasonable in their assessment.
 
I would say that Grant was still in command of his district, Smith was given command of the upriver expedition, and nobody was in arrest, virtually or otherwise.
I know that our discussion here has flowed along since then, but your reply here intrigued me, so I took the time to read through some OR materials. We were talking about the period between March 4 and March 13, 1862, and Grant's comment in his memoirs (p. 327) that as of Halleck's March 4 dispatch Grant was "virtually in arrest and without a command."

I think you are right that C.F. Smith only replaced Grant in field command having to do with the upriver expedition. Reviewing some of the OR reports and correspondence from that period, it does appear that Grant was still exercising control over his district. However, considering the tenor of the OR documents by Halleck and McClellan, it's easy to see how Grant at the time might have believed that his entire position was tenuous and that he was in danger of being removed from any kind of command. He even asked to be relieved at more than one point.

As it turned out, apparently communications between Grant and Halleck were being interrupted by an enemy agent, so Halleck thought Grant was being intentionally unresponsive. At least that's what Grant says: "My dispatches were all sent to Cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. This operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him." (p. 325)

As far as being 'virtually under arrest,' don't you think that would come down again to the tone of Halleck's and McClellan's communications? "Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C.F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way." (McClellan to Halleck, 3 March 1862) "Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return." (Halleck to Grant, 6 March 1862)

All of this occurred within a period of about ten days and was resolved relatively quickly once communications resumed. But during that short period, isn't it understandable that Grant believed he was about to lose all command and even his freedom, and that he might have portrayed things that way in his personal memoirs?

I realize that you might have access to further documentation that can shed light on this point about the accuracy of Grant's memoirs.

ARB
 
Actually, you don't even have to go by percentages. In actual numbers, armies commanded by Grant suffered about 150,000 casualties throughout the war. Those commanded by Lee suffered about 200,000 casualties. By real numbers, Lee was more of a butcher.

After Grant assumed overall command, he beat Lee in a year while suffering fewer union casualties than the union commanders had suffered against confederates in the east in the previous 3 years while making no progress.
Apples versus Oranges
 
Well, this just makes no sense whatsoever and is rather simplistic reasoning. First off, you take my comment completely out of context, which is your specialty, I realize. I was not complimenting Grant's Overland Campaign based on that fact. I was disputing the Grant as butcher narrative. Anyone with a basic grasp of logic and the English language should realize that. So your snarky comment misses the issue completely.

Second, success or failure has almost nothing to do with casualties. This is just simplistic reasoning that ignores the larger picture. Lee suffered tremendous casualties during the Seven Days that exceeded McClellans in raw numbers, but strategically he changed the course of the war. It would be simplistic to argue that Lee lost the Seven Days due to losing more men. You need to look at what he accomplished. Same is true of the Overland Campaign. True, Grant suffered tremendous losses. But look at what was accomplished. Lee was trapped, and the offensive ability of the ANV was crippled, and ultimate victory was just a matter of time.
I wasn't attacking you, at least not intentionally. I'm attacking the methodology of comparative percentage of casualties as an indicator of generalship. It's a stupid, stupid methodology.

I wouldn't go so far as stating that "success or failure has almost nothing to do with casualties." There's such a thing as a Pyrrhic victory, for one. But casualties are certainly not the only or even the main measure of success (although they are certainly very relevant if you're waging a war of attrition).

Instead of the "tremendous losses" suffered by Grant in the Overland campaign, he could have just taken the major part of his force up the James and avoided those grievous losses. Or he could have eschewed the foolish frontal assaults on fortified positions, often done at the spur of the moment, and just maneuvered his way overland towards Richmond. With his overwhelming force, he had the ability to take the initiative. Instead, the AotP was a chewed-up, relatively spent force by the time it arrived at the James under Grant and needed time and reinforcements to regain its strength.
 

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