Gov Pickens thoughts on Sumter

wilber6150

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I keep hearing people state that the South Carolina only wanted peace and that Lincoln was the one that pushed for war.. I thought a part of letter from Pickens to Toombs shows S. Carolinas actual thinking Feb 12..

"I hope to be ready by Friday night [Feduary 15th], and think I am prepared to take the fort or silence it" Later in the letter he writes " Besides these I have mortars and Columbiads at Fort Moultrie, and plenty of 32-pounders as well as mortars at Fort Johnson. If the attack was commenced the fort should be taken at every hazard: and if resisted, the slaughter of the garrison was inevitable."

It is no wonder that Anderson wanted to move to safer fort, if they thought this about Sumter what would have stopped them from seizing a indefensible fort like Moultrie..Its also no suprise that the Confederacy took over the responsibility for Sumter from S. Carolina as they didnt want a war before they were ready...
 
"I hope to be ready by Friday night [Feduary 15th], and think I am prepared to take the fort or silence it" Later in the letter he writes " Besides these I have mortars and Columbiads at Fort Moultrie, and plenty of 32-pounders as well as mortars at Fort Johnson. If the attack was commenced the fort should be taken at every hazard: and if resisted, the slaughter of the garrison was inevitable."

He said so himself. :laugh1:
 
Its also no suprise that the Confederacy took over the responsibility for Sumter from S. Carolina as they didnt want a war before they were ready...

I'll beat Whitworth to the punch here and say the Confederates were no where near ready for war when they fired on Fort Sumter, but I do understand your point. The Confederates didn't want the South Carolinians starting a war before at least a Provisional Confederate Government and Army had been created.
 
I'll beat Whitworth to the punch here and say the Confederates were no where near ready for war when they fired on Fort Sumter, but I do understand your point. The Confederates didn't want the South Carolinians starting a war before at least a Provisional Confederate Government and Army had been created.

And the minute one was... Booyah!
 
I'll beat Whitworth to the punch here and say the Confederates were no where near ready for war when they fired on Fort Sumter, but I do understand your point. The Confederates didn't want the South Carolinians starting a war before at least a Provisional Confederate Government and Army had been created.

Exactly, and this letter underlies Andersons fear of being in a fort where it could be stormed at will without a chance of putting up a fight..This is one of his main reasons for moving to Sumter, if the attackers would actually have to put some effort and pay a cost in seizing his command they might think twice about it and thus stop bloodshed from occuring...
 
Pickens saw secession movement, at least in its early stages, in terms of being a true revolution, where violent action was vital to secure safety of the Revolution. Davis and the csa tended to see it in legalistic terms, where the law itself was on the side of a mere political adjustment(specifically rejecting any relationship with illegal Revolution)
 
I keep hearing people state that the South Carolina only wanted peace and that Lincoln was the one that pushed for war.. I thought a part of letter from Pickens to Toombs shows S. Carolinas actual thinking Feb 12..

"I hope to be ready by Friday night [Feduary 15th], and think I am prepared to take the fort or silence it" Later in the letter he writes " Besides these I have mortars and Columbiads at Fort Moultrie, and plenty of 32-pounders as well as mortars at Fort Johnson. If the attack was commenced the fort should be taken at every hazard: and if resisted, the slaughter of the garrison was inevitable."

It is no wonder that Anderson wanted to move to safer fort, if they thought this about Sumter what would have stopped them from seizing a indefensible fort like Moultrie..Its also no suprise that the Confederacy took over the responsibility for Sumter from S. Carolina as they didnt want a war before they were ready...

Do you have a source where I could read the entire letter?
 
Although not a hard enough man to be a true revolutionary, Pickens thought and wanted to act as one. Recognizing that in successful Revolutions, speed and vigorous action were matters of greatest importance. Davis and the csa gov't tried to engage in revolution by 'legal' means.
 
From the book, Allegiance: Fort Sumter, Charleston, And The Beginning Of The Civil War, by David Detzer, Chapter 7, pg. 93:

Slim Pickens, Stout Fort

"I believe it is my destiny to be disliked by all who know me well." -- Francis W. Pickens

"Francis Pickens was a child of privilege, born into vast wealth, a member of one of South Carolina's most prominent families. His grandfather had been a successful general in the Revolution, then a congressman, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs. His father, Andrew Pickens, was a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Brown, had married rich, had become richers in successful planting, then had become the first man from upstate to be elected governor. The Pickenses were cousins of John C. Calhoun, who was so taken with Andrew that he named his first son after him.

Francis, unlike his father, attended South Carolina College, but he withdrew in his senior year over some difficulty involving mess hall regulations; already his temperament and manner seemed a bit unsettled. When young Francis first entered politics, Calhoun termed him, "the most promising man in the state." During the nullification crisis of 1832-33 Francis made a remark that would be remembered in South Carolina for many years. Someone asked him whether he was not afraid of the consequences of such a direct confrontation with Washington. "Fear!" he replied. "Mr. President, I was born insensible to fear!" He was twenty-seven years old.

In 1860, now fifty-five, he had not matured all that much. He had become a portly man with receding hair, a lumpish face, and watery, deep-set eyes. Some people considered him a fine speaker, others found him pompous and tiresome. He was, indeed, quite full of himself. He could be haughty and was frequently overbearing. He was opinionated and often dogmatic, and he was far too given to nasty pettiness, especially with those whom he saw as threats--which turned out to be most of South Carolina's political and social leaders. He also had prolonged bouts of moodiness, at times filled with self-doubt, hesitant and cautious, at other times impulsive. He could be overly confident in his judgments and made little attempt to control his tendency toward rashness, which he preferred to consider boldness.

Had Francis Pickens been governor of South Carolina at any other time, his unfortunate personality would have gone unnoticed to history. The position--limited to a single, two-year term--was traditionally but a figurehead, a pleasant little honor given to state leaders at some point late in their careers. South Carolina had no political parties, and virtually all political power remained with the legislature. Ironically, the governor's official responsibility over the militia, a little-noticed and empty right, became Picken's main source of power during the crisis over Fort Sumter. After South Carolina actually seceded, the governor was handed the duties performed by American presidents--including the right to oversee "foreign" diplomacy, which in this case was interpreted to mean relations with Washington. Eventually, most crucial decisions would be made by others--Buchanan, Lincoln, Davis. Yet for a few weeks between December and February, it seemed as though Francis Pickens would be able to bring about war all by himself."

More to follow...

Unionblue
 
Continued from above...

"...In the antebellum era, South Carolina's state legislature chose the governor. In 1860 rival candidates spent weeks attacking each other. Pickens, who had recently ended a term as minister to Russia, arrived in the state at the very last minute and presented himself as a moderate, compromise candidate. The legislature took four days and seven ballots to decide, but on December 16, it agreed on him. His official inauguration took place the next day. When the secessionist convention decided to move to Charleston, the new governor rented a suite at the Charleston Hotel for himself and his lovely young wife, and set up his office three blocks away on the second floor of the City Hall. He put up a simple, hand-lettered sign on the door, and was ready for business. He was also ready for action.

On December 19, even before the South Carolina Convention voted on secession, it agreed to send a delegation to Washington to negotiate the transfer of all the federal properties in the state, especially the three forts. The delegation's assignment was to inform Buchanan officially about South Carolina's secession, then to open negotiations. Most of the convention was optimistic that a conflict could be avoided, but if Washington refused to give up the forts South Carolina would have to take them--with all that that implied. The convention, however, as its Journal noted, hoped for "the continuance of peace and amity between this Commonwealth and the Government at Washington."

Francis Pickens was not so patient. After his election on December 16, and even before his official inaugural the next day, he wrote a remarkable letter to hi friend President James Buchanan. This note was an accurate mirror of the new South Carolina governor--bombastic and ill-informed.

Robert Barnwell Rhett had told Pickens that the guns of the federal forts were no longer pointing seaward, that they had been turned and were now trained directly on Charleston. Perhaps he believed it. Rhett was quite unsophisticated in things military, so he may have misinterpreted the goings-on at the three forts, where workmen were indeed muscling a few cannon into position. Or maybe Rhett was simply hoping to stir things up, to initiate some incident.

Pickens opened his letter to the president: "I am authentically informed that the forts in Charleston harbor are now being thoroughly prepared to turn, with effect, their guns upon the interior and the city." He was, he added, particularly concerned about Fort Sumter, that federal soldiers might try to man it. "I would most respectfully, and from a sincere devotion to the public peace, request that you allow me to send a small force, not exceeding twenty-five men and an officer, to take possession of Fort Sumter immediately, in order to give a feeling of safety to the community." Pickens told Buchanan that putting Carolina militiamen in Fort Sumter should be no problem. "There are no United States troops in that fort whatsoever, or perhaps only four or five." (He was being typically casual and vague, but had he wanted to be sure of his facts, any reasonably knowledgeable citizen of Charleston would have informed him there were exactly two, Lieutenant Snyder and an ordnance sergeant.) "If Fort Sumter could be given to me as Governor,...then I think the public mind would be quieted, under a feeling of safety." Pickens closed his note snippily, "If something of the kind be not done, I cannot answer for the consequences." Pickens, reputedly smart enough, had written a letter that had as much charm as a colicky baby. He was often socially inept, but he had just proved himself to be asinine."

More to follow...
Unionblue
 
Continued from above...

"...On December 20, the day South Carolina seceded, (Daniel Heyward) Hamilton and Trescot arrived at the Executive Mansion, where Hamilton handed Pickens's unopened message to Buchanan. The president stood quietly reading it while Hamilton waited. Old Buck, the professional diplomat, showed little reaction. He told Hamilton he needed time to formulate a proper response, perhaps the next day. Buchanan signaled Trescot to remain.

When Hamilton departed, the president handed Trescot the note. The Carolinian was stunned at its tone, both pugnacious and obtuse. Trescot also recognized that Buchanan was quite annoyed--which could have serious consequences. Two weeks earlier the president had virtually committed himself to SouthCarolina's congressional delegation, saying that he would take no action against their state. Now, with Pickens's message as a goad, Buchanan might feel justified altering that position. Trescot felt he better do something, and quickly. He either made a copy of the letter or borrowed the original, then rushed across town and showed it to Jefferson Davis and John Slidell, two of the Deep South's most respected senators. They were agast at Pickens's clumsiness. Trescot then contacted South Carolina's two remaining congressmen in town, Milledge Luke Bonham and John McQueen. Both had been at the earlier meeting when Buchanan had seemed to indicate a do-nothing policy. They, too, shook their heads in disbelief. The three composed and sent a telegram, urging Pickens to withdraw his letter before Buchanan was forced to respond to it. Pickens wired back immediately, agreeing.

The following day Trescot wrote Pickens a long follow-up message, outlining Buchanan's reaction in greater detail. Trescot's words obviously echoed things Buchanan had said to him. The president, Trescot explained, was deeply resentful at the pressure implied in the message, feeling he had for weeks been acting graciously toward South Carolina's concerns. He had, for instance, fired Lieutenant Colonel Gardner for trying to move arms from the arsenal. (This was a simplification; Gardner had been relieved at least partly due to his incompetence.) Buchanan had also refused to reinforce the garrison at Fort Moultrie, and he had accepted Cass's resignation over this issue, even though the secretary of state was "the oldest, most eminent and highest member of his Cabinet" (another self-serving recollection, since Old Buck had been happy to see him go). The president had been hammered by the Northern press for these actions, and Congress had even started talking about investigating his administration. He had accepted all this, and more, because of his "determination to avoid all risk of collision."

As an aside, Trescot himself added that he had just spoken to (secretary of war) Floyd that morning. The secretary of war had promised him "that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm." Trescot apologized that his wording here was rather vague an said he could not be more precise because of questions of confidentiality, but Governor Pickens ought to relax. "No order has been issued that will at all disturb the present condition of the garrisons." Trescot concluded his note saying that, if the state's commissioners were unable to pry the forts away from Washington, "the whole issue is fairly before you, to be met as courage, honor and wisdom may direct...""

Unionblue
 
Continued from above...

"...
The following day Trescot wrote Pickens a long follow-up message, outlining Buchanan's reaction in greater detail. Trescot's words obviously echoed things Buchanan had said to him. The president, Trescot explained, was deeply resentful at the pressure implied in the message, feeling he had for weeks been acting graciously toward South Carolina's concerns. He had, for instance, fired Lieutenant Colonel Gardner for trying to move arms from the arsenal. (This was a simplification; Gardner had been relieved at least partly due to his incompetence.) Buchanan had also refused to reinforce the garrison at Fort Moultrie, and he had accepted Cass's resignation over this issue, even though the secretary of state was "the oldest, most eminent and highest member of his Cabinet" (another self-serving recollection, since Old Buck had been happy to see him go). The president had been hammered by the Northern press for these actions, and Congress had even started talking about investigating his administration. He had accepted all this, and more, because of his "determination to avoid all risk of collision."

As an aside, Trescot himself added that he had just spoken to (secretary of war) Floyd that morning. The secretary of war had promised him "that nothing will be done which will either do you injury or properly create alarm." Trescot apologized that his wording here was rather vague an said he could not be more precise because of questions of confidentiality, but Governor Pickens ought to relax. "No order has been issued that will at all disturb the present condition of the garrisons." Trescot concluded his note saying that, if the state's commissioners were unable to pry the forts away from Washington, "the whole issue is fairly before you, to be met as courage, honor and wisdom may direct...""

In passing, anything Floyd says at this point is questionable.

Floyd spoke with Trescott on the morning of the 21st. On December 23, 1860, Buchanan requested Floyd's resignation because of the incredible financial scandal about to hit the press revolving around the misuse/theft/misappropriation/fraudulent use of bonds by Floyd/his clerk/Floyd's nephew in another government department and the Vermont flim-flam artist/con-man/blackmailer. By the end of December, Floyd -- until this point very unpopular with secessionists -- suddenly wrapped himself in the banners of "Southern Rights" and Secession, rose to oppose the Buchanan administration, ordered over 125 heavy guns sent from Pittsburgh to where secessionists could easily capture them and managed to cast his resignation on December 30th as being over Anderson's move to Ft. Sumter on December 26th -- no matter that he had been asked to resign before Anderson moved. Floyd may have been a dolt, but he understood how to apply "spin" to a political disaster.

As a result, we need to remember that for Floyd of Virginia on December 21st, 1861, everything was coming apart. Absent Anderson's move to Ft. Sumter he would have been a politician resigning in disgrace facing serious criminal charges, unpopular in the press and with Fire-Eaters in his native Virginia (also, I have heard, in personal financial difficulties and newly out of his Secretary of War job). In the space of ten days, he went from that to a popular secessionist figure with a supposedly bright future in the new Confederacy if Virginia seceded.

Floyd truly was a dolt about many things -- lots of historians defend him on the grounds that he may truly have believed he was acting properly in the bond matter, and that he might not have known that his clerk and nephew were stealing and submitting to blackmail to protect the "great man" from himself. Being defended because you are that thick isn't much of a recommendation in my book. I find it hard to believe that Floyd was truly stupid enough to be clueless on December 21st about how bad things were for him, and so it is perfectly reasonable to question his motives for making nice with secessionists on that date, and if he was starting to look desperately for a way to feather his nest in a hurry.

Of course, maybe Floyd really was a big enough dolt that he actually was clueless or arrogant enough not to know that Buchanan was going to ask him to resign and that he, Floyd, would have to suffer for the mess he had created. Hard to believe, but on the record of Floyd's life I have to say it might be possible.

Tim
 
Very clearly, Gov. Pickens did not make the clear distinction between secession and revolution, as did Davis and the csa congress.
 
Continued from above, Allegiance, chapter 7, Slim Pickens and Stout Fort, pg. 98:

"Two days later Pickens wired Trescot again. He had heard, he said, that thirteen men had just arrived in Charleston by train, on their way to Fort Moultrie, that they were part of a hundred and fifty reinforcements that Washington was sending. He demanded to know whether Buchanan had any intention ofreinforcing the garrison, "or to transfer any force from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter," and concluded peremptorily, "I want a clear answer on this immedately. Until the Commissioners shall negotiate at Washington, there can be no change here." Trescot may have been annoyed by the governor's haughty tone but he tramped over to Floyd's again, unaware that the secretary had just been asked to resign over the Russell fiasco. When Trescot asked Floyd about any reinforcements, the secretary whined that "his position ought to be appreciated." He said he was being constantly watched, that his actions were misrepresented. It was all the fault, he said, of the Republicans, who hated him more than any other Southerner. Then he drew himself back from this self-pity enough to tell Trescot to advise Pickens once more that no reinforcements were being sent. As to moving Moultrie's garrison to Sumter, he did not think that likely. And since South Carolina's commissioners would be arriving soon to negotiate the takeover of all Federal properties in that state, it seemed to Floyd unnecessary to be unduly jumpy about something as implausible as Anderson's moving to Sumter.

Francis Pickens remained jittery. He kept hearing all these rumors: reinforcements, no reinforcements; a move to take over Sumter, no such movement. He had been granted the power to deal with some of this, but was uncertain how best to proceed. During the past few weeks the state legislature had been contemplating South Carolina's military situation. It had called for the organization of ten regiments of soldiers, and had stipulated that Governor Pickens was authorized to use them to resist any attempt by "the General Government of the United States, or any officer thereof" to try to coerce the state. Coercion, they said, would include not only any overt act, but even an "intention" to commit such an act--for instance, if Washington simply gathered some troops together that might threaten South Carolina.

The legislature also started the process of purchasing new weapons, though this would take time. On December 20 Pickens received a report that the state's arsenal in Columbia had only several thousand old muskets, 34 cavalry pistols, 3 swords, and 1,580 sabers. Conemplating military action with such arms would have been foolhardy.

As far as Washington sending reinforcements, Pickens could do little about it other than bluster, something he was inclined to do anyway. But he could try to separate rumors from fact--hence his agitated notes to Trescot. He tried other ways, as well. O the day of his inauguration, December 17, he sent an envoy, Lt. Colonel John Green, to Virginia to snoop around, particularly to find out if anything was stirring at Fort Monroe. Once there, Green traveled to nearby Norfolk and contacted a man named Charles Norris, the leader of the local Minute Men. He asked Norris to keep a watchful ey on Fort Monroe and report any doings to South Carolina. While at Norfolk, Green also hired a workman at the naval yard. Under this arrangement, the man would let them know if any ships there seemed to be preparing for action. Pickens later admitted that he received frequent spy reports from Norfolk.

As to whether Major Anderson's garrison might move to Sumter, Pickens could nose about himself. On December 20, the day South Carolina officially seceded, he spoke to Captain Humphreys of the arsenal and quizzed him about a rumor he had come across that very morning--that twenty men were being transferred from Fort Moultrie to Sumter. Was this true? Humphreys said he doubted it, but promised to ask Captain Foster. The same day, Foster received Humphreys's query and wrote back immediately, saying he would not send Pickens any such official denial--especially on this particular day. Let Pickens check with Washington."

Unionblue
 

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