Grant Leaves the West

[Zack]

I've seen plenty of ink spilled discussing how the Army of the Potomac felt about Grant's arrival in the east. My question is precisely the opposite: how did the western armies feel about having Grant move east? Did they feel they were losing a great commander? Did they think Sherman was a good replacement?

 

[Zack]

I'll try to start answering my own question. From Steven Woodworth's Nothing But Victory:
The general-in-chief would make his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, but Sherman thought that was a mistake. "Come out West," he urged his friend, "take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley," by which Sherman meant the whole Western theater of the war. "The Atlantic slope and Pacific shores will follow its destiny as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk!" Virginia was simply too close to Washington. Political intrigues and complications would always hamstring any general who operated there. "Here lies the seat of the coming empire," Sherman exhorted, "and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic."
Grant in direct command of the 1864 Western campaign is one of the more interesting might-have-beens in a war filled with such tantalizing contingencies. To Grant, however, the situation in Virginia cried out for his presence. The very difficulty of the Virginia - the skill of Robert E. Lee, the clumsiness of the Army of the Potomac, and the political snake pit of Washington - all pointed to the fact that only Grant's presence could mend Union fortunes there.

 

[civilken]

I like how you turned the table. I believe his men in the West never felt he left them after all he was put in charge of all the armies so they still had him. And now so did the Army of the Potomac.

 

[Dom71]

I've always believed he had to come east. I think Lincoln wanted him to operate here, to supervise his campaign here. Sherman was perfectly capable of leading the force in the west, and would follow the strategy Grant put forward. Also with the fame he had gained with his successes out west I think the Northern public at large wanted their best guy against the South's best guy, and I think he understood that.

 

[wausaubob]

When Grant left the armies in the West the generals he left in command included Sherman, McPherson, Schofield, Thomas and as subordinates, Logan, Dodge, and Hooker. Even Howard and Slocum prospered as they learned to work in the western way.
My belief is that the western soldiers had high hopes that if Grant went East he would quietly teach the Army of the Potomac to win. Slowly, but surely, that is what happened.

 

[jackt62]

Grant had no choice but to accompany the AOTP in the field rather than making his HQ with the Army of the Tennessee or staying in Washington City. And that was the right choice. The western armies were capably led, and with Sherman, Grant had someone who was on the same page with him as far as fighting the war was concerned. Although Grant's presence
with the AOTP created a certain amount of command confusion at times, it was through his force of will that the AOTP soldiered on relentlessley through the Overland campaign and beyond.

 

[Patrick H]

I like how you turned the table. I believe his men in the West never felt he left them after all he was put in charge of all the armies so they still had him. And now so did the Army of the Potomac.

I'm going with this line of thought. I like it!

 

[General Butterfield]

My belief is that the western soldiers had high hopes that if Grant went East he would quietly teach the Army of the Potomac to win. Slowly, but surely, that is what happened.

That's a little harsh on my AoP boys. I wouldn't sell Meade short he won at Gettysburg and Bristoe, the tide was turning.

 

[mobile_96]

I believe his men in the West never felt he left them after all he was put in charge of all the armies so they still had him.

I think another reason they could accept Grant leaving them was that the men had confidence in Sherman, and there didn't seem to be much, if any, disagreement within the ranks of the officers over Sherman being given charge of the Western Army.

 

[wausaubob]

That's a little harsh on my AoP boys. I wouldn't sell Meade short he won at Gettysburg and Bristoe, the tide was turning.

But I was opining about what the westerners thought. What I think is what Charles Francis Adams, Jr. thought: Grant will defeat Lee if Grant is left alone.
When Grant had a regular chain of command established with Meade, Butler and Sheridan, he won. Lee stopped winning battles and the operations linked together to make Richmond a logistics trap.
Butler was not skilled, and Meade had a bad temper, and Sheridan could accept guidance only from Grant.
As Sheridan wrote, Grant became the hub around which the spokes rotated.

 

[OpnCoronet]

In the West, where there were vast(comparatively speaking) between more than 1 armies, Grant was, I think, generally, a more remote figure to his men than in the East.

I think westerners took a more casual view of commanding generals. Bruce Catton, quoted an anecdote, that I think described the attitude of the armies Grant commanded, about a sergeant, at Chattanooga, who seeing Grant riding by, remarked,'I hate to see that cuss, because when he shows up, there's bound to be a fight.' and being an experienced soldier, he knew who would be doing most of the fighting.

I think the en in the ranks in western armies were used to victories and accomplishing great deeds and accepted that in war there was bound to be fighting under most circumstances and all they asked was to not see their efforts in service to be waste and Grant could and did lead them to victories and great deeds.

.

 

[Dave Wilma]

We would have to examine the primary evidence, letters between soldiers and letters home. What did the soldiers say at the time? Reminiscences tend to conform to subsequent events and are less reliable, but should not be ignored. An individual soldier is more focused on his mates and up a few levels and probably accepts high level changes of command as changes in the weather. Certainly soldiers in Mississippi who saw the simply dressed, dusty, cigar-smoking commander telling them "keep moving, keep moving" were affected by that kind of leadership. This also impacted other leaders by setting the example. I say Grant had his influence in this way and in his selection of subordinates and the armies of the west did not need him any longer.

 

[chucksr]

How could the men of the Western Army not "miss" Grant after a string of victories going back to Island Number Ten up to and including Missionary Ridge. Their performance with Grant as their commander as compared to the Army of the Potomac under several commanders could not have been more diametric.
Whether stated or not there had to be an enormous sense of accomplishment in those westerners because of Grant's leadership and a concern when he left that role.

 

[jackt62]

That's a little harsh on my AoP boys. I wouldn't sell Meade short he won at Gettysburg and Bristoe, the tide was turning.

I agree. I don't think the fighting quality and motivation of the ranks of the AOTP were any different from those of the western armies. The difference was in leadership, which was lacking in the AOTP until Meade and Grant came along.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I agree. I don't think the fighting quality and motivation of the ranks of the AOTP were any different from those of the western armies. The difference was in leadership, which was lacking in the AOTP until Meade and Grant came along.

Actually, if Meade had been able to lead the AoP to Victories, on his own, there would have been no real need for Grant to leave the West.

 

[General Butterfield]

Actually, if Meade had been able to lead the AoP to Victories, on his own, there would have been no real need for Grant to leave the West.

I think Grant needed to be in the East in order to organize Meade, Sheridan and Butler movements together.

However I will point out Meade never really got a chance to conduct his own offensive campaign. The Mine Run campaign was a rushed affair before winter just to make Washington happy. I imagine Meade's Overland campaign would have been roughly similar to Grant's effort. Meade would have a 2-1 superiority in numbers and unlike previous AoP commanders he had no intention of taking a step back when attacked. He objected to Hooker's withdraw at Chancellorsville and to any idea of pulling back at the Wilderness in 64. Tactical matters during the campaign were still largely under Meade's jurisdiction with Grant giving occasional input. So Meade probably slogs his way down to Richmond anyway.

 

[Carronade]

Grant coming east was taking on two roles, which were somewhat conflicting. The general-in-chief needed to be based in the capital to coordinate with the President and government and to manage his own department. However Grant was also becoming the Union's "go-to" field commander. Through the Vicksburg campaign, he had been one of several generals each commanding their own theater, but when he was summoned to take over for Rosecrans at Chattanooga it became clear that he was primae inter pares, the man called on to deal with the Union's most pressing military problems.

As the 1864 season opened, the big unresolved issue was dealing with Lee and the ANV. It may or may not have been fortunate that this was the theater closest to Washington, making it feasible for the g-in-c to spend most of his time with the army in the field.

 

[OpnCoronet]

I think Grant needed to be in the East in order to organize Meade, Sheridan and Butler movements together.
However I will point out Meade never really got a chance to conduct his own offensive campaign. The Mine Run campaign was a rushed affair before winter just to make Washington happy. I imagine Meade's Overland campaign would have been roughly similar to Grant's effort. Meade would have a 2-1 superiority in numbers and unlike previous AoP commanders he had no intention of taking a step back when attacked. He objected to Hooker's withdraw at Chancellorsville and to any idea of pulling back at the Wilderness in 64. Tactical matters during the campaign were still largely under Meade's jurisdiction with Grant giving occasional input. So Meade probably slogs his way down to Richmond anyway.

In actual fact though, Meade wanted to withdraw, before Lee had a chance to attack him(Meade, certainly, had no desire or plans to attack Lee)and continue McClellan's campaign on the Peninsula.

It seems, to me, that Meade's plan in Va. was to keep about 24 hrs. distance between himself and Lee. Lincoln can be forgiven for thinking that the offensive war in the East, that he wanted, was not really Meade's cup of tea.



Actually Meade wanted to stop the war, for a little R&R for the AoP and then dust off McClellan old Richmond campaign., both an anathema to Lincoln and Stanton. Meade, like many AoP commanders, never seemed to realize that the wishes of Lincoln was, and would be, a significant factor in any of his plans.

In the time between Gettysburg and Grant's arrival in the East, did Meade bring Lee to battle?

 

[General Butterfield]

In actual fact though, Meade wanted to withdraw, before Lee had a chance to attack him(Meade, certainly, had no desire or plans to attack Lee)and continue McClellan's campaign on the Peninsula.

It seems, to me, that Meade's plan in Va. was to keep about 24 hrs. distance between himself and Lee. Lincoln can be forgiven for thinking that the offensive war in the East, that he wanted, was not really Meade's cup of tea.

Actually Meade wanted to stop the war, for a little R&R for the AoP and then dust off McClellan old Richmond campaign., both an anathema to Lincoln and Stanton. Meade, like many AoP commanders, never seemed to realize that the wishes of Lincoln was, and would be, a significant factor in any of his plans.

In the time between Gettysburg and Grant's arrival in the East, did Meade bring Lee to battle?

I don't think Meade ever wanted to stop the war but the capabilities he had were limited until Spring 64. You have to remember that Meade was stripped of alot of manpower to be sent West after disaster at Chickamauga. He did win the Bristoe Station campaign with Warren scoring a nice victory. At Mine Run, technically Meade ordered the attack but Warren didn't follow orders.When Meade went over to him furious, he explained why and Meade relented. It was a pointless effort anyway, I don't think it could have been decisive before winter and just would have got men killed.

I'm not sure if Meade favored a McClellan style approach in 64. I recall he mentioned a move in the Fredericksburg sector as his most likely option. Though dusting off the old plans wasn't a bad idea as it avoids the heavy losses of the Overland Campaign. The threat to Washington was well wasn't the biggest focus of Lincoln anymore judging by the anemic reaction to Early's raid.

Its hard to argue that Meade wasn't aggressive and didn't want to get at Lee. If you recall Meade was in complete tactical control at Cold Harbor, he was fully prepared to bloody his men if need be though he did resist assaults he deemed futile such as Falling Waters.

 

[John S. Carter]

That's a little harsh on my AoP boys. I wouldn't sell Meade short he won at Gettysburg and Bristoe, the tide was turning.

When Grant bought Sherman and his western army to the East to invade Georgia that was when the tide of the war turned.The Western forces would maintain Johnson from having any chance of joining Lee or visa versa.Grant had a capable officer under Thomas to maintain the limited Confederate force occupied with the fall of Nashville.By bringing Sherman to the East Grant was bring in a skilled army to deal with the final destruction of the Deep South and denying Lee of his final base for supplies.There by not have to use any of his AP to do this which would diminish his army against Lee.Then who would Grant had had to command such a force,Meade? Just a Theory .