General Lee's Antietam Report

[Rebforever]

"The arduous service in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without shoes over mountain roads, had greatly reduced our ranks before the action began. These causes had compelled thousands of brave men to absent themselves, and many more had done so from unworthy motives. This great battle was fought by less than 40,000 men on our side, all of whom had undergone the greatest labors and hardships in the field and on the march. Nothing could surpass the determined valor witch they met the large army of the enemy, fully supplied and equipped, and the result reflects the highest credit on the officers and men engaged. Our artillery, though much inferior to that of the enemy in the number of guns and weight of metal, rendered most efficient and gallant service throughout the day, and contributed greatly to the repulse of the attacks on every part of the line. General Stuart, with the cavalry and horse artillery, performed the duty entrusted to him of guarding our left wing with great energy and courage, and rendered valuable assistance in defeating the attack on that part of our line."

War of the Rebellion: Serial 027 Page 0151 Chapter XXXI. GENERAL REPORTS. | eHISTORY

ehistory.osu.edu

 

[67th Tigers]

Lee wrote this report in August 1863, about 11 months after the battle.

How did Lee know how many men fought there? The only information he would have had is the field return dated 22nd September:

With an estimate of the forces not on the field removed, and adding the cavalry and elements of the reserve artillery that were on the field, it shows he left the field with about 40,000 effectives. Given that he suffered ca. 14,000 casualties on that field (13,417 plus some unreported regiments), this would place his effective strength around 54,000.

However, they certainly weren't all on the field at any one time. Take DR Jones' division as an example, which counted 3,810 effectives after the battle. Carman estimated 2,878 on the field, exclusive of Brown's battery (est 81), half the 11th Georgia (152 in the other half, assume same), the Phillips Legion (135). The 28th Virginia was estimated, but other sources indicate Carman underestimated. The source used by Carman was a newspaper, but the brigadier said he had 1,250 on the field excluding the 1st SC. By brigade it seems the strength on the field was:

Toombs: 821
Garnett: 261 (had passed through their recruiting area and suffered massed straggling)
Kemper: 600
Drayton: 772
Jenkins: 1,356
GT Anderson 597
Brown's Battery: 81
Sum = 4,488

They suffered 1,435 casualties by Thorp, leaving an expected 3,053 indicating if the above estimate is correct then they recovered 757 stragglers. An officer of Pickett's (Garnett's) brigade recorded that these men arrived on the evening of the 17th, placing them at about a thousand, and that on the 18th his brigade was twice the strength it had been on the 17th.

 

[Saphroneth]

It would have made things a lot bloody easier if Lee had kept up with his trimonthly paperwork.

 

[Rebforever]

It would have made things a lot bloody easier if Lee had kept up with his trimonthly paperwork.

I believe his report. You can do whatever you want to. He was there. He would know best.

 

[Bruce Vail]

It is my belief that it was at the battle of Antietam that the superior manpower and industrial resources of the North showed itself effective for the first time in the East. Lee says he had less than 40,000 men at the battle, and no matter how you want to count the details of the Union army strength, it was clearly more numerous, despite the fact that the Union forces had been badly battered all summer long. The effectiveness of the Union artillery has been testified to by countless witnesses ("artillery hell") and the Northern foundries had supplied McClellans army with enough firepower to have deterred a hoped-for counterattack by Jackson late in the battle. In retrospect, the battle showed that the North's superior resources were finally begining to tell, and that Confederate hopes for a military victory were doomed.

 

[Saphroneth]

I believe his report. You can do whatever you want to. He was there. He would know best.

He was there, but so was McClellan; seems pointless to go down that route, unless the claim is that Lee had not more than 40,000 (Lee's report claim of own strength) and suffered as many casualties as McClellan claimed.

More to the point, it's not as if 67th is contrasting "Lee was there" with someone who wasn't. 67th's analysis of strength at Antietam is well-sourced and based on the accounts of lots of people who were also there as to the strengths of their individual formations.

As of the 17th September, Lee can only have a vague idea as to the strength of his own army. He hasn't taken any kind of consolidated reports (that survive) since 20th July, and in that time he's fought a major battle at Manassas and another at South Mountain plus suffered from heavy straggling (almost two months of attrition and reinforcement, and then the push through Maryland); he's doubtless aware of how many brigades he has, but the more detailed numbers are a bit fuzzy. The best he can do is more-or-less estimate how much straggling there was, and remember that his report was written more than a year later - I don't know about you but I'd need to use previously made notes to check on a numerical value from something that happened more than a year ago.

This is notwithstanding, of course, that Lee's claim of "not more than 40,000 men" may well simply refer to effective Other Ranks (as in "officers and men")

 

[Bruce Vail]

FYI - Wikipedia places Lee's strength at 38,000 while the American Battlefield Trust site says 45,000.

 

[67th Tigers]

FYI - Wikipedia places Lee's strength at 38,000 while the American Battlefield Trust site says 45,000.

and Livermore would place the number at around 55,000.

 

[Lost Cause]

He was there, but so was McClellan; seems pointless to go down that route, unless the claim is that Lee had not more than 40,000 (Lee's report claim of own strength) and suffered

McClellan listed the Confederate army as suffering 30,000 casualties during the Maryland campaign from his official report .

"the rebel loss in killed and wounded and prisoners 25,542. It will be observed that this does not include their stragglers, the number of whom is said by citizens here to be large. It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops during their brief campaign in Maryland."

Antietam: MGen McClellan's Official Reports

antietam.aotw.org

 

[Saphroneth]

McClellan listed the Confederate army as suffering 30,000 casualties during the Maryland campaign from his official report .

Well, yes, that's sort of my point. McClellan was there and claimed 30,000 casualties inflicted, and Lee was there and claimed not more than 40,000 troops at Antietam. Either you accept them both because both were there, or (and I think this is correct) you consider whether they were correct or not based on the other available evidence.

I happen to think both are wrong. My estimate of Lee's total effective strength at Antietam is about 47,000 (though there are error bars on it), and my estimate of Confederate casualties in the Maryland campaign (which includes those captured before the 17th) is about 17,000 (which may be higher but not by much).

 

[Scott Bowden]

Lee ordered parade-states taken on September 12 through a Circular issued on his orders and signed by Bob Chilton that same date to all division commanders. When those parade-states were returned, and after Lee examined them in detail, he knew exactly how many were present and under arms in his army as of that date.

 

[uaskme]

There is a difference between Present or on the rolls and Effective. As much as 25%. So, 1 report of 47k and Lee says 40k. Both could be telling the Truth.

 

[Saphroneth]

There is a difference between Present or on the rolls and Effective. As much as 25%. So, 1 report of 47k and Lee says 40k. Both could be telling the Truth.

The 47,000 is estimated effective, though if you exclude officers it goes down to nearer 43,000.

Lee ordered parade-states taken on September 12 through a Circular issued on his orders and signed by Bob Chilton that same date to all division commanders. When those parade-states were returned, and after Lee examined them in detail, he knew exactly how many were present and under arms in his army as of that date.

Oddly, the reconstructed September 2nd strength (based on individual unit paperwork) is about 75,000 PFD, and where we have subsequent paperwork for constituent units as late as September 11 they haven't significantly changed. If Lee was seeing about 40,000 on or about September 12 then it means over half his army somehow buggered off overnight pretty much while he was in Frederick, and somehow evaded being captured by the Union.

If Lee claimed 40,000 and he did have some kind of parade-states (and I'm assuming for now that we don't have them all, as if we did then we'd know for sure) then either something extremely weird was going on or he was being economical with the truth. Looking at the actual positions of his units on September 12th, meanwhile:

Jackson, AP Hill, Ewell - south of the Potomac
McLaws, Anderson - in the Pleasant Valley, closing in on Harpers Ferry
Walker - Crossing the Loudoun Valley
Longstreet - Hagerstown
DH Hill - South Mountain

I'm not sure when all those units would have got that September 12th order, but it's quite possible some of them (like Jackson) didn't get a chance to parade properly until after Antietam?

 

[67th Tigers]

I'm not sure when all those units would have got that September 12th order, but it's quite possible some of them (like Jackson) didn't get a chance to parade properly until after Antietam?

On the 10th Steiner had much of the ANV march past his house (except DH Hill, Walker and the cavalry) and estimated them at about 64,000. The next day he estimated DH Hill at 8,000.

On the 12th, the ANV was still moving. On the 13th they were moving, with the HF force reaching HF and DH Hill reversing his course back towards South Mountain. Only Longstreet was fairly static.

It is likely that the 22nd September field return would be in response to the 12th order. This is what Harsh determined:

"[Lee] issued a circular to all division commanders requiring that they forward "at once" a field return of their strength to his headquarters. 68 The circular may have been nothing more than another round in Lee's continuing attempt to establish regular reporting habits in an army that resisted bureaucratic details. Nevertheless, the admonition that these returns were "indispensably necessary for the information of the commanding general and to govern him in his movements" suggests he had an ulterior motive for counting his troops at this particular time. What that motive was is open to contradictory conclusions. On the one hand, his concern over the impact of straggling may have grown to such an extent he was concerned about his ability to carry through with the objects of his campaign. On the other, flushed by his success thus far, he may have been assessing his strength to determine if he might undertake even more than he had originally intended. 69"

Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 3919-3927). Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.

68. Orders and Circulars of the Army of Northern Virginia, RG-109, National Archives. For some reason the editors of the OR chose not to publish this circular.

69. In either case, the rush of events would deny Lee the information he sought until four days after he had returned to Virginia. See returns dated Sept. 22, OR, vol. 19, 2: 621.

Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kindle Locations 11214-11217). Kent State University Press. Kindle Edition.

 

[Saphroneth]

It is likely that the 22nd September field return would be in response to the 12th order.

Ah, I wondered about that but since there's a regular sequence for a month or two after that I thought it might just be a new normal sequence of reports.


So in fact Lee wouldn't have those parade strengths for as-of-September-12...

 

[67th Tigers]

Ah, I wondered about that but since there's a regular sequence for a month or two after that I thought it might just be a new normal sequence of reports.


So in fact Lee wouldn't have those parade strengths for as-of-September-12...

No, in fact Lee had no idea of his strength, and apparently thought he he was stronger than he actually was. He might have gotten a feeling for the straggling, but the 22nd was probably when he found out how bad it was.

 

[Rebforever]

You had better bet that General Lee new exactly how many effectives he had. And I do believe what he says. Under 40,000.
It is a heart breaking thought of all those men to0 feeble to follow him where he led them.

So y'all just go ahead and do your thing. A piece of paper will lay still and let one put whatever they want to.

I am out of here. Some folks like to jack up their favorite General to down grade history.

 

[67th Tigers]

You had better bet that General Lee new exactly how many effectives he had. And I do believe what he says. Under 40,000.
It is a heart breaking thought of all those men to0 feeble to follow him where he led them.

No he didn't. He sent the circular on the 12th precisely because he didn't know the strength of his army. They hadn't stopped to count the men since well before 2nd Bull Run. Lee believed he was going to attack McClellan with his large army (ca. 87,000 effectives before 2nd Bull Run), and he acted like it. Even after Antietam Lee tried to renew the combat by crossing at Williamsport, which would be insane if he knew he only had ca. 40,000 effectives remaining. However, until after Antietam there is little evidence Lee knew just how weak his army had become. He wrote to his President on the 21st detail what he knew:

"The army is resting to-day on the Opequon, below Martinsburg. Its present efficiency is greatly paralyzed by the loss to its ranks of the numerous stragglers. I have taken every means in my power from the beginning to correct this evil, which has increased instead of diminished. A great many men belonging to the army never entered Maryland at all; many returned after getting there, while others who crossed the river kept aloof. The stream has not lessened since crossing the Potomac, though the cavalry has been constantly employed in endeavoring to arrest it. As illustrative of the fact, I inclose a report(*) just received from General J. R. Jones, who was sent to Winchester to arrest stragglers at that point while the army was at Sharpsburg. It occasions me the greatest concern in the future operations of the army, for it is still my desire to threaten a passage into Maryland, to occupy the enemy on this frontier, and, if my purpose cannot be accomplished, to draw them into the Valley, where I can attack them to advantage. Some immediate legislation, in my opinion, is required, and the most summary punishment should be authorized. It ought to be construed into desertion in face of the enemy, and thus brought under the Rules and Articles of War. To give you an idea of its extent in some brigades, I will mention that, on the morning after the battle of the 17th, General Evans reported to me on the field, where he was holding the front position, that he had but 120 of his brigade present, and that the next brigade to his, that of General Garnett, consisted of but 100 men [in fact this brigade had over 500 at this time]. General Pendleton reported that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Armistead, left to guard the ford at Shepherdstown, together contained but 600 men. This is a woeful condition of affairs, and I am pained to state it, but you ought not to be ignorant of the fact, in order, if possible, that you may apply the proper remedy. It is true that the army has had hard work to perform, long and laborious marches, and large odds to encounter in every conflict, but not greater than were endured by our revolutionary fathers, or than what any army must encounter to be victorious. There are brilliant examples of endurance and valor on the part of those who have had to bear the brunt in the battle and the labor in the field in consequence of this desertion of their comrades. "

All these weak brigades were reported to be weak to Lee after the battle. Lee simply didn't know at the time how weak he was.

 

[Saphroneth]

You had better bet that General Lee new exactly how many effectives he had. And I do believe what he says. Under 40,000.
It is a heart breaking thought of all those men to0 feeble to follow him where he led them.

So y'all just go ahead and do your thing. A piece of paper will lay still and let one put whatever they want to.

I am out of here. Some folks like to jack up their favorite General to down grade history.

I'm at a loss to understand why you think this is "downgrading history" to point out that a primary source is not necessarily flawless truth. What a primary source shows is what the person who wrote it decided to put down in writing - it might be completely true, but it might also be coloured by the imperfections inherent in human memory, or it might be the result of an honest mistake of fact, or it might simply be what the person in question thinks will make them look better.

The idea that primary sources might nevertheless disagree is so elementary to a study of history as to barely require demonstration, but I'll do it anyway with an unambiguous example.

In Napoleon's report on the Waterloo campaign, specifically in his memoirs, he claimed specifically that he ordered Ney to take the town of Quatre-Bras shortly after dawn on the 16th. What he did not know, however, was that his actual orders of the day would come to light nearly twenty years later and verify positively that he did not do this - his orders to Ney came much later (not long before noon) and did not envisage serious fighting on that wing.
Napoleon's report is a primary source by the commanding general, and it contains this complete falsehood which would not have been discovered if the report was taken entirely at face value. In this case the discrepancy appears to result from dishonesty.

 

[Saphroneth]

In the specific case of Lee's report, by the way, I suspect all three are going on to differing degrees..

Firstly, there's "the imperfections inherent in human memory". Lee is writing this after Gettysburg, about a year later; I couldn't tell you how much I paid for my car about a year ago, and if Lee is trying to remember how big his army was based on his personal experiences it'd be natural for his estimate to have error bars on it simply from that.

Second, there's the "honest mistake of fact". If Lee is relying on his official casualty reports and his official post-battle (September 22) return, then he's missing things out - apart from anything else there are more Confederates captured than are accounted for in his official reports' "Missing", and in this case we can trust the Union reports because they actually have the captured Confederates right there to count them.
A plausible explanation for this is that Lee (and his subordinates) didn't know quite how large his army was during the campaign and thus did not know how many men had been swept up as captures during the move to Sharpsburg or on the field itself. (You can count your own wounded and the men you buried, but if you're not sure if a brigade was meant to have 1,200 or 1,000 men before the battle you don't know how many men have gone missing from it.) This however would allow for a situation where Lee took his official reports and added them together, came up with a number, and was still incorrect.

Thirdly, there's "thinks will make them look better". As of when Lee is writing his report, he has invaded Northern soil twice. On one occasion he fought a battle where he did not achieve everything he was hoping, but felt he had (in his words) "conquered a success" and had blazed a trail across the North before inflicting heavy casualties in an offensive battle.
In the other occasion he didn't do so well; he didn't make it into Pennsylvania, got caught out at South Mountain, and he was the one doing the defending rather than the attacking.
The best way to make himself look good under those circumstances is to claim that he was heavily outnumbered and that he fought off otherwise overwhelming odds.

Note that none of these has to involve conscious deception. The course of events that leads to all three of these influencing the number is that Lee isn't sure how many men he had, looks up his own records, adds the numbers together, and doesn't question it when the number turns out quite small because it happens to make him look good.

(n.b. this is assuming that the PFD-Effectives difference is already factored out.)