Grant Grant and Meade commanding the AOP

[infomanpa]

In 1864, Lincoln appointed Ulysses Grant as General-In-Chief. Instead of staying in Washington as did Henry Halleck, his predecessor, General Grant traveled with the Army of the Potomac, which was commanded by George Meade. It appears to me, that Grant was making all the command decisions for the AOP as it fought in important engagements from 1864 until the conclusion of the war in 1865. What role did Meade play in this command structure? Was he simply an "aide" to Grant? Did the 2 generals have a relationship like Ambrose Burns and Jacob Cox of the 9th Corps at Antietam? Should I have read Sears' book, Lincoln's Lieutenants?

 

[jackt62]

Grant tried to be respectful of Meade's authority but no question, having the General in Chief attached to the Army Commander's location made for some uncomfortable dealings. Grant dealt with the big strategic questions, and left the tactical methods for carrying out that strategy to Meade, although of course, the lines were never so clearly drawn. But the working relationship between the two continued for almost a year, and led to the successful defeat of the ANV.

 

[rpkennedy]

In 1864, Lincoln appointed Ulysses Grant as General-In-Chief. Instead of staying in Washington as did Henry Halleck, his predecessor, General Grant traveled with the Army of the Potomac, which was commanded by George Meade. It appears to me, that Grant was making all the command decisions for the AOP as it fought in important engagements from 1864 until the conclusion of the war in 1865. What role did Meade play in this command structure? Was he simply an "aide" to Grant? Did the 2 generals have a relationship like Ambrose Burns and Jacob Cox of the 9th Corps at Antietam? Should I have read Sears' book, Lincoln's Lieutenants?

You should read Sears' book because it's a good book.

As for Grant and Meade, initially, Grant let Meade have control but was unhappy with how the army moved and acted in the Wilderness and began to exert more control as time went on but Meade still retained much of the tactical control (although Grant often did express his opinion about what should be done). Gordon Rhea covers a lot of the details of this relationship in his books on the Overland Campaign.

Ryan

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I think Meade gained a little of his authority during and after the movement across the James to Petersburg. Once the Army of the Potomac & James combined I think it was more like an army group and Meade had some autonomy tactically.

This is a question that interests me too, but it is really hard to differentiate orders since they were nearly always together, especially during the Overland Campaign.

Sears is a good book. The other 2 perspectives I find interesting & informative regarding the Grant-Meade issue is an article by Ethan Rafuse in Grant's Lieutenants & the new book called Meade:The Price of Command.

 

[WJC]

Meade was notorious for his temper, but he seems to have recovered quickly and not let any of these outbursts have lasting impact on his relationships.
Having Grant nearby most certainly must have weighed on Meade. At the same time, Grant had a lot more on his plate than Meade's Army. Fortunately, both were 'big boys' and handled the situation well. One thing that infuriated Meade was the practice of the media and others to praise Grant and the officers he brought from the west for the successes of the Army of the Potomac. Lyman comments on one such episode:

There came a cipher despatch from Sherman, in the West. Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, hastened — with considerable want of tact — to read it to the General. Sherman therein told Grant that the Army of the West, having fought, could now afford to manoeuvre, and that, if his (Grant's) inspiration could make the Army of the Potomac do its share, success would crown our efforts. The eyes of George Gordon Meade stood out about one inch as he said, in a voice like cutting an iron bar with a handsaw: "Sir! I consider that despatch an insult to the Army I command and to me personally. The Army of the Potomac does not require General Grant's inspiration or anybody's else inspiration to make it fight!" He did not get over it all day, and, at dinner, spoke of the western army as "an armed rabble."​

<Theodore Lyman, With Grant and Meade from the Wilderness to Appomattox, (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922), p. 126.> How did the rebels view this arrangement? We know that on June 5, 1864, when Hancock pursued a truce authorized by Meade to recover dead and wounded, Lee refused to discuss the request. Meade explained the rebuff to Grant, saying "Any communication by flag of truce will have to come from you, as the enemy do not recognize me as in command while you are present."
<War of the Rebellion: Serial 069 Page 0599 Chapter XLVIII. CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.-UNION. https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/069/0599 >

 

[Andy Cardinal]

I believe Meade was more valuable to Grant than is generally recognized -- Grant said so himself on a couple of occasions. Another piece of evidence is that he retained Meade in his position even when there were a few opportunities to make a change. While I don't believe they were friends in the way Grant & Sherman were, I do think Grant thought very favorably of Meade's abilities. The real issue that damaged the Grant-Meade relationship in my opinion was Sheridan, who was a favorite of Grant's and who Meade absolutely detested.

 

[infomanpa]

How did the rebels view this arrangement? We know that on June 5, 1864, when Hancock pursued a truce authorized by Meade to recover dead and wounded, Lee refused to discuss the request. Meade explained the rebuff to Grant, saying "Any communication by flag of truce will have to come from you, as the enemy do not recognize me as in command while you are present."

Until you mentioned this, I never thought about how Lee thought about the Grant-Meade arrangement. Then, I remembered that Meade wasn't even present at the surrender at Appomattox. I'm not sure why, even though a thread on that subject was started by @KansasFreestater a few years ago.

 

[WJC]

Until you mentioned this, I never thought about how Lee thought about the Grant-Meade arrangement. Then, I remembered that Meade wasn't even present at the surrender at Appomattox. I'm not sure why, even though a thread on that subject was started by @KansasFreestater a few years ago.

Thanks for your response.
As I understand it, Meade was not close at hand when the surrender took place. Appomattox was shaping up as another battle, with Lee being pursued from different directions by U. S. forces. Both Meade and Grant were in the rear of the rapidly advancing troops. On the morning of the surrender, Grant was with Meade at Clifton, where Grant responded to Lee's first letter suggesting a meeting. Afterwards, he and his staff rode off to Appomattox. Meanwhile, Meade received Lee's second letter, responding to Grant and forwarded it to Grant at about 10:00 AM. When Grant famously opened Lee's letter and announced its contents, he was in the company of his staff and a number of generals from the western armies: Meade and many of the long-time A of P generals were on the roads with their units. Meade did not actually learn of the surrender until 5:00 PM.
Although many since then have made much of the fact that Meade was not at the McLean house, neither he nor the other generals who were not there seem to have had any ill feelings.

 

[Carronade]

The Overland campaign and the subsequent siege of Richmond/Petersburg involved more than just the AofP. At the outset the 9th Corps was a separate command, with Burnside senior to Meade, and Grant issuing orders to both. This proved cumbersome as early as the second day of the Wilderness, with 9th Corps units intermingled with the AofP. Eventually 9th Corps was subordinated to the AofP; Burnside to his credit did not make an issue of seniority.

Grant also had to coordinate the actions of the Army of the James whose commander, Ben Butler, was also senior to Meade. It wasn't just a matter of Grant looking over Meade's shoulder.

 

[Eric Wittenberg]

Thanks for your response.
As I understand it, Meade was not close at hand when the surrender took place. Appomattox was shaping up as another battle, with Lee being pursued from different directions by U. S. forces. Both Meade and Grant were in the rear of the rapidly advancing troops. On the morning of the surrender, Grant was with Meade at Clifton, where Grant responded to Lee's first letter suggesting a meeting. Afterwards, he and his staff rode off to Appomattox. Meanwhile, Meade received Lee's second letter, responding to Grant and forwarded it to Grant at about 10:00 AM. When Grant famously opened Lee's letter and announced its contents, he was in the company of his staff and a number of generals from the western armies: Meade and many of the long-time A of P generals were on the roads with their units. Meade did not actually learn of the surrender until 5:00 PM.
Although many since then have made much of the fact that Meade was not at the McLean house, neither he nor the other generals who were not there seem to have had any ill feelings.

It was not a slight. Meade was sick with pneumonia on April 9. He was shot in the lung in 1862, and had frequent bouts with pneumonia regularly after that. It killed him in 1870.

 

[thomas aagaard]

I also think we need to remember that running an army require a lot of paperwork. Sure staff officers deal with a lot of it, but the commanding general of the army still got a lot to do even when not in combat.
By keeping Meade in command Grant could focus on the strategy and dealing with the other armies in the field.

 

[jackt62]

The relationship got off to a good start when Meade offered to resign and let Grant choose his own AOTP commander. Grant was impressed with Meade's graciousness, and of course, chose to keep him in command.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

I've often found myself wondering this same question. Even after Rhea's series it was unclear to me.

My impression is that after Wilderness, Grant was effectively running the show, with a few exceptions like the Cold Harbor debacle of June 2-3.

Maybe Selby's Price of Command delves into the subject. If not a proper analysis remains to be done.

Sherman held a similar arrangement in 1864-1865. He commanded 2.5 armies in the Atlanta Campaign, and 2 armies after Atlanta (3 in NC after the column from Wilmington arrived?). Credit seems to be given primarily to Sherman, theater commander in the field, rather than his army commanders (Thomas, McPherson, Hooker, Howard, Slocum) when those armies were operating directly under him. The reconsideration of Meade's role under Grant seems to be a modern phenomenon.

 

[OpnCoronet]

The command system, was crude and not very efficient. It worked well enough(barely, in some cases) only because Grant and Meade were determined to make it work.



P.S. I think, Grant, especially, believed it necessary for the system to work. Replacing Meade, was seen by Meade and Washington as a difficult, if not dangerous operation. The morale of the AoP(men and officers) was seen to be fragile and given its experiences over its life, the Army was not likely to accept a commander from outside its ranks and, I think, from Lincoln's(and Grant's) perspective any of the senior Officers from within the ranks of the Army, would be no improvement over Meade.

 

[jackt62]

If Grant were to replace Meade, he would have been inclined to do it with one of his known western commanders such as Sherman or McPherson. But Grant was shrewd enough to understand that bringing in an outsider to the AOTP and bypassing the other corps or division commanders of that army for the position, would have been a huge morale buster at best, and an ongoing command disruption at best. So given that Grant was generally unfamiliar at first-hand with the officers of the AOTP, leaving Meade in command made a lot of sense.

 

[Irishtom29]

It's interesting that the Army of the Tennessee and Army of Georgia took on eastern commanders without a big fuss or loss of morale. The Army of Georgia did have a formerly eastern corps, part of which was once commanded by Slocum. But the 14th Corps didn't know him.

 

[Josh The Lighthouse Guy]

It's interesting that the Army of the Tennessee and Army of Georgia took on eastern commanders without a big fuss or loss of morale. The Army of Georgia did have a formerly eastern corps, part of which was once commanded by Slocum. But the 14th Corps didn't know him.

Howard and Slocum took over at Atlanta, after about a year with the western armies as corps commanders. More significantly, their elevation did not in any way seem like a punishment to the armies they commanded.

Meade's removal and replacement by someone brand new to the east would have effectively told the AotP that Grant thought none of their generals was any good, not even the one who commanded at their greatest victory to date.

 

[rpkennedy]

Howard and Slocum took over at Atlanta, after about a year with the western armies as corps commanders. More significantly, their elevation did not in any way seem like a punishment to the armies they commanded.

Meade's removal and replacement by someone brand new to the east would have effectively told the AotP that Grant thought none of their generals was any good, not even the one who commanded at their greatest victory to date.

Especially coming after the victory at Gettysburg and competent showings at Bristoe Station and Mine Run. Getting rid of Meade, the only general to have defeated Lee so far, would have been a crippling blow to morale.

Ryan