Gettysburg magazine #21 map question

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Dec 17, 2018
On pg. 91 Gettysburg Mag issue #21 ‘Hays/Avery strike East Cemetery Hill,” by 25th OH they have, Batt D, 1st NY. Should that be Batt I , 1st NY ‘Wiedrich’s battery? Batt F & G 1st PA is Ricketts. Batt B 4th US is Stewart. Batt L, 1st NY is Beck. Correct ?
Can. anyone ID on this map the batteries west of Baltimore Pike? Like the one below & to the left of “Carroll?”
Are the maps in earlier issues of this publication unreliable? With so many issues is their an online index? Thanks for any shared information
 
As Battery D of the 1st New York Light is Wilmslow's 6 Napoleon's in Sickles heavily pressed 3rd Corps I would guess it is indeed a typo. Without seeing the map I would not wish to say what the author meant.
 
Looks like a typo as it is Wiedrich’s battery. As to the batteries to the west of the Baltimore Pike, I think the author was just depicting that Union batteries were on Cemetery Hill. He doesn't try to identify them. I wouldn't put too much into that portion of the map.
 
Here is the map.
IMG_1083.jpg
 
At this time, based on my research, west of the Baltimore Pike stood Battery I/1st Ohio (6 guns); a section of 5th New York (2 guns); a section of Battery G, 4th U.S. (2 guns); half of Battery H, 1st U.S. (3 guns); Battery H, 1st Ohio (6 guns); and Battery C, 1st West Virginia (4 guns). South of the cemetery entrance, along the west side of the Baltimore Pike, were the other 4 guns of 5th New York and the remaining 4 guns of Battery G, 4th U.S. Behind the cemetery in reserve was the other half (3 guns) of Battery H, 1st U.S.; and 6 guns of Battery A, 1st New Hampshire. Also not shown on this map is a fifth gun of Battery L, 1st New York, which had rolled down the hill into the left of 41st New York.

I would not put absolute faith in any map. Others interpret the regiment positions quite differently than indicated on this map. For instance, I believe the 17th Connecticut split the 41st New York into two parts, leaving an open gap where the 17th Connecticut appears on this map, which enabled Hays' men to break through to the summit and reach the position of Battery I, 1st New York. I think the 68th New York was smaller than shown on this map and the small 54th New York joined on its left. Also, the 106th Pennsylvania arrived later. Not shown is the 58th New York and 119th New York, which counterattacked into the position of Battery I, New York, followed by the 73rd Pennsylvania.

Avery's regiments, in my opinion, came in somewhat farther south than shown on this map. The 6th and 21st North Carolina were rather large regiments. I figure the 21st reached where the 41st New York is placed on this map (and where I believe the 17th Connecticut held firm until reinforced by the 4th Ohio). By this time Avery had received a mortal wound out in the field, and Col. Godwin commanded the NC brigade.

When the Confederates had reached the approximate positions shown on this map, Carroll's brigade in my view had not yet crossed the Taneytown road. In fact, when they came on the scene the Confederates were already on the verge of retreat, and Carroll's appearance merely hastened their departure. Carroll's light losses in this action support this contention.

Attached draft map shows my alternative interpretation at 7:55 p.m. - about three to four minutes after Hay's men first entered Battery I, 1st New York. Carroll's brigade is just coming up.

CemHill1955 001.jpg
 
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Anyone want to comment about the time that Rickett's Battery relieved Cooper's Battery? Their times of departure/arrival are different.
 
The following, extracted from "Gettysburg, July 2: The Ebb and Flow of Battle", addressed the Cooper/Ricketts situation and my conclusion that the relief occurred at approximately 6:20 p.m.

6:20 PM
1. Cooper's Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania, is relieved by Ricketts' Battery F & G, 1st Pennsylvania.

1. Colonel Wainwright, commanding the 1st Corps’ Artillery Brigade, in discussing the duel between his and Major Latimer’s gunners, reported that, “...It was an hour and a half, however, before we were able to compel them to withdraw...A portion of the guns again took position farther to the right, but were soon silenced...Soon after, Captain Cooper’s battery...was relieved by Captain Ricketts battery of six 3-inch guns....” General Howard, 11th Corps commander, reported that, “...about 6:30 p.m. I sent word to General Meade that the enemy’s batteries on our extreme right had been silenced or withdrawn.”

Captain Cooper’s report seconds that of his chief, but the time he believed he was relieved is three quarters of an hour later than that given here, “...the enemy’s guns were silenced in about two and a half hours’ firing. The battery fired occasional shots into the position of these batteries until about 7 p.m., when it was relieved by Captain Ricketts’ battery....”

As described in Pennsylvania at Gettysburg, Captain Ricketts recalled that his battery had, “...halted for a short time behind Cemetery Hill and then moved up the Baltimore pike and relieved Cooper’s Battery ‘B’....” Ricketts was under the impression that he relieved Cooper at 4 PM, citing as proof an entry made in his small pocket diary for Thursday, July 2d, 1863: “Ordered into position at 4 P.M. on Cemetery Hill, under a heavy artillery fire-Heavy artillery fighting until dusk-.”

Ricketts became quite exercised upon visiting the battlefield in 1883 when he noticed, “...a tablet* erected by Cooper’s battery, on the most conspicuous part of the ground occupied by my battery,- and the statement cut in stone that Cooper’s battery had occupied that position on the 2d of July until 7 P.M.- Now the fact is my battery relieved Cooper at 4 P.M. on the 2d ...& as from 4 to 7 P.M. were three very important hours, it seems to me that the statement ought to be corrected....”

Ricketts penned that letter to Bachelder in October 1883, and a similar one in December of the same year to the Hon. R. G. McCreary, Vice President of the Battlefield Association, arguing, “If this mistake is not corrected, I will ask permission of the Battle-field authorities, to put up my own tablets and on them my own time, for my battery would be entitled to as much consideration on that ground, as Cooper’s. But if that sort of thing is permitted, all over the field, it would certainly cause great confusion.” Ricketts entreaty was apparently successful, because neither Cooper’s nor Ricketts’ batteries’ battlefield monuments are explicit regarding the time one was relieved by the other.

Notwithstanding Ricketts’ impassioned arguments, the fact that Cooper’s battery engaged Latimer starting at 4 PM, and proceeded to expend all its ammunition (approximately 475 rounds by the 4 gun battery) strongly suggests that it remained in position until at least 6:00 P.M. Cooper reported that most of Latimer’s guns had ceased fire at that time. While the enemy prepared to retire and for a short time thereafter, Cooper fired, “...occasional shots into the position of these batteries...until...relieved.”

Not all of Latimer’s guns evacuated their Benner’s Hill position; Raine and Dement still had two guns each and these continued sporadic firing as their comrades withdrew and then increased the tempo as Johnson’s Division, to their left, swept forward. Ricketts wrote that he took position in the midst of “heavy artillery” firing, which, he said, continued through to dusk. Obviously, the firing from Latimer’s four remaining guns had to have been less severe than when his whole battalion crowded Benner’s Hill. For Ricketts not to distinguish any difference in the Confederate artillery fire from the time he went into position until that fire ceased, is another strong indication that Ricketts only experienced the fire of Latimer’s remaining four guns (sometime after 6:00 PM.) As noted, the falling off of Confederate fire presented Colonel Wainwright the opportunity to relieve those batteries whose ammunition had become exhausted. Allowing time for Cooper to extricate his guns and for Ricketts to replace them, 6:20 PM appears to be a reasonable time for this to have been accomplished.

* Note: The tablet referenced by Ricketts has weathered over time, rendering it unreadable.

1548787839888.gif
 
The following, extracted from "Gettysburg, July 2: The Ebb and Flow of Battle", addressed the Cooper/Ricketts situation and my conclusion that the relief occurred at approximately 6:20 p.m.

A reasonable conclusion based on the analysis of available sources. My initial analysis put heavy emphasis on Cooper's comments about retiring not long after Latimer's fire had largely abated. If this occurred around 5 p.m., I concluded that Cooper could have been relieved by 5:30 p.m. Rate of fire is an important consideration as you note. It is theoretically possible for each gun to fire off 120 rounds in well under 90 minutes, but one round per minute per gun seems to be closer to the norm. For instance, one gun in Ross' Confederate battery fired 100 shots in about 90 minutes during the July 3 cannonade - extrapolating to 120 rounds would take about 1 hour, 45 minutes. If the last few rounds were "occasional," that brings it closer to two hours, meaning Cooper could have been in place until 6 p.m. That is quite close to your estimate, although the relief should not require 20 minutes to accomplish. Nice work.

The inscription on the now weathered tablet of Cooper is possibly recorded on rolls 3 or 4, manuscript group 18, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA.
 
On Tom's excellent map, I would suggest that Battery H 1st Ohio is misplaced. Huntington wrote about July 2 "Norton, with Battery H, took position at an angle across the cemetery, to oppose some guns of the enemy planted at the edge of a wood to our right of town." In that passage Huntington is stating that Norton's guns were firing towards Benner's Hill. Concerning July 3, he wrote "As I have said Battery H was faced to the right of the town. The weight of the enemy's fire now came from the left and the Battery was obliged to change front under this storm of shot." He also wrote " Most of the fire came from the left, and my battery was then faced to the front; we had to change the position of the guns under that fire...Soon had our guns around, and opened one section to the left , another to the front, and the third I could not work for want of men able to stand on their feet." John Merrell of Battery H wrote (July 3)"We were ordered to change front and I and my gun did so and worked our guns on the enemy as lively as we could for over an hour...."
To accurately place Osborn's Batteries is a challenge, but I think that Battery H's placement on that map more accurately reflects its placement for July 3.
 
On Tom's excellent map, I would suggest that Battery H 1st Ohio is misplaced. ... I think that Battery H's placement on that map more accurately reflects its placement for July 3.

It seems clear Norton opposed Confederate artillery in the direction of Benner's Hill in the late afternoon, but that duel was over a couple of hours before Early attacked Cemetery Hill. Before the duel on July 3 the battery was faced "to the front," and changed position to fire toward the left - the direction of the Confederate infantry assault against Cemetery Ridge.

Since there seems no compelling reason to adjust the battery's direction of fire "to the front" earlier on July 3, I have interpreted that change as coming soon after the duel with the Benner's Hill batteries, but prior to Early's assault on Cemetery Hill, in order to counter Confederate artillery posted along Seminary Ridge south of the Fairfield road, in particular certain guns in Garnett's and McIntosh's battalions, thus the general direction of H/1st Ohio's guns indicated on my map.

Moreover, if Battery H/1st Ohio was still facing toward the northeast at the time of the Cemetery Hill assault, they should have been able to deliver an effective fire upon the brigade of Avery/Godwin in the low ground beyond the hill, yet I find no indication they were engaged at all in that action.

We may skip much of this guesswork because of an eyewitness, W. E. Parmelee from Battery H/1st Ohio, who wrote (The National Tribune, September 2, 1886): "Giving our attention first to some guns and troops on the right of the town, being fortunate in getting the range, we soon silenced the battery. Other batteries claim our attention, and we shift our position so that part of the guns fire to the left of the town." ... "It is getting dusk. We think it time to quit for the night, when we hear the rebel yell just to our right and front." Parmelee goes on to say that Carroll's men passed their guns and the artillerymen conversed with them.

Parmelee confirms that at least some of the guns of the battery were facing to the left (west) of the town when Carroll passed through, and presumably it includes Parmelee's own gun or section as deduced by the above comment in bold. But perhaps at least one section still faced toward the northeast. So we may both be partially correct.
 
Here is Wilkison D. Perrin's diary account for Battery H.
He was in Det. A. You can see that they moved their guns.
It is not clear from exactly where, but for movement to occur they
could not have already been posted on the farthest left.
Friday July 3d
at daylight the rebels commenced
to charge our right the fighting
was very bad we openend on the
their batteries with shell and
soon dried them up. we drove
them on our right and took
a good many prisoners at noon
the opened all their Art all
along the line and the cannon
ading was af awful we could
not fire for a long time but
after while move our guns
up and opened on theme.
the shell were flying in all
directions. it was rough our
gun got so hot that we could
not work them got another
gun and went in again at
this time the enemy a dvanced
in a line on the center they
came up. and were all taken
prisoners we fired so fast
they could not get out some four
thousand were taken our gun
was disabled and went to rear
stayed and help work some
other guns...
 
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I envision their guns on July 3 were initially facing northwesterly and, per Perrin's description, were maneuvered forward and to the left to fire in a southwesterly direction, so as not to have their field of fire obstructed by the other guns in the battery. Put another way, the left gun of the battery might have simply been turned toward the left, but the guns on its right would have to be pushed forward and to the left, with the far right gun having to move the furthest. In order words, like a left wheel made by an infantry line.
 
Thank you for your analysis. It is very plausible. It seems reasonable that Battery H changed front and that some guns moved a short distance. With conflicting accounts, it is hard to track the batteries. Major Osborn left this "conflicting" account: "About 2 p.m. they opened along our whole front with an unbroken line of artillery, and also heavily on our right flank, apparently using every description of missiles and field artillery. The crest which the enemy occupied varied from 1,000 to 1,900 yards distance, and afforded an excellent protection. I judge that the guns of not less than one-half mile of this front were concentrated on our position, besides several batteries on our right, which enfiladed our position, excepting Captains Taft's and Huntington's batteries." Osborn implies that Huntington's (Norton's) Battery was still arranged facing east and over by the Baltimore Pike. Probably Osborn is in error as it seems more probable that Norton had previously moved somewhere to the left, as previously discussed.
 
Battery H/1st Ohio had plenty of Confederate artillery targets on the northern end of Seminary Ridge to occupy them in their direct front, so I imagine the reason they maneuvered their guns to fire in a southwesterly direction was to strike the open left flank of the advancing Confederate infantry under Pettigrew and Trimble. I suspect they focused upon the far left brigade of Brockenbrough and significantly helped damage them early on, particularly since the Second Corps batteries were by then virtually out of long-range ammunition.
 
For instance, I believe the 17th Connecticut split the 41st New York into two parts,

To clarify, if I may, while the effect of the 17th Connecticut going into position opposite Menchey's Spring was to "split" the 41st New York into two parts, it wasn't as if they muscled an in-position 41st aside to do so. The 41st New York had been sent out as skirmishers about a half hour earlier from the position subsequently occupied by he 17th Connecticut. Forced back by the advancing Confederates, the 41st fell in on both flanks of the 17th Connecticut just as it was going into position.

According to the 17th's Major Brady, he compelled, "about 300 stragglers who had no commander" to form on the 17th's flanks;
a reference, undoubtedly, to the 41st New York.

Timing these events is always a challenge. I have this confused repositioning (17 Ct/41 NY) occurring at 7:58 p.m., with the surge of Confederates into Wiedrich's guns obviously happening sometime later.

With the sun setting at 7:32 p.m. EST, darkness, as described by those fighting in the batteries (and observable by anyone standing on East Cemetery Hill on July 2), doesn't cover the field until approximately 45 minutes later, e.g., 8:18 p.m.- 8:20 p.m.
 
Forced back by the advancing Confederates, the 41st fell in on both flanks of the 17th Connecticut just as it was going into position.

Yes, exactly. The 17th Connecticut was shifted from between the 25th and 75th Ohio to the right in response to the Confederate advance against Culp's Hill, just minutes before Hays and Avery moved forward, which I figure occurred just after sunset. The 33rd Massachusetts advanced for the same reason. I calculate Hays' men entered Battery I, 1st New York at 7:52 p.m. Five minutes later it would have been difficult to read a newspaper in the waning light. At 45 minutes after sunset one cannot see any distance, and at 50 minutes it is nearly pitch dark. Moonrise came at 8:38 p.m.
 
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